Chen-kuo Lin/Michael Radich (eds.)
A Distant Mirror

Hamburg Buddhist Studies 3
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Numata Center
for Buddhist Studies

Chen-kuo Lin / Michael Radich (eds.)

A Distant Mirror

Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century
Chinese Buddhism

Imprint

Contents

in memoriam
John R. McRae (1947-2011)

Foreword

About *Hamburg Buddhist Studies*

Buddhism has enjoyed a prominent place in the study of Asian religious ideas at the University of Hamburg for almost 100 years, ever since the birth of Buddhist Studies in Germany. We are proud that our program is housed in one of the pioneering academic institutions in Europe at which the study of Buddhism has become a core subject for students focusing on the religious dimensions of South and Central Asia.

With this publication series, the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of Hamburg aims to honor this long-standing commitment to research and share the results of this tradition with the academic community and the wider public. Today, Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline makes use of a broad variety of approaches and methods. The field covers contemporary issues as much as it delves into the historic aspects of Buddhism. Similarly, the questions shaping the field of Buddhist Studies have broadened. Understanding present-day Buddhist phenomena, and how such phenomena are rooted in a distant past, is not a matter of indulgence. Rather, it has become clear that fostering such an understanding is one of the many crucial obligations of modern multicultural societies in a globalized world.

Buddhism is one of the great human traditions of religious and philosophical thought. The *Hamburg Buddhist Studies* series aims to discuss aspects of the wide variety of Buddhist traditions that will be of interest to scholars and specialists of Buddhism, but it also wants to confront Buddhism's rich heritage with questions whose answers might not be easily deduced by the exclusive use of philological research methods. Such questions require the penetrating insight of scholars who approach Buddhism from a variety of disciplines building upon and yet going beyond the solid study of textual materials. We are convinced that the *Hamburg*

Buddhist Studies series will contribute to opening up Buddhist Studies to those who are not necessarily trained in the classical languages of the Buddhist traditions but want to approach the field with their own disciplinary interests in mind. We very much hope that this series will encourage a wider audience to take interest in the academic study of the Buddhist traditions.

About this publication

It is my great pleasure to introduce the third volume in the *Hamburg Buddhist Studies* series, which is edited by Prof. Chen-kuo Lin and Michael Radich, and presents the work of an international team of fourteen scholars. In this book, the authors investigate a range of topics and materials in the Chinese reception of Indian Buddhist ideas, focusing on the broad period centering on the sixth and seventh centuries. The topics investigated include Buddhist logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa, yinming*); commentaries on Indian Buddhist texts translated into Chinese, or composed in Chinese; Chinese readings of doctrines and systems as diverse as Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and *tathāgatagarbha*; the working out of Indian concepts and problematics in new works by Chinese scholiast monks; and previously under-studied Chinese evidence for developments in India.

Through this work, the authors collectively aim to push back against a certain parochializing tendency to relegate the study of Chinese materials to the study of questions pertaining to China alone. Instead, they strive to consider the ways that Chinese materials, even those beyond translation texts, might furnish evidence of broader Buddhist trends. In so doing, they also aim to problematize a prevalent notion of "sinification", which has led scholars to consider the relation of Indic to Chinese materials predominantly in terms of the ways Indic ideas and practices were transformed into something ostensibly distinctive to China, which supposedly reflected perduring features of Chinese civilization as a whole. In the same spirit, the volume also tries to go beyond another paradigm, that of seeing the sixth and seventh centuries in China primarily as the age of the formation and establishment of the so-called "sects" or "schools" of "Chinese" Buddhism (such as Tiantai, Huayan,

Chan, and Faxiang). Instead, by bracketing out possibly essentializing notions of "India" and "China", these studies attempt to view the ideas they study on their own terms – as valid Buddhist ideas, finding their existence in a rich, "liminal" space of interchange between two large traditions.

Michael Zimmermann

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Michael Radich and Chen-kuo Lin

The title of this book, *A Distant Mirror,* ultimately refers back to Barbara Tuchman's work of the same title on the history of fourteenth-century Europe (Tuchman, 1978). Tuchman uses this evocative phrase to convey her claim that the fourteenth century can be read as reflecting the twentieth century, and thus, more broadly, to evoke the idea that the study of history can be a kind of study, by reflection, of ourselves. However, although we gratefully acknowledge our debt to Tuchman for the phrase, we do not intend it to have this connotation. We are alluding to a more proximate model.

In her *A Few Good Men,* Jan Nattier borrows Tuchman's phrase to refer to the problem of investigating the contents of Indian Buddhism through Chinese (and Tibetan) translations of Buddhist texts.[1] In borrowing the title from Nattier in turn, then, we intend both to generalise the problematic Nattier points to, and to problematise it further. Nattier herself does not discuss the problem of views on Indian Buddhism that might be obtained through other dimensions of the Chinese tradition, including topics investigated in the present volume, such as: the independent creative thought of Chinese Buddhist thinkers; or the possibility that Chinese reports might be accurately based upon information obtained through extra-textual channels like oral reports. However, we do use the phrase in this considerably extended sense. We intend our title to encapsulate a methodological intuition, which we believe runs as a common thread through almost all of the studies collected here – that scholars should

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[1] Nattier, 2003: 70-72, "A Distant Mirror: Studying Indian Buddhism through Chinese and Tibetan Texts."

seriously consider the possibility that a wider set of features of the Chinese tradition, treated carefully, might serve us as a "distant mirror", accurately displaying features common to Buddhism in India and elsewhere outside China.

In other words, the studies in this volume typically set out to explore, in some detailed case, the possibility that even where Chinese Buddhism appears in some respect or degree to depart from what we know of its Indian counterparts, Chinese developments might still in some ways inform us about "genuine" Buddhism (to use a dangerous turn of phrase), rather than representing mere distortions of, or departures from, an Indian gold standard.

The counterpart and foil to this view, of course, is a simplistic understanding of Chinese Buddhism as a product of so-called "sinification", or "making Chinese", which, at a hypothetical extreme (which may not be fully realized in any actual scholarship), sees Indian Buddhism as a norm; any difference between Chinese and Indian Buddhism is read as a failure in China to approximate that Indian norm, often under the pressure of distinctive presuppositions, ideas and tendencies endemic to and characteristic of Chinese culture as a whole.

Of course, this is no simple matter, and we do not mean to deny that Buddhism did indeed change greatly in the complex transition from its Indian (and other) points of origin into China. Indeed, the real challenge for any full consideration of the overall formation and character of Chinese Buddhism (an ambitious project we do not pretend to essay here) would be to balance the treatment of Chinese Buddhism as "a distant mirror" with the problematic encapsulated by the notion of "sinification" in its broad sense. Fortuitously, in fact, this opposite interpretation of Chinese developments and evidence has also been expressed through another variation on the conceit of the mirror. To borrow a phrase from a forceful argument by Gregory Schopen (without implying that this is entirely what Schopen meant), we must also consider the possibility that rather than furnishing us with a clear if distant "mirror" for Buddhism in India (and at large), Chinese evidence gives us a view "through a Chinese

looking-glass".[2] By this apt and wry allusion to Lewis Carroll (Carroll, 1871), Schopen suggests the troubling possibility that Chinese evidence might present us with mere caricatures, bordering on the satirical, of the Indian Buddhism it represents, and perhaps, that only a fool would mistake this image for sober reality.

In the article in which he speaks of the "Chinese looking-glass", Schopen makes a very strong point, and we certainly would not deny his conclusions or ignore his prudent warning. Chinese evidence must be used with great care if it is to lead us to any reliable conclusions about Indian Buddhism; and historically, the field has sometimes gone astray through simplistic, insufficiently rigorous use of Chinese evidence. The studies in the present collection, however, tend to focus on, and work to correct, an equally salient, opposite type of methodological error. At the same time that Chinese evidence has sometimes been regarded as too directly reflecting Indian developments, on other occasions, scholars can too hastily conclude (and have concluded) that developments in China must be unique and parochial, and thereby overlook ways that Chinese evidence might reflect, even if distantly and indirectly, important features of Buddhism that also held beyond Chinese borders. The studies gathered here attempt in various ways to correct this bias.

Perhaps the most significant sense in which the present studies treat Chinese evidence as capable of teaching us new things about Indian systems is in considering the ideas of Chinese authors and thinkers as independent or alternate developments, equally valid, of ideas and systems

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[2] Schopen, 2000. The argument Schopen advances under this title is more specific than the very general problematic we discuss here – in brief, that in the history of Buddhist scholarship, excessive and methodologically naive reliance on various kinds of Chinese evidence has produced a distorted picture of Indian Buddhism between the beginning of the Common Era and the fifth/sixth centuries, which exaggerates the centrality of "the" Mahāyāna.

Incidentally, it seems that Schopen and Nattier conceived independently of these different takes on the conceit of China as mirror: Schopen published his paper too early to be responding to Nattier (2003); but Nattier used her title before Schopen (2000) appeared, in unpublished talks and papers which were eventually worked into her book (Nattier, personal communication).

also known in India. Various contributors explore this approach in different ways.

For example, Chen-kuo Lin's study employs the novel strategy of putting Jingying Huiyuan and Dignāga side by side, as two roughly contemporaneous Buddhist thinkers, inheriting and working out different consequences from a similar body of material (with due allowance, in the case of Huiyuan, for differences of both selection and nuance conditioned by the process of translation from Indic sources). Both the Indian and the Chinese thinker alike are regarded as creative individuals, working out different possible responses to a common inherited problematic. On this approach, the Chinese alternative, instead of merely "failing to be Indian", can be seen, rather, as representing alternate possibilities implicit within the common stock of Buddhist tradition – as exploring a "path not taken" in India, perhaps. In the reflected light of this approach, we might even appreciate anew the creative energy of the Indian tradition itself, instead of misperceiving it as plotting the only possible line of development from its historical roots and premises.

Similarly, Shinya Moriyama examines Xuanzang and Kuiji's theories of the fallacy known as *viruddhāvyabhicārin,* as instances of alternative lines of development from the same premises as the Indian system. That is to say, he too treats the Chinese thinkers as having pursued lines of development possible in the system of Dignāga, but different from those pursued by Dharmakīrti, which became authoritative in the Indo-Tibetan tradition.

A slightly different tack is taken by Jakub Zamorski. Zamorski refrains from treating unparalleled Chinese ideas about Buddhist logic as products of "sinification", suggesting that such interpretations might "reveal the inherent limitations of the system [Chinese scholars] were working within, rather than their own misunderstandings of this system". Following Chmielewski and Harbsmeier, Zamorski argues that in fact, in some respects, Chinese syntax harboured the potential to *clarify* some logical issues, so that it did not necessarily function as a constraint on the understanding of Chinese thinkers. He concludes that "Chinese commentators were capable of clarifying some ambiguous aspects of the Indian 'science of reasons' (*hetuvidyā*)."

Several other studies demur from the models used by theorists of "sinification" in treating Chinese authors and thinkers as making deliberate and self-aware choices about the doctrinal directions they took, in ways that potentially cast light on the issues already inherent in their Indic source materials.

For example, Yoke Meei Choong shows that Chinese scholiast monks were quite capable of picking and choosing among the sources available to them with acute critical acumen, and artfully spinning those sources in the service of their own doctrinal agendas. Choong carefully studies the intricate complexities of interpretation in a few short passages from the *Vajracchedikā,* in both Indian texts (mainly preserved in Chinese translation), and further Chinese commentaries. A picture emerges of Chinese authors not as dupes to Chinese cultural presuppositions, misunderstanding Indic sources, but rather, as equal and sophisticated contributors to an ongoing, pan-Buddhist discussion about the most consequential questions in large doctrinal systems, engaging with debates that were already conducted in similar terms between the Prajñā-pāramitā literature itself and Yogācāra authors in India.

Similarly, Hans-Rudolf Kantor's study takes Chinese Buddhist thinkers seriously as qualified and incisive contributors to the elucidation of fundamental doctrinal questions, focusing on what Kantor regards as a fundamental Buddhist problematic – the relation between reality and delusion, awakened and non-awakened mind – which cuts across large Mahāyāna doctrinal currents. At the outset of his study, Kantor explicitly brackets out all questions of whether or not Chinese texts and thinkers represented continuations or transformations of Indic positions. Rather, he approaches the texts on the assumption that they may be able to teach us profound lessons about Mahāyāna Buddhism – not "Indian" or "Chinese" Mahāyāna, but just Mahāyāna, pure and simple.

Quite possibly, the results of Kantor's approach speak for themselves. Following his medieval Chinese authors, Kantor argues that from a soteriological perspective, the Mahāyāna "ultimate" (whether we call it *śūnyatā, nirvāṇa, tathatā,* or a number of other names) is thoroughly interwoven with and interdependent upon the relative/conventional (*saṃsāra,* ignorance, falsehood etc.), just as much as the reverse is also true. Insight into this interdependence has the power to transform the mun-

dane world into an avenue, rather than a barrier, to liberation. Given that the notion of the dependence of the conditioned world upon the unconditioned, let alone the reverse, is sometimes presented as a typically "sinified" position, Kantor's argument potentially has a more general significance, implying that inflections upon common Buddhist problematics that have been regarded as typically Chinese do not demonstrate that Chinese thinkers were prevented by their own cultural limits from accurately understanding Indian Buddhist systems. Rather, they may represent new and genuine insights into actual dimensions of those problematics, which may have been brought out less clearly by the treatments they received in other parts of the Buddhist world.

Zhihua Yao studies the Yogācāra understanding of emptiness. Yao takes this understanding to be more balanced than the interpretations of the Madhyamaka, which he claims can justly be characterized as "nihilistic". Although Yao himself does not address it from this angle, the problem he studies touches upon what some scholars have sometimes characterized as a basic distinction or difference in emphasis between Indian and Chinese Buddhism – where Indian Buddhism tends to be more apophatic, Chinese Buddhism tends to be more kataphatic. However, like other scholars in this volume, Yao tends to treat the positions in his Chinese source texts as authentic Indian positions, or coherent organic developments of Indian positions, even though the evidence for those positions happens to be preserved in Chinese. The case of the *Foxing lun/*Buddhadhātu-śāstra* presents this problem particularly sharply (and the text is quite central to Yao's argument, representing, for Yao, the best development of the position he wants to characterise as typically Yogācāra). As Yao himself mentions, some scholars have regarded this text as a Chinese composition. Yao, however, chooses to adhere to the traditional ascription of the text to Vasubandhu. He thereby demonstrates the kind of difference that is made by such apparently technical questions of ascription, in considering matters related to common claims about the types of doctrine that most typically characterise "sinified" Buddhism.

Some of the present studies also scrutinise Chinese texts in light of the possibility that they might record information transmitted orally to Chinese authors. This possibility should arguably be considered more

often, even in cases where Chinese texts record ideas or positions for which we have no extant Indic evidence. For example, Jakub Zamorski discusses the possibility that works by Xuanzang's disciples could reflect information about the Dignāgan system of Buddhist logic transmitted in this manner. Indeed, Shoryu Katsura shows that Kuiji did in fact have a better knowledge of Dignāga's *apoha* theory than previously thought. In this case, then, ideas outside translated texts must have made their way into the Chinese tradition (i.e. the works of Kuiji) via oral transmission by a known route – the teaching of Xuanzang. Similarly, Junjie Chu's study of *avakāśadānāśraya* shows that ideas of Indic provenance very probably did underlie discussions in the *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論) and Kuiji (but at the same time, that Kuiji's discussion of *krāntāśraya* also shows that not all this information is necessarily reliable).

One of the original impulses behind this project was to do justice to the true diversity and heterogeneity of Buddhist thinking in China during the sixth and seventh centuries. We have therefore used the device of tracing the reception and transformation of Indian elements more as a heuristic. We do not pretend thereby that this theme is somehow more central to the overall course of Buddhism in that period than other rubrics that might equally have been chosen. The original project plan provisionally divided the problem into three main strands, and the ultimate shape of this volume, we believe, can still be understood quite well in terms of those strands: (1) Buddhist logic and epistemology in China; (2) Buddhist developments in China and Korea falling under the broad head of "Yogācāra" (this category naturally overlaps somewhat with the first); and (3) other Indian elements in Chinese Buddhist systems. The selection of scholars for the project naturally also ensured that the center of gravity would be in Buddhist ideas, doctrines and texts.

Beyond these common threads, however, the focus on the heterogeneity and complexity of the materials has meant that we have not striven to superimpose an artificial uniformity or unity on contributions to the project. For example, just as we have tried to avoid the pitfalls of a simplistic "sinification" paradigm, as explained above, we have equally tried to avoid sifting through the period for putative "origins of the schools" of Chinese Buddhism. We have preferred to think that often, equally valuable historical lessons can be learned by examining "roads

not taken" in the long-term historical trends of East Asian Buddhism as a whole; or by scrutinizing those respects in which Chinese Buddhism approaches its Indic predecessors and parallels most closely, rather than focusing exclusively on what is ostensibly most distinctive to China.

Thus, without laying artificial claim to excessive thematic unison, the remainder of this introduction will introduce the papers in the volume in précis, and then allow the individual authors and papers to speak for themselves.

Logic and epistemology

Funayama Toru analyzes the term *xianliang* (現量) as a translation for Sanskrit *pratyakṣa* ("direct perception"). This translation is best known as that used by Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602-664), but Xuanzang was not the first person to use this term. *Xianliang* is, strictly speaking, not a literal translation of *pratyakṣa,* and this opens up larger questions about how and why such Buddhist concepts might have changed in the transition to China. Funayama studies the historical situation both before and after Xuanzang's adoption of the term, with special attention to some Chinese interpretations of *xianliang* in the post-Xuanzang period. After Xuanzang, as Funayama shows, Chinese scholar-monks analyzed the term *xianliang* using such terms of Sanskrit grammatical analysis as "*tatpuruṣa* compound" (*yishi shi* 依士釋) and "*karmadhāraya* compound" (*chiye shi* 持業釋). However, these interpretations differed significantly from those usual in Sanskrit. Funayama argues on this basis that during the Tang and the Ming, Chinese scholars began to develop distinctive Chinese interpretations of the term, but that it is beside the point to ask whether such Chinese interpretations make sense from a Sanskrit point of view; we are better to consider these Chinese interpretations from the perspective of the Chinese language, in which light they look extremely attractive. Thus, Funayama contends, it is almost meaningless to say that Chinese understandings of *xianliang* are "mistakes". They are better regarded as a new type of development, and it is in this sense that we might productively think about the "sinification of Buddhist concepts".

Chen-kuo Lin presents a textual and doctrinal study of Jingying Hui-yuan's 淨影慧遠 (523-592) *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition* (*San*

liang zhi yi 三量智義). Lin contends that we can fully understand the soteriological project at this early stage of Chinese Buddhist logico-epistemology only in light of links between epistemology and meditation. Unlike Dignāga, who attempted to lay down logic and epistemology as the *universal* foundation for all Indian philosophical systems, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Huiyuan rather attempts to demonstrate that episte-mology is *relative* to the various stages of intellectual and spiritual culti-vation. Everything, including cognition, is condition-dependent: as the path of mental cultivation progresses, perception differs from beginner to advanced practitioner; and so too for inference; and for authoritative teaching (Huiyuan's three *pramāṇas*). Thus, for Huiyuan, *pramāṇa*s are indeed *instruments* to soteriological ends, and cannot be taken as autono-mous domains and universal disciplines. For Lin, this means that Hui-yuan is faithful to the authentic intent of Indian Buddhist epistemology. Lin also discusses a striking peculiarity in Huiyuan's theory of knowledge, namely, his use of a pair of sinitic notions, "principle" (*li* 理) and "phe-nomenon/phenomena" (*shi* 事), to develop the pre-Dignāgan theory of *pramāṇa*. Huiyuan uses *li* to refer to the "universal" (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) and *shi* to refer to the "particular" (*svalakṣaṇa*), adopting these ontological concepts to stand in for the Indic notions of *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*. Huiyuan's application of this hermeneutics of *li* and *shi* to the epistemo-logical enterprise might appear to constitute a classic proof-case for the theory of sinification: Huiyuan might easily be regarded as simply look-ing at Indic materials through a sinitic lens. However, Lin concludes that a better interpretation might understand that Huiyuan's interpretation operates dialectically, that is to say, such transformations as it might affect in the Indian concepts at issue also redound to reframe the seman-tics of *li* and *shi* in the terms of an Indian Buddhist epistemological con-text.

Shoryu Katsura discusses little-studied materials reflecting Chinese understandings of Dignāga's (Chenna 陳那 ca. 480-530) *apoha* theory (i.e. his theory of meaning). Given that Yijing's (義淨, 635-713) transla-tion of Dignāga's masterwork, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*Ji liang lun* 集量論) and its accompanying *Svavṛtti*, did not survive, it has been easy for modern scholars to assume that classical Chinese Buddhist scholars did not know *apoha* theory. However, Kuiji (窺基, 632-682), Xuanzang's

direct disciple, refers to *apoha* in his *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (成唯識論述記). Katsura shows that Kuiji knows that there are two means of valid cognition (*liang* 量): perception (*xianliang* 現量), taking as its object the particular characteristic (*zixiang* 自相); and inference (*biliang* 比量), taking the general characteristic (*gongxiang* 共相). Further, Kuiji defines the general characteristic as "exclusion of others" (*zheyu* 遮餘), and says that both types of conceptual cognition, namely, inference and verbal cognition, take this general characteristic as object by "exclusion of others". This makes the exclusion of others the nature and function of conceptual cognition in general. Moreover, only this general characteristic can be expressed verbally; the particular characteristic (the object itself) is beyond the reach of conceptual cognition, and cannot be expressed by verbal designation (*yanshuo* 言説). However, in an interesting development, Kuiji holds that even the general characteristic cannot ultimately be expressed by any verbal designation. Katsura observes that this idea might not have been endorsed by Dignāga and other Indian Buddhist logicians, but points out a similar development in the late work of Jñānaśrīmitra. Finally, Katsura shows that another possible new development in Kuiji is his understanding that the distinction between particular and universal is relative, just as in the hierarchy of the Vaiśeṣika categories. This understanding, again, might not have been endorsed by Dignāga, for whom only universal characteristics are relative to each other and constitute a hierarchy.

Shinya Moriyama examines Kuiji's (窺基) commentary on Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa(ka)*, which had the greatest impact on the later development of Chinese and Japanese *hetuvidyā*. Moriyama examines Kuiji's peculiar interpretations of the topic of the antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*). This is a type of fallacy that takes the unique position of fulfilling the triple characteristics of a valid reason (*trairūpya*, 因三相); what makes it invalid, rather than its internal structure, is the fact that it contradicts other presuppositions in the declared position of its proponent. Moriyama argues that contrary to expectation, Kuiji understands very well the background of this category in the *vāda*-tradition of debate, and correctly sees its practical significance in various debates among Buddhist insiders, such as debates on "non-manifested matter" (*avijñaptirūpa*) between a Sarvāstivādin and a Mahāyāna Buddhist. How-

ever, Moriyama also shows that on the whole, Kuiji's interpretation of the category seems to reflect a complex mix of insight, original thought, and misunderstanding of Indian ideas; and in particular, that Kuiji seems in fact to construct a new set of rules for debate, which seem to be motivated in part by the particular exigencies of a proof given by Xuanzang for consciousness-only. Thus, this example in Kuiji's thought shows that the dynamics at work in the production of distinctive East Asian interpretations of Buddhist ideas can be complex, and irreducible to simplistic models.

Jakub Zamorski analyzes a chapter in the history of the so-called "science of reasons" (*hetuvidyā, yinming* 因明) with significance for the comparative study of logic. Both of the Indian *hetuvidyā* treatises translated into Chinese by Xuanzang in the seventh century contain examples of fallacious statements which are untenable on logical grounds alone, and therefore unacceptable as topics of debate, regardless of the philosophical affiliation of the disputant and opponent. Zamorski argues that all Chinese (and other East Asian) commentators regarded these two sentences as examples of one and the same fallacy, which they followed the *Nyāyapraveśa* in labeling "opposition to one's own words" (*svavacana-viruddha*). Primarily through the analysis of three Tang commentaries, Zamorski argues that Chinese authors achieved genuine original contributions to the issue of self-refutation, of significance to the history of logic even in a broad historical perspective reaching beyond China; but at the same time, that the arguments of these authors also reveal some peculiarities of a "sinified" understanding of the *hetuvidyā* system.

Yogācāra ideas and authors

Ching Keng's paper challenges the prevalent assumption that the *Awakening of Faith* was composed under the influence of the Dilun School. Keng aims to show that in the representative works of Huiyuan, arguably the most important Dilun master, we do not find the essential doctrinal feature of the *Awakening of Faith*, namely, the compromise or even the total obliteration of the distinction between unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) and conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma*s. Keng observes that almost all available studies of Huiyuan focus on a small piece entitled "Bashi yi" (八識義,

"On the Meaning of the Eight Consciousnesses"), which shows strong influence from the *Awakening of Faith;* but that other works of Huiyuan outline a very different conceptual scheme. Taking these other works as representing Huiyuan's earlier thought, and therefore Dilun thought, Keng argues that the hallmark of Huiyuan's thought is a dualist scheme, in which the inherently pure aspect is unambiguously unconditioned, with no blending with conditioned *dharma*s; this inherently pure aspect can adjust to falsity (*suiwang* 隨妄) and give rise to misconception, but without compromising its unconditioned nature. Upon this basis, Keng contends that the compromise between unconditioned and conditioned in the *Awakening of Faith* should be regarded as an innovation, rather than a direct outgrowth from Dilun thought. An important broader implication of Keng's argument is that Huiyuan's thought, Dilun thought, and even the thought of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* has been anachronistically misinterpreted through the later, typically Chinese lens of the *Awakening of Faith.* This suggests the sobering possibility that typically "sinitic" (or even "sinified") developments became so pervasive in the later East Asian tradition that their stamp may still lie heavy upon parts of modern Buddhology itself, and that we might therefore overlook both evidence and products of "sinifying" processes, and even the actual features of Indic materials.

Charles Muller presents a full annotated translation of Jingying Huiyuan's (淨影慧遠, 523–592) *Erzhang yi* (二障義, "System of the Two Hindrances"), accompanied by a lengthy introduction to the major issues surrounding the two hindrances, and the role played by Huiyuan in defining their future course. Muller situates this work in a broad current in Buddhism, especially its meditative forms, whereby it pays unique attention, among religious traditions, to the psychological aspect of human problems, and distinguishes to an unusual degree between the categories of emotional and cognitive in the analysis of such problems. Muller argues that the general patterns of this distinction are discernible in early Buddhism, and become clearer in Abhidharmic scholasticism; but that it is only with the maturation of the Mahāyāna that afflictive and cognitive obstacles to liberation are formally organized under the rubrics of the *two hindrances* – the afflictive hindrances (*kleśa-āvaraṇa* 煩惱障, 煩惱惑) and the cognitive hindrances (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*; 智障, 智惑,

所知障). Against some discussion in modern scholarship that has tended to cast the pair as a fundamentally Yogācāra construction, Muller contends that a significant portion of their development – at least in East Asia – occurred in the works of Dilun or Tathāgatagarbha scholars. This is exemplified by Huiyuan's essay, which subsequently deeply informed later work on the hindrances by the Silla scholiast Wonhyo (元曉, 617–686), and even the interpretations of the Chinese Weishi school by such figures as Kuiji (窺基, 632–682).

Junjie Chu presents a close analysis of a passage in Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* discussing the term *kaidaoyi* (開導依). The text presents three different opinions concerning the interpretation of this special term. Chu's main aim is to examine the meaning of the two elements in the term, namely *kaidao* and *yi*, with reference to their possible origins in both Abhidharma and Yogācāra Indian sources. He argues that *kaidaoyi* reflects an alternate name for the concept of the *samanantarapratyaya*, viz. **avakāśadānāśraya* (widely used both Abhidharma and Yogācāra), referring to the awareness that has passed away in the immediate antecedent moment, called "mind", which has the function of giving way so that the subsequent awareness can arise. This shows that *kaidaoyi* cannot be a translation of the Sanskrit word **krāntāśraya,* as Kuiji's phonetic transcription *jielanduo* (羯爛多) suggests. Chu also studies the information given in the *Cheng weishi lun* about controversies between three different interpretations of the function and nature of this **avakāśadānāśraya.* In so doing, he shows that the Chinese texts of Xuanzang and his disciples preserve important information that can cast fresh light on key terms in Indian systems.

Zhihua Yao's paper sets out from the observation that due to the prevalent influence of Madhyamaka philosophy, the paradigm of the two truths has become a convenient way to characterize the Buddhist approach to reality. Yao argues that this two-tiered paradigm contributed to a great extent to a view of the world as fundamentally illusory, to which the majority of Mādhyamikas subscribe. He contrasts this with the Yogācāra theory of the three natures, which he contends was intended to improve on this two-tiered paradigm, and restore a more robust and holistic worldview. To this end, Yao examines scattered sources from Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, and seeks to analyze their

criticisms of the Madhyamaka version of the two truths on the basis of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures. Yao's study thus aims to correct misconceptions concerning the Buddhist approach to reality among contemporary scholars, who he argues have fallen under the influence of Madhyamaka; and to champion a Yogācāra perspective that he regards as more plausible and fruitful.

Other Indian ideas

Hans-Rudolf Kantor presents a philosophical and comparative analysis of various constructivist approaches to the problem of "mind and consciousness" (*xinshi* 心識), developed by sixth-century Chinese Buddhists in debates based on the Indian Mahāyāna scriptures and treatises available to them. The paper falls into two parts. First, Kantor discusses a selection of influential Chinese Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and Tathāgata-garbha sources translated from Sanskrit between the fifth and seventh centuries. Kantor then focuses on the varying interpretations of the ideas in those sources propounded by Chinese Dilun, Tiantai, and Huayan masters. For Kantor, all the Mahāyāna texts he discusses stress that "mind and consciousness" must be discussed on the basis of the insight that "truth and falsehood are inseparable", as they pertain to the way we relate to and exist in our world. In other words, Kantor contends, all these discussions feature in common a key coincidence of epistemological and ontological issues, even as each presents a different view on the nature of "mind and consciousness".

　　Chien-hsing Ho studies Jizang's (吉藏, 549-623) Chinese Madhyamaka philosophy of ontic indeterminacy. On this view, all things are empty of determinate form or nature: given any thing *x*, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to *x*, in the sense of positing in it some determinate form or nature. This ontic indeterminacy is closely connected with Jizang's notion of the Way (*dao* 道) – also termed the correct Way (*zhengdao* 正道) or the Real (*shixiang* 實相) – which Ho sees as indicating a kind of ineffable principle of reality. However, even as he thus propounds a "Way", which in other hands refers to a kind of metaphysical ultimate, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition, as a conscious state of freedom from any attachment or conception what-

soever. Ho therefore considers the question: Does Jizang's notion of the Way indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Or is it actually a skillful expedient designed to lead us to the consummate state of complete spiritual freedom? Ho argues that Jizang does not clearly posit any nonempty metaphysical reality or principle. Jizang does speak of the Way as nonempty (as well as empty), but Ho interprets this as aiming to highlight the claim that the Way cannot be determined *as* empty, or reduced to emptiness. Nonetheless, for Ho, Jizang's Way is not any reality metaphysically higher than the myriad things (*wanwu* 萬物); it is nothing more than the ineffable, indeterminable, nondual quiescence wherein both oneself and (the myriad) external things are conceptually undifferentiated. In light of Jizang's debt to Sengzhao (僧肇, 374?–414), Ho argues that this Way *qua* quiescence is only revealed in nonconceptual experience, which entails a state of forgetting speech and cessation of thought (*yan wang lü jue* 言忘慮絕), and harbors within itself the myriad things in their undifferentiated state. The Way is thus beyond conceptual determination and attachment, and so accessible only to a mind of nonacquisition (*wude* 無得); it is therefore realized only when one's mind ceases to approach things in a spirit of acquisition (*youde* 有得).

Yoke Meei Choong studies various interpretations of the "parable of the raft" in an early canonical *sūtra* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (and parallel Chinese *Āgama*s), which appears again in the *Vajracchedikā,* focusing on discussions of the terms *dharma* and *adharma* in both Indian commentaries (mainly preserved in Chinese translation) and Chinese authors and commentators. She shows that key textual variants are distributed in a complex pattern through both translations and commentaries, in both Indian and Chinese texts. Her careful analysis shows that all texts containing the variant readings contain Yogācāra thought, and thus, that the variants probably stemmed from Yogācāra circles in India. Moreover, the diverse interpretations of the term *adharma,* in particular, differentiate themselves along the lines of sectarian divisions between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra authors. This sectarian coloring of interpretation continues in China, where Zhiyi and Jizang explain the root text's notion of "abandoning *adharma*" to mean the abandonment of even the ultimate reality, that is, non-existence, whereas Kuiji follows Vasubandhu and interprets the notion to refer to the denial of the non-existence of the

ultimate truth. Thus, the Chinese commentators accept the ideas in Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's commentaries only selectively, depending upon their own doctrinal preferences; and the fact that Jizang aligns himself more closely with Asaṅga on several points shows, interestingly enough, that Asaṅga's interpretation was more acceptable to the Chinese Mādhyamikas. As already discussed above, these subtly nuanced choices on the part of Chinese commentators clearly show them to be aware and insightful contributors to a debate continuous with concerns that were also vital in India.

Michael Radich attempts to provide a fresh perspective on fifth- and sixth-century debates in the Chinese Buddhist world about whether or not some part of the sentient being does or does not survive death, to transmigrate and reap *karmic* rewards. Chinese Buddhist thinkers argued, against their non-Buddhist opponents, that something does survive death. Seen against the background of normative Indian Buddhism, this turn of events has struck scholars as odd and even heretical (as a kind of "*ātmavāda*"); unsurprisingly, then, the debate and its fruits have often been regarded as evidence of the supposed "sinification" of Buddhist ideas. Radich suggests that this way of reading the debates is probably misleading. A significant thread running through Buddhist contributions to these debates is the use of terms meaning "consciousness" (esp. equivalents to Skt. *vijñāna*) for the transmigrating entity, and Radich aims to show that the uses of *vijñāna* in this debate have a longer prehistory in China than has usually been recognized, and ultimately, can be traced in part to a minority strand of ideas in Indic traditions. The center of Radich's study is a new interpretation of Liang Wudi's (梁武帝, r. 502-549) *Shenming cheng fo yi* (神明成佛義) and its relation to its scriptural sources and intellectual-historical context. This study is intended as part of a larger project examining possible antecedents to Paramārtha's (Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) doctrine of *amalavijñāna* (amoluoshi 阿摩羅識, "taintless consciousness"). As such, this paper attempts to contribute to a larger reconsideration of outdated interpretations of the development of Chinese Buddhist doctrine in terms of "sinification", by arguing that continuities with Indian materials often prove on closer scrutiny to be greater than scholars have sometimes thought.

On the basis of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra,* Michael Zimmermann studies two different models of Buddha-nature in Indian sources, both of which can be read into the Sanskrit term *tathāgatagarbha*: a theory of disclosure, and a theory of development. The disclosure model is built on the idea that living beings already carry within themselves a full-fledged Buddha, whose efficacy has only to be disclosed, without any essential modification of the living being. The developmental model, by contrast, perceives this Buddha-element in sentient beings as something which has to be nourished and can transform into full buddhahood only after a process of development. Over the course of subsequent centuries, Zimmermann contends, these two models became two prototypes of the theory of Buddha-nature, and influenced the intellectual history of the spread of Buddha-nature teaching throughout Central and East Asia. Zimmermann argues that at the early stage of Buddha-nature thought in India, the authors of the texts obviously had no intention to promote their message along philosophically refined lines, but rather, seem mainly to have aimed to spread the idea that all sentient beings have the potential to become a Buddha, by arguing that sentient beings carry all they need for that end within themselves, albeit hidden and unknown to themselves; the texts also do not outline concrete modes of practice by which this aim can be realized.

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Chinese Translations of *Pratyakṣa*[1]

Funayama Toru

The theory of direct perception was one of the most fundamental topics in Buddhist epistemology. It became more important particularly with Dignāga (ca. 480-540 C.E.), who advocated the ground-breaking theory of *pramāṇa* (lit. "measure", "scale", or "standard") or the "means of valid cognition". As is well known, *pratyakṣa* ("direct perception") and *anu-māna* ("inference") constitute the two most important elements of this theory.

It was Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602-664) who laid the foundation for the study of *pramāṇa* in China. In the Chinese context this study was called *yinming* (因明, "science of logic", **hetuvidyā*), which is often counted as one of five sciences (Skt. *pañcavidyā*, Ch. *wuming* 五明), by contrast to *pramāṇavāda* ("the theory of *pramāṇa*") which belongs to the Sautrāntika and/or the Yocācāra position in Buddhist logic and epistemology.[2] Although Xuanzang was not the first person to bring Dignāga's views to

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[2] *Pramāṇa* theory places equal emphasis on epistemology and logic, whereas the notion of *yinming* tends much more to emphasize the latter. In this sense, *yinming* is not the best word for the genre, insofar as it includes the theory of perception.

China,[3] it was with him that study of this topic in China began in earnest.

Xuanzang translated *pratyakṣa* as *xianliang* (現量). In this paper I would like to consider the historical situation before and after Xuanzang's adoption of this translation. The first half of this paper will be spent examining earlier appearances of the term in question, before Xuanzang's time. As I will show, this topic is important for at least two reasons. First, the term *xianliang* is, strictly speaking, not a literal translation of *pratyakṣa,* despite Xuanzang's general tendency to give fully literal translations. Second, it is not yet clear who first used this term. It is clear, however, that Xuanzang was not the first person. In the second half of this paper, I will shift to the post-Xuanzang period, paying special attention to some Chinese interpretations of *xianliang.* Developments in this period are possibly related to the process of the "sinification of Buddhism", in the sense that Chinese works during the Tang and Ming dynasties showed some serious discrepancies from the Indian Buddhist tradition, and began to develop peculiar Chinese interpretations of this word.

1   *Xianliang* as translation

I will begin with some observations about Xuanzang's usage of *xianliang.* This term is used in some important translations by Xuanzang, such as the *Yinming zhengli men lun* (因明正理門論, *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga), the *Yinming ru zhengli lun* (因明入正理論, *Nyāyapraveśa*[*ka*] of Śaṅkarasvāmin) and the *Apidamo jushe lun* (阿毘達磨俱舍論, *Abhidharmakośa*[*bhāṣya*] of Vasubandhu), in which *xianliang* is obviously used as a translation of *pratyakṣa.* For example, Dignāga's well-known definition of direct perception, viz., *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham* ("Direct perception is free from conceptual construction"), is rendered by Xuanzang as *xianliang chu fenbie* (現量除分別).

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[3] Prior to Xuanzang, the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha had already translated Dignāga's epistemological text entitled *Ālambanaparīkṣā* ("An Examination of Epistemic Objects"), under the title *Wuxiang sichen lun* (無相思塵論, T1619). For a discussion of this issue, see Funayama, 2010: 147.

Modern readers of Xuanzang's translations generally take *xianliang* as an unproblematic translation of *pratyakṣa.* Strictly speaking, however, the term *xianliang* is not a literal translation, because *liang* (量), which literally means "measure", "measurement", "scale", or "amount/quantity", as either a verb or a noun, corresponds to *pramāṇa.* According to the *Index to the* Abhidharmakośabhāṣya compiled by Hirakawa *et al.,* the word *pratyakṣa* corresponds in some of Xuanzang's texts to other Chinese terms as well: e.g., *xianjian* (現見).[4] The *Xianyang shengjiao lun* (顯揚聖教論), one of Xuanzang's earliest translations, is consistent in the usage of *xianliang* for *pratyakṣa.* On the other hand, yet another important text, the *Yuqie shi di lun* (瑜伽師地論, *Yogācārabhūmi*), the search for which inspired Xuanzang's journey to India, occasionally has *xian* (現) and *xianzheng liang* (現證量) as translations of *pratyakṣa*, although in many cases it prefers *xianliang*.[5] These examples show that for Xuanzang, though *xianliang* was certainly a well-established translation of *pratyakṣa*, it was not necessarily the only Chinese translation*,* as modern scholars often assume.

The matter of wording with or without *liang, per se,* is not at all a serious problem, but it is interesting to imagine why Xuanzang might have wanted to add it to his translation of *pratyakṣa.* As a rigorous Sanskritist, Xuanzang by and large preferred literal translation; he did not like adding words and thereby embellishing the meaning of the original term. In this sense, it is worthwhile to ask whether *xianliang* was a translation newly created by Xuanzang himself. As it turns out, it was not. There are some noteworthy examples of *xianliang* before Xuanzang's time.

Before Xuanzang came back from India, Prabhākaramitra (波羅頗蜜多羅, 565-633, also called 波羅頗迦羅蜜多羅) had employed *xianliang* (現量) and *yanliang* (驗量) for *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, respectively, in his

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[4] Hirakawa *et al.,* 1973: 251 *pratyakṣa,* q.v. Note also that the same term is even used in yet other forms (e.g., *neng xian liaoda* 能現了達, *xianzhao* 現照), especially when it means not direct perception as one of the two/three *pramāṇa*s, but direct experience in the broader sense*.*

[5] Yokoyama/Hirosawa, 1996: 264 (*xian* 現), 266 (*xianjian* 現見), 268 (*xianzhengliang* 現證量), and 272 (*xianliang* 現量)*.*

translation of Bhāviveka's commentary, *Prajñāpradīpa,* on the *Middle Treatise.*[6]

Even prior to this time, at the end of the sixth century, members of the Dilun (地論) school had already used the term. A typical example is found in Jingying Huiyuan's (淨影寺慧遠, 523-592) doxographical compendium entitled *Dasheng yi zhang* (大乘義章). Huiyuan summarizes the theory of the threefold classification of *pramāṇa* as follows:

> First, the Exposition of Names [as follows:] The doctrine of the three measurements [of valid cognition] comes from the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra.* When the mind of wisdom grasps entities, each has its own portion. Therefore it is called "measurement" [or "amount"]. There are manifold ways of distinguishing [types of] "measurement": one says that there are three: first, direct measurement; second, measurement as inference; and third, measurement as teaching.

> (第一釋名。三量之義出於《相續解脱經》中。慧心取法,各有分限,故名為量。量別不同,一門説三:一是現量,二是比量,三是教量; T44:1851.670c7-9)

It is clear here how Huiyuan understands *xianliang.* Further, the term *fenxian* 分限, which appears here in the explanation of *liang,* is also interesting, because *fenxian* means "portion" or "amount", which reminds us more of Sanskrit words like *parimāṇa,* rather than *pramāṇa.* At least, it seems true that by *liang* Huiyuan took the term to mean "measure" in the broad sense, and not specifically "a means of valid cognition", as it was defined in later texts composed by Dignāga and his followers.

Moreover, members of the Dilun school used *xianliang* in other texts too. For example, the Dunhuang manuscript S.613v mentions, as a Dilun theory, a fourfold classification of *pramāṇa: xianliang* (現量), *biliang* (比量), *xinyanliang* (信言量), and *jiaoliang* (教量).[7] Further, in the above

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[6] See the *Bore deng lun shi* (般若燈論釋 12, T30:1566.111b-c). *Yanliang,* appearing four times in the text, is a rare translation, probably for *anumāna.* It is not used elsewhere.

[7] See Funayama, 2000: 145. The fourfold theory of *pramāṇa* is mentioned in S.613v as a theory upheld by those within the Buddhist fold, viz., the Dilun themselves. This enumeration is undoubtedly different from the four kinds claimed by the Nyāya school

quotation, Huiyuan refers to the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra,* but this *sūtra*'s wording is not the same as his. Guṇabhadra's (求那跋陀羅, 394-468) translation has *xianqian* (現前) for **pratyakṣa* (Tib. *mṅon sum*) and *xianqian liang* (現前量) for **pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam* (Tib. *mṅon sum gyi tshad ma*).[8] Bodhiruci's (菩提流[/留]支, d. 527) translation, on the other hand, has *xianqianjian* (現前見) and *xianjian* (現見) for *pratyakṣa.*[9]

Returning to Xuanzang, we may assume that his use of *xianliang* was influenced by the preceding scholastic tradition, as found in Huiyuan's compendium, and also in Prabhākaramitra's translation.

Here a question arises. Though it is evident that the Dilun employed the term *xianliang* in their writings, what kind of textual basis did they have in translated texts? This is an interesting question because, as stated just above, in spite of Huiyuan's explicit reference to the *Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra* as the source for the theory of the threefold classi-fication, neither Guṇabhadra's nor Bodhiruci's translations have *xian-*

(i.e., *pratyakṣa* "direct perception", *anumāna* "inference", *āptavacana* (or *āgama*) "words of a reliable person", and *upamāna* "analogy"). It is a peculiarity of the Dilun fourfold classification that they distinguish *xinyanliang* and *jiaoliang,* which are usually regarded as identical. This view is criticized even within the Dilun School. See *Dasheng yi zhang* 10 (T44:1851.671b4-6; pointed out in Funayama, *op. cit.*: 153 n. 39). According to Aoki Takashi (Aoki, 2000: 194, 198-201), the date of S.613v is around 560 or later. As pointed out in Funayama, *op. cit.,* the Dilun classification of *pramāṇa* into these four kinds is also found in S.4303, another important Dilun text, which was, according to Aoki (*loc., cit.*), composed later than S.613v and before ca. 585 CE.

[8] Guṇabhadra: 一切行無常，一切行苦，一切法無我，若世間現前得，如是等名現前得相 (T16:679.719a14-16). Tib: *de la 'du byed thams cad mi rtag pa ñid daṅ | 'du byed thams cad sdug bsṅal ba ñid daṅ | chos thams cad bdag med pa ñid 'jig rten na mṅon sum du dmigs pa daṅ | de lta bu daṅ mthun pa gaṅ yin pa de ni de mṅon sum du dmigs pa'i mtshan ñid yin no ||* (Lamotte, 1935: 156). Cf. Xuanzang: 一切行皆無常性，一切行皆是苦性，一切法皆無我性，此為世間現量所得 (T16:676.709b25-26).

   Guṇabhadra: 若此助成如是現前量比量信言量，是名五種快淨相 (T16:679.719b5-6). Tib: *de ltar 'thad pa'i sgrub par pa'i rigs pa de ni mṅon sum gyi tshad ma daṅ | rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma daṅ | yid ches pa'i luṅ gi tshad mas mtshan ñid lṅa po dag gis yoṅs su dag pa yin no ||* (Lamotte, 1935: 157). Cf. Xuanzang: 如是證成道理，由現量故，由比量故，由聖教量故。由五種相，名為清淨 (T16:676.709c28-710a1).

[9] Bodhiruci: 一切有為行無常，一切有為行苦，一切法無我，世間現前見法，如是等是名彼現前見相 (T16:675.686b7-8); 此依生成相應，現見相應，量相應，比智相應，聖人説法相應，知五種相，是名清淨相 (686c2-4). See also the previous note.

liang.[10] Therefore, it is still unclear at this juncture what source Huiyuan drew upon in employing *xianliang*. In what follows, I will try to survey translations of *pratyakṣa* in the Six Dynasties period.

   The earliest texts in which I have identified translations of *pratyakṣa* and *pramāṇa* are attributed to Kumārajīva. Investigation into the question of whether there exist any earlier translations than Kumārajīva will be a task for future research.

(a) Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, ca. 350-409) – *xin* (信) or *kexin* (可信) for **pramāṇa; xianshi* (現事) or *xianzai* (現在) for **pratyakṣa*

《中論》 3，觀法品（青目釋）：信有四種。一現事可信。二名比知可信，如見烟知有火。三名譬喻可信，如國無鍮意志，喻之如金。四名賢聖所説故可信。如説有地獄，有天，有欝單曰，無有見者，信聖人語，故知 (T30:1564.24a28-b3).[11]

《成實論》 8: 有三種信。見名現在信。聞名信賢聖語。知名比知... (T32:1646.304a7-8).

(b) Tanwuchen (曇無讖, 385-433) – *xianzhi* (現智) for *pratyakṣa*[12]

《菩薩地持經》 1，真實義品: 云何學所知真實義耶。如世智人依現智比智及從師聞思量修學，彼決定智所行處事，結集建立。是名學所知真實義也 (T30:1581.893a1-3).

Bodhisattvabhūmi, Tattvārthapaṭala (Wogihara, 1936: 37, 22-38, 1; Dutt, 1966: 25, 17-21): *yuktiprasiddhatvaṃ katamat. satāṃ yuktārthapaṇḍitānāṃ vicakṣaṇānāṃ tārkikāṇāṃ mīmāṃsakānāṃ tarkaparyāpannāyāṃ bhūmau sthitānāṃ svayaṃ pratibhānikyāṃ pārthagjanikyāṃ mīmāṃsānucaritāyāṃ pratyaksaṃ anumānam āptāgamaṃ pramāṇaṃ niścitya suviditasuviniścitajñānagocarajñeyeyaṃ* [D: *suviniścitajñānagocaro jñeyeyaṃ* W] *vastū-*

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[10] No corresponding section exists in Paramārtha's translation, *Jie jie jing* (解節經, T677).

[11] This is a reference to a non-Buddhist view, most probably of the Nyāya school. See also n. 7 above.

[12] The Chinese word for *pramāṇa* is not clear in Tanwuchen's translation. This is probably because the translator was not aware of the significance of *pramāṇa,* as he flourished before the *pramāṇa* theory became popular.

papattisādhanayuktyā prasādhitaṃ vyavasthāpitam, idam ucyate yuktipra-siddhaṃ tattvam.

Cf. 玄奘譯《瑜伽師地論》 36, 菩薩地・真實義品: 云何道理極成真實。謂諸智者有道理義。諸聰叡者諸黠慧者。能尋思者能伺察者。住尋伺地者具自辯才者。居異生位者隨觀察行者。依止現比及至教量極善思擇決定智所行所智事。由證成道理所建立所施設義。是名道理極成真實 (T30:1579.486b27-c3).

Cf. 求那跋摩 (367-431) 譯《菩薩善戒經》2: 云何名方便流布。如世智人先以籌量，然後造作經書論義，是名方便流布 (T30:1582.968b7-9).

《菩薩地持經》 3, 力種性品: <u>現智</u>比智，從師具聞而為人説，<u>非不思量</u>[13] (T30:1581.904c23-24).

Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara, 1936: 106, 24-25; Dutt, 1966: 75, 10-11): *<u>pratyakṣā</u>numānāptāgamayuktāṃ ca kathāṃ karoti, <u>nāpramāṇayuktāṃ</u>.*

Cf. 玄奘譯《瑜伽師地論》38, 菩薩地力種姓品: 又依<u>現</u>比至教道理而説正法，非<u>不依彼三量道理</u> (T30:1579.503b10-11).

No corresponding passage exists in Guṇavarman's translation (cf. T30: 1566.78c).

(c) Guṇabhadra (求那跋陀羅, 394-468) – *xianqian* (現前) for **pratyakṣa*; *xianqianliang* (現前量) for **pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam.* See the above paragraph.[14]

(d) Jijiaye (吉迦夜, ca. 472)[15] – *xianjian* (現見) for *pratyakṣa*

《方便心論》: 凡欲立義，當依四種知見。何等為四。一者<u>現見</u>，二者比知，三以喻知，四隨經書 (T32:1632.23c29-24a2).

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[13] *Fei bu si liang* (非不思量) is a problematic translation of *nāpramāṇayukta-.* It seems that the translator took *pramāṇa* to mean "to measure, estimate" as a verb.

[14] For the original passage (T16:679.719b5-6) of Guṇabhadra's translation, see n. 8 above.

[15] According to the *Chu sanzang ji ji* (出三藏記集) 2 (T55:2145.13b6-12), the *Fangbian xin lun* was translated in the second year of Yanxing (延興, viz., 472 CE). The Sanskrit underlying this name is not clear to me.

Ibid.: 知因有四。一現見，二比知，三喻知，四隨經書。此四知中，現見為上 (T32:1632.25a26-27).

(e) Bodhiruci (菩提流[/留]支, d. 527) – *xin* (信) for *pramāṇa*; *xianjian* (現見) for *pratyakṣa*; *xianxin* (現信) for *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam*

《唯識論》：問曰。依信説有。信者有四種。一者現見，二者比知，三者譬喻，四者阿含。此諸信中，現信最勝 (T31:1588.68b25-27).

See also (f) Paramārtha's translation of the same text below.

(f) Paramārtha (真諦, 499-569, also called Kulanātha 拘羅那他) – *liang* (量) for *pramāṇa*; *zheng* (證) or *zhengliang* (證量) for *pratyakṣa*; *zhengliang* (證量) for *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam*[16]

《大乘唯識論》：一切量中，證量最勝 (T31:1589.72c22-23).

Viṃśikā/Viṃśatikā:[17] *sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ pratyakṣam pramāṇaṃ gariṣṭham iti* (Lévi, 1925: 8.23).

Cf. 玄奘譯《唯識二十論》：一切量中，現量為勝 (T31:1590.76b15-16).

Thus, it is clear that none of the translators above uses *xianliang* as the translation of *pratyakṣa.* Among the translations we do encounter in these texts, Paramārtha's term *zhengliang* (證量) is peculiar. It translates either *pratyakṣa* or *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam,* in which *zheng* signifies "something vivid, clear or direct".[18] As mentioned above, this wording is some-

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[16] Paramārtha's translation also contains *zhengliang* as a translation of *pratyakṣa.* See Hirakawa *et al.,* 1977: 255, 證<...>量, q.v. Further, the *Foxing lun* (佛性論) 1 (T31:1610.790b28-c4, 791a-c, 793a5-6, b27-c1) has examples of *nengliang* (能量, for **pramāṇa*), *suoliang* (所量, for **prameya*), *zhengliang* (證量, for **pratyakṣa*), *biliang* (比量, for **anumāna* as a noun, "inference"), *bizhi* (比知, "to infer"), and *shengyan[liang]* (聖言[量], for **āgama*).

[17] On the basis of a careful examination of earlier manuscripts, Kano Kazuo (Kano, 2008: esp. 345 and 350) has recently proposed the new form *Viṃśikā* as a preferable title for the text otherwise known as *Viṃśatikā.*

[18] According to Hirakawa *et al.,* 1977: 254 證, q.v., *zheng* is sometimes used as a translation of Skt. *sākṣāt-kṛ* "to operate or function directly", in both Paramārtha's and Xuanzang's translation of the *Abhidharmakośa.* Further, *zheng* in this context signifies a direct cognition of an object (*sākṣātkārijñāna*) as belonging to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), and has nothing to do with inference (*anumāna*) or logical demonstration (*sādha-*

times, though not very often, found even in Xuanzang's translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi,* in the form of *xianzheng liang* (現證量).[19]

There is, however, a text in which the term *xianliang* does appear as a translation – the *Huizheng lun* (迴諍論) or *Vigrahavyāvartanī* of Nāgārjuna. According to the Translation Record attached to the head of the translation (T32:1631.13b11-21), the Chinese translation was made in the third year of Xinghe 興和 of the Eastern Wei dynasty, i.e. 541 CE. The translators were Pimuzhixian 毘目智仙[20] and Qutan liuzhi 瞿曇流支 (alias Prajñāruci 般若流支). The relevant section is as follows, shown together with the corresponding Sanskrit text:

(g) 《迴諍論》: 又復有義。偈言:
　　若彼現是有，汝可得有迴。
　　彼現亦是無，云何得取迴。
此偈明何義。若一切法有現可取，汝得迴我諸法令空。而實不爾。何以知之。現量入在一切法數，則亦是空。若汝分別依現有比，現比皆空，如是無現比，何可得現之與比，是二皆無，云何得遮。汝言一切諸法空者，是義不然。
　　若汝復謂: 或比或喻，或以阿含，得一切法。如是一切諸法自體，我能迴者。此我今説。偈言:
　　説現比阿含　譬喻等四量
　　現比阿含成　譬喻亦能成
此偈明何義。比喻阿含現等四量若現能成，比阿含等皆亦能成，如一切法皆悉是空，現量亦空... (T32:1631.16a5-21).

　　kiṃcānyat.

> *pratyaksena hi tāvad yady upalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān |*
> *tan nāsti pratyaksam bhāvā yenopalabhyante || [5]*

yadi pratyaksataḥ sarvabhāvān upalabhya bhavān nivartayati – śūnyāḥ sar-
vabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam. kasmāt. pratyaksam api hi pramāṇaṃ sva-
bhāvāntargatatvāc chūnyam. yo 'pi sarvabhāvān upalabhate so 'pi śūnyaḥ.
tasmāt pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena nopalambhabhāvaḥ. anupalabdhasya ca
pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ - śūnyaḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam.

   syāt te buddhir anumānenāgamenopamānena vā sarvabhāvān upalabhya
sarvabhāvavyāvartanaṃ kriyata iti. atra brūmaḥ.

> *anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyaksenāgamopamāne ca |*
> *anumānāgamasādhyā ye 'rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ca || [6]*

anumānam apy upamānāgamāś ca[21] *pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena pratyuktāḥ.*
yathā hi pratyaksam pramāṇaṃ śūnyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt... (Yo-
nezawa, 2008: 228, 230 with stylistic modification by FT).

Here, it is evident that *xianliang* (現量) appears as the translation of *pra-*
tyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, and not *pratyakṣa.* This distinction is obvious because
pratyakṣa is translated as *xian* (現).

   As far as I know, the *Huizheng lun* is the only translation text prior to
Huiyuan which employs *xianliang.* However, the exact reason for the
Dilun school's preference for the term *xianliang* is still not entirely clear,
because the *Huizheng lun* is not a major text for the Dilun school, and it is
scarcely cited in Dilun compositions. In any case, I find it interesting that
even though the actual usage of *xianliang* is rather limited in translations,
the Dilun school preferred it over other options, and that it was then
adopted even by Xuanzang, in spite of the fact that the element *liang* is
superfluous as a literal translation of *pratyakṣa.* In fact, the use of this
term meant that Xuanzang could not distinguish between *pratyakṣa* and
pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam in his translation, since both are translated in the
same way as *xianliang.* This is certainly a small point, but I think it is
noteworthy when we take into account the generally rigorous character
of Xuanzang's translations.

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[21] The wording *anumānam apy upamānāgamāś ca* is grammatically incorrect. Johnston/
Kunst, 1986: 46 reads *anumānopamānāgamāś ca.*

In ending this first section, I would like finally to refer to the usage of *xian liang* in Guṇabhadra's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (*Lengqie jing* 楞伽經, T670). In fact, we find that the phrase *zixin xian liang* (自心現量) appears forty times in the *Lengqie jing.* In addition to this, a similar expression, *zixin xian* (自心現, without *liang*), also appears many times in the same text. When we compare Guṇabhadra's translation with the extant Skt. text, we can identify *zixin xian liang* with *svacitta-dṛśya-mātra,* which means "nothing but what is experienced by one's own mind".[22] That is, *xian liang* is not a single term in this case; *xian* signifies "to appear, manifest itself" and *liang* is a translation of *mātra* "merely, only, nothing but", often rendered in other translations as *wei* (唯).

The usage of *xian liang* in the following passage from the Chinese *Laṅkāvatāra* is also noteworthy in connection with *pramāṇa* theory:

> O Mahāmati! The Nirvāṇa that I teach means the following: one understands with one's superior awareness what is none other than the manifestation of one's mind. (*Note*: Measurement is of four kinds: one, direct perception; two, inferential understanding; three, analogy; and four, what is transmitted by distinguished predecessors. All those non-Buddhists [mentioned previously in the *sūtra*] are not trustworthy on [the topic of] the four [types of] mensuration.) One does not become attached to the external nature [of ontic entities]; is free from [denial by the method of] the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*); perceives the condition of what exists in accordance with reality, without falling into the two delusory extremes manifested by one's own mind, so that neither cognizer nor cognized is apprehended; and the non-perception of all [types of] mensuration is accomplished. When one is ignorant of true reality, one is not able to apprehend [it] at all. When one discards [the above-stated erroneous condition of mind], one attains the truth of self-awakened sages; understands the two kinds of no-self; transcends the two kinds of affliction; purifies the two obstacles and removes them; and becomes eternally free from the two

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22 The meaning of *liang* in the case of *zixin xian liang* in the text in question has already been pointed out in previous studies, such as Takasaki, 1980: 128 and 287; Nakamura, 1975: 1428a; and Yanagi, 2011: 77.

deaths. [Being equipped with] numerous kinds of profound *samādhi* such as the shadow-and-illusion-like [*samādhi* that are acquired in] higher and higher grounds (or stages, *bhūmi*) [of *bodhisattva*s and the final] ground of the Thus Come One, one becomes entirely free from mind (*citta*), mentation (*manas*) and mental consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*). This is called "Nirvāṇa".[23]

(大慧，<u>如我所説涅槃者</u>[1]，謂善覺知<u>自心現量</u>[2]〈<u>量</u>[3]有四種。一現見，二比知，三譬喻，四先勝相傳。彼外道，於<u>四度量</u>[4]，悉皆<u>不成</u>[5]也〉，不著外性，離於四句，見如實處，不墮[24]<u>自心現妄想</u>[6]二邊，攝所攝不可得，一切<u>度量</u>[7]<u>不見所成</u>[8]。愚於真實，不應攝受。棄捨彼已，得自覺聖法，知二無我，離二煩惱，淨除二障，永離二死，上上地如來地如影幻等諸深三昧，離心意意識，説名涅槃，[25] T16:670.505a8-15; underlining and index numbers [1]-[8] added by FT for convenience.)

There is an interlinear note (shown by the angle brackets: 〈...〉) after *zixin xian liang* (<u>自心現量</u>)[2].[26] This note is a reference to a fourfold classification of *pramāṇa* (*liang* 量[3]) which is most probably maintained by

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[23] This is a tentative translation of the Chinese translation, which is not exactly the same as the Sanskrit text. A closer examination, as well as a comparison of the Sanskrit and the Chinese versions, must await future research.

[24] I take the variant *duo* (墮) in the "Gong (宮, Palace)" edition (i.e., the Kaiyuan si 開元寺 edition, alias the *Pilu dazang jing* 毘盧大藏經), which fits *āpatana* in Skt. The Korean edition (i.e., both the first and the second editions) has *sui* (隨).

[25] Cf. Bodhiruci: 復次大慧，餘建立法智者説言：如實見者，唯是自心，而不取著外諸境界，離四種法。見一切法如彼彼法住，不見自心分別之相，不墮二邊，不見能取可取境界，見世間建立一切不實迷如實法，以不取諸法，名之爲實，以自内身證聖智法，如實而知二種無我，離於二種諸煩惱垢，清淨二障，如實能知上上地相，入如來地，得如幻三昧，遠離心意意識分別，如是等見，名爲涅槃 (T16:671.549b23-c3); and Śikṣānanda: 大慧，復有異彼外道所説，以一切智大師子吼説，能了達唯心所現，不取外境，遠離四句，住如實見，不墮二邊，離能所取，不入諸量，不著真實，住於聖智所現證法，悟二無我，離二煩惱，淨二種障，轉修諸地，入於佛地，得如幻等諸大三昧，永超心意及以意識，名得涅槃 (T16:672.614a26-b3).

[26] According to a footnote to T670 in the Taisho edition p. 505, the Ming edition (i.e., the Jiaxing 嘉興 Canon) omits this interlinear note.

the Nyāya school.[27]　First of all, I do not find any strong reason to regard this note as a later interpolation. In other words, in my view, this is probably a kind of commentary added by the translators themselves, i.e., Guṇabhadra *et al.*[28] In this case, a question will naturally follow: Did the translators mistake *zixin xian liang* "what is none other than the manifestation of one's mind" for "direct perception of one's own mind"? To this question, my answer is definitely, "No." We should not confuse the meanings of the two occurrences of the character *liang,* i.e., *liang* for Skt. *mātra* in the translation and the four kinds of *liang* for *pramāṇa* in the interlinear note.

This passage corresponds to the following Sanskrit passage, though the two are not entirely identical:[29]

anye punar Mahāmate varṇayanti – sarvajñasiṃhanādanādino yathā sva-
<u>*cittadṛśyamātrā*</u>*[2]-vabodhād bāhyabhāvābhāvānabhiniveśāc cātuṣkoṭikara-*
hitād yathābhūtāvasthānadarśanāt <u>*svacittadṛśyavikalpasyā*</u>*[6]-ntadvayāpa-*
tanatayā grāhyagrāhakānupalabdheḥ sarva<u>*pramāṇā*</u>*[7]-*<u>*grahaṇāpravṛttidar-*</u>

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[27] Namely, *xianjian* (現見) for *pratyakṣa, bizhi* (比知) for *anumāna, piyu* (譬喩) for *upamāna,* and *xiansheng xiangchuan* (先勝相傳) for *āptavacana,* respectively. The interlinear note clearly says that these four kinds of "measurement" represent a theory promulgated by non-Buddhists (*waidao* 外道).

[28] Guṇabhadra's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra* also has other interlinear notes, some of which reveal that the person(s) who wrote them had knowledge of the Sanskrit text. For example, a note at T16:670.483b17-18 on the word *xin* (心) in the term *diyi yi xin* (第 一義心) distinguishes two Skt. words for Ch. *xin,* i.e., *ganlida* (肝栗大, for Skt. *hṛdaya,* lit. "heart") and *zhiduo* (質多, for Skt. *citta,* lit. "mind"), and clearly states that the word *xin* corresponds to *hṛdaya* in Sanskrit. This indication coincides with the reading in the extant Skt. text. It would be natural, in light of this evidence, to consider such comments as due to the translator(s); and this is to say nothing of a more general tendency, whereby such interlinear notes are usually due to the translator(s) in any case.

[29] No equivalent for Chinese passage [1] exists in the Sanskrit text. The Chinese translation has *ru wo suoshuo niepan zhe*[1] *wei* (如我所説涅槃者[1]謂). Further, the Sanskrit expression *"nirvāṇam kalpayanti"* and the Chinese expression *shuo ming niepan* (説名涅槃) are not identical. Otherwise, the wording in the Sanskrit and Chinese texts basically corresponds.

śanāt[8][30] *tattvasya vyāmohakatvād agrahaṇaṃ tattvasya, tadvyudāsāt sva-pratyātmāryadharmādhigamān nairātmyadvayāvabodhāt kleśadvayavini-vṛtter āvaraṇadvayaviśuddhatvād bhūmyuttarottaratathāgatabhūmimāyā-diviśvasamādhicittamanomanovijñānavyāvṛtter nirvāṇaṃ kalpayanti* (Vaidya, 1963: 75.3-8; cf. Nanjio, 1923: 184.15-185.6. The index numbers [2], [6], [7] and [8] correspond to the same index numbers in the above Chinese translation).

Obviously *svacittadṛśyamātra-* is translated as *zixin xian liang* in Chinese, and there is no note in Skt. I direct the reader's attention to the term *pramāṇa* (Index Number [7]) which is translated as *duliang* (度量) in Chinese. The context reveals that *pramāṇa* here clearly signifies a foil theory of *pramāṇa* (which the author will ultimately reject). The Chinese wording *bujian suocheng* (不見所成[8] in the translation) and *xijie bu cheng ye* (悉皆不成[5]也 in the note) also seems worthy of our attention. Both have the negative particle *bu* and the verb *cheng*. Taking it into consideration that these appear after the reference to *pramāṇa/liang,* I think that the Chinese interlinear note is placed in the wrong position: it must be a brief commentary on the word *pramāṇa* (Index Number [7]), and not *svacittadṛśyamātra.* The mislocation of the note may also possibly be caused by the fact that the word *liang* appears twice in Chinese ([2] and [7]), as does the wording *zixin xian/svacittadṛśya-* ([2] and [6]). To sum up, in my view, in this passage of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, zixin xian liang* has nothing to do with *xianliang* as *pratyakṣa,* though at first glance it appears that it does, because the interlinear note on the fourfold classification of *pramāṇa* was put in the wrong place.

2 The sinification of the concept of *xianliang*

So far we have examined earlier usages of *xianliang* and reached the following conclusions: that *xianliang* had already been used before Xuanzang in texts by the Dilun school; and that as a translation, *xianliang* corresponds to *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam,* and not to *pratyakṣa* in the strict sense.

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[30] The exact meaning of the compound *sarvapramāṇāgrahaṇāpravṛttidarśanāt* is not clear to me.

In what follows, I would like to consider how this term was construed by Chinese scholar-monks, focusing on the "evolution" of their interpretations.

The Sanskrit word *pratyakṣa* is a compound which consists of two elements: *prati-* ("towards", "in the vicinity of", or "with regard to") and *akṣa* ("the eye", or "the sense organ" in the broad sense); hence *pratyakṣa* means either "perception" as a neuter compound noun *pratyakṣam,* signifying a type of cognition (Skt. *jñāna, vijñāna,* etc.), or "perceptible" as an adjective, or even "that which is perceptible", namely "the object of perception" (in the form of nt. *pratyakṣam,* m. *pratyakṣaḥ,* or f. *pratyakṣā*). Of these two, the former case, viz., a neuter noun meaning a kind of cognition, is predominant over the latter; the former usage as a neuter compound noun is much more popular in many texts. In other words, it is a common, generic word for perception or the object of perception.

In the context of the Buddhist Pramāṇa school (i.e., the Sautrāntika and/or Yogācāra), Dharmottara (ca. 740-800), in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā ad Nyāyabindu* I 3, explicates direct perception as *pratigatam āśritam akṣam* ("that which depends on – namely is based on – the sense organ"). He also states that the term can be taken as any gender (*sarvaliṅgaḥ pratyakṣa-śabdaḥ*). In his commentary on Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā,* Durveka-miśra explicitly states that *akṣa* here means the sense organ (*akṣam indriyam*).[31]

In spite of its frequent use among modern Buddhist scholars, the Chinese term *xianliang* is a strange word. Once we have been informed that it is a translation of Skt. *pratyakṣa,* or that it means "perception" in English, we usually do not inquire any further. But in fact, as a Chinese word, the meaning of *xianliang* as it is remains totally unclear.[32] One of the problems lies in the fact that it was created artificially, most probably for the purpose of translation, and no actual usage can be found in pre-Buddhist Chinese literature. Another difficulty for us in understan-

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[31] Malvania, 1955: 38-39. See also Hattori, 1968: 76-78 n. 1, 11; Sharma, 1985: 15, 20, and 22; and Taber, 2005: 191 n. 71.

[32] It is very interesting to note in passing that the well-known fixed Tibetan translation of the same term, *mṅon sum*, is also not very clear regarding its etymology, though *mṅon* probably signifies *mṅon par* or *mṅon du* "clearly, evidently".

ding the term is that both elements, *xian* and *liang,* each being a single graph, have various senses; for example, it is not entirely clear whether *liang* in this term is a verb or a noun, and in fact it can be used in both ways as a Chinese word, as we will see in some of the examples below. Moreover, the exact relationship between *xian* and *liang* is also not self-evident.

As indicated above, Xuanzang often employed the term as a single equivalent to *pratyakṣa.* Probably he had no difficulty in understanding the term himself, because he knew the meaning and the usages of *pratyakṣa* in Sanskrit very well. However, the technical term *xianliang* started its own journey when Chinese scholar-monks began to comment on it.

We start our examination from the pre-Xuanzang period. In his *Dasheng yi zhang*, Jingying Huiyuan of the Sui dynasty, one of the earliest scholars of Chinese *pramāṇa* theory, gives the meaning of *xianliang* as follows:

> What is called "direct measurement" [is the following]: Direct understanding (*xianzhi* 現知) of entities is termed "direct measurement". Further, [another explanation is the following:] Understanding of direct (i.e., present) entities (*xianfa* 現法) is also called "direct [measurement]".

> (言現量者，現知諸法，名為現量。又知現法，亦名為現, T44:1851.670 c11-13.）

Here, Huiyuan gives two different interpretations to the term. One is to take *xian* in the sense of *xianzhi* 現知, "to understand directly", or alternatively, "to understand vividly". The other is to understand *xian* in the sense of *xianfa* 現法, "present entities (*dharma*s)". The former means that *xian* is an adverb (or alternatively, that *xianzhi* is a single verb), and the latter that it is an adjective. Giving two different meanings to a single notion looks ambiguous, but it is a typical working method in commentarial literature to present as many interpretations as possible. Further, in this context, Huiyuan pays attention to *xian* only; he does not give any comment on *liang.*

Another notable text which reports the meaning of *xianliang* is the *She dasheng lun chao* (攝大乘論抄, T2806). This text is a commentary on Vasubandhu's *She dasheng lun shi lun* (攝大乘論釋, **Mahāyānasaṃgraha-*

bhāṣya, T1595) translated by Paramārtha. It belongs to what is called the Shelun (攝論) school. Although the exact date of the activity of the author of this text is not certain, it probably belongs to either the late Sui or the early Tang dynasty. This anonymous commentary has recently been re-edited by Ikeda Masanori. Consulting his new edition, let me refer to a line which gives the literal meaning of *xianliang.* It says:

> Names and Bodies (Essences) of the Three Measurements – [First,] Name(s). 1) Present (or Direct) Measurement. What ordinary and holy people cognize is neither [entities] in the past, nor in the future, [hence] it is termed "present". "Measurement" (*liang*) means precisely "mensuration" (*liangdu*). [Thus the word *xianliang*] is so called in terms of the time of engagement...

> (三量名體。名。一現量。凡聖所知，事非過未，名現。量即量度。從事時義為名... T85:2806.1003c20-21; Ikeda, 2009: 18.)

It is remarkable that the author explicates the meaning of *xian* by saying that it refers to present entities to be cognized by ordinary and holy persons, distinguishing them from past (*guo* 過) and future (*wei* 未) entities. This interpretation of *xian* as referring to the present object corresponds to the second of Huiyuan's interpretations. The other element, *liang,* is defined as "mensuration" (*liangdu* 量度).

Huiyuan and the author of the *She dasheng lun chao* were aware of the significance of the threefold classification of *pramāṇa* as found in Vasubandhu's texts. They were not, however, in any position to get access to the new theory of Dignāga, who opened up a new era of *pramāṇa* in Indian Buddhism; Dignāga's views on *pramāṇa* were first translated into Chinese only later, by Xuanzang.

Xuanzang's translations of the *Nyāyamukha* and the *Nyāyapraveśa,* in particular, were the most important texts for East Asian studies of *yinming.* Both the *Nyāyamukha* and the *Nyāyapraveśa* give the same etymology of *pratyakṣa,* that is: *akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam,* "Because it occurs in connection with each sense organ, it is (called) direct perception." Xuanzang translated this passage, *xian xian bie zhuan, gu ming xian-*

liang (現現別轉，故名現量).[33] If we compare the Chinese translation
with Sanskrit, we can safely conclude that *xian* (現) is a translation of
akṣa.[34] Namely,

xian	xian	bie	zhuan	gu ming	xianliang
現	現	別	轉	故　名	現量
akṣam	akṣam	prati	vartate	iti　φ	pratyakṣam

It is evident that the expression *xian xian* is a translation of *akṣam akṣam*
(that is, *xian* means *akṣa*), and that *xianliang* is used for *pratyakṣa*. On the
other hand, as we have verified in "I. *Xianliang* as translation" above, in
his translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi,* Xuanzang sometimes uses *xian* (and
sometimes even *xianjian*) for *pratyakṣa.* Moreover, he also uses *xianliang*
as a translation of *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam* in his translation of the *Twenty
Stanzas.*[35] Here we encounter a somewhat confusing result of Xuanzang's
terminology: the word *xian* can be used for either *akṣa* or *pratyakṣa* and
xianliang for either *pratyakṣa* or *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam.* Thus, in sum,
Xuanzang translated Skt. *pratyakṣa* in two ways: as *xian* and *xianliang.*

　　It seems to be the case that this ambiguity opened the way to a new
phase of interpretation, which guided later scholars in the direction of
philosophical developments different from those seen in Indian Bud-
dhism.

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[33] T32:1630.12b29, T32:1628.3b17. See Katsura, 1982: 84; Funayama, 1992: 89 n. 182; and
Taber, 2005: 191 n. 71. Taber also introduces some different views on the etymology of
pratyakṣa in Brahmanical (Hindu) texts, such as Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃ-
graha* (which employs a similar, but slightly different wording, *akṣam akṣaṃ pratītyot-
padyata iti pratyakṣam),* Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya,* and others. His elucidation is par-
tially based on Sharma, 1985. It is noteworthy that, according to Sharma, some gram-
matical authors, such as Haradatta (a commentator on the *Kāśikāvṛtti*), construe the
meaning of *prati* in the sense not of *akṣam akṣaṃ prati* but *akṣi akṣi prati*, but others,
such as Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra (all three authors belonging to
the Nyāya school), prefer *akṣa* to *akṣi*. Among Buddhist authors, Sharma takes up Dhar-
mottara, but he does not mention Dignāga.

[34] In this context, the word *akṣa* metonymically signifies the sense organs in general, as I
indicated above. It is interesting that Xuanzang translates *akṣa* as *gen* (根) in the *Jushe
lun* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya). See Hirakawa et al.,* 1973: 3 *akṣa*, q.v.

[35] See p. 40 above.

   In his commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa,* Kuiji (窺基, alias Dashengji 大乘基 or Ji 基, 632-682) gives an intricate explanation of the passage in question in terms of the fourfold classification of non-conceptual cognition (*wushishen* 五識身, *wujuyi* 五俱意, *zhuzizheng* 諸自證, and *xiudingzhe* 修定者) and five kinds of sensory cognition (*pañca-vijñāna*).[36] Further, in his commentary on the *Viṃśikā/Viṃśatikā* (*The Twenty Stanzas*), the same author gives a different type of elucidation in terms of differences between schools. According to him, there were at least eight ways of interpreting *xianliang:* the views of Vasumitra of the Sarvāstivāda school; of Dharmatrāta of the same school; of Ghoṣa of the same school; of the Saṃmitīya/Saṃmatīya school; of the Sautrāntika school; of the non-Buddhist Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools; and finally, of the Mahāyāna. In briefly introducing the gist of each idea, Kuiji even gives a formal analysis of *xianliang* as a compound, after the manner of Sanskrit grammar, using terminology such as "*karmadhāraya* compound" (*chiye shi* 持業釋) and "*tatpuruṣa* compound" (*yishi shi* 依士釋, also called *yizhu shi* 依主釋).[37]

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[36] The original passage in Kuiji's *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏, 下) reads as follows: 論。現現別轉，故名現量。述曰。此顯名也。此四類心，或唯五識，現體非一，名為現現。各附境體，離貫通緣，名為別轉。由此現現各別緣故，名現量。故者，結上所以，是名現量 (T44:1840.139c1-4).

[37] The original passage in Kuiji's *Weishi ershi lun shuji* (唯識二十論述記) reads as follows: 言現量者，諸部説異。且薩婆多，用世友説：以根名見，根體是現量。以顯現義是根義故。此能量境，故名現量。是持業釋。法救説：識名見。能量境故。識名現量。持業如前。妙音：慧名見，能量法，勝慧名現量。正量部説：心心所法和合名見，心心所法合名現量。經部師説：根識和合，假名為見，假能量境，假名現量。吠世史迦、德句義中覺為現量。數論師説：十一根中五根是現量。若歸於本，自性是現量。大乘師説：根名為現，依・發・屬・助・如根五義勝餘故。然是色法不能量境。唯心心所能量度故。心心所法，正是量體。依現之量，名為現量。此依士釋 (T43:1834.999a11-24; translation omitted). This is Kuiji's explanation of the word *xianliang* as it is used in the *Twenty Stanzas* in the form *yiqie liang zhong, xianliang wei sheng* (一切量中，現量為勝, T31:1590.76b15-16; Skt. *sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ gariṣṭham iti*). In other words, in this context, *xianliang* is used primarily as a translation of *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam.* In the above commentary, it seems certain that Kuiji takes *xian* (現) in the sense of *jian* (見) and *liang* (量) in the sense of *nengliang* (能量, "to measure" as a verb). The critical point here is that Kuiji uses terms such as *xian, liang,* and *xianliang* as explanations of different views held in the Indian context by Vasumitra (Shiyou 世友), Dharmatrāta (Fajiu 法救) and Ghoṣa (Miaoyin 妙音) of the Sarvāstivāda school (*sapoduo* 薩婆多), the *Saṃmitīya school (*zhengliang*

I am not able to give here a precise survey of these detailed discussions, but Kuiji's exposition is fascinating, inasmuch as it is, to some extent, certainly based on contemporaneous philosophical development in India, that is, on information most probably stemming from Xuanzang's oral instruction.[38] However, at the same time, we should not overlook the Chinese flavor of his exposition. I want to draw special attention to one point: Kuiji reports that Indian followers of the Mahāyāna take *xianliang* as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, construing *xianliang* as *yi xian zhi liang* (依現之量), "measure (*liang*) which is based on the actual (*xian*)".[39] Throughout the same discussion, Kuiji paraphrases "measure-[ment]" (*liang*) by "mensuration" (*liangdu*), and explains the meaning of "the actual (*xian*)" as "the sense organ (*gen* 根)".[40] The first point is in line with the view expressed in the *She dasheng lun chao,* and the second point is probably based on Xuanzang's own view, which was based on the *pramāṇa*-tradition founded by Dignāga.

These points reveal without any doubt that Kuiji takes *xian* and *liang* as a compound(!) consisting of two elements, and understands *xian* as

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bu 正量部), Sautrāntika (*jingbu shi* 經部師), the Vaiśeṣika school (*feishishi jia* 吠世史迦), the Sāṃkhya school (*shulun shi* 數論師) and the Mahāyāna school (*dasheng shi* 大乘師). Therefore, it is evident that Kuiji uses the term *xianliang* as an Indic word, referring to the Indian context, and not as a Chinese word.

[38] For example, parallel discussion regarding differences of opinion between Vasumitra, Dharmatrāta and Ghoṣa is found in Xuanzang's translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*Da piposha lun* 大毘婆沙論, T27:1545.61c, 63b, 489c).

[39] The explanation "*yi* X *zhi* Y", as in *yi xian zhi liang* (依現之量), signifies that the term X-Y is a *tatpuruṣa* compound. This point is clear from Kuiji's exegesis. In his *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (成唯識論述記), Kuiji explains *yiye* (意業 for Skt. *manaskarman*) as *yi yi zhi ye* (依意之業), stipulating that it is a *tatpuruṣa* compound (*yishi shi,* 依士釋) (T43: 1830.276a3). Regarding this, see also n. 44 below. Further, some texts explain that *yanshi* (眼識 for Skt. *cakṣurvijñāna*) is a *tatpuruṣa* compound by using the expression *yi yan zhi shi* (依眼之識; e.g., Kuiji's expression "...依主釋...如眼識等...依眼之識，故名眼識" in T43:1830.377b24-26) or *yan zhi shi* (眼之識) without resorting to *yi* (依) in the same sense (e.g., Kuiji's expression "(彼云如)眼之識故名眼識" in T43:1830.416b 10-11).

[40] See Kuiji's passage in n. 36 above.

corresponding to *pratyakṣa,* and *liang* to *pramāṇa.*[41] We know this because reference to a kind of compound makes sense only if the word *xianliang* is interpreted as a single compound noun. It looks as though Kuiji assumed an underlying form such as **pratyakṣapramāṇa,* as a single compound.

Now, such a form is not attested in any Sanskrit Buddhist texts on *pramāṇa*: we have many examples of *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam* as two nouns, but, as far as I know, the form **pratyakṣapramāṇa* as a *tatpuruṣa* compound is unattested. On the other hand, Kuiji's statement does not make sense if we assume that the form *pratyakṣa* was the compound Kuiji meant, for in that case, we cannot find any reason why he would add the interpretation(s) of *pramāṇa* (*liang*). Thus, we might suppose that Kuiji is mixing up two different things: the analysis of *pratyakṣa* (< *prati+akṣa*) and the analysis of *xianliang* (< *xian+liang*). I do not mean that Kuiji's endeavor is nonsense. Rather, I would like to see this complicated exegesis as a new idea, which makes sense only in the Chinese language, and not in Sanskrit. If this is the case, we have here an example of the "sinification" of Buddhist terms.

Another interesting interpretation of the above-mentioned passage, common to the *Nyāyapraveśa* and the *Nyāyamukha,* is found in Jingyan's (淨眼) commentary entitled *Yinming ru zhengli lun hou shu* (因明入正理論後疏, Pelliot chinois No. 2063). This text was edited by Takemura Shōhō (武邑尚邦) and subsequently studied by Shen Jianying (沈劍英).[42]

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[41] Against my interpretation, some people might claim that Kuiji used the term *yi xian zhi liang* only to explain the Chinese word *xianliang,* and that it had nothing to do with the explanation of the Skt. term **pratyakṣapramāṇa.* However, I do not think that this idea is tenable, because, as I pointed out in n. 37 above, in the case of his commentary on the *Twenty Stanzas,* Kuiji did not intend to explain a Chinese scholarly situation – i.e., how Chinese scholar-monks construed the Chinese word *xianliang* – but rather, introduced various Indian interpretations, referring to the word *yi xian zhi liang* as a Mahāyānic interpretation current in India. This implies that Kuiji tried to analyze the relationship between *xian* and *liang* in the Indian context, namely, in terms of the relationship between *pratyakṣa* and *pramāṇa* in the Sanskrit language. In fact, however, we do not find this type of discussion attested in extant Sanskrit texts. All that we can actually confirm is that there existed different interpretations of the relationship between *praty-* (*prati*) and *akṣa,* as shown, for example, in Sharma, 1985 and Taber, 2005: 191 n. 71.

[42] Takemura, 1986: 300-301 (Yang/Xiao, 2008: 270-271); Shen, 2008: 281-282; cf. 136-138.

According to Takemura, Jingyan is a commentator who lived between Wengui (文軌, d.u.) and Huizhao (慧沼, d. 714).[43] Regarding the latter, Wei Jen Teng (Teng, 2011: 117) has recently pointed out that Huizhao explains that *xianliang* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound in his *Dasheng fayuan lin zhang bu que* (大乘法苑林章補闕) 8.[44]

Jingyan first introduces the three interpretations of the passage in question already mentioned. Though I cannot describe them all here, the second interpretation is similar to Kuiji's, construing *xianliang* as a *tat-puruṣa* compound. The phrase *yi xian zhi liang* appears in that context.[45] According to the third interpretation, the term *xianliang* should be interpreted as a *karmadhāraya* compound (*chiye shi* 持業釋), in the sense that *xian* itself is *liang*.[46] After introducing these different types of interpretation, Jingyan further proceeds to present his own view (*jin jie* 今解) in two ways: namely that it can be either a *tatpuruṣa-* or a *karmadhāraya* compound. Here we can see a further development in interpretation.

Next, in the second half of the eighth century, Tankuang (曇曠) composed the *Dasheng bai faming men lun kaizong yiji* (大乘百法明門論開宗義記) at Dunhuang.[47] In this work, he describes the meaning of *xianliang* as follows:

> What is called "measurement regarding the eight kinds of consciousness" is of three kinds in total. The first is "direct measurement". "Di-

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[43] Takemura, 1986: 36.

[44] "The compound [is analyzed as follows:] An object [of the mind] is called *xian.* The mind is called *liang.* It is the *liang* regarding that *xian.* [Therefore] it is called *xianliang.* It is a *tatpuruṣa* compound." (合釋者。若境名現，心名為量，即現之量，名為現量，依主釋也，　Z1, 2, 3, 1, 30, verso, b8-10; X55:882.159b22-23).

[45] "Namely [because it is] the *liang* which is based on the *xian*, it is called *xianliang.* This is a *tatpuruṣa* compound" (此即依現之量，名為現量。即依仕釋; Takemura, 1986: 300 [Yang/Xiao, 2008: 270]). See also n. 39 above. The character *shi* (仕) here is used as a synonym of *shi* (士). This interpretation is shared by Kuiji. Apart from this basic point regarding the analysis of the compound, however, the actual contents of their views differ very much.

[46] "Namely, [because] *xian* is none other than *liang,* it is called *xianliang.* This is a *karmadhāraya* compound" (此即現即是量，名為現量。即持業釋也; Takemura, 1986: 300 [Yang/Xiao, 2008: 271]).

[47] Ueyama, 1990: 20-23.

rect" (or "real", *xian* 現) means that which is really existent in front of one (*xianqian* 現前). "Measurement" (*liang*) means "mensuration" (*liangdu*). That is to say, when colors and so forth are clear and determinate and directly exist in front of one, one is not deluded by an erroneous form, attains a determinate cognition, and is free from the conception of various designations, species and classes, [thus] illuminating [the object] clearly. Therefore this is called "direct measurement". It is "direct", on the one hand, and at the same time it is "measurement", on the other. [Hence] it is an action-carrying (*karmadhāraya*) compound.

(謂八識量，總有三種。一者現量。現謂現前。量謂量度。謂於現前明了色等，不迷亂相，而得了知，離諸名言種類分別，照鏡明白，故名現量。現即是量，持業釋也, T85:2810.1053a8-11.)

Tankuang construes the term as a *karmadhāraya* compound, and states that *xian* means *xianqian* 現前, "(that which is) before one['s eyes]", which is a vividly manifesting, non-erroneous object of cognition; and that *liang* means *liangdu* "mensuration".

Thus, Chinese scholar-monks developed the interpretation of the term *xianliang* by considering the relationship between *xian* and *liang*. This viewpoint would not have been possible in Sanskrit literature, because **pratyakṣapramāṇa* is not a common compound, even if it is not entirely impossible; and because the normal form *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam* is not a compound at all.

Finally, let me introduce a Chinese attempt to associate *xianliang* as *pramāṇa* with the teaching of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.* Such an idea is found in the commentary entitled *Lengqie abaduoluo bao jing xuan yi* (楞伽阿跋多羅寶經玄義), composed by Zhixu (智旭, 1599-1655). Very interestingly, this important monk of the Ming-Qing period explicates the meaning of *xianliang* in yet another way:

What is called "direct measurement" [means the following:] "Direct" means direct manifestation. "Measurement" means amount. This implies that, regarding all entities such as the five entities, the three kinds of intrinsic nature, the eight kinds of consciousness, the two kinds of no-self, and so on, to [as many as] ten realms (*jie* 界), a hundred realms, or a thousand, all of these various entities [that are men-

tioned in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*] are, as a whole, nothing but what is directly manifested (*xianxian* 顯現) by one's own mind, and do not go beyond [what the mind can] discern and measure (*fenliang* 分量). Therefore it is called "direct measurement (*xianliang* 現量)".

(言現量者，現謂顯現，量謂分量。言一切五法三自性八識二無我，乃至十界百界千，如等種種諸法，總是唯心所現，不出心之分量，故名為現量也, Z1,1,26,1, 49, recto, b15-18; X17:328.484b.)

Here, Zhixu states that *xian* signifies "directly manifest" (*xianxian* 顯現) as a verb, and *liang* means "[what the mind can] discern and measure" (*fenliang* 分量) as a noun. As a whole, he claims, the term *xianliang* signifies that all the mental categories, such as the five entities (*pañca-dharma*), the three natures, and so forth, are nothing but the manifestation of one's own mind, and they all remain within the scope of the mind. Although similar wording regarding *xian* in the sense of *xianxian* had existed previously,[48] such a combination of *pramāṇa* theory and Mind-Only theory is a unique result of the Chinese Buddhist exegetical tradition, and cannot be found in Indian literature. We should also bear in mind that the idea developed here has a special connotation because, as a commentator on the *Laṅkāvatāra,* Zhixu needed to integrate the tenets of this *sūtra* with the notion of *pramāṇa.* His unique exegesis of *liang* as *fenliang* is influenced by the notion of *liang,* which is a translation of Skt. *mātra* in the *sūtra* in question (as we saw above).

Conclusion

In the Six Dynasties period, *pratyakṣa* was translated by various words, such as *xian, xianqian, xianjian, zheng,* and so forth. The earliest reference to *xianliang* meaning "direct perception" is found in the *Huizheng lun* (Skt.

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[48] See, for example, passages in the *Zongjing lu* (宗鏡録 49) compiled by Yanshou (延壽, 904-975) (T48:2016.703a17-21), and Baochen's (寶臣) commentary *Zhu Dasheng ru Lengqie jing* (注大乘入楞伽經 4) (T39:1791.459a15-17). However the chronological sequence of these passages, as well as their sources, are not clear to me. See also Zhengshou's (正受, fl. ca. 1200) commentary *Lengqie jing jizhu* (楞伽經集註 2) (Z1, 1, 25, 4, 325, verso, a11-13; X17:324.246c).

Vigrahavyāvartanī) of Nāgārjuna, in which *xianliang* is a translation of *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam,* and not *pratyakṣa* as a single word. Soon thereafter, at the end of the Six Dynasties period, the Dilun school started to use *xianliang* as a technical term.

This is probably what influenced Xuanzang's usage of *xianliang.* He employed it alternately as a translation of both *pratyakṣa* and of *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam.*[49] To put it another way, the term *xianliang* has a double meaning in Xuanzang's translations, and without consulting the original Sanskrit text, it is impossible to determine in which of these two senses each instance of *xianliang* is being used.

We also saw that it is hard to imagine that any term like **pratyakṣapramāṇa,* as a single compound, prevailed in the Indian Buddhist world. In Sanskrit texts, the most popular form is undoubtedly *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam,* i.e. two words in apposition. Though I hesitate to say that the form **pratyakṣapramāṇa* never existed in Sanskrit, even if, hypothetically, the term did exist, I do not think it would be possible to regard such a compound as a *tatpuruṣa,* for as long as **pratyakṣapramāṇa* is intended as a synonym of *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam,* the compound would have to be a *karmadhāraya.*

However, after Xuanzang, Chinese scholar-monks began to analyze the meaning of *xianliang* by dividing it into *xian* and *liang,* and in so doing, they made use of their knowledge of classes of Sanskrit compounds like *tatpuruṣa* and *karmadhāraya.* The results of their analyses look somewhat unacceptable to the eyes of anyone familiar with Sanskrit grammar, because these Chinese scholars conflated the construction of *xianliang* with that of **pratyakṣapramāṇa.* However, it would not be correct to criticize their views only with reference to Indian modes of analysis, because these Chinese monks used the Chinese language and thought in Chinese.

Here, we should bear in mind that Chinese scholar-monks after Xuanzang applied such terms as *yishi shi* (*tatpuruṣa*) or *chiye shi* (*karma-*

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[49] As pointed out on p. 40, an evident example of *xianliang* in the sense of *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam* is found in Xuanzang's translation of the *Viṃśikā/Viṃśatikā: yiqie liang zhong, xianliang wei sheng* (一切量中，現量為勝; Skt. *sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ gariṣṭham iti*).

dhāraya) to Chinese terms or Chinese translations, and not directly to original Sanskrit terms or their phonetic transcriptions. Under such circumstances, earlier monks such as Kuiji probably had sufficient knowledge of the Sanskrit equivalents of the Chinese words they analyzed, while later - for example, in the Ming - scholar-monks no longer had any interest in, or knowledge of, the original Sanskrit terms, nor of the relationship between a Chinese translation and its Sanskrit equivalent. This implies that many of these later figures just applied Sanskrit words such as *yishi shi* or *chiye shi* to the explanation of Chinese terms in the Chinese context. In other words, they used the names of Sanskrit compounds to talk about the Chinese language. This being the case, it would be beside the point or meaningless to ask whether such Chinese interpretations make sense from a Sanskrit point of view. Rather than harshly criticizing those Chinese views, it would be better to take them differently; such Chinese interpretations look extremely attractive when we view them in a different light, as a matter of the Chinese language.

It is almost meaningless to say, on the basis of Indic language, that the Chinese way of understanding *xianliang* was a mistake. Rather, it can be evaluated as a new type of development. In this sense it is an interesting example of what is called the "Sinification of Buddhist Concepts".[50]

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[50] I owe this viewpoint to Michael Radich (Radich, 2008: 163-164).

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Epistemology and Cultivation in Jingying Huiyuan's *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition*

Chen-kuo Lin

It is a wide-spread impression that Buddhist epistemology (*pramāṇa-vāda*) never received any serious attention outside of the development of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Current scholarship clearly shows that Chinese textual sources in this field have been totally ignored, owing to the belief that they are unhelpful, if not perhaps entirely useless, for our under-standing of Buddhist epistemology in its original form. According to this belief, all that we find of this particular aspect of Indian Buddhism in the Chinese heritage is the scholastic tradition of *hetu-vidyā* ("the science of reason"), and especially the early system of Dignāga (ca. 480-540), which was brought back to China by Xuanzang in the seventh century. Before Xuanzang, as Giuseppe Tucci noted nearly a century ago, there were also some Chinese translations of pre-Dignāga texts, which are only useful for reconstructing the early history of Buddhist logic in India.[1]

In this paper, however, I will demonstrate that the Chinese record preserves more than this. I will present a textual and doctrinal study of Jingying Huiyuan's 淨影慧遠 (523-592) *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition* (*San liang zhi yi* 三量智義, hereafter SLZY), a gem among early Chinese Buddhist epistemological treatises. I will aim to show that the

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Chinese reception of Indian Buddhist epistemology before the era of Xuanzang was far more significant than has been previously assumed.[2]

Before exploring Huiyuan's contribution, I will give a brief historical picture of the way that Buddhist epistemology was introduced from India to China during the fifth and sixth centuries. This picture will be drawn from two angles: first, a brief chronological sketch; and second, a topical reconstruction.

As far as the chronological background is concerned, it is important to look into Kumārajīva's (350-413) early fifth century translations of Āryadeva's *Śata-śāstra*, Qingmu's (青目 *Piṅgala*) *Commentary* on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, and the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*. In those early translations, Indian logic and epistemology was introduced to China for the first time. Some early materials relating to Buddhist logic and epistemology were also preserved in the last chapter of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, where four methods of reasoning (*yukti*) were found. These texts were first translated in the first half of the fifth century.

Subsequently, before Huiyuan composed the SLZY, some other early Indian texts of logic and epistemology were also translated into Chinese. In 472, Jijiaye (吉迦夜) and Tanyao (曇曜) translated the *Upāyahṛdaya-śāstra* (方便心論), the authorship of which is disputably ascribed to Nāgārjuna. In 538-541, *Gautama Prajñāruci (瞿曇般若流支) translated Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* and co-translated with *Vimokṣa Prajñārṣi (毘目智仙) Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. In 542, Vimokṣa Prajñārṣi translated Asaṅga's *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra (順中論). In 550-569, Paramārtha translated Vasubandhu's *Tarka-śāstra (如實論), retranslated the same author's *Viṃśatikā*, and translated Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. It seems that most of those early translations were not accessible to Huiyuan. However, those materials provide us with useful sources to reconstruct the ways Chinese thinkers viewed Indian debates on some philosophical and religious topics. As we will see later, translation always

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implicitly embodies the pre-understanding of the recipient. Those early Chinese translations are no exception.

In order to present a topical background to the subject of the present study, I have chosen three topics that were pervasive in these early translation texts: first, theological issues, such as arguments for the existence of a soul (*ātman*, *puruṣa*) and cosmic creators (Īśvara, Viṣṇu); second, the metaphysical problem of the existence of the external world; and third, the relationship between epistemology and meditation, in which, as my study will show, Huiyuan is much more interested.

Theological topics

In Kumārajīva's translation of Qingmu's (*Piṅgala) *Commentary* on *MMK*, four means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) are employed for the first time to argue for the non-existence of the soul (*ātman*). The word *ātman* is either rendered by *wo* (我) or *shen* (神) in Chinese. It was through Kumārajīva's translation that Chinese readers came to know that belief in the *ātman* played a significant role in ancient Indian religions. For Indians, one achieves spiritual liberation only when the *ātman* is liberated from the cycle of rebirth. However, whether the *ātman* exists or not is an issue of debate between various Indian systems. A famous example can be found in the earliest record of Indian logic, the *Carakasaṃhitā*, where the five-step syllogism was used to argue for the eternity (*nitya*) of the soul (*puruṣa*) (Kajiyama, 1984: 11).

In Qingmu's *Commentary*, four *pramāṇa*s are used rather to argue *against* the *ātmavāda*. These *pramāṇa*s are mentioned as being: (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*); (2) inference (*anumāna*), which is subdivided into inference from effect to cause (**pūrvavat)*, inference from part to whole (**śeṣavat*) and inference from general correlation (**sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*); (3) analogy (*upamāna*); and (4) authority (*āptāgama*). Inference, analogy and authority are all said to function on the basis of perception. Qingmu argued that, given this epistemic priority of perception, and given that no one has seen a soul, there is no epistemic ground upon which know-

ledge of the existence of the soul could arise through the other three means of cognition.[3]

It is worthy of note that Kumārajīva rendered the Sanskrit term *pramāṇa* by *xin* (信), which literally means "trust", "warrant", and "assurance".[4] This rendering was replaced by *zhi* (智 *jñāna*, cognition) in later Chinese translations. Both *xin* and *zhi* refer to a certain form of mental state, which is considered the foundation of cognition. However, Kumārajīva's rendering preserves the early Chinese understanding of the meaning of *pramāṇa,* namely, that the means of knowledge must be trustworthy.

After Kumārajīva, logical arguments against the existence of a soul and a cosmic creator are also found in more detail in such early Buddhist logical texts as the *Upāyahṛdaya,* the *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra,* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya.*

Metaphysical topics

In addition to such theological issues, Buddhist philosophical schools, such as Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra, turned their attention to metaphysical questions: What is an existent (*dharma*)? Do existents possess essence or substance (*svabhāva*)?[5] Does the world exist independent of mind? In response to these questions, the Sarvāstivādin argues for a form of direct realism, while the Sautrāntika argues

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[3] See *Zhong lun* (中論), T30:1564.24a-24b.

[4] The word *xin* (信) in this context could be taken to mean "reliability", as testified by the use of the phrase *kexin* (可信) in Kumārajīva's translation.

[5] Jan Westerhoff distinguishes two usages of *svabhāva* in Mādhyamika philosophy: (1) *svabhāva* as essence and (2) *svabhāva* as substance. Essence-*svabhāva* refers to the specific property of an object by which it is distinguished from the other objects. Substance-*svabhāva* is employed as an ontological notion, meaning "primary existent" in the sense that it is free of causal law. It is the permanent foundation of impermanent phenomena. Westerhoff concludes that "The elaborate Mādhyamika criticism of the notion of *svabhāva* is directed against this stronger notion of substance-*svabhāva* rather than against essence-*svabhāva*." See Westerhoff, 2009: 19-29. However, I would like to emphasize that the ontological notion of substance-*svabhāva* should not be separated from the epistemological notion of essence-*svabhāva*.

for indirect realism. In contrast, the Mādhyamika claims that all objects are empty, in the sense of being void of substance, whereas the Yogācārin takes an idealist position, contending that existents should be understood as mental representations only. In India, these philosophical controversies were to be settled only on the basis of logical argument and epistemological justification. Even though the early Mādhyamikas questioned the legitimacy of logic and epistemology, they still needed to argue for their positions according to certain rules of dialectics. The best evidence of this fact can be found in Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, a philosophical text that was translated, but unfortunately ignored throughout the entire history of Chinese Buddhism.

On the side of Yogācāra, Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* was first translated by Gautama Prajñāruci in 538-541. In this text, Vasubandhu employed four *pramāṇa*s to argue for idealism (*vijñaptimātra*) and against realism, by appealing to the same epistemological premise: "The existence and nonexistence [of objects] are to be determined by means of valid cognition" (*pramāṇavaśād astitvaṃ nāstitvaṃ vā nirdhāryate*).[6] That is to say, metaphysical questions with regard to the existence of external objects can be answered only through epistemological justification. As we can see from Huiyuan's writings, this typical Indian philosophical practice did not win much appreciation from early Chinese Buddhists.

Topics on epistemology and meditation

Now we come to Huiyuan's SLZY which can be viewed as an example showing interest in the relationship between epistemology and meditation. In contrast to the persistence of Indian Buddhist philosophers in engaging in theological and metaphysical debate, Huiyuan clearly does not show interest in the practice of logic and epistemological analysis. His writing style shows itself more in favor of hermeneutic exegesis than argumentation. In his exegesis, moreover, he places great stress on the meditational context in which he believes epistemology is properly to be situated. By "meditational context", I mean that he refers to the stages of

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[6] Also see Xuanzang's translation of the *Viṃśatikā*: 諸法由量刊定有無. T31:1690.76b.15.

meditational cultivation as explained in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* and Yogācāra texts. According to those early texts, various stages of meditation practice correspond to various levels of mental experience, which are depicted according to the system of the three realms (*tridhātu*). That is, mental experience at the level of the desire-realm (*kāmadhātu*) is considered different from that in the form- and formless realms (*rūpadhātu, ārūpyadhātu*). Accordingly, when we analyze perception, we have to differentiate the various forms of perception in accordance with the various levels of mental experience that can be observed at the various stages of meditational practice.

Similarly, Huiyuan contends that when we are doing epistemological analysis, we have to ascertain the meditational stage at which the object is discerned. Our mental experience, including perception and inference, depends upon the various levels of mental development. Hence, perception and inference cannot be conceived as something universal and unchanging. In this regard, Huiyuan is more concerned with cognitive variation in mental cultivation than with the *a priori* conditions of knowledge as they might be conceived, for example, in Kantian epistemology.

Huiyuan did not have any knowledge of Dignāga's system. Rather, he attempted independently to derive an understanding of Buddhist logic and epistemology from pre-Dignāgan sources. It will be illuminating, therefore, if we strategically place Huiyuan and Dignāga side by side, to see the different paths they took in confronting the same tradition of *hetu-vidyā*.

The most apparent difference between the two thinkers is that Dignāga admits two means of valid cognition only (i.e., *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*), while Huiyuan admits three (adding *āgama* to Dignāga's two). Dignāga accepts only two means of cognition, perception and inference, for the reason that the object itself only presents two aspects to cognition, namely, the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Dignāga argues that no third means of cognition can be accepted

because ontologically, there is no other aspect of the object, beside the particular and the universal, that could serve as the object of cognition.[7]

On the other hand, Huiyuan contends that each of the three means of cognition has both the particular (*shi* 事) and the universal (*li* 理) as objects of cognition. That is, perception is directed at both the particular and the universal as the object of cognition; and the same is also true for inference; and for authoritative teaching. At first sight, this theory looks to be totally at odds with Dignāga's system. How can this be explained? In order to explain Huiyuan's theory of cognition, I suggest that we should look into his ontology of the *prameya*, which takes both *li* and *shi* as the object of each means of cognition.

Text, author, and context

The text under study is Huiyuan's *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition* (SLZY), a chapter in his magnum opus, *A Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (*Dasheng yizhang* 大乘義章 = DSYZ). As recorded in Daoxuan's 道宣 (596-667) *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks* (*Xu gaoseng zhuan* 續高僧傳), Huiyuan composed DSYZ in fourteen fascicles, and the text consists of two hundred and fifty-nine entries in five categories of doctrine: (1) the Canon; (2) Foundational Doctrine; (3) Defiled Dharmas; (4) Purified Dharmas; and (5) Miscellaneous Dharmas. Daoxuan describes this text as follows: "The essentials of the Buddha's teaching are all laid out here, for scholars who want to grasp the gist of the teaching" (T50: 2060.491c).

However, the genre of DSYZ, that is, Mahāyāna Abhidharma, was not invented by Huiyuan. Rather, it can be traced back to the writings of Kumārajīva, who is said to have authored a text with the same title in three fascicles. The same title of "compendium" (*yizhang*) was also seen in many works by Huiyuan's contemporaries, such as Fashang (法上, 495-580) (T50:2060.485c), Shi Lingyu (釋靈裕, 518-605) (T50:2060.497c), Shi Tanwuzui (釋曇無最, d.u.) (T50:2060.624c), Shi Daobian (釋道辯, d.u.) (T50:2060.471c) and Shi Baoqiong (釋寶瓊, 504-584) (T50:2060.479c). This

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[7] This is exactly why Candrakīrti took issue with Dignāga in the opening chapter of the *Prasannapadā*.

shows that the genre of the Mahāyāna compendium was widely adopted by Chinese Buddhists during the fifth and sixth centuries, in order to systematize their understanding of the Dharma.[8]

Within the overall structure of DSYZ, SLZY is included under the category of Purified Dharmas. The SLZY can be considered an independent work, but this does not mean that it does not need to be properly contextualized within the historical process of the scriptural transmission of DSYZ as a whole. As we can see from the SLZY itself, Huiyuan composed this chapter by citing from various early translations of Indian texts, such as:

(1) *Xiangxu jietuo rulai suozuo suishun liaoyi jing* (**Saṃdhinirmocanatathāgatakṛtyānuṣṭhānanītārtha-sūtra* 相續解脫如來所作隨順了義經), translated by Guṇabhadra (394-468) in the middle of the fifth century. This text can be identified as the last chapter of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, where four methods of reasoning (*yukti*) are discussed, placing it among the oldest materials in Buddhist logic and epistemology. It is also important to note that the problem of the three *pramāṇa*s is found in the same context as the four *yukti*s.

(2) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Pusa dichi jing* 菩薩地持經), translated by Dharmakṣema (曇無讖) in 418. Huiyuan also refers to a passage on the four *yukti*s which appears in this text.

(3) The **Satyasiddhi-śāstra* (*Cheng shi lun* 成實論), translated by Kumārajīva in 411-412.

(4) Āryadeva's *Śataka-śāstra (*Bai lun* 百論), also translated by Kumārajīva.

(5) The **Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (*Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論), translated by Daotai (道泰) and Buddhavarman (佛陀跋摩) in 425-427.

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[8] The popularity of *yizhang* in the sixth-century Dilun school can be seen in the newly discovered Dunhuang manuscripts. See Aoki, *et al.*, 2012.

Doctrinal analysis

In the SLZY, Huiyuan lays out an exposition of the three *pramāṇa*s in the scholastic style. The essay as a whole is divided into three sections: (1) "Exposition of terminology", which defines the meaning and usage of the three *pramāṇa*s; (2) "Examination of characteristics", which gives further clarification; and (3) "Analysis in accordance with the ranks of cultivation", where issues of *pramāṇa* are placed in the context of meditative cultivation. The first two sections are often combined, as in many other entries in the DSYZ.

Instead of presenting Huiyuan's doctrine of *pramāṇa*s within his own hermeneutic framework, I will focus on Huiyuan's epistemology as it relates to ontology and meditation. For Huiyuan, epistemology and ontology will make no sense if they are not placed within the context of meditation. Hence, it is the main aim of this paper to demonstrate that only when the context of epistemology and meditation has been properly exposed are we able to fully understand the soteriological project in the early stage of Chinese Buddhist logico-epistemology.

In the first section of SLZY, Huiyuan elucidates the meaning of the *pramāṇa*s, treating *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āptāgama* respectively. In this discussion, he refers to Guṇabhadra's translation of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, Dharmakṣema's translation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and Kumārajīva's translation of the **Satyasiddhi-śāstra*. Based on these early texts, Huiyuan uses the term *liang* (量, "measure of cognition"), which is the Chinese rendering of *pramāṇa*, to refer to "the specific capacity of the discerning mind which apprehends the specific aspect of the object" (慧心取法，各有分限，故名為量; SLZY, T44:1851.670c7-8). That is, the mind with the various functions of discernment (*prajñā*), which is none other than the mind of cognition, apprehends specific aspects of the object of cognition. It is also called "*prajñā*-mind" (*huixin* 慧心) due to its capability to cognize with certainty at the stage of seeing (*darśana-mārga*) (DSYZ, T44:1851.642b, 672c). Once again, we note that by referring to the various stages of meditation the analysis of cognition is clearly conducted within the context of cultivational practice.

Perception

The first means of cognition is named *pratyakṣa*, which is rendered in Chinese by *xian* (現), with various connotations. In Huiyuan's own words, *pratyakṣa* is defined either as the immediate cognition (*xianzhi* 現知) of existents, or as the cognition of present existents (*xianfa* 現法).[9] Here we see the difference between Huiyuan's interpretation and Indian etymological exegesis. In India, as Masaaki Hattori points out, both the Naiyāyikas and Dignāga agreed that *pratyakṣa* is so named either because it is closely connected with (*prati*) each sense faculty, or because it is the function of each sense faculty (*akṣa*) toward (*prati*) its object. That is, *pratyakṣa* literally means what immediately appears to the sense faculty.[10] Although Indian etymological exegesis of this sort would have been beyond Huiyuan's knowledge, it is not surprising to see that his interpretation is not too far from the conventional Indian etymology of *pratyakṣa* as "direct apprehension" (*sākṣātkārijñāna*) (Chattopadhyay, 2007: 81-82).

Huiyuan further analyzes perception into two types. The first type of perception is cognition of a particular ("fact", "thing", *shi* 事), while the second type is cognition of a universal ("truth", "principle", *li* 理). Here we see the most striking peculiarity in Huiyuan's theory of knowledge, for he brings a pair of Sinitic notions, *li* and *shi*, to bear upon the theory of *pramāṇa*. As we will see below, the terms *li* and *shi* play a central role in Huiyuan's doctrinal system. Now, we have to bear in mind that this usage is not confined to Huiyuan's theory of knowledge; basically, this pair of ontological concepts was used by Chinese Buddhists to account for the theory of the Two Truths. In the context of SLZY, however, it is quite certain that the term *li* refers to the "universal" and the term *shi* refers to the "particular", as generally used in Indian epistemology. At

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[9] In other chapters, the term *xianfa* (現法) is taken to mean the object of *pratyakṣa* (*xianzhi* 現智), which is immediately present to perception. See *DSYZ*, T44:1581.642c, 756c.

[10] 現現別轉，故名現量 (NMukh, 3b.17) *akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam* (*pratyakṣa* is so named because it occurs in close connection with [*prati*] each sense faculty [*akṣa*]); Nyāya: *akṣasyâkṣasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam* ("*Pratyakṣa* is the function of each sense-organ [*akṣa*] toward [*prati*] its object") (Hattori, 1968: 76-77).

this point, we have to be cautious; reading Chinese phrases by merely tracing back to the Sanskrit "origin" is not enough, because we might lose the subtle nuances of terms that have been shaped by Chinese semantic contexts.

Huiyuan first treats perception as cognition of *shi* (the fact/thing, i.e. the particular), defining it as "cognition without the aid of inference and verbal testimony". It is obvious that this definition of *pratyakṣa* merely distinguishes it from the other means of valid cognition. Comparison shows that at least on the surface, this definition is reminiscent of Dignāga's definition in PS (V).I.3c-d: "Perception is free from conceptual construction, the association of name, genus, etc." (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ nāmajatyādiyojanā*) (Hattori, 1968: 25; Steinkellner, 2005), in which "free from conceptual construction" can be taken to match Huiyuan's "without the aid of inference", and "free from the association of name, genus, etc." corresponds to Huiyuan's "without the aid of verbal testimony". The difference is that Huiyuan was not as well-informed as Dignāga about the grammarians' and epistemological interpretations of *kalpanā* (conceptual construction).

Huiyuan goes on to define another aspect of perception as cognition of *li* (the universal), claiming that perception of *li* (the universal) occurs in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) only, while perception of *shi* (the particular) can occur in any realm and at any time. Now, the question arises: Why have these epistemological issues been brought into relation with the scheme of the *tridhātu*?

In answering this question, we should bear in mind that Huiyuan was quite well versed in Abhidharma literature. According to the Abhidharma teaching, the *tridhātu* system corresponds to various mental states, which are achieved in accordance with various levels of meditation; the various modes of contemplation take place at particular stages on this gradated path of practice. Huiyuan illustrates the perception of *li* by citing a passage from the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (translated by Buddhavarman and Daotai) which refers to the stage of *laukikāgra-dharma* (世第一法) just preceding the entry into the outflow-free *darśana-mārga*.[11] In the

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[11] The stage of *laukikāgra-dharma* belongs to the mundane realm, whereas the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) belongs to the trans-mundane realm.

stage of *laukikāgra-dharma* (and in three other stages, viz. *uṣmagata*, *mūrdhan*, and *kṣānti*) the practitioner is trained to contemplate sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the Four Noble Truths. In regard to the truth of suffering, for instance, four aspects of phenomena are taken as the objects of contemplation: that they are impermanent (*anitya*), suffering (*duḥkha*), void (*śūnya*), and selfless (*anātmaka*).[12] These sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths are also called "general marks" (*zongxiang* 總相) in the *Vibhāṣā*, whereas the nature of specific phenomena, such as the nature of *rūpa*, *vijñāna*, etc., is called "particular marks" (*biexiang* 別相).[13]

In the DSYZ, Huiyuan characterizes the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths as *li* (the universal), while characterizing individual object as *shi* (the particular), as can be seen in his exposition of the ten forms of knowledge (*jñāna*):

> According to the Abhidharma, "knowledge of suffering" refers to knowing the universal (*li* 理) comprising the four aspects of suffering by means of understanding (*prajñā*) with outflow (*sāsrava*). "Knowledge of the cause of suffering" refers to knowing the universal comprising the four aspects of the cause of suffering. "Knowledge of cessation" refers to knowing the universal comprising the four aspects of cessation. "Knowledge of the path" refers to knowing the universal comprising the four aspects of the path..." Dharma knowledge (*dharma-jñāna* 法智) and inferential knowledge" (*anvaya-jñāna* 比智) refers to knowing the universal (*li*) of the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths by means of the understanding without outflow. "Conventional knowledge" (*saṃvṛti-jñāna* 等智) refers to knowing either

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[12] Cf. Hirakawa, 1990: 210. The meaning of *ākāra* in this context is subject to various interpretations. Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti explains "*ākāra*" as "the mode of comprehending activity of the mind" which "results in a resemblance or reflection of the object in the mind". See Dhammajoti, 2007: 581; cf. Wayman, 1984: 117-127.

[13] *Abhidharmavibhāṣā*: "'Contemplation of the particular mark' is named for contemplation of the mark of form as form, up to contemplation of the mark of consciousness as consciousness, and contemplation of the mark of earth as solidness, up to contemplation of the mark of wind as fluidness. 'Contemplation of the general mark' is named for contemplation of the sixteen holy marks" (T28:1546.40a22-25). 別相觀者觀色是色相，乃至觀識是識相，觀地是堅相，乃至觀風是動相，是名別相觀。總相觀者十六聖行觀，是名總相觀.

the universal or particular [aspect] of all existents with outflow. Four types of mind in the stages of warmth (*uṣmagata*), etc., and the rest of conventional knowledge, which take the universal of the Noble Truths as the object of knowledge, are called "knowing the universal" (*zhi li* 知理), while the other types of knowledge are called "knowing the particular" (*zhi shi* 知事).[14]

It should be noted that Huiyuan here employs the Sinitic concepts, *li* and *shi*, to interpret these Abhidharma doctrines. The term *li* is used to refer to the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths as the universal characteristics of phenomena, while *shi* refers to phenomena which can be further defined by their different natures. *Li* and *shi* refer respectively to the two aspects of the object of meditation, the "universal" (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and the "particular" (*svalakṣaṇa*), as can be demonstrated by comparison of Huiyuan's treatment with Vasubandhu's account of the four methods of mindfulness in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*.[15] (Although the categories of universal and particular are applied to the analysis of the object of meditation in the Abhidharma literature, it seems that a theoretical account of corresponding parallels between the universal

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[14] *DSYZ*: 依如毘曇，以有漏慧知彼苦下四行之理，名為苦智。知彼集下四行之理，名為集智。知彼滅下四行之理，名為滅智。知彼道下四行之理，名為道智。以無漏慧知彼四諦十六行理，名法比智...以有漏慧知一切法，若理若事，名為等智。煖等四心及餘等智緣諦理者，名為知理，餘名知事 (T44:1851.760a-b). For the ten forms of knowledge, see Dhammajoti 2007: 319-322.

[15] Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, VI: "Verse: In order to practice mindfulness for contemplation that is based on the accomplished state of concentration, one contemplates one's own body, feelings, thoughts and concepts in terms of particular and universal. Comment: One practices the four kinds of mindfulness for *vipaśyanā* when he has accomplished the supreme *śamatha*. How does one practice the four kinds of mindfulness? Answer: One contemplates the universal aspect and the particular aspect of body, feelings, thoughts and concepts. 'The particular' refers to the specific nature (*svabhāva*) of body, feelings, thoughts and concepts. 'The universal' refers to the fact that: (1) all conditioned objects are by nature impermanent; (2) all defilements are unsatisfactory by nature; and (3) all objects are by nature empty and non-self." 頌曰：依已修成止 為觀修念住 以自相共相 觀身受心法 [...] 論曰：依已修成滿勝奢摩他。為毘鉢舍那修四念住。如何修習四念住耶。謂以自共相觀身受心法。身受心法各別自性名為自相。一切有為皆非常性。一切有漏皆是苦性。及一切法空非我性名為共相 (T29:1558.118c).

and inference, on the one hand, and the particular and perception, on the other, appeared no earlier than the age of Dignāga's epistemology.)

In his account of Buddhist epistemology, Huiyuan clearly states that each object of cognition consists of both *li* and *shi*. It is commonly grant-ed that *shi* refers to existents (*dharma*s) categorized as *skandha*s, *dhātu*s and *āyatana*s. As to *li*, according to Huiyuan's classification of the teach-ings (*panjiao* 判教), the Vaibhāṣikas hold that *li* refers to the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, while the Sautrāntikas, Mādhyamikas and Tathāgatagarbha thinkers each hold different theories.[16] (Huiyuan also investigates the ontology of *li* and *shi* in his analysis of the Twofold Truth. We will come back to this issue later.[17]) In the context of the clas-

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[16] *DSYZ*: "In the fourth section [of the exposition], the realm of the object will be examined first and then the exposition of cognition will follow. The object [of cognition] consists of two kinds: the thing/particular (*shi*) and the principle/universal (*li*). 'The thing/particular' refers to the aggregates (*skandha*), realms (*dhātu*), bases (*āyatana*), and so forth. As for the principle/universal, there is no fixed theory. Accord-ing to the Abhidharma, the sixteen holy aspects are named principle/universal. The sixteen holy aspects are explained above in detail. Under the category of suffering, there are four subcategories: suffering [itself], impermanence, emptiness, and no-self. Under the category of the arising of suffering, there are four [subcategories]: the cause [of suffering], the gathering [of karmic fruits], coming into existence, and conditions. Under the category of cessation, there are four [subcategories]: cessation [itself], calming, sublimity, and detachment. Under the category of the path, there are four [subcategories]: the path [itself], accordance [with correct principle], trace, and vehic-le. According to the *Satyasiddhi*, the principle/universal (*li*) means that all objects are linguistic designations for all that arises with causes and conditions, i.e., all things that are empty of self-nature. According to the Mahāyāna teachings, the principle/univer-sal refers to the twofold truth: 'conventional truth' refers to that which exists in causes and conditions, whereas 'ultimate truth' refers to that which does not exist in causes and conditions. 'Principle/universal' also refers to the one principle of reality, i.e., the nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, which is neither existence nor nonexistence. This is the exposition of the object of cognition." 第四門中辨其境界，後約智論。境別有二。一事、二理。陰界入等，名之為事。理則不定。依如毘曇，十六聖行，名之為理。十六聖行，廣如上辨。苦下有四，謂苦、無常、空與無我。集下有四，因集有緣。滅下有四，滅止妙出。道下有四，道如迹乘。若依成實說，一切法因緣假有，無性之空，方名為理。大乘法中因緣有無名二諦理，非有非無如來藏性為一實理。境別如是（T44:1581.760a).

[17] *DSYZ*: "As to the principle/universal and the thing/particular, the distinction of phe-nomena into *skandha*s, *dhātu*s, and *āyatana*s is designated as conventional truth,

sification of teachings Huiyuan analyzes different accounts of the various modes of perception that occur at the different stages of meditation:

(1) the Vaibhāṣika Theory: "'Perception' is named for the vividness of perception in the realm of desire only. In the realm of desire, there are two kinds of perception. The first is called 'perception detached from desire', while the second is called 'direct perception by oneself'."

(2) the Sautrāntika Theory: "According to the teaching in the *Satyasiddhi*, perception is analyzed into two types in terms of time: The first type of perception refers to the contemplation of the non-substantiality of *prajñapti* right at the initial stage of practice, which is conducted during the present moment before the Realization of Truth (*dṛṣṭa-satya*, *jiandi* 見諦). The second type of perception refers to intuition of the principle of emptiness (*kongli* 空理) in the existents of the past, the present and the future, which occurs after the Realization of Truth."

(3) the Mahāyāna Theory: "Perception is analyzed in terms of the four stages of meditation.

  i) "At the initial stage of meditation, perception refers to the seeing of the *tathatā* of present existents in the realm of desire.

  ii) "At the subsequent stage of meditation, perception refers to either the seeing of the *tathatā* of existents in the realm of desire in the past, the present and the future, or to the seeing of the *tathatā* of present existents in the three realms.

  iii) "At the completion of meditation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of the *tathatā* of all existents by the practitioner himself in all three time-periods.

  iv) "At the cessation of meditation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of all existents in the three time-periods during

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whereas the principle as the general characteristics of the sixteen holy aspects is taken as the ultimate truth" 言理事者，陰界入等事相差別說為世諦，十六聖行通相之理以為真諦 (T44:1581.484a).

the stage of awakening (*bodhi*), whether by oneself or by others."

In the above account, the theory of perception is further explained according to the classification of teachings. Although each teaching has its own theory of perception, they all agree in analyzing perception in terms of the stages of meditation, which are arranged according to different teachings.

Inference

Huiyuan defines "inference" as "knowing *dharma*s through analogical reasoning (*pidu* 譬度)". Nothing about this definition looks peculiar. What is peculiar is that, unlike Dignāga, Huiyuan once more includes *both* the universal/principle (*li*) and the particular/thing (*shi*) as the object of inference. As in the above exposition of perception, Huiyuan explains the inferential cognition of the particular first, claiming that it is the cognition of existents that are known through inference in any realm and any time. Then, Huiyuan proceeds to explain the inferential cognition of the universal, using the hermeneutical framework of the classification of teachings. (1) According to the Abhidharma, inference refers to cognition of the universal (*li*) of the Four Noble Truths in the upper realms (the realm of form and the formless realm) only. (2) According to the **Satyasiddhi*, inference refers to the cognition of the non-substantiality of conventional existents (*prajñapti*, *jia* 假) in the past and the future, which takes place before the path of insight. (3) According to Mahāyāna doctrine, inference can be further analyzed in accordance with the three progressive stages of meditation. In the process of cultivation, the practitioner is trained to inferentially cognize Suchness (*tathatā*) either in other realms, or in other time-periods, through his knowledge of truth in the realm of desire. In the final state of enlightenment, by contrast, one does not need any inference to cognize the truth; one intuitively perceives the truth. In short, for Huiyuan, inference is mainly conceived as the means for cognizing Suchness (*tathatā*), which is the same as *li*, during the progressive course of cultivation.

Huiyuan goes on to analyze the method of inference into three types: (1) The first type of inference is called "analogy from the same species". That is, through knowing one item in a given category, one analogically knows the rest of the items in the same category. (2) The second type of inference is called "giving a case of lower quality in order to know other cases of higher quality". For instance, one uses copper as an analogy for those who have never seen gold. (3) The third type of inference is called "giving a case of higher quality in order to know other cases of lower quality". For instance, one uses gold as an example for those who have never seen copper. Another example is that in the scriptures, the hypothetical case of a king being sentenced to death is taken as an example for knowing neither the existence nor the non-existence of supreme *nirvāṇa*.[18]

Under the first type of inference, "analogy from the same species", Huiyuan lists three sub-types, which are adopted from Qingmu's (青目 *Piṅgala) account of *pramāṇa* theory as preserved in the *Zhong lun* (*Commentary* on *MMK*). (In the SLZY, Huiyuan obviously mistakes Āryadeva's *Śata-śāstra* for Qingmu's *Zhong lun*.) The three sub-modes of inference are listed as follows:

(1) Inference from part to whole (**śeṣavat*, *rucan* 如殘). For instance, one can infer the saltiness of the water of the entire ocean by tasting the saltiness of a single drop. For another instance, one can infer that all existents are characterized by suffering, impermanence, emptiness and no-self, by cognizing these same characteristics in one existent.

(2) Inference from effect to cause (**pūrvavat*, *ruben* 如本). For instance, when one sees the smoke from a fire, he knows that there must be fire whenever there is smoke.

(3) Inference from common relation (**sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, *gongxiang bizhi* 共相比知). For instance, someone observes the movement of a man from the east to the west. When he similarly observes the movement of the sun in the sky from the east to the west, he then analogically

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18 That is to say, the impossibility of characterizing *nirvāṇa* is similar to the impossibility of prosecuting the King for a capital crime.

infers that the sun also moves, like human beings. For another instance, someone observes the impermanence of material form (*rūpa*) by observing the production and destruction of that [same] material form. He then infers the impermanence of conception, feelings, volitions, etc., by observing the production and destruction of these same elements.

We know that the above three sub-types of inference, as recorded in the oldest Chinese translations of Indian texts, namely the *Zhong lun*, the *Upāyahṛdaya* (*Fangbian xin lun* 方便心論) and the *Suvarṇasaptati-śāstra* (*Jin qishi lun* 金七十論), are also found in parallel sources in the *Nyāya-sūtra*s and Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (Ui, 1944: 71-72; Katsura, 1998: 36-39; Potter, 1977: 184, 223, 242; Jhā, 1983: 153-155). Although there is some discrepancy and inconsistency of interpretation among these texts, it is quite certain that the old theory of inference found in the early Chinese translations was inherited from pan-Indian logical sources which were accepted in common by the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas and the Sāṃkhyas.

Authoritative teaching

The third means of valid cognition is authoritative teaching (*āptāgama*). Unlike Dignāga, who incorporated *āgama/śabda* as part of the inference, Huiyuan still holds fast to the independent value of authoritative teaching handed down from the tradition. He defines "authoritative teaching" as "that by which one knows profound *dharma*s that it is beyond one's own capability to learn". By means of this third *pramāṇa* of authoritative teaching, one is, once again, able to know both *li* and *shi*; and once again, *li* and *shi* are viewed in the theoretical framework of the Two Truths. Knowledge of *shi*, whether acquired by perception, inference, or authoritative teaching, belongs to the conventional realm. On the other hand, knowledge of *li* belongs to the trans-conventional realm.

In terms of its application, Huiyuan emphasizes that authoritative teaching (*āgama*) allows us to penetrate the most profound teachings, such as the teaching of Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha*, which is regarded by Huiyuan as the most profound teaching. It seems that Huiyuan

endorses the value of authoritative teaching simply for the reason that he wants to make sense of the seemingly unfathomable thought of *tathāgatagarbha*.

Concluding remarks

How did Huiyuan contextualize his understanding of *pramāṇavāda* with the very limited sources available in sixth-century China? As probably the first Chinese scholar-monk to systematize Indian Buddhist epistemology, Huiyuan did not construct his knowledge of *pramāṇavāda* by means of hermeneutic speculation only. In his efforts at systematization, rather, he relied upon the textual and doctrinal sources available to him. Huiyuan arranges those Buddhist doctrines, ranging from Abhidharma to Yogācāra, and from Madhyamaka to Tathāgatagarbha, according to a peculiarly Sinitic mode of classification (*panjiao*). In this regard, Huiyuan can be counted as one of the pioneers in creating a Buddhist hermeneutics of reading and practice. Unlike Dignāga, who attempted to lay down logic and epistemology as the *universal foundation* for all Indian philosophical systems, including Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Huiyuan rather attempted to demonstrate that epistemology is relative to the various stages of intellectual and spiritual cultivation. Everything, including cognition, is condition-dependent. Hence, perception for the beginner in the path of mental cultivation is naturally different from perception for the practitioner at an advanced stage. The same is true for inference and authoritative teaching. For Huiyuan, then, *pramāṇa*s are indeed *instruments* to soteriological ends. They cannot be taken as autonomous domains and universal disciplines, as we see logic and epistemology are treated as modern academic fields of inquiry. In this sense, Huiyuan did preserve the authentic intent of Indian Buddhist epistemology.

The most striking feature of Huiyuan's *pramāṇa* theory is that it brings into epistemological discourse the ontological categories of *li* and *shi* ("particular" and "universal", but with special Chinese overtones). Huiyuan's application of this hermeneutics of *li* and *shi* to the epistemological enterprise might appear to make for a classic proof-case for the theory of Sinification; he might be regarded as simply looking at Indic materials through a Sinitic lens. On such an interpretation, the on-

tological terminology of *li* and *shi*, which are deliberately employed by Huiyuan as equivalents to the notions of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, would constitute strong evidence in support of the theory of Sinification. However, before we jump to this conclusion, we should carefully examine Huiyuan's ontology of *li* and *shi* in detail.

To anticipate my conclusion, Huiyuan's *pramāṇa* theory can be seen as the result of a dialectical interplay between Sinification and Indianization. The main reason we might ascribe Huiyuan's project to Sinification is the fact that he adopts typical Sinitic terms, especially *li* and *shi*, equivalents of which had never been seen in Indian Buddhist systems. However, as we have seen in detail above, Huiyuan is justified in employing the notions of *li* and *shi* by his move in viewing the problem of *pramāṇa*s within the context of the progressive course of meditation as described in the Abhidharma literature. *Li* refers to the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, while *shi* refers to the individual object of meditation. In virtue of this move, instead of reading Indian literature through a Sinitic lens, Huiyuan arguably reads conversely: that is, he reframes the semantics of *li* and *shi* in the terms of an Indian Buddhist context. As we have seen above, the categories of *li* and *shi* and the categories of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are taken to be compatible with each other. This is, then, a case of Indianization.

On the other hand, the phenomenon of Sinification did take place at the level of the very basis of Huiyuan's hermeneutical project, namely, the framework of *panjiao*, or "classification of teachings". If we do not take Huiyuan's hermeneutical project of *panjiao* into account, we cannot properly understand the theory of *pramāṇa*s in SLZY. That is to say, Huiyuan's theory of cognition should be viewed from the perspective of his ontology.

As can be seen in the chapter on the Two Truths (*erdi* 二諦) in the DSYZ, Huiyuan deals with the problem of the ontological relationship between *li* and *shi*, or between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, within the hermeneutical framework of *panjiao*. He examines the relationship between *li* and *shi* in four Buddhist schools. Briefly, according to Huiyuan's account, the relationship between *li* and *shi* is treated by the Sarvāstivādins as indeterminate; on the one hand, they are identical, because *li* is the ontological principle of the variety of phenomena (*shi*); on the other

hand, however, they are different, because phenomena (*shi*) are not un-conditioned existents. For the Sautrāntikas, *li* and *shi* are conceived as both identical and different; they are differentiated, because *shi* exists as convention (psycho-linguistic construction, *prajñapti*), and is therefore not ultimately empty in the sense of *li*. For the Mādhyamikas, *li* and *shi* are regarded as completely identical. Finally, for the Tathāgatagarbha school, the relationship between *li* and *shi* is conceived in terms of *ti* (體 substance) and *yong* (用 function). Ontologically, principle (*li*) serves as the transcendental ground of phenomena (*shi*). The relationship between *li* and *shi* is also conceived to be both identical and different on the Tathāgatagarbha interpretation (DSYZ, T44:1851.485).

We might be tempted to speculatively identify the Sinitic and the Indic ways of thinking with ontological and epistemological thinking re-spectively. If we adopt this view, then Huiyuan's system demonstrates the feasibility of creatively weaving both Sinitic ontology and Indic epis-temology into one system. This possibility may provide a clue toward an answer to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter, namely: Is it justifiable for both *li* and *shi* to be taken as the object of cognition for each of the *pramāṇa*s, namely, perception, inference and authoritative teaching?

The seeds of a resolution of this apparent difficulty may lie in the fact that, quite apart from factors proper to Indic systems, *li* and *shi* are al-ways considered by Huiyuan as ontologically both identical and different. For Dignāga, however, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *svalakṣaṇa* (or *li* and *shi*) should be kept strictly separate, because according to the theory of the Two Truths that he adopted from the Abhidharma, *svalakṣaṇa* is con-ceived as ultimately real, while *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is conceived as merely *prajñapti-sat*.[19] This means that according to Huiyuan's classification, Dignāga would be considered as still belonging to the lowest rank of teaching, namely the teaching of *svabhāva* (*li xing zong* 立性宗), while Huiyuan considers his own position to be the final teaching, that of disclosing reality (*xian shi zong* 顯實宗). For Huiyuan, the enterprise of

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[19] Dan Arnold contends that Dignāga "retains the basically Ābhidharmika notion of the 'two truths'" as a basis for the ontological separation of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Arnold, 2005: 23.

epistemology should be taken only as a step on the path to the full dis-
closure of ontological reality.

Appendix: English translation of Huiyuan's *Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition*

大乘義章   *Treatise on the Meanings of the Great Vehicle*
遠法師撰   Dharma Master Yuan

三量智義三門分別（釋名義一　辨相二　就位分別三）
Threefold Analysis of the Three Means of Valid Cognition (Exposition of Terminology, Examination of Characteristics, and Analysis According to the Ranks of Cultivation)

第一釋名   *1   Exposition of terminology*

三量之義出於《相續解脫經》中。慧心取法，各有分限，故名為量。量別不同，一門說三。一是現量，二是比量，三是教量。《地持》《成實》，亦有此相。《地持》說言，現智、比智及從師同聞。《成實論》言，見、聞及比，猶此三矣。

The meaning of the three means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is found in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*.[20] These are termed "means of valid cognition" because each [aspect of] cognitive mind apprehends the specific aspect of objects. Regarding the number of the means of valid cognition, there are different theories. One theory holds that it [i.e., the means of valid cognition] can be divided into three types: (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inference (*anumāna*) and (3) scripture (*āptāgama*). This typology is also seen in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the **Satyasiddhi-śāstra*. In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, [the three means of valid cognition are named as] perceptual knowledge (*xianzhi* 現智), inferential knowledge (*bizhi* 比智) and [the knowledge of] hearing from the teacher (*cong shi tong wen* 從師

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[20] In the *Xiangxu jietuo rulaisuozuo suishunchu liaoyi jing* 相續解脫如來所作隨順處了義經 (**Saṃdhinirmocanatathāgatakṛtyānuṣṭhānanītārtha-sūtra*), trans., Guṇabhadra, three types of *pramāṇa* are listed: perception (*xianqianliang* 現前量), inference (*biliang* 比量), and testimony (*xinyanliang* 信言量) (T16:679.679b5-6).

同聞).[21] According to the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*, the three are called "seeing" (*jian* 見), "hearing" (*wen* 聞) and "inferring" (*bi* 比).[22]

> 言現量者，現知諸法，名為現量。又知現法，亦名為現。於中分別，
> 有其二種。一者知事，二者知理。言知事者，隨在何時何處法中，
> 不因比度，不藉他言，而能知者，同名現量；事相麁近，隨在何時
> 何處之中能現知故。言知理者，毘曇法中，就處分別，知欲界法，
> 名之為現。

Regarding perception (*pratyakṣa*), it is so named because [it refers to] the *immediate* cognition of objects. It is also named "perception" (*xian* 現) for the reason that it refers to cognition of *present* objects (*xianfa* 現法). Perception can be further analyzed into two types: (1) cognition of the particular/thing (*shi* 事), and (2) cognition of the universal/principle (*li* 理). Regarding "cognition of the particular/thing", the cognition of objects in any time and any place without the aid of reasoning and verbal testimony is also named "perception", because the characteristics of the particular/thing are coarse and near (i.e., observable), and can be immediately perceived anytime and anywhere. In terms of "cognition of the universal/principle", according to the Abhidharma theory of place (*chu* 處), "perception" is so named because it refers to the cognition of objects in the realm of desire.

> 以何義故，知欲界法，偏名為現？《毘婆沙》云：得正決定必在欲
> 界，要先見於欲界苦等，後見上界。良以欲界法麁易見，故先見之。
> 先見分了，故偏名現。上界不爾，故知上界不名為現。又復行者於
> 欲界苦有二現見：一、離欲現見，以離欲道現照知故；二、自身現
> 見，欲界之苦身現覺故。於上界苦但有一種，離欲現見，身不在彼，
> 不覺知故。如兩擔物，一則自擔，二使人擔。於自所擔，有二現見：
> 一知是物，二知輕重。知欲界苦，其狀似此。於他所擔，但有一種

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[21] *Pusadichi jing* (菩薩地持經 *Bodhisattvabhūmi*), trans. Dharmakṣema (T30:1581.893a).

[22] *Chengshilun* (成實論 *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*), trans., Kumārajīva: "Question: What is the distinction between seeing, hearing, comprehension, and knowing? Answer: There are three reliable sources (*xin* 信 = *pramāṇa*). Seeing is termed 'perception' (*xian zaixin* 現在信). Hearing is termed 'testimony' (*xin xiansheng yu* 信賢聖語). Knowing is termed 'inference' (*bizhi* 比知). Comprehension is termed the discernment of the three reliable sources of cognition." 問曰：見聞覺知，有何差別？答曰：有三種信。見名現在信，聞名信賢聖語，知名比知，覺名分別三種信慧 (T32:1646.304a).

知物現見，不知輕重，上界如是。以知欲界，其二現故，偏名為現。
上界唯一，故不名現。

In what sense is "perception" specifically named for the cognition of objects in the realm of desire only? It is stated in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (T28:1546.10c, 303c) that correct certainty (*samyaktvaniyata*, *zhengjueding* 正決定) must be attained in the realm of desire. A practitioner is able to perceive [suffering and so forth] in the upper realms only after he has perceived suffering and so forth in the realm of desire. One perceives the objects in the realm of desire first, for the reason that they are coarse and easy to perceive (i.e., observable). "Perception" is so named specifically due to the vividness of initial perception. Due to the lack of vividness in the upper realms, knowledge in the upper realms is not named "perception".

Further, the practitioner has two types of perception of suffering in the realm of desire: The first is called "perception detached from desire" (*li yu xianjian* 離欲現見) for the reason that [suffering] is immediately cognized in the path of detaching from desire. The second is called "direct perception by oneself" (*zishen xianjian* 自身現見) for the reason that suffering in the realm of desire is perceived by oneself. Regarding suffering in the upper realms, there is only one type of perception, that which is detached from desire, because the physical body is not in that [i.e., pain]. This is just as there are two ways of carrying an object: one way is to carry the object yourself, while the other way is to ask someone to carry the object for you. With respect to an object that you are carrying yourself, there are two forms of perception: one is perception of the object, while the other is perception of its weight. The situation when we cognize suffering in the realm of desire is similar to this. As for an object that is being carried by someone else, there is only one form of perception, i.e., perception of the object, without the awareness of its weight. The same is true in the upper realms. Accordingly, perception is so named for two types of perception [i.e., perception detached from desire and perception by oneself] in the realm of desire. Since there is only one type of perception in the upper realms, it is therefore not named "perception".

《成實》法中，約時分別。彼現有二，一據修始，見諦已前，現在時中，觀假無性，名之為現。二據修成，見諦已上，三世法中，現見空理，同名為現。大乘通就時處分別，義釋有四：一據修始，唯於欲界現在法中見諸法如，名為現量。欲界現法易觀察故。二者修次，或於欲界見三世如，或於三界見現在如，同名現量。三者修成，於自分中現見三世一切法如，悉名現量。四據修息，到菩提時現見三世一切諸法，皆名現量。不簡自分他分之別。故《地持》言：諸佛如來於一切法現知見覺，現量如是。

According to the teaching in the *Satyasiddhi, perception is analyzed into two forms in terms of time: The first form of perception refers to the contemplation of the non-substantiality of *prajñapti* right at the initial stage of cultivation, which is conducted during the present moment before the [the moment of] Insight into the Truth (*jiandi* 見諦). The second form of perception refers to intuition of the Principle of Emptiness (*kongli* 空理) in the objects of the past, the present and the future, which occurs after the Realization of Truth. This is also termed "perception".

According to the Mahāyāna exposition in terms of time and place, perception refers to that which takes place at four stages:

(1) At the initial stage of cultivation, perception refers to seeing present objects as they are (*tathatā*) in the realm of desire, for it is easier to investigate present objects in the realm of desire.

(2) At the subsequent stage of cultivation, perception refers either to seeing the *tathatā* of objects in the realm of desire in the past, the present and the future, or to seeing the *tathatā* of present objects in the three realms.

(3) At the completion of cultivation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of the *tathatā* of all objects by the practitioner himself in all three time-periods.

(4) At the cessation of cultivation, perception refers to the intuitive seeing of all objects in three time-periods during the stage of awakening (*bodhi*), either by oneself or by another. Hence it says in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that the Buddhas are directly aware of all *dharmas*.

Thus is explained perception.

言比量者，譬度知法，名之為比。於中分別，亦有二種。一者知事，二者知理。言知事者，隨在何時何處法中比度而知，悉名比量。言知理者，毘曇法中，約處分別，知上二界四諦之理，名為比量。《成實》法中，約時分別，見諦已前，過未法中，觀假無性，名為比量。大乘通就時處分別，義釋有三：一據修始，以彼欲界現在法如，比知他界他世法如，名為比量。二據修次，或以欲界三世法如，比上二界，或以三界現在法如，比知過未，名為比量。三據修成，以自分中所知三界三世法如，比他分中未所見處三界三世一切法如，名為比量。以何義故不說修息？到菩提時，無復比故。然此比量，經中亦名譬喻量也。通釋是一，於中分別，同類相比，名為比量；異類相比，名譬喻量。

As to inference, it refers to the knowing of *dharma*s through analogy and reasoning, which can be analyzed into two kinds: (1) knowing the particular/thing and (2) knowing the universal/principle. Regarding "knowing the particular/thing", knowing objects anytime and anywhere through reasoning is named "inference". Regarding "knowing the universal/principle", according to the Abhidharma theory of place, "inference" is so named because it refers to reasoning that knows the universal aspect of the Four Truths in the two upper realms. According to the *Satyasiddhi*'s analysis in terms of time, inference refers to the contemplation of the non-substantiality of *prajñapti* in the objects of the past and the future right before the [the moment of] Insight into the Truth.

According to the Mahāyāna exposition in terms of time and place, inference refers to that which takes place in three stages:

(1) At the initial stage of cultivation, inference is named for that which analogically knows the *tathatā* of objects in other realms and time-periods by knowing the *tathatā* of present objects in the realm of desire.

(2) At the subsequent stage of cultivation, inference is named either for that which analogically knows [the *tathatā* of objects in the three time-periods] in the two upper realms through knowing the *tathatā* of objects in the three time-periods in the realm of desire, or for that which analogically knows [the *tathatā* of objects] in the past and the future through knowing the *tathatā* of objects in the present in all three realms.

(3) At the completion of cultivation, inference refers to analogically knowing the *tathatā* of all objects in the three realms and the three time-periods, which has not been realized by others, through one's own knowledge of the *tathatā* of objects in the three realms and the three time-periods.

[Question:] For what reason is the cessation of cultivation not included [in the Mahāyāna exposition of inference]? [Answer:] It is because there is no inference at the stage of awakening. However, according to the *sūtra*s, inference is also called "analogy" (*upamā*, *piyu liang* 譬喻量). Generally speaking, both are the same. On further analysis, however, inference is named for inferring analogically between members of the same species, while analogy is named for inferring analogically between members of different species.

言教量者，有法玄絕，自力不知，藉教以通，名為教量。於中分別，亦有二種：一者知事，二者知理。於世諦中，藉教知者，名為知事。二諦理中，藉教知者，名為知理。此之教量法中亦名信言量也。通釋是一，於中分別，法隣自分，藉言入者，名信言量。法大玄絕，依教知者，名為教量。有人就此分量為四：現量為一，比量為二，教量為三，信言為四。此亦無傷，但非經論名義如是。

Regarding teaching (*āgama*) as a means of valid cognition, this refers to those teachings by which one knows profound *dharma*s that it would be beyond one's capacity to learn on one's own. It can be further analyzed into two forms: (1) knowing the particular/thing (*shi*) and (2) knowing the universal/principle (*li*). The knowledge of the particular/thing refers to the conventional truth (*saṁvṛti-satya*) which is attained through teachings. The knowledge of universal/principle refers to those universals/principles of the Two Truths which are attained through teachings.

Teachings in this sense are also called "verbal testimony" (*xinyan liang* 信言量). Generally speaking, these two are the same. If we analyze more precisely, "verbal testimony" refers to those words by which one is led to apprehend *dharma*s that are close to one's own [knowledge], while "authoritative teaching" refers to that by which one is led to know profound and unfathomable *dharma*s. Accordingly, some classify means of valid cognition into four types: (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) autho-

ritative teaching and (4) testimony. Although this classification does no harm, it is not the way the scriptures and treatises define things.

次辨其相   *2   Analysis of characteristics*

現量可知，比量有三：一、同類相比。相似之法，以此比餘。如《百論》中，義別有三：一者如殘，如人海中取一滴水，嘗之知鹹，則知餘者一切皆鹹。亦如有人於一法中見苦、無常、空、無我等，知餘皆爾，如是一切。二者如本，如人先曾見火有煙，後見餘煙，必知有火。亦如有人曾見諸法無常故苦，後見法苦，必知無常。如是一切。三共相比知，如似人見從東至西人有行動，類天上日從東至西，當知亦動[23]。亦如有人見色生滅，色性無常，後見其餘想受行等，有生滅故，性亦無常。如是一切。此三合為同類比也。二、以劣比勝，如國無金，用鍮比之。亦如經中以世虛空不生不滅比況佛性。如是一切。三、以勝比劣，如國無鍮，將金比之。亦如經中以大涅槃非有非無，譬王殺罪。如是一切。此後兩門通釋，亦是共相比也，少分同故，比量如是。

First, perception, which requires no further analysis.

Second, inference is of three types:

(1) Analogy from the same species. That is, by knowing one example in a category of similar objects, one analogically knows the remaining objects. As is pointed out in *The Treatise in One Hundred Verses* (*Śata-śāstra, Bai lun* 百論), there are three such modes of inference:[24]

i)   The first mode is called "inference from part to whole" (*śeṣavat, rucan* 如殘).[25] For instance, someone infers the saltiness of the water of the entire ocean by tasting the saltiness of a single drop. For another instance, someone infers that all objects are characterized by suffering, impermanence, emptiness and non-self by cognizing [these same characteristics] in one object.

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[23]   This form of analogical reasoning is found in Vaiśeṣika. Cf., Takemura 1986: 7.

[24]   Huiyuan misidentified the textual source. The correct source is seen in Kumārajīva's translation of *The Middle Treatise* (*Zhong lun*), T30:1564.24b.

[25]   Cf. Schuster, 1972.

ii) The second mode is called "inference from effect to cause" (*_pūrvavat_, _ruben_ 如本). For instance, when someone sees the smoke that comes from a fire, he knows that there must be fire whenever there is smoke, and so on for all objects. For another instance, when someone knows that all objects are characterized by suffering because they are impermanent, he comes to know that a certain object must be impermanent when he sees that the same object is characterized by suffering, and so on for all objects.

iii) The third mode is called "inference from common relation" (*_sāmānyatodṛṣta_, _gongxiang bizhi_ 共相比知). For instance, someone observes a man moving from the east to the west. He then analogically infers (_lei_ 類) that the sun must also move, because he has also observed the sun shift its position in the sky from the east to the west. For another instance, someone observes the impermanence of material form (_rūpa_) by observing the production and destruction of the [same] material form. He then infers the impermanence of conception, feeling, volition, etc. through observing the production and destruction of these same elements; and similarly for all cases.

The above three modes are named "analogy from the same species".

(2) The second mode of inference is called "giving an example of lower quality for other cases of higher quality". For instance, one uses copper as an analogy for those who have never seen gold. Another instance is that in the scriptures the Buddha-nature is made known by using the analogy of the non-production and non-destruction of space; and similarly for all cases.

(3) The third mode of inference is called "giving an example of higher quality for other cases of lower quality". For instance, one uses gold as an example for those who have never seen copper. Another example is that in the scriptures, the fact that supreme _nirvāṇa_ neither exists nor does not exist is taken as a case similar to the case of a king being sentenced to death ; and similarly for all cases.

The last two modes of analogy are also subsumed under the general category of "analogy between two parties", for both parties share a common feature. Thus is explained the inference.

次辨教量，義別有三：一、異時法，藉教以知，如過未法不現見故，因說方知。二、異處法，藉教以知，如他方事不現見故，因說乃知。三者、同時同處之法，藉教以知，如說身中如來性等。教量如是。此教量中所知不定，或深勝法，藉教方知，如彼佛性涅槃道等。或中間法，藉教方知，如苦集等。或麁淺法，藉教方知，如世間中難識事等(此二門竟)。

Third, the teaching as a means of cognition can be analyzed into three types:

(1) Objects in another time can be known through teaching. For instance, the objects of the past and the future can be known only through teaching, because they are not directly perceived.

(2) Objects in another place can be known through teaching. For instance, objects in another place can be known only through hearsay, because they are not directly perceived.

(3) For that which exists in the same time and the same place, teachings can also be required for cognition, such as when it is explained that the nature of the Tathāgata [exists] in the body.

Thus is explained the teaching as a means of cognition.

That which is known by the teaching as the means of cognition varies in nature. Some profound *dharma*s can only be known through the teaching, such as Buddha-nature, *nirvāṇa*, the path, etc.[26] Some *dharma*s of middling quality, such as suffering, the causes of suffering, etc., can [also] be known only through the teaching. Some superficial and coarse *dharma*s, such as points in the mundane world that can be known only with difficulty, can [also] be known only through teaching.

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[26] "Indeterminate" (*buding* 不定) means "not determined in time and place".

次就位別　　*3*　　*Analysis* [*of* Pramāṇa] *in terms of the rank of cultivation*

位謂習種、性種、解行、十地、佛地。於此位中，辨義有三。一、
開始合終，習種為一，性種為二，解行已上合為第三，同觀如故。
於此門中，或以三位共望一法以辨三量。所謂望於解行已上所觀之
法，習種望彼，是其教量。在彼玄絕，藉教知故。性種望彼，是其
比量。位分相隣，可比知故。解行已上，望自所得，是其現量，現
證知故。或以一位別望三法以辨三量。習種還望自所證法是其現量，
現證知故。望性種地所證之法是其比量，位分相隣，可比知故。望
解行上所證之法是其教量，法玄絕故。向前門中教淺現深，於此門
中現淺教深。或以三位別望三法。向前三位自望所得皆是現量，是
則現量是通深淺。

"Rank" refers to [the rank of cultivation attained by]: (1) the *gotra*
formed by learning (*xizhong* 習種, *samudānītaṃ gotram*); (2) the *gotra*
formed by nature (*xingzhong* 性種, *prakṛtisthaṃ gotram*); (3) determinate
comprehension [of the trans-mundane path] (*jiexing* 解行, *adhimukti-
caryā*); (4) the ten stages (*bhūmi*); and (5) the stage of Buddhahood. There
are three ways of analyzing the meaning [of *pramāṇa*] in terms of rank-
ing.

First, the five ranks can be re-arranged into three. The rank of the
gotra formed by learning and the rank of the *gotra* formed by nature
remain unchanged, while Ranks 3, 4 and 5 are combined as one, for all of
the [last] three take *tathatā* as the object of contemplation. According to
this mode of ranking, on one interpretation, the three *pramāṇa*s can be
explained with reference to an object [of contemplation] common to [all]
three ranks [Ranks 1, 2 and 3-5 respectively]. That is to say, from the
perspective of the *gotra* formed by learning [Rank 1], the object of con-
templation in Ranks 3-5 is taken as [the object known through] the
teaching as a means of cognition, because it is so profound that it can be
apprehended only through teaching; from the perspective of the *gotra*
formed by nature [Rank 2], the object of contemplation in Ranks 3-5 is
taken as the [object known through the] inference as a means of cog-
nition, because that rank is close to the next rank and can know it by
inference; [whereas] from the perspective of determinate comprehen-
sion and beyond [Ranks 3-5], their own object of contemplation is taken

as the [object perceived by] perception as a means of cognition, because it is directly perceived.

On an alternate interpretation, the three *pramāṇa*s can be explained with reference to viewing separately three [different] objects [of contemplation] from the perspective of a single [given] rank. That is to say, the *gotra* formed by learning reflectively views by perception the object which it directly perceives itself, because it is directly perceived; [the same *gotra*] views by inference the object perceived by the *gotra* formed by nature, because the ranks are close to each other, and [that object] therefore can be known by analogical inference; [the same *gotra*] views by means of the teaching the object perceived by determinate comprehension and beyond [i.e., Ranks 3-5], for the object is profound and unfathomable. [Similarly], as the stage of cultivation advances, the teaching becomes shallower, while perception deepens;[27] however, in this stage, perception is [yet] shallow, while the teaching is deep.

On yet another interpretation, [the three *pramāṇa*s can be explained with reference to] separately viewing three objects of contemplation from the perspective of the three [re-arranged] ranks of cultivation. From the perspective of the advanced three ranks, [the object attained at each stage itself respectively] is [known by] perception. Accordingly, perception [in the three ranks] is common to all ranks of cultivation, whether shallow or profound.

二、開中間以合初後。如《地持》說，習種性種，合之為一，種子同故。解行為二，初地已上合為第三，同證如故。於此門中亦得三位共望一法，望初地上所證之法，種性位中是其教量，解行比量，地上現量。亦得一位別望三法，亦得三位別望三法。類上可知。

In the second analysis, the first two ranks and the last two ranks are combined as one respectively, while the middle is left unchanged. As is mentioned in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (T30:1581.888a), the rank of the *gotra* formed by learning and the rank of the *gotra* formed by nature are combined as one [rank], because they are equally rooted in seeds. [According to this re-arrangement,] *adhimukti-caryā* is the second rank. The

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27 That is to say, the portion of knowledge as a whole attained by direct perception grows ever larger, while the portion attained through the teaching dwindles.

first *bhūmi* and beyond are combined as the third rank, because they all perceive *tathatā*. According to this mode of analysis, also, the same object of contemplation can be viewed from the [perspective of all] three ranks; from the perspective of the rank of the *gotra*s, the object perceived in the first *bhūmi* and beyond is [known] by the teaching as the means of cognition; from the perspective of the rank of *adhimukti-caryā*, [it is known] by inference as the means of cognition; and from the perspective of the rank of the *bhūmis*, it is [known] by perception as the means of cognition. As explained in the above analysis, the objects of the three ranks can also be viewed from the perspective of each particular rank respectively; or the three objects [of contemplation] can be viewed from the perspective of each of the three stages of cultivation respectively.

三、合始開終。種性解行，合之為一，信地同故。十地為二，佛地為三。於此門中亦得三位共望一法，望佛所證，地前名教，相去玄絕，信教知故；地上名比，以自所得，上比佛故；佛地名現，現證性故，亦得一位別望三法，地前還望地前之法是其現量，望地上法是其比量，望佛所得是其教量，以玄絕故。亦得三位別望三法，皆是現量，同現見故。三量如是。

In the third analysis, the first [three ranks] are grouped as one, while the last [two] are left unchanged. The ranks of the *gotra* and the rank of *adhimukti-caryā* are combined as one, because they belong alike to the stage of faith; the ten stages belong to the second [rank]; and the stage of Buddhahood to the third [rank]. According to this mode of analysis, also, the same object of contemplation can be viewed differently from the perspective of each of the three ranks. From the viewpoint of the preparatory rank [i.e., the rank prior to the ten stages], at the rank before the [ten] stages, the realization at the stage of Buddhahood is termed "teaching", because it is so profound and unfathomable that it can only be known through faith in the teaching. At the rank of the [ten] *bhūmi*s, what is realized by the Buddha is termed "inference", for it is analogically known through what is realized [in the *bhūmi*s]. At the rank of Buddhahood, [what is realized by the Buddha] is named "perception", because the nature [of *dharma*s] (*dharmatā*) is directly realized. The object of contemplation in each of the three ranks can be also viewed from the viewpoint of each particular rank. From the viewpoint of the

rank prior to the ten stages, the object of cognition in that same rank is [known by] perception as a means of cognition, the object of cognition in the rank of ten *bhūmi*s is [known by] inference as a means of cognition, and the object of cognition in the rank of Buddhahood is [known by] the teaching as a means of cognition, because it is so profound and unfathomable. Also, the objects of cognition in the three ranks can be viewed separately from the viewpoint of each of the three ranks as [known by] perception as a cognitive means, because they are all directly cognized. Thus are explained the three means of cognition.

Abbreviations

DSYZ   *Dasheng yizhang* (大乘義章) T1851
MMK   *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*
NMukh   *Nyāyamukha*
PS   *Pramāṇasamuccaya*
SLZY   *Sanliang zhiyi* (三量智義) T44:1851.670c-672a

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Xiangxu jietuo rulai suozuo suishun liaoyi jing (相續解脫如來所作隨順了義
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The Theory of *Apoha* in Kuiji's *Cheng weishi lun Shuji*[1]

Shoryu Katsura

1

The fifth- to sixth-century Indian Buddhist logician, Dignāga (Chenna 陳那 ca. 480-530), is often regarded as the founder of "New Logic" in India. As a matter of fact, in his main work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS, *Ji liang lun* 集量論) with *Svavṛtti* (PSV),[2] Dignāga integrated two traditions of

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[2] PS & PSV are only available in two Tibetan translations; Ernst Steinkellner has reconstructed the first chapter into Sanskrit, working mainly from the Sanskrit version of Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* (Steinkellner, 2005). Sanskrit reconstruction of the other chapters is also under way.

No Chinese translation is extant apart from Fazun's (法尊) modern studies, e.g. *Ji liang lun lüejie* (集量論略解, Beijing 1982), though some catalogues record that Yijing (義淨) translated PS & PSV into Chinese. I owe the following information to Dr. Michael Radich.

Kaiyuan Shijiao lu 開元釋教錄:

1. "*Pramāṇasamuccaya* in four fascicles (translated in [the year] Jingyun 2 [711 C.E.]; the above [entries] largely adopt the date of promulgation, and thus the date of appearance is identical [in all cases]). The above sixty-one works, in 239 fascicles ...were translated by the Śramaṇa Yijing of Qizhou" 集量論四卷（景雲二年譯已上多取奏行年月所以出日名同）右六十一部二百三十九卷...沙門釋義淨。齊州人; T55:2154.568b3-5.

2. "*Pramāṇasamuccaya* in four fascicles, translated by the Trepiṭaka Yijing of the Great Tang [dynasty]" 集量論四卷 大唐三藏義淨譯; T55:2154.637c3.

Zhenyuan xinding Shijiao mulu 貞元新定釋教目錄 repeats this information verbatim; T55:2157.868c19 ff.,T55:2157.972b15-16. See also Zhisheng's *Xu gu jin yi jing tu ji* 續古今譯經圖紀: "*Pramāṇasamuccaya* (four fascicles)" 集量論一部(四卷); T55:2152.370c17-18.

Indian logic, viz., the tradition of debate (*vāda, lun* 論), and the tradition of the theory of knowledge, which deals with the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa, liang* 量), into a single system, which we may call "Epistemological Logic". What he achieved in this work becomes clear when we compare its internal structure with that of the *Nyāyamukha* (NMukh, *Yinming zhengli men lun* 因明正理門論, T1628), one of Dignāga's earlier works.[3]

NMukh is essentially a manual of debate like the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama, the *Vādavidhi* (*Lun gui* 論軌) of Vasubandhu, and other similar works; it deals with two main subjects, viz. proof (*sādhana, nengli* 能立) and refutation (*dūṣaṇa, nengpo* 能破). According to Dignāga, a proof consists of three propositions/members (*avayava*): thesis (*pakṣa, zong* 宗),

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Prof. Toru Funayama has kindly pointed out to me that Xuanzang's (玄奘) disciples seem to have been well informed about the contents of PS & PSV, even though Xuanzang did not translate them into Chinese. For example, Wengui's (文軌) *Yinming ruzheng lilun shu* (因明入正理論疏): "In addition, in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* Dignāga states that when, in the *Vādavidhi,* the jar, as *dharmin,* is given as the *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta,* it is [because the *Vādavidhi*] is either not by Vasubandhu, or was written when Vasubandhu's studies were still incomplete; after his studies were complete, he wrote a treatise called *Vādavidhāna*, where he took as the *dṛṣṭānta* [the statement:] "Created things are non-eternal", which does not differ from my own position. Given that the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* contains this statement…" 又集量論中陳那云，論軌論中，以瓶有法爲同喻者，其論非是世親所造，或是世親未學時造，學成已後，造論式論，即以所作無常爲同喻體，不異我義。集量論中既有此説… (X848:53.687a1-4). See also Hattori, 1968: 114-115.

3 Synopsis of NMukh: Introduction T1628:32.1a5; Ia Thesis & Pseudo-thesis 1a6~1b3; Ib Reason & Pseudo-reason 1b4~2c1; Ic Example & Pseudo-example 2c2~3b7; Id Perception & Inference 3b7~c16; II Refutation & Pseudo-refutation 3c16~6a3; Conclusion 6a3~6.

NMukh is currently available only in Chinese translation, but the existence of a Sanskrit manuscript has been known for some time now; I sincerely hope that it will become accessible to Buddhist scholars, which I am sure will greatly promote the study of *yinming* (因明) in the Chinese-speaking world, because the text has played such an important role in the development of *yinming.* For the time being, we must satisfy ourselves by reconstructing the Sanskrit text from fragmentary quotes discovered in other Sanskrit texts, such as Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on PSV. As one such attempt, I have reconstructed the concluding verse of NMukh (爲開智人慧毒藥　啓斯妙義正理門　諸有外量所迷者　令越邪途契眞義, 6a5~6) from Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* in the following manner: *mukhamātram idaṃ sadarthanīteḥ kṛtam udghaṭitajñadhīviṣaghnam | kuṣṛtīr apavidhya tīrthyatarkabhramitāḥ katham arthatattvabhājaḥ ||* Steinkellner, Krasser and Lasic, 2005: xlvii fn. 77.

reason (*hetu, yin* 因) and example (*dṛṣṭānta, yu* 喻).[4] In the first half of NMukh, Dignāga discusses these elements of the proof, together with their fallacious counterparts: the pseudo-thesis (*pakṣābhāsa, sizong* 似宗), the pseudo-reason (*hetvābhāsa, siyin* 似因) and the pseudo-example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, siyu* 似喻). He then inserts a brief description of the two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa, liang* 量), viz., perception (*pratyakṣa, xianliang* 現量) and inference (*anumāna, biliang* 比量), together with pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa, sixianliang* 似現量). In the second half of NMukh, Dignāga discusses refutation and pseudo-refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa, sinengpo* 似能破). He simply defines refutation as pointing out the incompleteness of a proof formulation (*nyūnatā, que* 闕) and other points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna, fuchu* 負處), or an error in one of the members of a proof, such as being a pseudo-thesis. Dignāga does not give any detailed description of the points of defeat, although it is one of the most important topics in the tradition of debate in India; but he gives a full discussion of fourteen types of erroneous criticisms (*jāti, guolei* 過類).[5]

Now, PS and PSV have a completely different structure from NMukh. That is to say, PS/PSV consists of six chapters: (1) Perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference for Oneself (*svārthānumāna*), (3) Inference for Others (*parārthānumāna*), (4) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (5) *Apoha* and (6) Erroneous Criti-

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[4] In PSV, Dignāga comes to regard the thesis as a proposition that merely proposes the case and does not positively contribute to the proof.

[5] The various kinds of points of defeat are found in the medical text, the *Carakasaṃhitā*; in the early Buddhist manual of debate, the **Upāyahṛdaya* (*Fangbian xin lun* 方便心論); and in the *Nyāya-sūtra* Chapter 5-2. It is interesting to note in this connection that in his *Vādanyāya*, Dharmakīrti, who, unlike Dignāga, does not deal with the erroneous criticisms, gives a full discussion of the points of defeat, and criticizes Nyāya interpretations of their typology of twenty-two points of defeat.

Prof. Yuichi Kajiyama has proven that what are called erroneous criticisms in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Chapter 5-1, stem from Nāgārjuna's method of argument called *prasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*), and points out that the **Upāyahṛdaya* (attributed to Nāgārjuna) lists twenty such arguments not as erroneous, but as proper criticisms; Kajiyama, 1991. However, Dignāga does not regard these as proper criticisms; instead, he reveals the falsity of such arguments by pointing out errors in the reason and other members. It is also well known that Dignāga owes a lot in this regard to Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi* and the **Tarka-śāstra* (*Rushilun fan zhinan pin* 如實論反質難品) attributed to Vasubandhu.

cisms (*jāti*). Unlike Vasubadhu, who accepted three *pramāṇa*s, viz. perception, inference and scripture/verbal testimony (*āgama/śabda*), Dignāga admits only the first two *pramāṇa*s, and discusses them respectively in the first two chapters of PS & PSV. He regards the proof as a kind of inference that is verbally expressed for the sake of others; hence, he names inference proper "inference for oneself" and the proof "inference for others". In this way, he succeeds in integrating the theories of proof developed by the tradition of debate into his new system of epistemological logic. The third and fourth chapters of PS & PSV, which deal with thesis and pseudo-thesis, reason and pseudo-reason, and example and pseudo-example, naturally inherited a lot of verses, passages and ideas from NMukh. The same is true of the sixth chapter, which deals with erroneous criticisms. The remaining chapter, the fifth, deals with Vasubandhu's third *pramāṇa*, i.e., verbal testimony (*śabda*), and identifies it with inference; at the end of the chapter, Dignāga declares that other *pramāṇa*s maintained by other schools of Indian philosophy, such as analogy/identification (*upamāna*), are also included in the category of inference in his system. Thus it is clear that the theories of debate formulated in NMukh are completely embedded in the framework of the theory of the *pramāṇa*s in PS & PSV.

The main theme of the fifth chapter of PS & PSV is the theory of *apoha* or "exclusion/negation", or more precisely, "exclusion/negation of others" (*anyāpoha/anyavyāvṛtti*), which is in fact a feature common to both inference and verbal testimony, as well as to conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa* 分別) in general. In other words, verbal testimony and the other *pramāṇa*s are included under the category of inference because they all share the same function of "excluding others".

Since, as we have seen above, NMukh does not discuss the theory of *apoha,* and since PS & PSV are not available in the Chinese Tripiṭaka,[6] I previously assumed that Chinese Buddhist scholars in the classical period had no idea about *apoha.* Subsequently, I was told that Prof. Dr. Makio Takemura (竹村牧男; formerly of Tsukuba University, now President of Tōyō University) once remarked in a lecture at Kōyasan University that Kuiji (窺基, 632-682), the direct disciple of Xuanzang (玄奘, 602-664), re-

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[6] Please see fn. 1 above.

fers to the theory of *apoha* in his extensive commentary (*shuji* 述記) on his master's *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論). In this paper, I would like to show the traces of the transmission of Dignāga's theory of *apoha* in Kuiji's work, which will indicate that Xuanzang, though he did not translate PS & PSV into Chinese, must have discussed some of Dignāga's important theories, including his *apoha* theory, during his lectures, in order for Kuiji to have been able to utilize that theory in his explications of his master's work.

2

The theory of *apoha* mainly deals with the problem of the meaning of a linguistic item/word (*śabdārtha*). According to Dignāga, a linguistic item refers neither to an individual object (*vyakti*) nor to the universal (*sāmānya/jāti*) that is shared by the individual members of the same class, but refers rather to *apoha*, or more precisely, *anyāpoha* (exclusion of others), which is nothing other than our mental construction. Thus, *apoha* is an imaginary existent, but it possesses all the properties of the universal (*jātidharma*), viz. singularity (*ekatva*), eternality (*nityatva*) and existence in all the members of the same class (*pratyekaparisamāpti*).[7] Therefore, according to Dignāga, a linguistic item in fact refers to the universal, which is our mental construction, and is not a real existent, as was imagined by his opponents.[8]

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[7] PSV *ad* PS 5.36d; Pind, 2009: A15.

[8] In PSV *ad* PS 5.36d, Dignāga makes the following remark: "A linguistic item denotes entities qualified by the negation of other referents" (*śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha*). Dharmakīrti quotes this remark in his *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, Gnoli 1960, pp. 62-63. Dharmakīrti seems to hold the view that a linguistic item (or verbal cognition and conceptual cognition in general) refers directly to the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa* or the universal), but refers indirectly to the external entity that produced the verbal cognition. That external entity is qualified by various exclusions of others belonging to the same class or other classes; it is a unique reality that may be called the particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the object itself. Now, it is not clear whether Dignāga would have endorsed a view like that of Dharmakīrti, because he did not discuss this problem any further. However, it is clear that for him, a linguistic item refers directly to the universal, i.e., the general characteristic of the entity.

Before I present a brief outline of Dignāga's theory of *apoha*, I would like to mention that NMukh at least once refers to the idea of "exclusion of others" (*jianbieyu* 簡別餘) in the context of the Inference, as E. Frauwallner pointed out long ago[9]. The seventeenth verse of NMukh reads as follows:

> A real entity (*shi* 事) possesses many properties, which the inferential mark (*xiang* 相) does not indicate all together [at the same time]. It reveals only through the exclusion of others (*jianbieyu* 簡別餘) whatever necessarily follows [from that which is to be inferred].
>
> 一事有多法　相非一切行　唯由簡別餘　表定能隨逐 (T1628:32.3c 10-11).[10]

In this connection, Dignāga is discussing the essential nature of inferential cognition. For example, when a puff of smoke rises from the top of a hill, we may infer the existence of a fire on the hill, which produced the smoke. Here, the smoke is the inferential mark (*liṅga, xiang/nengxiang* 相/能相), and the fire is that which is to be inferred from the smoke. Now, Dignāga argues that an inferential mark reveals its object (*liṅgin, suoxiang* 所相), i.e., that which is to be inferred (*anumeya, suobi* 所比), through the exclusion of others (*anyavyavaccheda/anyāpoha*), as e.g. smoke reveals a fire by excluding non-fire. In other words, when we infer a fire from smoke, the inferential mark, i.e., smoke, does not reveal the real fire itself, but it does reveal the existence of a fire in general, by excluding non-fire. By contrast, if a fire exists in front of us, we directly perceive the fire itself as it really is. If the fire is out of reach of our senses, however, and we cannot perceive the real fire, we may infer the existence of a fire in general, and it is this that Dignāga names "exclusion of non-fire". Therefore, "exclusion of others" is a mode of indirectly know-

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[9] Frauwallner 1959, 103.

[10] There is a corresponding verse in PS 2.12: *don gyi chos rnams du ma ni* || *thams cad rtags las rtogs ma yin* || *gang zhig rjes 'brel gzhan las ni* || *ldog pa rtogs par byed pa yin* || Dr. Horst Lasic kindly provided me with the following reconstruction: *arthasyānekadharmā hi na liṅgāt sarvathā gatāḥ* (or *anekadharmaṇo 'rthasya na liṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ*) | *anubaddhasya vicchedaṃ gamayaty anyato yataḥ* ||

ing an object. As discussed immediately below, the object of such an indirect cognition itself is regarded as "exclusion of others" as well.

2.1

According to Dignāga, there are only two *pramāṇa*s, viz. direct perception (*pratyakṣa, xianliang* 現量) and inference (*anumāna, biliang* 比量). The former cognizes the unique and particular object itself (*svalakṣaṇa, zixiang* 自相), and the latter the general or universal characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa, gongxiang* 共相) of that object. Thus the "exclusion of others" is nothing but the general characteristic of an object, which other schools of Indian philosophy call the universal (*sāmānya/jāti*) and which they regard as real. Dignāga, on the other hand, regards it as a mere mental construction. As I mentioned above, in the fifth chapter of PS and PSV, Dignāga deals with the third possible *pramāṇa,* i.e., verbal testimony, and identifies it with inference. Therefore, for him, a verbal cognition is a kind of inference in which a linguistic item plays the role of an inferential mark. Thus, a linguistic item refers to its referent by excluding others, and the referent, or what is meant by the linguistic item, is "exclusion of others", i.e., the general characteristic.

   In this connection, it is to be noted that Dignāga classifies our cognitions into two kinds, viz., (1) immediate perception or sensation, and (2) mediated conceptual cognition. The former is regarded as *pramāṇa*; while the latter, on the other hand, includes both *pramāṇa*s, such as inference and verbal cognition, and non-*pramāṇa*s or erroneous cognitions. Thus, the "exclusion of others" is a general principle that pertains to any conceptual cognition. In other words, whenever we make a certain judgment, whether it is right or wrong, we do so in the form, "It is certainly a cow, not a horse and so on"; generally speaking, "It is certainly A, not non-A (A *evāyam, nānyaḥ*)."

2.2

In order to specify what the "others" are for each linguistic expression, Dignāga presupposes a certain hierarchy of universal concepts, which

reminds us of the Vaiśeṣika hierarchy of the six categories (*padārtha*s) and their sub-categories. According to Dignāga, the highest category of universal is "the knowable" (*jñeya, suozhi* 所知), which is divided into two sub-categories, viz., "existent" (*sat, you* 有) and "non-existent" (*asat, wu* 無). The existent is further divided into three groups, viz., "substance" (*dravya, shi* 實), "quality" (*guṇa, de* 德) and "action" (*karman, ye* 業).[11]

Substance is divided into things which are "made of the earth element" (*di suocheng* 地所成), "made of the water element" (*shui suocheng* 水所成), etc. Things that are made of the earth element may be divided into "trees", "pots", etc. Trees are classified into cherry trees, pine trees, etc., and pine trees are further divided into those "with flowers", "with fruit", etc.

In like manner, quality is divided into "color", "sound", etc.; and action is divided into "upward motion", etc.

Now, let us take as an example the word "tree". The word "tree" directly excludes pots, etc., that belong to the same level of the hierarchy, by sharing the same universal of "being made of the earth element". It also indirectly excludes things that are made of the water element, because they are excluded by the universal of "being made of the earth element". Generally speaking, a given word X excludes the referents of those words that share the same universal with the referents of X, and it further excludes whatever is excluded by the words that express the universals shared by the referents of X. Thus, the "others" in the expression "exclusion of others" does not mean just anything "other than itself", but rather, is limited to "others" that belong to the same level of the hierarchy as those referred to by a given word, and to "others" of those universals belonging to higher levels of the hierarchy, which are possessed by the referent of that word.

Furthermore, Dignāga proposes that a given word, by excluding "others" at higher orders, engenders definite knowledge (*niścaya*) of the universals of higher orders. For example, the word "tree" determines that its referent (i.e., a tree) is made of the earth element, that it is a kind of substance, that it is existent and that it is knowable. A given word also

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[11] For a brief description of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, see Katsura, 1979.

awakens the expectation (*ākāṅkṣaṇa*) that it will determine which particular it actually refers to, as e.g. whether the tree designated by the word "tree" is a cherry tree, a pine tree, or something else. A given word is indifferent (*upekṣā*) to the subsets of the referents excluded by words of higher orders. For example, the word "tree" (being made of the earth element) is not concerned with the question of whether or not its referent is milk (being made of the water element), for that is simply out of the question. Thus, the "exclusion of others" is not the sole function of a linguistic item or a word; a word, by excluding others, also produces a definite cognition, and it may also entail expectation or indifference to other things.

So far, I have discussed Dignāga's theory of *apoha* mainly from the perspective of epistemology. The "exclusion of others" (or "excluding others") is the function of conceptual cognition in general, which includes both inferential and verbal knowledge. It is also the object of conceptual cognition, which is called the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), and which is nothing but a mental construction, unlike the real universals (*sāmānya/jāti*) maintained by other schools of Indian philosophy. Nonetheless, the "exclusion of others", according to Dignāga, possesses some of the essential features of the universal, viz. "singularity", "eternity" and "being present in all the members of the same class".

Now let me explain some of the semantic aspects of Dignāga's theory of *apoha*. I have mentioned that for him, the exclusion of others is the referent or meaning of a word. As a matter of fact, at the very beginning of the fifth chapter of PS & PSV, he examines four possible candidates for the meaning of words, viz., an individual (*bheda*), a universal (*sāmānya*), a relation (*sambandha*) between the two, and a thing possessing a universal (*tadvat*). He rejects all four of these possibilities, and comes to the conclusion that the meaning of a word is the "exclusion of others". Furthermore, he discusses how the theory of *apoha* can explain linguistic phenomena in which two words refer to one and the same object (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), and in which two words are in the relation of the modifier and the modified (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*). He also refers to the semantic theories of other schools, especially that of the Sāṅkhyas, and demonstrates the supremacy of his semantic theory.

3

I will now discuss the problem of the extent to which Kuiji knows Dig-nāga's theory of *apoha.*

3.1

When he refutes the Sarvāstivādin categories of *nāma-, pada-,* and *vyañjana-kāya* (*mingshen* 名身, *jushen* 句身, *wenshen* 文身, namely, word, phrase/sentence and syllable), Kuiji discusses the question of what con-stitutes the object of each. He refers to the two kinds of objects proposed by Dignāga, viz., the particular or "own" characteristic (*zixiang* 自相, *svalakṣaṇa*) and the general characteristic (*gongxiang* 共相, *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*); and he clearly states that the former is the object of direct per-ception (*xianliang* 現量, *pratyakṣa*) and cannot be referred to by a verbal designation, while the latter is the object of the word (*ming* 名), as well as a conventional cognition (*jiazhi* 假智, **prajñapti/saṃvṛti-jñāna*)*.* He lays out these views in the following passages:

> [1] The particular characteristics of *dharma*s are not expressed by the word. They are realized by perception only. A word expresses the general characteristic only.
>
> 諸法自相非名等詮、唯現量證。名唯詮共相 (T1830:43.288a17-18).
>
> [2] Question: For what reason are they named "particular charac-teristic" or "general characteristic"?
>
> Answer: The essences of *dharma*s are known by direct perception only, and verbal designations do not refer to the particular characteristic. Those properties of *dharma*s that are referred to by verbal designa-tions and taken as the objects of conventional cognition are the gene-ral characteristics [of *dharma*s].
>
> 問曰。何故名自相共相。
>
> 答曰。法自體唯證智知、言説不及是自相。若法體性言説所及、假智所縁、是爲共相 (T1830:43.288a20-23)*.*

Kuiji is well aware of the fact that there are two different usages of the expression *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (*gongxiang* 共相). Namely, the Sarvāstivādins understand it to refer to "suffering" (*ku* 苦), "emptiness" (*kong* 空), and other properties which pertain to all *dharma*s; while Dignāga and other Buddhist logicians define it as the "exclusion/negation of others". Kuiji says that when we use the word "fire", we exclude non-fire (*zhe feihuo* 遮非火), and that the exclusion of non-fire is the property that is shared by all fires. He distinguishes the two different usages of the general characteristic in Buddhist literature in the following passage:

> [3] Objection: If all *dharma*s are not referred to by verbal designations, and yet, at the same time, you say that that which is referred to by the verbal designation is the general characteristic, is this not an egregious contradiction?
>
> Answer: The general characteristic is something superimposed upon the essence of the *dharma*, and there is no separate entity apart [from the *dharma,* that is called the general characteristic]. Whenever a word denotes fire or other *dharma*s, it [actually] excludes/negates non-fire, etc. This meaning [i.e., "exclusion/negation of non-fire"] is common to all fires. Only thus can the term "general/common characteristic" be meaningful. It does not [mean, in this context,] the principle (*li* 理), [that is,] general characteristics such as "suffering", "emptiness", and so on [which are characteristics of all *dharma*s according to the Sarvāstivādins].
>
> 問曰。如一切法　皆言不及。而復乃云言説及者是爲共相。一何乖返。
>
> 答曰。共相是法自體上義、更無別體。且如名詮火等法時、遮非火等。此義即通一切火上。故言共相得其義也。非苦空等之共相理 (T1830:43.288a23-27).

In this connection, it is most interesting that Kuiji, like the Vaiśeṣikas and Dignāga as mentioned above, also refers to the hierarchy of *dharma*s in terms of universals and particulars, although he puts this remark in the mouth of an opponent. Namely, when the "defiled" ([*you*]*lou*〔有〕漏, *sāsrava*) and "undefiled" (*wulou* 無漏, *anāsrava*) are regarded as universals (lit., *gongxiang* 共相, general characteristics), "matter" (*seyun* 色蘊,

rūpaskandha) is regarded as the particular (lit., *zixiang* 自相, particular characteristics). However, when matter is regarded as the universal, color-sphere (*sechu* 色處, *rūpāyatana*) and so on is regarded as the particulars; when color is regarded as the universal, blue and so forth (*qing deng* 青等, *nīlādi*) is regarded as the particular; when blue and so forth is regarded as the universal, trees and so forth (*shu deng* 樹等, **vṛkṣādi*) are regarded as the particulars; when trees and so forth are regarded as the universals, branches and so forth (*zhi deng* 枝等, **śākhādi*) are regarded as the particulars; and when branches and so forth are regarded as the universals, atoms (*jiwei* 極微, *paramāṇu*) are regarded as the particulars. Here we see a clear hierarchy of *dharma*s, beginning with "defiled" and "undefiled" [*dharma*s], and ending with atoms. In Kuiji's own words:

> [4] Question: If *rūpaskandha* is the particular, then defiled and undefiled [*dharmas*] are the universals; within *rūpaskandha, rūpāyatana* and so forth are the particulars, and *rūpaskandha* is the universal; within *rūpāyatana,* blue and so forth are the particulars, and *rūpāyatana* is the universal; furthermore, if blue and so forth are the universals, each [blue-colored thing, such as] a tree and so forth, is the particular; if the tree and so forth are the universals, branches and so forth are the particulars; if the branch and so forth are the universals, atoms are the particulars.
>
> Now, when you say that [a word] cannot [refer to] the particular characteristic, do you mean that it cannot refer to the particular characteristic of *rūpa* "common" to [all] *rūpaskandhas,* or that it cannot refer to the particular characteristic of *rūpa* "specific" to blue and others?
>
> Answer: It can refer neither to *rūpa*[*skandha*]*,* nor to blue and so forth, because all [such *dharma*s] are not referred to by [verbal] designations.

> 問曰。如色蘊是自相、漏無漏是共相。色蘊之中色處等是自相、色蘊是共相。色處中青等是自相、色處是共相。又青等是共相、隨一樹等是自相。樹等是共相、枝等是自相。枝等是共相、極微爲自相。今言不得自相、爲是不得色蘊色總自相。爲不得青等色別自相。

> 答曰。俱不得色及青等。皆詮不及故 (T1830:43.288b8-14).

Towards the end of the following discussion, Kuiji further refers to the Mahāyānistic conviction that no words can ever refer to anything in any way, and that, ultimately, even the general characteristic cannot be expressed by words:

[5] Question: In that case, how can [verbal] expressions refer to the "defiled", "undefiled", and so forth? For example, when the Buddha speaks of "the defiled", his statement [itself] is not defiled; and when ordinary worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) speak of "the undefiled", their statements are not undefiled, just as when someone speaks of "fire", it also does not burn his mouth. How can [verbal expressions] refer to the "defiled" and "undefiled"?

[Answer:] Well, when we say that a word can refer to the essence of the general characteristic, we only mean to negate the ability [of the word] to refer to the particular characteristic, and do not assert that the word can in fact refer to the general characteristic. Thus, the essence of *dharma*s is ineffable [and] it is [only] in terms of conventional language [that we] speak of particular and general characteristics; the particular and general characteristics are expressed by means of conventional language. That is to say, within a certain limit, we provisionally speak of "general characteristics", but that is not to say that we assert that the particular and general characteristics are [in fact] referred to by words.

問曰。若爾即漏無漏等豈詮得及。如佛言有漏、佛言非有漏。凡夫言無漏、凡夫言非無漏。如詮火時、亦不燒口。豈得漏無漏耶。

而言名得共相之自性、此義但遮得自相、非謂名即得共相。然法體不可説、自相共相以假言詮也。謂有定量且名共相。非謂自共相者名言所及 (T1830:43.288b15-21).

3.2

Kuiji discusses the referent or meaning of a word again when he comments upon the concept of "metaphorical transference" (*upacāra, jiashuo* 假説), which appears in the very first verse of the *Triṃśikā vijñaptimātra-*

tāsiddhi of Vasubandhu.[12] In this context, he defines the general charac-
teristic in terms of the exclusion/negation of others (*zheyu* 遮餘) in the
following manner:

> [6] When we speak of the "general characteristic", [it means:] when
> one speaks of "color", one [in fact] excludes/negates other things,
> [namely,] non-color; all "color" *dharma*s are included in what is spo-
> ken of; and so on, [so that, similarly,] when one speaks of "blue", one
> [in fact] excludes/negates non-blue; all blue [colors] are included in
> what is spoken of. [The exclusion of others] holds generally for all
> *dharma*s and does not exist only in one entity [of the whole class];
> hence, it is called the "general characteristic" and regarded as a con-
> cept; it can be termed "general characteristic" by negation of the pos-
> sibility that it refers to the particular characteristic.

> 言共相者。如言色時遮餘非色。一切色法皆在所言。乃至言青遮非
> 青。一切青皆在所言。貫通諸法。不唯在一事體中。故名共相　説
> 爲假也。遮得自相　名得共相 (T1830:43.296b21-25).

Kuiji also refers to a hierarchy of *dharma*s, as we already mentioned
above. The hierarchy consists of: (1) at the uppermost level, such general
characteristics as "emptiness" and "non-self" (*kong wuwo deng* 空無我等,
śūnyatā, nairātmya, etc.), which are shared by all *dharma*s; (2) the "five ag-
gregates" (*wuyun* 五蘊, *pañcaskandha*), such as "matter" (*seyun* 色蘊,
rūpaskandha), which consists of 10 sub-categories (viz. the five sense-
organs and their respective objects); (3) the twelve "spheres" (*chu* 處,
āyatana) such as "color-sphere" (*sechu* 色處, *rūpāyatana*), which consists
of the "different kinds" (*leibie* 類別) of colors, such as blue and yellow;
(4) kinds/classes (*lei* 類) of various "entities" (*shiti* 事體, **vastu*), such as
"[a tree] with blue fruits" and "[a tree] without flowers"; (5) entities,
which consist of many "atoms" (*jiwei* 極微, *paramāṇu*); and finally (6)
atoms, at the bottommost level of all. However, even atoms, insofar as

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[12] T1586:31.60a24-25:
> 由假説我法　有種種相轉
> 彼依識所變　此能變唯三
> *ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate |*
> *vijñānapariṇāme 'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā ||* Lévi, 1925: 8-13.

they are expressible (*keshuo* 可説), are not particulars, but rather, are also another instance of a general characteristic. Therefore, particulars are ineffable (*bukeshuo* 不可説), and whatever is effable is a general characteristic. Moreover, in the final analysis, there exists neither the general nor the particular characteristic. Kuiji lays out this view as follows:

> [7] Within the [category of the] the five *skandha*s, if the entities [called] the five *skandha*s are regarded as particular characteristics, principles such as "emptiness" and "non-self" are regarded as general characteristics. When we analyze the *skandha*s, they consist of *āyatana*s, [and then] *rūpa* is divided into ten [sub-categories]; [then] *āyatana*s are called "particular characteristics" and the *skandha* is called the "general characteristic", because the one *rūpaskandha* embraces all ten [*āyatana*s]. Within one *āyatana* there are different kinds [of colors], such as blue and yellow; the kinds [of colors] are called "particular characteristics", and the *āyatana* is called the "general characteristic". Within one kind [of color], such as blue, there are many entities, such as [trees] with blue fruits, [trees] without flowers, etc.; the kind is regarded as the "general characteristic", and the entities are called "particular characteristics". Within one entity, there are many atoms; the entity is regarded as the "general characteristic", and the atoms are regarded as "particular characteristics".
>
> By developing [this line of analysis] in this way, we reach the "ineffable", which is regarded as the "particular characteristic", while the effable "atoms" and so forth are regarded as "general characteristics". Therefore, if we proceed according to logic, there [ultimately] exists no essence of the "particular characteristic".
>
> Provisionally, we call the essence of *dharma*s, which [itself] is ineffable, the "particular characteristic", and expressible [things] "general characteristics". Strictly speaking, [however,] the general [characteristic] is not general, and neither is the particular [characteristic] particular. We speak of them separately only in order to [show how they] exclude/negate each other.

如五蘊中以五蘊事爲自相。空無我等理爲共相。分蘊成處。色成於十。處名自相、蘊名共相。一色蘊該十故。於一處中青黃等類別。

類名自相、處名共相。於一青等類中有多事體。菓青非華等。以類
爲共相。事名爲自相。一事中有多極微。以事爲共相。以極微爲自
相。

　如是展轉至不可説爲自相。可説極微等爲共相。故以理推無自相
體。

　且説不可言法體名自相。可説爲共相。以理而論、共既非共、自
亦非自。爲互遮故。但各別説 (T1830:43.296b27-c9).

Kuiji further identifies the conceptual cognition of "blue" with inference
(*biliangzhi* 比量知). According to him, visual perception (*yanshi* 眼識)
takes a certain color-sphere as its object, but it does not form a judgment
of the form, "This is a color-sphere," because the direct object of percep-
tion is not the general characteristic (*gongxiang* 共相), but the particular
characteristic (*zixiang* 自相). By contrast, mental and conceptual cogni-
tion (*yishi* 意識), which occurs immediately after perception, does take
the general characteristic of color as its object, and makes a judgment
like, "This is blue," because it does not continue to take the color in
general as its object. Kuiji declares that one forms a judgment that some-
thing is "blue" by excluding others, i. e., things that are not blue. In this
connection, it is interesting to note that he quotes Verse 16 of Vasuban-
dhu's *Viṃśikā* to support his argument. However, Vasubandhu is there
arguing that the external object cannot be directly perceived by percep-
tion, and thereby criticizing the Sautrāntika theory of perception, which
is generally accepted by Dignāga. Therefore, for the moment, I am not so
convinced by Kuiji's reference to *Viṃśikā* v. 16.

[8] Now, taking a blue thing as object, if one forms a judgment [that it
is] "blue", this is [a case of] inferential cognition. It is not adequate to
the *dharma* in front [of the cognizer]. If visual perception takes color
as its object, because it is adequate to the particular characteristic [of
color], it does not form a judgment of [the form] "color". Mental cog-
nition, which arises [immediately] after perception, takes the general
characteristic of color as its object, and since it does not continue to
take color [in general as its object], it makes a judgment of [the form]
"This is blue." It forms this judgment of [the form] "This is blue" by
excluding others, i.e., non-blue things; it is not the case that to make a
judgment of [the form] "This is blue" is adequate to the blue thing.

Therefore, in a verse of the *Viṃśikā,* it says: "Perception is like a dream, etc.; when perception has arisen, there is neither object nor direct vision [of that object]; how can it be the valid means of knowledge called Perception?"

今緣於青作青解者、此比量知。不稱前法。如眼識緣色、稱自相故、不作色解。後起意識緣色共相。不著色故、遂作青解。遮餘非青之物、遂作青解。非謂青解即稱青事。故二十唯識伽他中言。現覺如夢等。已起現覺時。見及境已無。寧許有現量 (T1830:43.296c17-22).[13]

Kuiji concludes that conventional cognition (*jiazhi* 假智) takes only the general characteristic as its object, because the unique and particular characteristic of a *dharma*, in short, the *dharma* itself, is not the object of conceptual cognition. The same is true with verbal cognition. It refers to the general characteristic only, just as the expression "blue lotus" (*qing lianhua* 青蓮華) is possible because "blue" and "lotus" share what is to be excluded/rejected in common. It is interesting to notice that Kuiji refers here to the expression "blue lotus", which is discussed so many times by Dignāga in his *Apoha* chapter.

[9] This is because conventional cognition arises only by taking the general characteristic as its object, because the particular characteristic of the *dharma* is devoid of conceptual construction. This is also true of verbal designations; they are not adequate to the real *dharma*, and they are applied to the general characteristic alone, just as a verbal designation such as "blue lotus" is [applied to the general characteristic], which is excluded [by both "non-blue" and "non-lotus"].

此[14]謂假智唯緣共相而得起故。法之自相離分別故。言説亦爾。不稱本法。亦但只於共相處轉。如説青蓮華等。有所遮故 (T1830:43.296c23-25).

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[13] Cf. T1590:31.76b18-19; *Viṃśikā* v. 16:
   pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādau yathā sā ca yadā tadā |
   na so 'rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṃ kathaṃ matam || Lévi, 1925: 2.

[14] 此 emendation: 比 Taisho ed.

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Let me summarize Kuiji's knowledge of *apoha* and other theories in Dignāga's epistemology.

1) Kuiji knows that there are two means of valid cognition (*liang* 量), viz., perception (*xianliang* 現量) and inference (*biliang* 比量); and that the former takes the particular characteristic (*zixiang* 自相) as its object, while the latter takes the general characteristic (*gongxiang* 共相).

2) Kuiji defines the general characteristic as "exclusion of others" (*zheyu* 遮餘), and both inference and verbal cognition take the general characteristic as their object by "excluding others". Therefore, the exclusion of others is the general nature and function of conceptual cognition, including both inference and verbal cognition.

3) The particular characteristic of an object, or the object itself, is beyond the reach of conceptual cognition. Thus, it cannot be expressed by any verbal designation (*yanshuo* 言説). Only the general characteristic can be expressed verbally.

4) However, ultimately speaking, even the general characteristic cannot be expressed by any verbal designation. This idea might not have been endorsed by Dignāga and other Indian Buddhist logicians. However, Jñānaśrīmitra, who enters the discussion on *apoha* at the final stage of Indian Buddhism, declares that he expounds *apoha* theory in order to show that nothing can be verbally expressed (see the introductory verse of his *Apohaprakaraṇa*[15]).

5) Kuiji seems to understand the distinction between the particular and the universal as relative to one another, just as in the hierarchy of the Vaiśeṣika categories. This understanding again might not have been endorsed by Dignāga, because for him, only the universal characteristics are relative to each other and constitute a hierarchy. In any case, it is important that Kuiji refers to the hierarchical construc-

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[15] See Katsura, 1986. Cf. also Katsura, 1991; Katsura, 2011.

tion of Buddhist *dharma*s when he discusses verbal and conceptual cognition.

Abbreviations

NMukh   *Nyāyamukha*
PS   *Pramāṇasamuccaya*
PSV   *Pramāṇasamuccayasvavṛtti*

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A Comparison between the Indian and Chinese Interpretations of the Antinomic Reason (*Viruddhāvyabhicārin*)[1]

Shinya Moriyama

Introduction: *Viruddhāvyabhicārin* in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

As is well known, the tradition of Chinese Buddhist logic, that is, the study of logical reasons (*hetuvidyā*, Chin. *yinming*, Jap. *immyō* 因明), started with the translations by Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602–664) of Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* (=NM, *Yinming zhengli men lun* 因明正理門論, T1628) and Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa*[*ka*] (=NP, *Yinming ru zhengli lun* 因明入正理論, T1630).[2] While a number of Xuanzang's pupils then wrote commentaries on these two texts, it was the commentary by Kuiji (窺基, 632–682) on the NP that had the greatest impact on the later development of the Chinese and Japanese *hetuvidyā*.[3] This commentary con-

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[2] Inami (2012: 22-23) has pointed out that the title of this work is still uncertain: according to the Tibetan and Chinese traditions it is called *Nyāyapraveśa*, whereas according to Jain tradition it is called *Nyāyapraveśaka*.

[3] With regard to Xuanzang's intentions in translating these two works, Takemura (1986: 31) assumes that it was for the purpose of educating his pupils who were engaged in translation work, especially those translating volumes 15 and 38 of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in which several logical issues are discussed. To train them in questions of logic, Xuanzang selected NM and NP as two introductions to Indian logic. In the process of working on these translations, some of his pupils (Shentai 神泰, Jingmai 靖邁, Mingjue 明覚,

tains several interesting topics, on which Kuiji provided his own inter-
pretations of logical terms and argumentations, including the topic of
the so-called antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*). The antinomic rea-
son is one of the fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) that fail to establish the
intended thesis. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the originality
of Kuiji's interpretation when compared to various interpretations by
Indian commentators on the NP.

Before undertaking this comparison, however, we shall start with a
brief overview of the historical development of the interpretations of
this fallacious reason in Indian Buddhism (see Ui, 1966: 227-230; Kitaga-
wa, 1965: 192-199; Tani 1987; Tillemans, 2000: 92-95; Ueda, 2008; and Ono,
2010). Dignāga, considered the founder of Buddhist logic, classifies the
fallacious reason called "antinomic" (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) as an "incon-
clusive" reason (*anaikāntika*). It takes a unique position, however, within
the group of "inconclusive" reasons: whereas the inconclusive nature of
the others is based on their not fulfilling the three characteristics of a
valid logical reason (*trairūpya*, 因三相), the antinomic reason does fulfill
the three characteristics. Why, then, is it considered an "inconclusive"
reason? In response to this question, Dignāga states the following:

> PSV$_K$ (ad PS 3.23b, Kitagawa, 1965: 495): *gang gi phyir bshad pa'i mtshan
> nyid can gyi 'gal ba dag gcig la the tshom bskyed pa dag mthong ste | dper na
> byas pa dang mnyan par bya ba dag las sgra la rtag pa dang mi rtag pa dag
> nyid la the tshom za ba bzhin no.*[4]

> = Ono, 2010: 127, fn. 4: *yasmād uktalakṣaṇābhyāṃ viruddhābhyām ekas-
> min saṃśayo dṛṣṭaḥ, tad yathā kṛtakatvaśrāvaṇatvābhyāṃ śabde nityānit-
> yatvena saṃśayaḥ.*

> Because doubt is observed in respect to the same subject on account
> of two contradictory [reasons], both fulfilling the above-stated [triple]
> characteristics of [a valid logical reason], for instance, one might

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Wenbei 文備, Wengui 文軌, Bigong 壁公, etc.) developed a great deal of interest in
this new field and began to write their own commentaries on these two works.

[4] See PSV$_V$ (ad PS 3.23b, Kitagawa, 1965: 495): *gal te gang phyir 'gal ba mtshan nyid gnyis su
brjod pa dag las grangs gcig par ni mthong ba nyid de | dper na sgra la byas pa nyid dang mnyan
bya dag las* (em.: *la* ed.) *rtag pa dang mi rtag pa nyid du the tshom za ba yin no zhe na |*

doubt whether sound is impermanent or permanent on account of [the two contradictory reasons:] "because it is a product" (*kṛtakatva*) and "because it is audible" (*śrāvaṇatva*) (see Kitagawa, 1965: 194; Tillemans, 2000: 93, fn. 332; Ono, 2010: 127).

From this description, one can reconstruct two proofs whose reasons result in the following antinomy:

	Proof 1	Proof 2
[Thesis:]	Sound is impermanent,	Sound is permanent,
[Reason:]	because it is a product,	because it is audible,
[Example:]	like a pot.	like sound-hood.

As Kitagawa (1973: 194), Tillemans (2000: 93) and Ono (2010: 131) have explained, in this debate, a Vaiśeṣika advocate who accepts the impermanence of sound presents Proof 1. In response, another disputant, who does not accept the impermanence of sound, presents Proof 2 to show that the Vaiśeṣika's logical reason is antinomic. This is because the two reasons, both acceptable to the Vaiśeṣika, lead to mutually contradictory theses, namely, in the first case, that sound is permanent, and in the second, that it is impermanent. Since the Vaiśeṣika accepts the existence of universals (*sāmānya*) like sound-hood (*śabdatva*) which are grasped by the sense organs, the example of Proof 2 is well-formed. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika is now unavoidably confronted with a contradiction between two conclusions that are both justified by valid logical reasons.

In the above procedure, it is noteworthy that taken as a whole, its logical structure constitutes a *prasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*) style of reasoning: the proponent's claim is rebutted by a counter-proof, which reveals the absurdity of the proponent's metaphysical presuppositions. In other words, to establish *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, the proponent's ontological system must contain some inconsistencies or absurdities. In the case of the Vaiśeṣika ontology, universals are categorized as eternal entities, which is directly perceived by the sense organs; yet the similarity between sound-hood and sound itself leads one to the conclusion that sound is eternal, which is contrary to their own position. This implies that the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* only occurs when a proponent presents a proof that relies on an inconsistent metaphysical system. Dignāga says:

PSV$_K$ (ad PS 3.24cd, Kitagawa, 1965: 498:) *gal te 'di la yang mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs byas pa nyid la sogs pa 'ga' zhig ston par mi byed na ni 'gyur na | gnyi ga dmigs pa na 'gal ba dag don gcig la mi srid pa'i phyir the tshom gyi rgyu yin no || 'di la yang mngon sum dang lung stobs dang ldan pa'i phyir de kho na las nges pa btsal bar bya 'o zhes bya ba'i...*[5]

= Ono, 2010: 133, fn. 16, 134, fn. 18: *yady atrānityatvahetuṃ kṛtakatvādi kaścin na nidarśayet. dvayor upalabdhayor viruddhaikārthāsambhavāt saṃśayahetuḥ. atra ca pratyakṣāgamasya balīyastvam. tata eva niścayo 'nveṣya iti.*

[One might argue: "The reason, 'because of being audible' (i.e., the fifth reason in Dignāga's wheel of reason) would be a valid logical reason for the Vaiśeṣika school if one presents 'sound' as its subject and 'permanence' as the property to be proved." To this, the following reply is given: "It would be so,] if on this [subject,] no one presents the reason 'being a product,' etc., as the reason for impermanence. [However,] if the two [reasons] are cognized [together], this is a cause for doubt, because it is impossible to [apply] two contradictory [reasons] to the same object. And in this case, a scripture based on perception (*pratyakṣāgama*)[6] is more powerful. Only from this [kind of scripture] is a determination [of truth] to be sought" (see Kitagawa, 1965: 203f.; Ono, 2010: 132).

Here, Dignāga is discussing the problem of the fifth reason in the wheel of reason, *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, which is, as is well known, the most problematic part when considering the generation of the theory of inter-

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[5] PSV$_V$ (ad PS 3.24cd, Kitagawa, 1965: 498): *gal te 'di la byas pa'i phyir zhes pa la sogs pa mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs su nam yang mi ston na 'o || gnyis ka dmigs pa'i don ltan na ni 'gal ba'i don yin pa'i phyir the tshom gyi gtan tshigs so || 'di yang de nyid nges pa ni rjes su tshol ba po rnams kyi mngon sum dang ldan pa'i phyir;* 若於爾時，無有顯示所作性等，是無常因，容有此義。然俱可得一義相違，不容有故，是猶豫因。又於此中現教力勝故，應依此思求決定 (NM, T32:1628.2b20-24).

[6] As Kitagawa (1965: 203, fn. 381) has noted, the term *pratyakṣāgama* is translated into Tibetan as a *dvandva* compound: *mngon sum dang lung*, but according to Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, it can be interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa* compound. The same term in Chinese (*xianjiao* 現教) is also interpreted as either a *dvandva* compound or a *tatpuruṣa* compound. See Kuiji's discussion below.

nal pervasion (*antarvyāpti*). The proof "sound is permanent because it is audible, like sound-hood" seems to be a valid reason, at least for the Vaiśeṣika. But when its contradictory proof, "Sound is impermanent because it is a product, like a pot," is taken into consideration, the reason in this proof forms a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, an antinomic reason, which causes doubt in the minds of the audience. It is noteworthy that here, Dignāga does not mention the sequence of the two proofs; for him, it does not matter which proof is presented first. This point will be mentioned again when we examine Kuiji's interpretation of this type of reason.

Moreover, the last sentence of the above argument is also remarkable: Dignāga concludes that scripture based on perception is necessary to determine whether or not sound is permanent. On this point, Kitagawa (1965: 204) has provided the following comment:

> It should be noted here that the phenomenon of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, in which two different reasons establish contradictory conclusions on one and the same subject, occurs only when one presents a reason that relies on incorrect teachings; it does not occur when one presents a reason that relies on teachings that are coherent with perceptions, etc. This implies that Dignāga implicitly accepts that all entities in this universe exist within a mutually logical harmony. This is because one can probably say that if the entities in this universe maintained this kind of logical harmony with one another, and if one only used reasoning based on correct teachings, namely, correct cosmology, a phenomenon such as *viruddhāvyabhicārin* would not occur.[7]

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[7] Kitagawa, 1965: 204: ただここで注意すべきは，同一の宗（パクシャ）に互に相容れない帰結へ導く二つの因が成立するという相違決定の現象は，誤った教説にもとづいて因を立てる時に起るものであり，現量等と撞着しない正しい教説にもとづいて因が立てられる時には起り得べきものではないという考えがここに述べられているという点である．何となればこのことは，宇宙内に於ける凡ゆる存在物が相互に論理的な調和を保っているということを陳那が暗黙の中に認めていたことを意味するからである．宇宙内の存在物が相互に論理的な調和を保っていてはじめて，正しい教説，即ち正しい宇宙観に立って推論が行われる限りは相違決定の如き現象は起るはずがないということが言えると考えられるからである．

Dignāga's philosophical endeavor is sometimes considered to be aiming at a certain kind of formal logic that would be acceptable to any religion or school, beyond the framework of Buddhism (see Katsura, 2012: 44). However, inasmuch as *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is concerned, we need an additional note about the exceptional case in which Dignāga dogmatically distinguishes between "correct" teachings and "wrong" teachings.

In the above sketch of Dignāga's treatment of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, we might ask why, in the context of the wheel of reason, Dignāga needed to discuss the antinomic reason and classify it as an "inconclusive" reason. On this point, his follower Dharmakīrti found a clear answer by separating the discussion of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* from the context of the wheel of reason. According to Dharmakīrti, the antinomic reason should be considered part of "scripturally based inference" (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*), not "inference functioning by the force of real entities" (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). In his *Nyāyabindu*, Dharmakīrti says:

> NB 3.110-114: *viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṃśayahetur uktaḥ | sa iha kasmān noktaḥ ǁ110ǁ anumānaviṣaye 'sambhavāt ǁ111ǁ na hi sambhavo 'sti kārya-svabhāvayor uktalakṣaṇayor anupalambhasya ca viruddhatāyāḥ ǁ112ǁ na cānyo 'vyabhicārī ǁ113ǁ tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ ǁ114ǁ*

> [Question:] The antinomic reason is also stated [by Digānga] as a cause producing doubt. Why is it not mentioned here (i.e., in the classification of the inconclusive reason)?

> [Reply:] Because [the antinomic reason] cannot occur with regard to an object of inference [that relies on the triple characteristics of reason]. For there can be no [other reasons] contradictory to *kāryahetu*, *svabhāvahetu*, and *anupalabdhihetu*, [which fulfill] the above-mentioned [triple] characteristics, and there is no non-deviating reason other than [these three kinds of reasons]. Therefore, only when one investigates the meaning of [scripture] by relying on scripturally based inference that does not presuppose the observation of reality is *viruddhāvyabhicārin* stated as a fallacy of reason (NB III 110-114).

As is well known, Dharmakīrti found the foundation of the inference in the necessary connection through the essential nature [of entities] (*svabhāvapratibandha*), namely, causal relation (*tadutpatti*) or essential identity (*tādātmya*). From the viewpoint of this necessary connection, a valid reason can be restricted to only three types, namely, *kāryahetu*, *svabhāvahetu*, and *anupalabdhihetu*. As far as inferences on the basis of empirical reality are concerned, there is no room for the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. According to Dharmakīrti's thinking, this fallacy occurs only in relation to a metaphysical world accepted by other religions and philosophical schools that are supposed to exist outside empirical reality. Since such metaphysical worlds were invented speculatively by the respective founders of the various religions and philosophical schools, they contain numerous contradictions that can be revealed through the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. To exemplify such a contradiction, Dharmakīrti uses the theme of universals (*sāmānya*), accepted by the Vaiśeṣika school, and constructs an example of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* that establishes two contradictory conclusions, namely, the omnipresence (*sarvatraga*) of universals and their non-omnipresence (see NB 3.117-120; Moriyama, 2013).

In this manner, in Dharmakīrti's system of logic, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* was removed from the wheel of reasons and occupied its own domain outside of empirical reality. At the same time, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* ended its role as a useful means for driving an opponent to self-contradiction, because in Dharmakīrti's logic there is little room for open discussion about religious issues beyond empirical reality.[8] However, until Dharmakīrti's interpretation, it seems that Dignāga's *viruddhāvyabhicārin* was quite useful as a tool of debate. Since Xuanzang and Kuiji's periods of activity fall exactly in the period between these two thinkers, by examining their ideas, another development of this same logical concept, in a place far to the east of India, comes into view.

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[8] Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignāga's PS 3.23-24 and several commentaries on Dharmakīrti's PV 4.65, NB 3.110-120, and HB *31.6-*33.1 are the best materials for studying *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in the post-Dharmakīrti period. However, such a comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this paper.

1   *Viruddhāvyabhicārin* in the *Nyāyapraveśaka* and its interpretations by Jain commentators

Following Dignāga's system of logic, the author of the NP, Śaṅkarasvā-min,[9] presents *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as one of six kinds of inconclusive reason as follows:

> NP 6.13-15: *viruddhāvyabhicārī yathā – anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭa-vad iti. nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavad iti. ubhayoḥ saṃśaya-hetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ bhavati samuditāv eva.*

> The antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) is, for example: "Sound is impermanent because it is a product, like a pot," and "Sound is per-manent because it is audible, like sound-hood." [Together] these two [reasons] become a cause of doubt, since if the two [reasons] are com-bined they form a single inconclusive reason (*anaikāntika*).

This statement conveys almost the same meaning as Dignāga's argument in his PS. As we will see below, Kuiji's interpretation of this statement has some unique features. However, in order to understand the special character of his interpretation, we should first look at the Indian under-standing of this concept. At present we have only two Sanskrit commen-taries on the NP, namely, a commentary called *Śiṣyahitā* or *Nyāyapraveśa-kavṛtti* (NPV) ascribed to the Jain author Haribhadrasūri (eighth century), and the sub-commentary thereto called *Nyāyapraveśakavṛttipañjikā* (NPVP) by Pārśvadevagaṇi (thirteenth century). What follows is a sum-

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[9] Modern scholars hold two opinions with regard to the authorship of NP, namely, Dignāga or Śaṅkarasvāmin. This discussion is summarized in Inami, 2011: 23-26. Inami has pointed out that in the ninefold classification of *pakṣābhāsa*, four items that were added by the author of the NP are refuted by various followers of Dharmakīrti, namely, Śākyabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin. This fact prob-ably shows, as many scholars now believe, that Dignāga is not the author of the NP. It seems unreasonable to suppose that Dharmakīrti's followers would criticize their mas-ter's opinion. Thus, I am also of the opinion that Śaṅkarasvāmin was the author of the NP.

mary of their arguments, especially focusing on those points that are comparable to Kuiji's interpretation.[10]

> <u>Analysis of the compound *viruddhāvyabhicārin*</u>: The compound is analyzed by Haribhadra as a *tatpuruṣa*, which means "[a reason] that does not deviate from a contradictory [reason, i.e., the other reason that proves what is contradictory to the intended conclusion]" (*viruddhaṃ na vyabhicarati*).[11] In addition, he criticizes the other option of interpreting the compound as a *karmadhāraya*, namely, "the reason that is contradictory and non-deviant" (*viruddhaś cāsāv avyabhicārī ca*), because being contradictory and being non-deviant are opposed to each other, and because this interpretation would result in the theory of perspectivism (*anekāntavāda*) (see NPV 37.13-14). On the other hand, Pārśvadeva shows a way to accept both interpreta-

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[10] In Pārśvadeva's explanation, there is also an interesting discussion on the necessity of preliminary investigation before presenting an antinomic reason. Since it is obvious that the discussion is constructed under the influence of Dharmakīrti, I would like to just summarize the discussion in the following. In Pārśvadeva's understanding, every reason contains the possibility of being interpreted as a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*; the primary role of the reason is to establish its own target property, not to refute its counter-proof. Thus, when presenting a certain reason, it is not possible to avoid being attacked by its counter-proof. Therefore one should begin by using another method (*upāyāntara*) to determine the target property. In other words, before starting a proof, one should rebut the property that is contradictory to the target property through logical reasoning (*yukti*). As a typical method for this kind of reasoning, Pārśvadeva proposes Dharmakīrti's *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa* (NPVP 92.18-23). However, when a disputant cannot demonstrate the necessary connection (*avinābhāva*) between a logical reason and its target property through the method of invalidating the reason's presence in the dissimilar example (i.e., *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*) and when he cannot criticize the other proof as being non-established (*asiddha*), the fallacious reason called *viruddhāvyabhicārin* occurs (NPVP 93.21f). This exposition by Pārśvadeva is clearly based on his knowledge of Dharmakīrtian logic, which aims at establishing the necessary connection between the logical reason and its target property. If we rigorously follow Pārśvadeva's procedure, we must admit that *viruddhāvyabhicārin* occurs only if the necessary connection is not ascertained. However, in the period before Dharmakīrti, this was not how *viruddhāvyabhicārin* was understood, as we will see in the next section.

[11] NPV 37.10-12. On this passage, Pārśvadeva comments as follows (NPVP 92.12f.): *taṃ viruddham śrāvaṇatvākhyaṃ na vyabhicarati kṛtakatvalakṣaṇo viruddhāvyabhicārī.*

tions. In order to defend the *karmadhāraya* interpretation, he explains the compound as follows: "[A reason] is a contradictory [reason] because it proves that which is contradictory to what is to be proved by another reason; [the same reason] is non-deviant from what is to be proved by [the reason] itself."[12] These two interpretations are also held by certain followers of Dharmakīrti, as for example Jinendrabuddhi and Dharmottara.[13]

Explanation of the two proofs: According to Haribhadra, while the first proof is presented by a Vaiśeṣika, the second is presented by a Mīmāṃsaka. With regard to the example of "sound-hood", Haribhadra notes that it is a lower universal (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) by means of which one is able to express and cognize "sound" with regard to the various particular sounds that are produced by musical instruments (see NPV 37.14-19). Pārśvadeva does not provide any information concerning the two disputants of the debate.

Explanation of the phrase "cause of doubt": With regard to the phrase "cause of doubt" (*saṃśayahetu*), Haribhadra explains that when the two reasons are combined, the complex reason becomes a cause of doubt about whether sound is permanent or not. If the two reasons were combined (*samasta*), the first reason would also be an over-exclusive, inconclusive reason (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) like the second; on the other hand, if the two reasons were separate (*vyasta*), each reason would be considered a valid logical reason because they both fulfill the necessary triple characteristics. It is only when the two reasons are mutually dependent (*parasparasāpekṣa*) that they become *viruddhāvyabhicārin* (see NPV 37.19-38.7).

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[12] NPVP 93.16f.: *yadi tu sādhanāntarasiddhasya viruddhasādhanād viruddhaḥ svasādhyāvyabhicārāc cāvyabhicārī tato viruddhaś cāsāv avyabhicārī ca viruddhāvyabhicārīty ucyate, tadā syād eva.*

[13] For Jinendrabuddhi's interpretations, see Ono, 2010: 129, fn. 9. Ono regards this sentence (*viruddhayor avyabhicāraḥ, so 'syāstīti viruddhāvyabhicārī*) as evidence for a *bahuvrīhi* interpretation, but in my view, it reveals that it has been interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa*. See NPVP 92.15: *viruddhasyāvyabhicāraḥ so 'syāstītīyam api vyutpattir jñeyā.* For Dharmottara's interpretation, see Tillemans, 2000: 92.

2   Kuiji's explanation of the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* section in NP

Kuiji, one of the great pupils of Xuanzang, wrote an extended commentary on NP. Although we know little about his knowledge of Sanskrit and Buddhist logic as transmitted from his master Xuanzang, his commentary is clearly good material for understanding the actual state of Chinese Buddhist logic in its early stages (see Ui, 1966: 294; Nakamura, 1960). In the following, we shall examine Kuiji's commentary on Śaṅkarasvāmin's argument about *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, which is divided by Kuiji into three parts: (1) the problem of the name (*biao ming* 標名), (2) the presentation of two proofs (*xian zong yin* 顯宗因), and (3) a conclusion.

2.1   Analysis of the compound

First of all, let us start with Kuiji's interpretation of the compound *viruddhāvyabhicārin*:

> YRZLS: 具三相因, 各自決定, 成相違之宗, 名相違決定。相違之決定, 決定令相違, 第三第六兩囀, 俱是依主釋也 (T44:1840.126a21-23).

> [A pair of reasons] are called an "antinomic reason", when each [reason] is determinative due to [its] fulfilling the triple characteristic [for a valid logical reason] and when [each reason] establishes [a mutually] contradictory thesis. [The compound can be analyzed as] a "determinative [reason] of the contradictory [thesis]" or a "[reason] that causes [its thesis] to contradict [the other thesis] through [its] determinative [reason]", namely, [it is either] a genitive *tatpuruṣa* or an instrumental *tatpuruṣa*.

Here Kuiji provides two interpretations of the compound. Of the two, analyzing the compound as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (*xiangwei zhi jueding* 相違之決定) seems less problematic, even though there are other possible ways to connect the first component (i.e., *xiangwei* 相違, *viruddha*) to the second (i.e., *jueding* 決定, *avyabhicārin*) through other case-endings. However, Kuiji's second analysis (*jueding ling xiangwei* 決定令相違) is unreasonable, not because it is an instrumental *tatpuruṣa*, but because it

interprets the second component as possessing the instrumental case-
ending "by means of *avyabhicārin*". In this case, by means of a determina-
tive (or non-deviant) reason such as *kṛtakatva*, in combination with
another reason such as *śrāvaṇatva*, we arrive at a contradiction between
the permanence and the impermanence of sound. What this exposition
intends to claim is perfectly understandable. In Sanskrit grammar, how-
ever, a compound is interpreted as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* when the
first component, in the instrumental case, determines the second. Thus,
Kuiji's analysis, which reverses the order of the two components, is im-
possible.[14] Presumably, Kuiji understood that a compound can be clas-
sified as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* if it is possible to analyze either of its
two components as instrumental to the other, but this would show that
his knowledge of Sanskrit was limited.[15]

2.2   *Explanation of the two proofs*

Next, we turn to the problem of identifying the opponent who presents
the second proof. The Jain commentator Haribhadra identifies the oppo-
nent as a certain Mīmāṃsaka, but Kuiji takes a different stance:

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[14] In order to understand Kuiji's argument, it is helpful to consult the *Inmyōron so myōtō
shō* (因明論疏明灯抄, T2270, hereafter Myōtōshō), written by a pioneer Japanese
scholar of logic/*inmyō*, Zenju (善珠, 723-798 C.E.): 具三相因等者，勝聲二師，所作所
聞，具三相因，各自決定，成常無常相違之宗。名相違決定。相違屬宗，決定屬因。
相違之決定，是第六轉。決定令相違，是第三囀。俱依主釋也。六三兩囀其相如何？
且依《瑜伽》，説男聲七，如其次第：①一ハ説ク體聲。②二所作業聲。如シ説斫樹。
樹是所作之業ナリ。③三能作具聲。如シ人及斧。能斫之具ナリ。④四所屬聲。如言斫
樹爲諸王等。⑤五所因聲。斫此樹木爲造堂故。⑥六所屬聲。如樹屬官。⑦七所依
聲。如樹依付百姓家等。⑧第八轉者。呼召諸法之聲。[1] 如樹屬官，是官之樹也。
相違屬宗，是相違之決定。故依主釋也。[2] 令斫樹倒,即依人斧。故云能作具聲。
令宗相違，即依因力故，決定令相違。是依主釋也 (T68:2270.362b10-25). Following
the grammatical explanations of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in the underlined passage, Zenju
explains Kuiji's second analysis as follows: "Because it causes [its thesis] to contradict
[the intended conclusion] [precisely] by means of the reason, [Kuiji says:] '[a reason]
that causes [its thesis] to contradict [the intended conclusion] by [its] determinative
nature'. This is based on interpretation [of the term] as a *tatpuruṣa* compound."

[15] On Kuiji's knowledge of Sanskrit grammar, see Teng, 2011, Chap. 3.

YRZLS: 此乃勝論對聲生論。義如前説，若對聲顯隨一不成 (T44: 1840.126b4-5).

That is to say, [the first proof] is [presented] by the Vaiśeṣika (Shenglun 勝論) against those who claim that sound is produced (**śabdotpattivādin*, shengshenglun 聲生論). As has been argued previously, if [the proof] were [presented] against those who claim that sound is [merely] made manifest (*śabdābhivyaktivādin*, shengxianlun 聲顯論), it would be a [reason] that is not established for either the proponent or the opponent (*anyatarāsiddha, suiyi bu cheng* 隨一不成).

Certainly, Śaṅkarasvāmin had already claimed that the reason "because it is a product" constitutes an *anyatarāsiddha* fallacy when that reason is presented against a Śabdābhivyaktivādin.[16] Therefore, in order to avoid this fallacy, it seems necessary to assume a different figure/school who/which is claiming the permanence of sound. Kuiji introduces this figure/school with the name "those who claim that sound is produced" (**Śabdotpattivādin*, *shengshenglun* 聲生論); this figure is different from the Śabdābhivyaktivādin.[17] These two advocates of the permanence of sound are mentioned by Kuiji in several discussions in his *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏, hereafter YRLZS) and *Dacheng fayuan yi*

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[16] NP 4.20: *kṛtakatvād iti śabdābhivyaktivādinaṃ praty anyatarāsiddhaḥ.*

[17] We have no Indian source for a group called **Śabdotpattivādin* (*shengshenglun* 聲生論). Hōjō (1980) claimed that the Śabdotpattivādin represents the Vaiśeṣika theory of language, but he did not present any evidence for this identification. On this point, however, Prof. Tōru Funayama has kindly informed me about the following passage from the commentary by Wengui (文軌) on the NP：今鵂鶹子等對聲顯論，立量云，聲是無常，因云，所作性故。彼聲顯論雖計聲從緣顯，其若太虛無所作義。今鵂鶹等云，所作性者但是自許聲有此義。他聲顯論不許聲有。此則自成他不成也(...)又釋，其所作因有生有顯。生即鵂鶹等許*，顯即聲顯論許* (see Shen, 2008: 347, where the reading *ji* 計 is accepted instead of *xu* 許). In the above passage, Wengui attributes the theory of **Śabdotpattivāda* (*shengshenglun* 聲生論) to Ulūka (Xiuliuzi 鵂鶹子, i.e., Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school) and others, and thus we know that Kuiji's interpretation was not the only one concerning this group. However, because of space constraints, I cannot here compare the two interpretations of Xuanzang's two pupils further, but I do plan to do so on another occasion.

lin zhang (大乘法苑義林章).[18] It should be noted here that "sound" or *sheng* (聲) in Kuiji's terminology is a complex concept that can be interpreted not only as a "physical sound" but also as a "signifer" and as "sound-hood". I will use the term "sound" in the broad sense covering those aspects. By contrast, to indicate more precisely the first sense only, I will use "mere sound":

> 1) YRZLS:聲生説聲總有三類：一者響音。雖耳所聞，不能詮表。如近坑語，別有響聲。二者聲性。一一能詮，各有性類。離能詮外，別有本常。不緣不覺。新生緣具，方始可聞。不同勝論。三者能詮。離前二有。響及此二皆新生。響不能詮。今此新生聲是常住。以本有聲性爲同品 (T44:1840.126b10-16).

The Śabdotpattivādin claims that "sound" generally has three aspects: [1] Mere sound, which is audible, but cannot denote [an object-meaning], just as, when one speaks in the vicinity of a cave, there is an additional [set of] word[s] in the echo; [2] Sound-hood. There is both a class and a genus (*xing, lei* 性類) in each signifer (*nengquan* 能詮, *abhidhāna*?). Outside of the signifer, [sound-hood] exists originally in permanence. It is not cognizable without a condition (*yuan* 緣). Once it comes into conjunction with the [appropriate] conditions [to make it] newly come into being, it becomes audible. [This] is different from the [idea of the] Vaiśeṣika; [3] Signifer (*nengquan* 能詮), which exists separately from the first two (i.e., mere sound and sound-hood). The mere sound and this signifer both come into being anew. This mere sound cannot denote [an object]. Now [i.e., when the Śabdotpattivādin presents the subject], this sound (i.e., signifer), which has newly come into being, is permanent [after it has arisen]. [The Śabdotpattivādin] can [therefore] present originally existing sound-hood (*ben you sheng xing* 本有聲性) as the similar example (*tongpin* 同品, *sapakṣa*).

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[18] In Kuiji's *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang* (大乘法苑義林章, T1861), six heretical theories are enumerated: the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the *Vedavāda, the Śabdābhivyaktivāda, the *Śabdotpattivāda, and the Lokāyata (*shulun* 數論, *shenglun* 勝論, *minglun* 明論, *shengxianlun* 聲顯論, *shengshenglun* 聲生論, *shunshilun* 順世論).

2) YRZLS: 聲論師中總有二種：一聲從緣生即常不滅。二聲本常住。從緣所顯今方可聞。緣響若息。還不可聞。聲生亦爾。緣息不聞。緣在故聞。此二師皆有一分一切内外異性，一體多體能詮別故。若佛弟子對聲生論立：聲無常，所作性因，便具三相。對聲顯論言：所作性，隨一不成。若對聲顯言：勤勇因，便具三相。對聲生論立：一切聲皆是無常，勤勇爲因。宗法非遍兩倶不成。今顯對聲生，所作爲因。若對聲顯，勤勇爲因 (T44:1840.108a27-b7).

Among the Śabdavādins (*shenglunshi* 聲論師), there are generally two types: First, [the *Śabdotpattivādin claims that] sound comes into being in accordance with conditions, and [that] it is eternal and non-perishing. Second, [the Śabdābhivyaktivādin claims that] sound is originally permanent; it becomes manifest in accordance with conditions, and only then is it audible; when the conditions, together with the mere sound, cease, it returns [to its original nature] and becomes inaudible. It is the same in the case of the *Śabdotpattivādin: when the condition ceases, [the sound] is inaudible; because the condition exists, it is audible. These two masters both [accept] that there are differences [in the sound] concerning the parts, the whole, [what is] internal [to it], and [what is] external [to it], because of distinctions between single essence and multiple essences in the signifer.[19] If the Buddhist claims the impermanence of sound against the *Śabdotpattivādin, the reason "being a product" (*kṛtakavta*) fulfills the triple characteristics [of a valid reason]. However, if [the same thesis] is presented against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, [the reason] "being a product" constitutes [the fallacious reason called] *anyatarāsiddha*. If [the thesis] is presented against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, [the reason] "[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort" (*prayatnānantarīyakatva*) fulfills the triple characteristics [of a valid reason]. If [the thesis] "all sounds are impermanent" is presented against the *Śabdotpattivādin with the reason "[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort", [the reason] does not pervade the property of the subject [i.e., it does not fulfill the first characteristic of a valid reason, *pakṣadharmatva*] and thus, it constitutes [the

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[19] This sentence is still unclear to me.

fallacious reason called] *ubhayāsiddha*. It is now clear that one [should] present the reason "being a product" against the *Śabdotpattivādin, and the reason "[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort" against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin.

3) *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang*: 聲顯論者, 聲體本有, 待緣顯之, 體性常住。此計有二：一者隨一一物, 各各有一能詮常聲, 猶如非擇滅。以尋伺等所發音顯。音是無常。今用衆多常聲爲體。二者一切法上, 但共有一能詮常聲, 猶如眞如。以尋伺等所發音顯。此音無常。今者唯取一常聲爲體。其音響等但是顯緣, 非能詮體 (T45:1861.251 b2-8).

The Śabdābhivyaktivāda [claims that] the nature of sound originally exists, and then becomes manifest in reliance upon its conditions. This nature is permanent. When one examines this nature, there are two types: [1] First, there is a permanent sound that signifies [each object] in accordance with the [corresponding] entity, like non-analytical cessation (*apratisaṅkhyānirodha*).[20] In terms of what is made manifest by sounds pronounced on the basis of reasoning (*vitarka) and reflection (*vicāra), etc., [mere] sound is impermanent; here, [however,] these plural [sounds] take the eternal sound (i.e., signifer) as their essence; [2] second, there is a single, permanent sound that signifies [an object] that exists commonly in all entities (*dharma*s), like suchness. In terms of what is made manifest by sounds pronounced on the basis of reasoning and reflection, etc., the [mere] sound is impermanent; here, [however,] we take only the singular, eternal sound as the essence. The mere sounds, etc., are only conditions for the manifestation [of the single, eternal sound], and [the single, eternal sound] is not the essence of the signifer.

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[20] For non-analytical cessation (*apratisaṅkhyānirodha*), see AK 1.6cd and AKBh on the half stanza. Unlike analytical cessation, which obstructs the arising of defilements by the power of wisdom, this non-analytical cessation concerns every entity (*dharma*). According to Vasubandhu's exposition, this cessation obstructs the arising of a future entity when it lacks the conditions for its arising. Since this cessation is permanent and applicable to each entity, Kuiji uses the concept as the example for sound as a signifer.

4) *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang*: 其聲生論計，聲本無，待緣生之，生已常住。由音響等所發生故，此計有二：一計體多，猶如非擇滅。二計體一，猶若眞如。音響生緣體無常法。今取新生常聲爲體，以能詮故。響非能詮 (T45:1861.251b12-16).

When we examine the *Śabdotpattivāda, [its doctrine is as follows:] Sound originally does not exist, but it comes into being in reliance upon conditions. Once it has come into being, it is everlasting. Because [sound] is brought into being by mere sounds, etc., there are two ways of enumerating [it]: [1] First, we can count it as multiple in nature, like non-analytical cessation; [2] second, we can count it as singular in nature, like suchness; here, [however,] we take the sound that is everlasting after newly coming into being (*xin sheng chang sheng* 新生常聲) as the essence [of sound] because it signifies [each object]. The mere sound is not the signifer.

From these descriptions – despite the fact that they contain a number of expressions that are difficult for me to understand – we can see how the two figures/schools differ:

The Śabdābhivyaktivādin does not accept the reason "being a product" (*kṛtakatva*); he only accepts "coming into being immediately after intentional effort" (*prayatnānantarīyakatva*). According to this belief, the essences/essence of sound – either multiple in accordance with the objects being signified, or having a single nature – are/is eternal and become/-s manifest in reliance upon conditions such as mere sounds produced by reasoning and reflection. The Śabdābhivyaktivādin seems to equate the signifer with the eternal essence of sound.

The *Śabdotpattivādin accepts the reason "being a product". Unlike the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, he claims that sound is produced by mere sound. Thus, for him, the permanence of sound means that a sound continues eternally after it is produced. According to the description in the NP-commentary, he distinguishes sound-hood from mere sound and signifer. However, in the *Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang*, it is said that for him, sound does not originally exist (*sheng ben wu* 聲本無). It is significant that this *Śabdotpattivādin claims that sound-

hood is audible when it fulfills the conditions upon which it newly comes into being (*xin sheng yuan* 新生縁).

Supposing this *Śabdotpattivādin as the opponent, Kuiji provides a clear picture of a specific debate in which the two disputants share concepts relating to the proofs, including the reason "being a product" and the example "sound-hood".

2.3   How do we determine the winner of the debate?

As seen in the previous section, when commenting on the antinomic reason, Kuiji aims at reconstructing a debate between a Vaiśeṣika and a *Śabdotpattivādin. However, if this is a real debate, one should be able to determine who the winner is. In the case of the debate under discussion, a Vaiśeṣika first presents a proof of the impermanence of sound, where-upon the opponent presents a counter-proof. Of the two antinomic reasons, then, neither *kṛtakatva* nor *śrāvaṇatva* results in a decisive conclusion.

In this situation, Śaṅkarasvāmin simply says, "both [reasons] are a cause of doubt; these two combined constitute a single inconclusive [reason]" (*ubhayoḥ saṃśayahetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ bhavati samuditāv eva*). Commenting on this passage, Kuiji explains that the author's intention consists in avoiding the misconception that in the case of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, the one who presents the counter-proof gains the advantage and becomes the winner. Indeed, this was the idea expressed by Wengui (文軌, d.u.), a predecessor of Kuiji.[21]

Kuiji points out the error in this idea by quoting Dignāga's statement: "And here, since *pratyakṣāgama* predominates, exactly by this [means] one should seek a determination [as to whether sound is permanent or

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[21] See Takemura, 1986: 227-232. As Takemura has emphasized, the above is Kuiji's under-standing of Wengui's discussion (Takemura, 1986: 230). Unlike the above summary, Wengui claims that the winner of the debate is determined by perception and Bud-dhist scripture; if both proponent and opponent are opposed by perception and scrip-ture, the one who first presents a proof is defeated, whereupon the other becomes the winner.

not]" （又於此中現教力勝故応依此思求決定）.[22] The compound *pratyakṣāgama* (*xianjiao* 現教) is analyzed by Kuiji in three different ways: (1) what is experienced in common by the world (*xian* 現＝*shijian* 世間) and the Buddha's teaching (*jiao* 教＝*fojiao* 佛教), (2) teaching based on Śākyamuni Buddha's direct experience (*Shijia fo xianzheng* 釋迦佛現證), and (3) teaching based on what is accepted by the world (*shijian xian* 世間現) (see T44:1840.126c9-17). In each case, Kuiji judges the Vaiśeṣika to be the winner of the debate. However, as Kuiji explains, to eliminate the misconception that victory always goes to the one who presents the counter-proof, Śaṅkarasvāmin concludes the section with the words, "both are inconclusive [reasons]".

In the above exposition, Kuiji seems to ignore the importance of the "antinomy" of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. Certainly, in a real debate, one must decide who the winner is. As we have seen in the introduction, from a logical viewpoint, this type of fallacious reason has the destructive function of driving the opponent's position into self-contradiction. As in other *prasaṅga*-style arguments, it is important to reveal the failure of the opponent's implicit presupposition logically, and yet, Kuiji's interpretation does not seem to do this. Nonetheless, we must refrain from concluding that Kuiji has completely ignored the "antinomy" in *viruddhāvyabhicārin* until we have examined his three types of inference.

2.4   *Kuiji's typology of* viruddhāvyabhicārin

Soon after the exposition of the concluding passage of this section, Kuiji adds some additional arguments concerning his own ideas on *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. These contain, in my view, three remarkable points:

A) The typology of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: According to Kuiji, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* can be classified into three types according to the situation

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[22] Katsura, 1979: 77. In YRZLS (T44:1840.126b29-c4), Kuiji quotes a passage of NM in order to criticize the interpretation of a former master (i.e., Wengui) that in a debate, the disputant who presents his proof second, after the first disputant, is the winner when the two proofs are equally valid, as in the case of stopping a slow (i.e., inconclusive) game of go, where one judges the player who took the second move of the game as the winner (古有斷言：如殺遲碁, 後下爲勝).

of the debate, namely: (1) a situation in which one is refuting the other's proof from one's own position; (2) a situation in which one is defending one's position from the other's refutation; and (3) a situation in which two disputants argue while commonly accepting the concepts used in their proofs.

B)   The relation between *viruddhāvyabhicārin* and *anumānaviruddha*: The fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is encompassed in the fallacious thesis called "thesis contradicted by another inference" (*anumānaviruddha*).

C)   Four kinds of *viruddha* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: In the NP, the contradictory reason (*viruddha*) is classified into four types, namely, *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana, dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana, dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*, and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*. Kuiji claims that these four categories are also applicable in classifying *viruddhāvyabhicārin* into four types. These types depend upon which element of the thesis is contradictory to the decisive reason.

Of the above three points, we will focus only on point A, in order to look for the basis of Kuiji's understanding of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. According to this typology, one can construct a counter-proof in three different situations, namely, when refuting the other's position, when defending one's own position, and during a discussion based on common acceptance.

Of these three situations, the two proofs exemplified in the NP concerning the permanence/impermanence of sound are understood as representing the third situation, namely, based upon common ground accepted by both disputants. In this case, all of the elements constituting the proof(s), such as the reason and the example, are expressed by concepts that are held in common by both the proponent and the opponent. In this case, the inference is called "inference based on commonly accepted grounds" (共比量), and the fallacy of *anyatarāsiddha* should not occur.

There remain the other two cases, in which the fallacy of *anyatarāsiddha* is not ruled out. Kuiji explains these two cases using the terms *svārthānumāna* ("inference based on grounds one accepts oneself", *zibiliang* 自比量) and *parārthānumāna* ("inference based on grounds accepted by the other", *tabiliang* 他比量), in a different way than they are

commonly understood based on the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. According to Kuiji, a *zibiliang*-inference is constructed with a logical reason containing the qualifier "we accept" (*zi xu* 自許); in a *tabiliang*-inference, the reason contains the qualifier "you believe" (*ru zhi* 汝執).[23] Based on this classification, Kuiji distinguishes three patterns of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*:[24]

	Proponent	Opponent
Pattern 1: *gongbiliang* vs. *gongbiliang*	[the Vaiśeṣika claims:] Sound is non-eternal because it is a product, like a pot.	[the Śabdotpattivādin claims:] Sound is eternal because it is audible, like sound-hood.
Pattern 2: *tabiliang* vs. *zibiliang*	[the Mahāyāna claims:] Non-manifested matter (*avijñaptirūpa*), which <u>you believe in</u>, is not in fact matter (*rūpa*), because <u>you believe</u> that it is non-resistant (*apratigha*), like consciousness	[the Hīnayāna claims:] Non-manifested matter, which <u>we accept</u>, is in fact matter, because <u>we accept</u> that it has the nature of matter, like color and sound, which <u>we [also]</u>

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[23] Although *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* are technical terms in Indian Buddhist logic, which are usually translated "inference for one's own sake" and "inference for others' sake", respectively, they are different from Kuiji's understanding of the two concepts. As Teng (2011: 148-149) has noted, "These two types of inference should not be confused with the inference for one's own sake *svārthānumāna* and inference for others' sake *parārthānumāna* found in the Indian logic transmissions; both 'self-*anumāna*' and 'other-*anumāna*' are *parārthānumāna*." See also Frankenhauser, 1996: 71. On the other hand, for the two qualifications which are particular to Chinese *hetuvidyā*, see Harbsmeier, 1998: 376-379, Frankenhauser, 1996: 55-59, Yao, 2009: 393-394, Teng, 2011: 148-149. As for Kuiji's definition of *zibiliang* 自比量, Harada (1993: 147f.) has pointed out its similarity to Candrakīrti's idea of *svārthānumāna*, which does not require any ground that is commonly accepted by both disputants. See Pras 35.9: *svārthānumāne tu sarvatra svaprasiddhir eva garīyasī, nobhayaprasiddhiḥ*. See also Yamazaki, 1960.

[24] Frankenhauser (1996: 72) presents a typology of inference which contains an additional fourth pattern, refutation of a *gongbiliang*-inference by a *zibiliang*-inference. However, I am doubtful whether such an example exists.

	and mental acts.[25]	accept.[26]
Pattern3: *zibiliang* vs. *tabiliang*[27]	[the Hīnayāna claims:]	[the Mahāyāna claims:]
	Non-manifested matter, which we accept, is in fact matter, because we accept that it has the nature of matter, like color and sound, which we accept.	Non-manifested matter, which you believe in, is not in fact matter, because you believe that it is non-resistant, like consciousness and mental acts.

On first reading, the two disputants in Patterns 2 and 3 (i.e., a Mahāyāna Buddhist, and a Hīnayāna Buddhist as represented by a Sarvāstivādin) seem to be talking at cross purposes, but when one looks closer at the text, one soon notices that these two patterns illustrate typical examples of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: If one ignores the qualifiers "we accept" and "you believe in", the two proofs are concerned with the same subject, "non-manifested matter", and aim to establish mutually contradictory conclusions, "being matter" or "not being matter", based on different reasons, namely "being non-resistant" or "having the nature of matter".

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[25] YRZLS: 汝無表色定非實色, 許無對故, 如心心所 (T44:1840.126c20-21). Vasubandhu defines *avijñaptirūpa* as follows (AK 1.11): *vikṣiptācittakasyāpi yo 'nubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ | mahābhūtāny upādāya sa hy avijñaptir ucyate.* This *avijñaptirūpa* arises by depending on four elements, and in accordance with the change of *vijñaptirūpa*, its corresponding *avijñaptirūpa* is also changed. According to Sako (1985), even though *avijñaptirūpa* is classified as one kind of "material" (*rūpa*), its function is closer to *prāpti/aprāpti* (karmic acquisition/non-acquisition). At any rate, also from the description in AK(Bh), we are aware of the problematic position of *avijñaptirūpa* in the Sarvāstivāda's categorical system, and therefore, it is a good example with which to construct a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. For Kuiji's own interpretation of *avijñaptirūpa/avijñapti* and its practical background, see Ōtani (2004).

[26] YRZLS: 我無表色(*em.* cf. *Dōgakushō* 227b16: 無對色 *ed.*)定是實色, 許色性故, 如許色聲等 (T44:1840.126c21-22).

[27] The following two proofs are not mentioned in Kuiji's commentary on the NP. See *Dōgakushō*: 若薩婆多對大乘立量云：我無表色定是實色, 許色性故, 如許色聲等。大乘作違決云：汝無表色定非實色, 許無對故, 如心心所者。是自比量相違決定也 (T66:2263.227b18-22).

What draws our attention is the proof presented by a Mahāyana Buddhist to refute the Hīnayāna's concept of *avijñaptirūpa.* In this proof, which Kuiji calls *tabiliang* 他比量, the Mahāyana Buddhist constructs a counter-argument against the opponent's position accepting the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* by using exactly the notions acceptable to the opponent. We can see here one of the most representative usages of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*: to reveal a self-contradiction in an opponent's ontological/metaphysical system. Thus, Kuiji was probably aware of the importance of "antinomy" in the cases of Patterns 2 and 3. Only in Pattern 1, however, does he ignore its importance, changing *viruddhāvyabhicārin* into a mere indicator of two opposite opinions in a common debate.

Why, then, did Kuiji regard Pattern 1 as a case of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*? To reply to this question, we shall in closing investigate the relation between Kuiji's interpretation of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* and Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only (*weishi biliang* 唯識比量).

3   Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only and its relation to *viruddhāvyabhicārin*

The famous proof of consciousness-only ascribed to Xuanzang is documented in the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* as follows:

> YRZLS: 大師立唯識比量云：眞故極成色不離於眼識宗,自許初三攝眼所不攝故因, 猶如眼識喩 (T44:1840.115b25-26).

> Master (Xuanzang) presented an inference for consciousness-only as follows: "From the ultimate viewpoint (*zhen gu* 真故, *paramārthatas*), commonly accepted colors and forms are not separate from the visual consciousness (*yanshi* 眼識, *cakṣurvijñāna*), because while being included in the first three [of the eighteen elements] that we accept, they are not included in the visual sense-faculty (*yan* 眼, *cakṣus*), like the visual consciousness" (see Ui, 1966: 321-325; Ejima, 1980: 205; Franco, 2004: 205; Teng, 2011: 149-154).

Commenting on the qualifier of the thesis "from the ultimate viewpoint", Kuiji explains that due to this qualifier, this inference can avoid the fallacious theses called "what is contradictory to what is accepted in

common by the world" (*shijian xiangwei* 世間相違) and "what is contradictory to one's own teaching" (*zijiao xiangwei* 自教相違). In addition, he explains the qualifier for indicating the inference as a type of *gongbiliang.* In doing so, he defends the inference from the criticism of the brilliant Korean monk Wŏnhyo (元曉, 618-686) (see Franco, 2004: 211f.; Moro, 2007). In a letter written to Xuanzang, Wŏnhyo challenged Xuanzang's proof by formulating the following counter-proof, which leads to a pair of reasons constituting a *viruddhāvyabhicārin*:

> YRZLS: 眞故極成色定離於眼識，自許初三攝眼識不攝故，猶如眼根 (T44:1840.116a20-21).

> From the ultimate viewpoint, commonly accepted colors and forms *are* separate from the visual consciousness, because while included in the first three [of the eighteen elements] that we accept, they are not included in the visual consciousness, like the visual sense-faculty (see Franco, 2004: 211f.).

Using the basic framework of Xuanzang's proof, Wŏnhyo has clearly constructed a counter-proof based on the Sarvāstivādin's viewpoint. As Franco (2004: 212) has remarked, "At least as far as the three characteristics are concerned, it seems that Wŏnhyo succeeded, after all, to annul Xuanzang's brilliant inference." However, Kuiji did not think this was the case. He claims that this counter-proof cannot be considered a *viruddhāvyabhicārin.* Why not? The following is Kuiji's reply:

> YRZLS: 凡因明法若自比量，宗因喻中皆須依自。他共亦爾。立依自他共，敵對亦須然。名善因明無疎謬矣。前云唯識依共比量。今依自立。即一切量皆有此違。如佛弟子對聲生論立：聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等。聲生論言：聲是其常，所聞性故，如自許聲性。應是前量決定相違。彼既不成。故依自比，不可對共而爲比量 (T44:1840.116a22-29).

Generally speaking, in Buddhist logic, "inference based on grounds one accepts oneself" (*zibiliang* 自比量) is [an inference where] thesis, reason, and example, are all dependent on the grounds of one's own [position]. The same is [true] for [the other two types of inference, namely,] *tabiliang* and *gongbiliang.* When [the proponent] presents a *zibiliang, tabiliang,* or *gongbiliang* [type of inference], the opponent

should also reply with the corresponding [type of inference]. This is what is called "good logic", which is free of fallacies. The above-mentioned [inference for] *vijñaptimātratā* is [presented] as a *gongbiliang* [type of inference]. Nevertheless, [Wǒnhyo] presents [as a counter-proof] a *zibiliang* [type of inference]. If this were allowed, the same fallacy would occur for all means of valid cognition. For instance, when the Buddhist claims against a Śabdotpattivādin [a *gongbiliang* type of inference such as] "Sound is impermanent, because it is a product, like a pot," [to this,] the Śabdotpattivādin could claim [a *zibiliang* type of inference:] "Sound is permanent, because it is audible, like sound-hood, which we accept." Exactly [this reason presented by the Śabdotpattivādin] would be an antinomic reason to the previous means of valid cognition [i.e., the previous inference by the Buddhist], but this [antinomic reason] is not established. Therefore, it is impossible to reply to a *gongbiliang*-inference by making a *zibiliang*-inference.

In this manner, supposing Xuanzang's proof to be a *gongbiliang*-inference, Kuiji criticizes Wǒnhyo by pointing out the impossibility of constructing a counter-proof in the form of a *zibiliang*-inference. However, it is undeniable that this critique of Kuiji's is unfair. In fact, he classifies Wǒnhyo's proof as a *zibiliang*-type just because of the expression "we accept" (*zi xu* 自許), which qualifies the reason. But in that case, why does he not classify Xuanzang's proof as a *zibiliang*-type for the same reason, since it also uses the term "we accept" as a qualifier of the reason? Kuiji replies that the qualifier "we accept" plays a different role in Xuanzang's proof, namely, the role of avoiding the fallacy of *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana;* thus, it does not indicate that it is a *zibiliang*-inference. This is certainly a lame excuse, and yet, for Kuiji, there was probably no other way to defend the glory of his master's proof from Wǒnhyo's criticism, within the innovative schema of three patterns of *viruddhāvyabhicārin*.[28]

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[28] In order to examine this issue in more detail, we would need to understand Xuanzang's concept of the three kinds of inferences and their qualifiers, namely, "we accept", "you believe in", and "both accept in common". In this regard, our attention is drawn by Xuanzang's criticism of the proof of Jayasena (Shengjun 勝軍). Cf. T44:1840. 121b21-23.

4   Conclusion

We have examined here a significant logical concept, *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, from various trans-cultural viewpoints, from India to China, as developed over a timespan of five to seven centuries. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows:

1. With regard to the analysis of the compound *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, Kuiji's first interpretation of it as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* is basically the same as the Jain commentators' interpretations, even though they did not specify the sub-class of *tatpuruṣa* in question. Kuiji's second interpretation, which understands the second component of the compound (*jueding* 決定, *avyabhicārin*) as having an instrumental case-ending, seems grammatically impossible.

2. Kuiji's identification of the opponent who claims the permanence of sound with the **śabdotpattivādin* reveals Kuiji's systematic understanding of the NP as a manual for practical debate. By introducing the **śabdotpattivādin*, whose actual historical nature is still uncertain, as the opponent, Kuiji clearly presents a debate in which the two disputants present their proofs without committing the fallacy of *anyatarāsiddha*.

3. To win a debate, it does not matter which proof is presented first, especially in the case of inference based on other-accepted grounds (*gongbiliang* 共比量). According to Kuiji, the winner of a debate is determined on the basis of "perception and scripture/scripture based on perception" (*xianjiao* 現教). In the case of the two example proofs, the Vaiśeṣika's position wins due to its reliance upon what is accepted in common by the world and the Buddha's teaching. On this point, Kuiji seems to misunderstand the destructive function of the "antinomy", namely, its ability to drive the opponent into the corner of self-contradiction.

4. Kuiji's typology of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* presupposes his classification of inference, namely, inference based on grounds one accepts oneself, inference based on grounds accepted by the other, and inference based on commonly accepted grounds. By using this clas-

sification system, Kuiji has constructed a new set of rules for debate, that is, in accordance with the type of the first proof, the type of the counter-proof should be restricted to one of three patterns. Of these, Patterns 2 and 3 can be understood as typical examples of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* being used as a method for a *prasaṅga* style of argument.

5. Kuiji's special interpretation of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is related to Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only. According to Kuiji's commentary and other sources, Xuanzang's proof was criticized by Wŏnhyo, who presented a counter-proof that leads to *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. In order to avoid this fallacy, Kuiji interprets Xuanzang's proof as an inference based on commonly accepted grounds (*gongbiliang* 共比量). Thus, any counter-proof must also be presented as a *gongbiliang*-inference. However, since Wŏnhyo's inference is interpreted as a *zibiliang*-inference, his challenge is judged to be illegitimate in its form.

Abbreviations

AK/AKBh   *Abhidharmakośa/-bhāṣya* (Pradhan, 1967)
DhPr   *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Malvania, 1971)
Dōgakushō   *Yuishikiron dōgaku shō* (唯識論同學鈔) of Ryōsan (良算), T2263
HB   *Hetubindu* (Steinkellner, 1967)
Myōtōshō: *Inmyōron so myōtō shō* (因明論疏明灯抄) of Zenju (善珠), T2270
NB   *Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti*: see DhPr
NBṬ   *Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara*: see DhPr
NM   *Nyāyamukha* (*Yinming zhengli men lun* 因明正理門論) of Dignāga, T1628
NP   *Nyāyapraveśa[ka]* (Jambuvijaya, 2001)
NPV   *Nyāyapraveśakavṛtti* of Haribhadrasūri: see NP
NPVP   *Nyāyapraveśakavṛttipañjikā* of Pārśvadevagaṇi: see NP
PS/PSV 3   *Pramāṇasamuccaya/-vṛtti* (3rd chapter) of Dignāga (Kitagawa, 1965)

T   *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大蔵経
YRZLS   *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏) of Kuiji (窺基),
               T1840

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The Problem of Self-Refuting Statements in Chinese Buddhist Logic

Jakub Zamorski

Introductory remarks

The famous pilgrim and translator Xuanzang's (玄奘, 602-664) translation of Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Introduction to Logic* (*Nyāyapraveśa, Yinming ru zhengli lun* 因明入正理論) around 647 marks the beginning of the systematic study of Indian Buddhist logic or the "science of reasons" (*hetuvidyā, yinming* 因明) by Buddhist monks in China. This terse treatise deals with methods of defending and refuting disputed theses by adducing sound arguments. Although it addresses examples of correct and fallacious inferences, its subject matter would be better described as rules of rational debate between representatives of competing philosophical schools, rather than formal logic.[1] This pragmatic concern is readily apparent in the section of the treatise that lists nine examples of "pseudo-theses" (*pakṣa-ābhāsa, sizong* 似宗), i.e. theses which are unacceptable as topics of debate. Śaṅkarasvāmin labels as "pseudo-theses" various kinds of statement which the opponent might refuse to discuss, e.g. theses incompatible with experience or common sense, or those that contain concepts and terms whose meanings cannot be agreed upon by both sides. A thesis inconsistent with the philosophical views of the school to which the disputant belongs is also dismissed as invalid. It is

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[1] According to I. M. Bocheński, Dignāga's system of the "science of reasons", presented in the *Nyāyapraveśa*, was one of the final stages in the transition from the "methodology of discussion" to formal logic in India (Bocheński, 1970: 431).

within such a context that the following sentence appears, without any further explanation:

Sentence [1]

自語相違者，如言：「我母是其石女」 (T32:1630.11c2-3).

svavacana-viruddho yathā: mātā me vandhyā iti (Guo, 1999: 43).

[The fallacy of] "inconsistency with one's own words" occurs in statements such as this: "My mother is that barren woman."[2]

Around 655, Xuanzang decided to translate a more substantial Indian logical work by Dignāga, called *The Gate of Logic* (*Nyāyamukha, Yinming zhengli men lun* 因明正理門論). This treatise provides a different, shorter list of "pseudo-theses", consisting of only five categories. Although the sentence above is not among them, Dignāga quotes another example of a thesis that is internally inconsistent:

Sentence [2]

若相[?][3]違義言聲所遣，如立:「一切言皆是妄」(T32:1628.1a19-20).

*yadi viruddhārthavācinā svavacanena bādhyate yathā: sarvam uktaṃ mṛṣêti.[4]

(A thesis is invalid) if one's own words and meaning exclude each other, for example, when someone claims: "All statements are false."[5]

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[2] It is clear from the context that the term "barren woman" ("stone woman" in Chinese) denotes a woman that has never been capable of giving birth.

[3] This reading follows the amendment proposed by Katsura Shōryū (桂紹隆) on the basis of the corresponding Skt. fragments. Traditional Chinese editions of the text have the character (*fei* 非). A third variant reading (*ti* 體) was proposed by the Japanese commentator Usui Hōun (烏水宝雲，1791-1847) (Katsura, 1977: 113).

[4] The Skt. manuscript of the *Nyāyamukha* preserved in Tibet (Luo, 1985: 69-70) had not been published at the time of writing of this paper. The corresponding Skt. fragment is reconstructed by Katsura Shōryū from the quotation in Prajñākaragupta's *Prāmaṇavārttika-bhāṣya* (Katsura, 1977: 113).

[5] The translation of the Chinese sentence is simplified due to textual problems. Classical Chinese vocabulary has no clear distinction between "sentence" and "statement". However, at least some Chinese commentators on this passage clearly understand the word

It seems that all Chinese (and in fact all East Asian) commentators of Indian treatises on Buddhist logic regarded Sentences [1] and [2] as two samples of one and the same fallacy, labeled according to the text of the *Introduction to Logic* as "inconsistency with one's own words" (*zi yu xiangwei* 自語相違, after Sanskrit *svavacanaviruddha*).[6] Even though it is not entirely clear to what extent this classification reflected the previous views of Indian Buddhist logicians,[7] it is fairly understandable in the

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yan (言) as referring to *yanlun* (言論) "discourses", i.e. sentences that express some claims.

[6] It is difficult if not impossible to find a term from contemporary logic that could be applied to both examples. The term "self-refutation" is probably the most appropriate choice, partly due to the fact that it has no universally accepted definition. The broadest definitions of this term largely match the meaning intended by the Buddhist authors discussed in this article. For example, Simon Blackburn defines the term as follows: "A self-refuting utterance is one which is shown to be false in the very fact of its being made" (Blackburn, 1996: 345). In modern Western philosophical literature, self-refuting statements have been defined by some authors (Passmore, 1970: 59, 80; Perrett, 1984: 237, 239) as statements which are self-contradictory in themselves, rather than inconsistent with some remote implications or other statements uttered by the same person. This is analogous to the rationale behind distinguishing the fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words" from "inconsistency with one's own teachings" (*āgamaviruddha, zijiao xiangwei* 自教相違) in Buddhist logic. Contemporary discussions of self-refutation also include so-called "pragmatic self-refutation", exemplified by such statements as "I cannot speak" (Mackie, 1964; Passmore, 1970: 62). As is shown below, precisely this kind of statement was counted by East Asian commentators as one of the subtypes of the fallacy in question. However, it should be noted that on some definitions, statements such as Sentence [1] are classified as self-contradictory but not self-refuting (Castagnoli, 2010: 5-6; Chmielewski, 1981: 67, 70). Even though self-refutation is sometimes considered to be a sub-category of self-contradiction, as a translation of technical expression used in Chinese Buddhist logic, the term "self-contradiction" could be misleading. It might be argued that the system of Buddhist logic does not seem to have a clear counterpart of the Western notion of contradiction, understood as a relation between two statements (Chmielewski, 1981: 71). The term *viruddha*, translated by Xuanzang as *xiangwei*, has broader application, as it refers to a relation between the thesis and any kind of counter-evidence that renders it problematic, including the testimony of perception. Moreover, neither sentence *directly* exhibits "contradiction" in the most common current meaning of this term, i.e. a conjunction of two opposing statements (*p* and not-*p*), and Buddhist logicians generally did not try to resolve both of them into this self-contradictory form.

[7] An anonymous Indian treatise translated into Chinese around 550 as *The Treatise on Accordance with Truth* (*Rushi lun* 如實論 **Tarka-śāstra*), in a passage that appears to be an

context of the principles of the "science of reasons". Both Sentences [1] and [2], unlike other types of "pseudo-theses", exemplify statements which are *internally* flawed, i.e. untenable on logical grounds alone. Anyone who proposes a thesis of either kind at the same time inadvertently proposes its refutation. For this reason such theses are unacceptable regardless of the philosophical affiliation of the disputant and opponent.

That being said, the issues represented by Sentences [1] and [2] have generally been distinguished in the history of logic in the West. "My mother is a barren woman" – hereafter referred to simply as Sentence [1] – is a case of what in traditional Western logic would be classified as *contradictio in terminis* or *contradictio in adiecto*, a statement whose predicate is in conflict with its subject. This kind of fallacy was discussed in detail by medieval scholastics (Rieger, 2005: 74-76). "All statements are false" – hereafter referred to as Sentence [2] – is a canonical example of a statement that is both self-referential and self-refuting. Although it never gained the notoriety of the much knottier "Liar's Paradox" ("This statement is false"), its variants have often appeared in Western logical literature of the ancient, medieval and modern periods (Chmielewski, 1981; Castagnoli, 2007).[8]

Both of the aforementioned Indian treatises were studied by the disciples of Xuanzang, who attempted to write their own commentaries

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early version of the list of "pseudo-theses", mentions the sentence "A virgin has a child" (童女有兒 *kumārī putravatī*) as an example of a thesis that is fallacious due to internal inconsistency. In a different passage, it demonstrates how to refute someone who claims, "I reject all that is said" (一切所說我皆不許 *sarvam uktaṃ na anujñāye*??). Zheng Weihong (2007: 79) follows the Chinese tradition in identifying the second statement as another example of the previously mentioned fallacy, but the text does not seem to state that explicitly (cf. T32:1633.29a18-21, 30b17-23; and Tucci, 1981: 4, 11 [Skt. pagination], 2, 3 [Arabic pagination]).

[8] According to Chmielewski, at least from the time of Aristotle, the customary approach of Western logicians was to regard such statements as implying their own falsehood, and ergo false. In the early twentieth century, Bertrand Russell (Russell, 1963: 40-42) challenged this view by arguing that [2], being a proposition about all propositions, is a meaningless statement, and as such cannot be legitimately asserted to be either true or false. Castagnoli argues that ancient self-refutation arguments generally did not aim at establishing the necessary falsehood of such statements as [2], but rather, at "criticizing such theses as dialectical losers" (Castagnoli, 2007: 68).

in order to clarify the meaning of these notoriously difficult texts. Needless to say, Chinese monks had no training in formal logic whatsoever. Their most reliable clues as to the interpretation of Sentences [1] and [2] was a rather random selection of Chinese translations of Indian works dealing with the art of argumentation, and possibly some pieces of oral commentary transmitted by their master Xuanzang, who had reportedly studied the "science of reasons" in India. Although ancient Chinese thinkers occasionally took issue with self-contradictory and self-refuting statements (Chmielewski, 2009: 269-296; Graham, 1978: 445, 453; Harbsmeier, 1998: 212-218; Sun, 1999: 51-53, 258-259), there is no trace of this indigenous legacy in the writings of Xuanzang's disciples.

The aim of the present paper is to analyze the interpretations of Sentences [1] and [2] provided by the Chinese commentators to see how they approached the logical problems involved in these sentences. The focus will be placed on commentaries from the early Tang period, written by three direct disciples of Xuanzang: Wengui (文軌, d.u.), Shentai (神泰, d.u.) and Kuiji (窺基, 632-682), since their works contain the most original and insightful treatment of this problem in the whole history of Buddhist logic in East Asia. Even though the fragments discussed below certainly belong to the history of logic as such, it is to be remembered that their authors did not conceive of themselves as "logicians" in the contemporary sense of the word. They perceived the fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words" primarily as a rhetorical tool that could be used to denounce heterodox views. Therefore, the final section of this paper will examine cases of the practical application of this notion in the context of doctrinal polemics typical of seventh-century East Asia.

Secondary scholarship on this subject is scarce. Sueki Takehiro (末木 剛博, 2001: 71-73) briefly mentioned Sentence [2] in his book devoted to the history of rationalism in Asia, and offered an interpretation of it in modern symbolic notation. Janusz Chmielewski (Chmielewski, 1981: 60-72) scrutinized relevant passage from Kuiji's commentary in a voluminous article about historical approaches to Russell's "principle of *reductio ad absurdum*", thus placing Kuiji's work in a very broad comparative perspective. Unfortunately, Chmielewski's paper, which was published only in Polish, is virtually unknown to specialists in related fields. The same passage was discussed by several contemporary Chinese scholars of

Buddhist logic, most notably Chen Daqi (陳大齊, 1974: 118-122) and Shen Jianying (沈劍英, 1985: 180-182), and more recently by Zheng Weihong (鄭偉宏, 1997: 368-371; 1999: 9-12; 2010: 353-356), who aligned it with the corresponding fragment of Shentai's work.[9] Generally speaking, the remarks of Chinese authors are not as extensive as Chmielewski's, and less informative in terms of the comparative history of logic.

The interpretation of Wengui

One of the earliest extant Chinese commentaries on Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Introduction to Logic* is the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏) by Wengui, a disciple of Xuanzang. Wengui's grasp of the Indian "science of reasons" is known to be remarkable (Shen, 2007; Takemura, 1968; 1986: 32-34, 217-246). Even though his treatment of these problematic statements appears to be significant in historical and comparative terms, it is relatively little known among contemporary scholars. For this reason it will be discussed first and in the most detail.

[3a] 「自語相違」者，如言：「我母是其石女」。述曰：「我母」是有法，「石女」是法。法及有法和合為宗。然，有法之言即違其法。法言復反有法。若言：「我母」，即知非虛。既言：「石女」，明非我母。更相反故。故名「相違」。

[The error of] "inconsistency with one's own words" – as in *My mother is that barren woman.*

Says the commentary: [In the sentence above] "my mother" is the *dharmin* (*youfa* 有法) and "barren woman" is the *dharma* (*fa* 法). When *dharmin* and *dharma* are in agreement with each other, there is [a valid] thesis. [Here,] however, what is said to be the *dharmin* opposes its *dharma* and what is said to be the *dharma* counters its *dharmin.* If one says: "my mother", it is understood that she is not an infertile woman; by saying: "barren woman", it is made clear that [the woman in question] is not my mother. In such a case, there is a mutu-

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[9] The last work also contains a very brief mention of the passage from Zhizhou's commentary, which is discussed in the last section of this article.

al conflict [between *dharmin* and *dharma*]. This is what is meant by "inconsistency with one's own words".

[3b] 如外道立言：「一切言論」是有法，「皆是妄語」是法。此立宗之言意許非妄有法中攝。 若言：「一切言論」，即意許一分非妄，何得云：「皆是妄語」？ 若云：「皆是妄語」，何得言「一切言論」？以「一切」之言攝此宗意許非妄故。

[Furthermore, some] non-Buddhists make a claim [in which] "all statements" is the *dharmin,* and "are all false talk" is the *dharma.* [But] if someone sets forth such a thesis, [then] what is intended by his words, [i.e.] the non-falsity [of his own thesis], is [also] included in the *dharmin.* If someone says [something about] "all statements", then that person [already] implicitly acknowledges [that] some [statements] (i.e. at least his own statement) are not false; how can he [further] maintain that they "are all false talk"? If someone says "are all false talk", how can he make [this] statement about "all claims"? [This is inadmissible,] because the word "all" (in "all claims") includes the intended non-falsity of his own thesis.

[3c] 若救言：「除我言外，餘一切言皆悉是妄者」，更有一人聞汝所說，便言：「汝語非妄，諦實」。彼所發言，為妄為實？ 若言：「是妄語」，則汝語虛。若言：「是實」，即違自語。

Suppose you try to defend [the above claim] by stating [it thus]: "Apart from my own statement, all other statements are false." Then another man, after hearing your words, states that it is indeed as you say. Is *his* utterance false or true? If you reply that it is false, then it follows that your own words are false [lit. in vain]. If you reply that it is true, then you oppose your own words [that all statements are false].

[3d] 若復救云：「除我言及說我言實者，餘言妄者」。若爾，此即與比量相違。 謂:
    [宗]: 餘一切言不必是妄
    [因]: 是語性故
    [喻]: 如汝所言。

Suppose you still try to defend [the above claim] by stating [it thus]: "Apart from my own statement, and the statements of those who say that what I say is true, all other statements are false." Such a thesis would [be unacceptable because it is] opposed by inference, namely:

Thesis [*zong* 宗]: All other statements are not necessarily false.
Reason [*yin* 因]: Because of their having the nature of speech.
Example [*yu* 喻]: Like what you yourself say (X53:848.690b7-19).

In the first paragraph, Wengui introduces a pair of key concepts in the Indian "science of reasons" – *dharma* and *dharmin* (literally "that which has the *dharma*" or "*dharma*-possessor"). There is no consensus among contemporary scholars as to exactly how Indian authors understood this opposition. English translations from Sanskrit include: "subject" and "predicate" (Tucci, 1930), "property-bearer" and "property" (Tachikawa, 1971), "substrate" and "superstrate" (Gillon & Love, 1980), "locus" and "locatee" (Matilal, 1998) etc. How Chinese commentators on Indian treatises understood these terms is of course yet another issue.

Wengui himself in his commentary discusses three possible interpretations of *dharma* and *dharmin*, but seems most committed to the one that defines *dharma* as "that which specifies" (*nengbie* 能別), and *dharmin* as "that which is specified" (*suobie* 所別) (X53:848.682a4 ff.).[10] He explains their mutual relation by the analogy of wax and seal.[11] When we attribute a certain *dharma* to a certain *dharmin*, the latter becomes "specified" or "differentiated" (*chabie* 差別), i.e. characterized by a particular quality that distinguishes it from other *dharmins*, just as a round seal distinguishes a piece of wax to which it was applied from a piece of wax in which a square seal was stamped. According to the principles of Buddhist logic, it is the presence of this distinguishing quality (*dharma*) in a given locus (*dharmin*) that is to be proved by disputants engaged in a debate. For example, an argument for the case that "sound is impermanent" has to convince one's opponent that the *dharma* of "impermanence" inheres in the *dharmin* identified as "sound".

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[10] Other interpretations mentioned by Wengui are "difference" (*chabie* 差別) vs. "essence" (*zixing* 自性) and "comment" (*houshu* 後述) vs. "topic" (*xianchen* 先陳).

[11] It appears that the character 臘 in the text of the Xuzangjing should be emended to 蠟.

What Wengui seems to understand by "inconsistency with one's own words", in the case of Sentence [1], is that a statement which attributes the *dharma* of "being infertile" to the *dharmin* described as "my mother" cannot become the subject of any meaningful debate, since it is known *a priori* that no "mother" can be a possible locus for such a quality. This is because the very term "mother" denotes someone who is not a barren woman, and the very term "barren woman" denotes someone who is not a mother. Whereas the disputant's objective is to prove the connection between *dharmin* and *dharma*, in the case of Sentence [1], the possibility of such a connection is implicitly refuted. It can be inferred that such a fallacy occurs whenever the subject and predicate of a thesis are mutually contrary or contradictory terms.[12]

Wengui's explanation of the fallacy inherent in Sentence [1] resembles the refutation of a similar statement, "A virgin has a child," in the Chinese translation of an early Indian work on Buddhist logic known as *The Treatise on Accordance with Truth* (*Rushi lun* 如實論, **Tarka-śāstra*), traditionally ascribed to the half-legendary sage Vasubandhu:

> [4] 若是童女，不得有兒。若有兒，則非童女。「童女」、「有兒」， 此二相違。 是故，稱有言說無道理。

> If she is a virgin, she cannot have a child. If she has a child then she is not a virgin. "Being a virgin" and "having a child" are two mutually opposed [qualities]. Thus it is said that this kind of discourse is illogical (T32:1633.29a18-21).[13]

From the comparative point of view, it should be noted that unlike the Indian author, Wengui clearly emphasizes the mutual semantic incongruence between the words or terms (*yan* 言) that constitute the two parts of the thesis. He does not elaborate any ontological reasons for which the quality of being a "barren woman" cannot be predicated of

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[12] It can be argued that Wengui was (at least vaguely) aware of the difference between contrary and contradictory terms, as he wrote: "'Permanence' and 'impermanence' are *directly* (truly) opposed" (「常」與「無常」正相違) (X53:848.685b1).

[13] T32:1633.29a18-20. Skt. retranslation by Tucci is as follows: (...) *yato yadi kumārī putravatīti na sampadyate. yadi putravatī tarhi naiva kumārī. kumārīti putravatīti cobhayaṃ viruddham. tasmān mama vacanam anyāyyam iti* (Tucci, 1981: 4 [Skt. pagination]).

anyone's mother. Moreover, from the structure of his argument in Passage [3a], it is clear that he focuses on the symmetrical relation between the two terms, rather than on the relation between subject and predicate.[14]

Wengui's analysis of Sentence [2] in Passage [3b] is clearly meant to follow the same scheme of explanation as his interpretation of Sentence [1] in Passage [3a]. Namely, he suggests that the *dharmin* "all statements" is incompatible with the *dharma* "are [all] false" and *vice versa*. In spite of this misguided premise, Wengui manages to pinpoint some essential differences between the two statements. He seems to be aware that the problem with Sentence [2] lies not in the mutually exclusive semantic fields of the terms in question (there is nothing outright contradictory in predicating falsehood of a statement), but in the use of the universal quantifier "all", which renders the whole statement self-referential and eventually self-refuting. Moreover, Wengui seems to believe that someone who states that "all statements are false" at the same time makes the tacit assumption that his own statement is true. It is the opposition between this assumption (the "intended meaning" *yixu* 意許) and the statement itself ("what is said" *yan* 言), rather than the opposition between the subject and predicate of the statement, that Wengui turns to in his analysis.[15]

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[14] The extent of difference between Wengui's understanding of *contradictio in terminis* and that of Western traditional logic merits further investigation. According to the thirteenth-century classification proposed by Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus), statements such as Sentence [1] are considered as propositions *in materia remota*, i.e. propositions whose predicates and subjects can never agree with each other. His contemporary, Lambert of Auxerre, argued that in propositions of this kind, the predicate "naturally disagrees" with its subject (*predicatum naturaliter disconvenit subiecto*) (Alessio, 1971: 19; Rieger, 2005: 74-75). An early twentieth-century German philosophical dictionary (Eisler, 1927) defines *contradictio in adiecto* as a "proposition in which the predicate term cancels the subject term" (*Urteil, in welchem der Prädikatsbegriff den Subjektsbegriff aufhebt*). Interestingly, in another fragment of his commentary, Wengui goes against Indian sources (and the Aristotelian approach) by saying that in some sense, the *dharmin* also "specifies" its *dharma* (X53:848.683a1-3; Harbsmeier, 1998: 369 n. 1).

[15] The distinction between the explicit content of what is said in a thesis ("that which is expressed by words" *yanchen* 言陳 or *yanxian* 言顯) and its intended meaning ("that which is implicitly accepted" *yixu* 意許) is an important one in the system of the "science of reasons". How Chinese authors understood this distinction, and the extent to

Wengui's main argument - that someone who denies the truth of all statements at the same time asserts the truth of his own statement and thus contradicts himself - has respectable parallels in the history of Western logic.[16] Interestingly, it appears that Indian Buddhist debaters started to apply the germinal form of this argument very early. Wengui might have taken this idea either directly from Dignāga's description of the fallacy represented by Sentence [2] in the *Gate of Logic,* or from his master Xuanzang's Chinese translation of *The Gem in the Palm of the Hand* (*Zhang zhen lun* 掌珍論, *Karatalaratna-śāstra) by the sixth-century philosopher Bhāviveka:

[5] 如梵志言:「世尊,一切我皆不忍」。佛言:「梵志忍此事不」? 此中,梵志固忍此事而言:「一切我皆不忍」。彼言違自所許事故, 可有違害自所言過。

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which they followed Indian discussions on this subject, is a topic that requires a separate study. Wengui comes closest to defining this pair of concepts in a fragment of his commentary which is preserved as a quote in the Japanese monk Zōshun's (藏俊, 1104-1180) *Inmyō daisho shō* (因明大疏抄). His explanation suggests that the main purpose of this distinction is to separate the literal or general meanings of terms that constitute a thesis (their "substance" *zixiang* 自相) from the specific meanings of those terms, which reflect the debater's hidden philosophical assumptions (their "specificities" *chabie* 差別). For example, when a Mahāyāna Buddhist utters the word "impermanence", his intended meaning may be "impermanence [of something] which is only a manifestation of Consciousness" (T68:2271.713b23-c5). However, Wengui's use of these concepts appears to be somewhat broader than his definition would suggest. In the surviving portion of his commentary he invokes the notion of "intended meaning" to explain how a Buddhist who argues that "sound is impermanent" at the same time establishes that sound is devoid of permanent self (*wuwo* 無我): since everything that is impermanent is also devoid of permanent self, the latter quality "follows" (*shun* 順) from the former without being explicitly mentioned (X53:848.686a16-21). Seen in this light, [2] represents a case in which a speaker's intended meaning – the non-falsity of his own statement – cannot be consistently attributed to either part of the explicitly stated thesis.

[16] Somewhat similar (although more theoretically sophisticated) refutations of sentences equivalent to Sentence [2] were discussed by Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210) and Bonaventure (1221-1274) (Castagnoli, 2010: 132-135). This type of argument was further refined by Thomas Bradwardine (ca. 1290-1349) and, more famously, John Buridan (ca. 1300-1362) (Hughes, 1982: 45-51, 100-112; Prior, 1976; Read, 2002; Spade, 1982: 249).

A [non-Buddhist] *brahmacārin* said [to the Buddha]: "World-Honored One, I do not assert anything." The Buddha replied: "*Brahmacārin*, do you assert this thing [you said] or not?" The *brahmacārin* firmly asserted the thing [he said], but [still] maintained that he did not assert anything. His words were in opposition with a thing he assumed [彼言違自所許事]. This is what is called the fallacy of violating one's own statement (T30:1578.27b10-12).[17]

In Passage [3c], Wengui discusses the possibility of defending the "non-Buddhist's" claim by explicitly excluding the statement "All statements are false" from the set of "all statements", in order to avoid self-reference and the self-refutation it entails. This idea might also have been inspired by an Indian antecedent, contained in *The Treatise on Accordance with Truth*:

[6] 若汝言:「一切所說我皆不許」,我今共汝辯決是處。 汝說:「不許一切」,此說為入一切數? 為不入一切數? 若入一切數,汝則自不許汝所說。 若自不許者,我義則是汝所許。我義自成,汝言便壞。若不入一切數者,則無一切。若無一切,汝不許一切。若不許一切,我義便非汝不許。我義亦成,汝言終壞。

If you say that you reject all that is said, I will now settle this issue with you. You say that you reject "all"; is what you say counted among "all" or is it not? If it is counted among "all", you yourself reject what you say. If you yourself reject it, then what I propose is what you do not reject. What I propose is established by itself, and your words are thus refuted. If it is not counted among "all", then there is no "all" [i.e. it is not "all" that you are making a statement about]. In such a case, you reject the "all" [in your own statement], and what I

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[17] In the Buddhist literature the *brahmacārin*'s skeptical claim is usually ascribed to a recluse called Dīrghanakha (Pali: Dīghanakha, Ch. Zhangzhao 長爪), the Buddha's interlocutor in the Pāli *Dīghanakha-sutta* (Jayatilleke, 1963: 213-216), who is quite frequently mentioned in the Chinese Tripiṭaka (e.g. T2:99.249b1 ff.). A more verbose refutation of Dīrghanakha's stance can be found in the preface to Jizang's (吉藏, 549-623) commentary on Āryadeva's *Śata-śāstra* (*Bai lun* 百論) (T42:1827.235b6-15).

propose is not what you reject. What I propose is again established, and your words are finally refuted (T32:1633.30b17-23).[18]

According to Janusz Chmielewski, this short fragment has ground-breaking significance in the history of logic. It suggests a way of avoiding self-reference which was not endorsed by ancient Greek or Chinese authors, and in fact, may be regarded as the earliest known anticipation of Russell's revolutionary approach (Chmielewski, 1981: 47-49, 86). The possibility of construing potentially self-referential statements as self-excepting, rather than literally universal, was discussed in the Western logical literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Ashworth, 1974: 104-106; Spade, 1982: 248) and has been suggested by a contemporary author as one of the most viable approaches to the elimination of the paradoxes occasioned by self-reference (Rescher, 1968: 16). In this context, it is certainly worth noticing that Wengui not only appears familiar with this possibility, but also discusses it at considerable length within the conceptual framework of the Buddhist "science of reasons".

In Passage [3c], the Chinese commentator argues that an improved version of Sentence [2]: "All statements are false, apart from this very statement," is untenable, since every other statement that affirms the truth of the speaker's sentence also cannot be false. For this reason, in Passage [3d], Wengui's imaginary non-Buddhist opponent once more rephrases his claim. The proposition he is now trying to defend is: "All statements are false, apart from this very statement and those statements that affirm the truth of this very statement." Wengui argues that such a thesis is still unacceptable, even though it belongs to a different category of "pseudo-thesis", namely "a thesis opposed by inference" (*anumānaviruddha, biliang xiangwei* 比量相違).

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[18] The Skt. retranslation by Tucci: *yac ca* (*bhavato*)*ktaṃ mayā sarvam uktaṃ nānujñāyata iti tad idānīṃ* (*bhavatā sārdhaṃ*) *vicārya nirdhāryate. sarvaṃ nānujñāyata iti yad uktam bhavatā, etad vacanaṃ sarvasminn antarbhavati na vā? yadi tāvat sarvasminn antarbhavati, tadā bhavān svayaṃ svoktaṃ nānujānāti. yadi svayaṃ nānujānāti, asmadarthaḥ svata eva siddho bhaved bhavavacanasya tu hāniḥ syāt. atha sarvasmin nāntarbhavati, tadā tasya sarvatvam eva na syāt. yadi sarvatvam eva na bhavet, tadā bhavatā yad ananujñātam tat sarvam. yadi sarvam ananujñātaṃ, tadāsmadartho bhavatā naivānanujñātaḥ. asmadarthaḥ siddho, bhavatas tu sarvasya pratiṣedhaḥ* (Tucci, 1981: 11 [Skt. pagination]).

The "inference" presented by Wengui follows the three-membered scheme expounded by Dignāga.[19] The crux of this reasoning is that statements arbitrarily excluded from the set of "all statements" by the opponent share with the remaining elements of this set a property described as "the nature of speech" (*yuxing* 語性). In the technical vocabulary of Xuanzang's disciples, this term apparently denotes the meaningful use of language.[20] By uttering his statement, the opponent demonstrates that meaningful sentences spoken by humans are not necessarily false. It is therefore illogical for him to maintain that all other statements, which are also meaningful sentences, are necessarily false.

It is not entirely clear, however, if Wengui's conclusion, "All other statements are not necessarily false" (餘一切言不必是妄) should be interpreted as a simple particular negative ("Some other statements are not false") or a modal statement ("All other statements are possibly not false"). Dignāga's "science of reasons", the only system of rules of inference known to Wengui, has little to say regarding quantification of theses, and has nothing commensurable with the modal syllogistic of traditional Western logic.

The intepretation of Shentai

Shentai's (神泰) commentary to the *Gate of Logic*, *Li men lun shuji* (理門論 述記), contains an interesting explanation of Sentence [2] that does not make explicit reference to Sentence [1]:

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[19] This sort of inference presupposes a relation of "invariable concomitance" between the two *dharmas* (qualities) possessed by the *dharmin* (locus of quality) in question. Just as the presence of fire on a mountain is inferred from the presence of smoke, since there cannot be smoke without fire, the presence of the quality described as "the nature of speech" serves an as infallible mark of the presence of the quality of "not necessarily [being] false" in every possible locus.

[20] Cf. Kuiji's explanation in T43:1830.504a20: "Verbal discourse is 'the nature of speech'. In general terms, the essential characteristic of 'the nature of speech' is verbal activity, which can be of three natures (i.e., good, bad and neutral)" (言說是語性。語性總言，即通三性語業為體).

[7a] 謂有外道立: 「一切語皆悉不實」。此所發語便自[語]相[違]。何故? 說: 「一切語是妄者」, 汝口中語為實為妄? 若言是實, 何因言「一切皆是妄語」? 若自言是妄, 即應一切語皆實。

[The fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words"] refers to the claims of non-Buddhists that all statements are not true. Whoever utters such a statement opposes his own words. Why is that? [If] you say that all statements are false, then are the words you speak true or false? If they are true, what are your grounds for maintaining that all statements are false? If your own words are false, then all statements turn out to be true.

[7b] 若復救云: 「解我口中所語, 餘一切語皆妄者」, 更有第二人聞汝所說「一切語皆是妄」即復發言: 「汝此言諦實」。彼人發語為妄為實? 若言是妄, 汝語即虛。若言是實, 何故便言「除我所說」?

Suppose you try to defend your claim by stating [it thus]: "Apart from what I am saying now, all other statements are false". If there is another man who, having heard you saying that all statements are false, replies: "It is indeed as you say," is his utterance true or false? If it is false, then your own words are false (lit. in vain). If it is true, how can you maintain that "Apart from what I am saying now [all other statements are false]"?

[7c] 若復救言: 「除道我語此一人是實, 除一切悟皆悉是妄」, 若爾受有第三人復云: 「此第二人語亦是實」, 此第三人語為虛為實? 若言是虛, 此第二人並初人語是實應妄。若第三人語是實, 何故言「除我及此人餘虛妄」耶?

Suppose you still try to defend your claim and state [it thus]: "What that man says about my words is true; apart from this, all other statements are false." [Now,] suppose you are confronted by a third man, who says that the second man's statement [about your words] is true. Is the statement of the third man false or true? If you reply that it is false, then it must be false that the words of the two previous speakers are true. If the statement of the third man is true, then why do you say that apart from your statement and the statement of the second man, all [other statements] are false? (T44:1839.78c28-79a12).

What Shentai says in Passage [7a] can be paraphrased as follows: if Sentence [2] is assumed to be true, it is untenable; if it is assumed to be false, it implies that all other propositions are true. The latter statement contains a rather blatant logical error, since the negation of a universal affirmative (all S are P) results in a particular negative (some S are not P) and not a universal negative (all S are not P). However, it should be noted that Shentai does not content himself with rejecting Sentence [2] as a statement that implies its own falsehood, and therefore is false. It looks as if he is trying to present this sentence as a sort of paradox that yields unacceptable conclusions, on the assumption that it is true *and* on the assumption that it is false. As stated earlier, this approach is rather unique in the history of logic.

Zheng Weihong (Zheng, 2007: 79) rightly points out that Shentai's refutation of Sentence [2] appears to be indebted to the passage from the *Treatise on Accordance With Truth* quoted above as Passage [6]. Granted, the arguments employed in Passages [6] and [7a] are formally very similar: the skeptical opponent is confronted with two horns of a dilemma implied by his statement and forced to admit self-refutation.[21] Nevertheless, the two authors use this form of argument in slightly different way. Whereas the reasoning presented in the Indian treatise is meant primarily to force the opponent to admit defeat,[22] the explanations of Shentai, although not correct in terms of formal logic, are more focused on demonstrating the inherent fallacy of the proposition in question.

In Passage [7b], Shentai tackles the issue raised by Wengui in Passage [3c]. He differs from his co-disciple in that he does not resort to inference as the ultimate refutation of "non-Buddhist" theses. Instead, he seems to suggest that exclusion of the problematic statement from the scope of "all" sentences eventually leads to infinite regress. Unlike Wengui, Shentai does not consider the refutation of the claim, "All statements are false, apart from this very statement and all those statements that assert this very statement." It is not clear whether he is not aware of

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[21] This form of argumentation was well known to Indian debaters, who called it the "double noose" (Skt. *ubhayataḥpāśā*) (Perrett, 1984: 251).

[22] According to Tucci (Tucci, 1981: 3) Passage [6] is an example of *chala*, i.e. openly sophistic refutation.

this possibility, or if he assumes that it would also be susceptible to infinite regress.

Shentai's discussion of Sentence [2] demonstrates even more clearly than parallel passages in Wengui's commentary that the opponent's theses are problematic not only because they involve self-reference but also due to the fact that they predicate truth (*shi* 實) and falsity (*wang* 妄) of other statements. While it is unlikely that the modern idea of relegating this category of statements to a higher level in a hierarchy of meta-languages could have emerged among Chinese monks studying the "science of reasons", it is certainly regrettable that later East Asian commentators on the *Introduction to Logic* were not interested in investigating this aspect of Shentai's argument any further.

The interpretation of Kuiji

Kuiji (窺基), the most renowned of Xuanzang's disciples, was credited with compiling the standard early Tang commentary on Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Introduction to Logic,* which became known in East Asia as the "Great Commentary" or *Da shu* (大疏). The following fragment was therefore regarded by the majority of subsequent commentators as the most authoritative explanation of the fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words":

[8a] 述曰: 宗之所依謂法、有法。有法是體，法是其義。義依彼體。不相乖角，可相順立。今言:「我母」，明知有子。復言:「石女」，明委無兒。我母之體與石女義，有法及法，不相依順。自言既已乖反，對敵何所申立? 故為過也。

The commentary says: "A thesis depends on a *dharmin* and a *dharma.* A *dharmin* is its subject (lit. substance [*ti* 體]). A *dharma* is its predicate (lit. meaning [*yi* 義]). A predicate depends on a subject. They cannot be at variance with each other and they have to be mutually reconcileable. Now, when someone says "my mother", it is clearly understood that she has a child. When someone says "a barren woman", it is clearly implied that she has no child. The subject "my mother" and the predicate "a barren woman", the *dharmin* and the *dharma*, do not support each other in mutual accord. If one already contradicts him-

self in his own words, what [thesis] could he establish for the opponent [to respond to]?[23] It is for this reason that such a sentence is fallacious (...).

[8b] 理門論云: 『如立一切言皆是妄』，謂有外道立: 「一切言皆是虛妄」。陳那難言: 『若如汝說: 「諸言皆妄」，則汝所言稱可實事。既非是妄，一分實故，便違有法「一切」之言。若汝所言自是虛妄，餘言不妄。汝今妄說。非妄作妄。汝語自妄，他語不妄。便違宗法言「皆是妄」。故名自語相違』。

It is said in *The Gate of Logic* (*Nyāyamukha*): *When someone states: All statements are false.* This refers to [those] non-Buddhists who claim that all statements are false. Dignāga refuted [such a view] in the following way:

> "If you say that every statement is false, then you utter [another] statement, [assuming] that it is in accord with the facts. [Your statement itself] not being false, [it turns out that] one part [of "all statements"] is true, [i.e. that some statements are after all not false]. That means that your statement is in opposition with the word "all" in the *dharmin* (subject) of your thesis [i.e. "all statements"]. If your own statement is itself false, [then] the other statements are not false, and by saying that they are false, you mistake what is not false for false; your own statement is itself false and the statements of others are not false. This [in turn] is in opposition with the *dharma* (predicate) of your thesis: "are all false". For this reason [such a fallacy] is called "inconsistency with one's own words" (T44:1840.116b21-c4).

Kuiji's initial comments resemble those of Wengui in Passage [3a]. However, his interpretation of the mutual incongruence between *dharmin* and *dharma* is somewhat different. Rather than the co-existence of two contrary terms within a statement, it is the co-existence of two mutually exclusive attributes ("having a child", *you zi* 有子, and "childlessness",

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wu er 無兒) in one subject (not mentioned explicitly) that renders such a thesis inadmissible. In this sense, Kuiji's understanding of the fallacy underlying Sentence [1] resembles the Aristotelian notion of contradiction (Höffe, 2005: 51) much more closely than Wengui's. The last sentence of the paragraph is also worthy of attention, since it very directly states that the Chinese author rejects Sentence [1] mainly because of its lack of pragmatic value. An opponent cannot really take issue with a statement that is self-contradictory. Perhaps he would not even understand what the controversy is about in the first place.

In the dense Passage [8b], Kuiji proceeds to analyze Sentence [2]. Just as in Wengui's commentary, this sentence is mentioned and analyzed after Sentence [1], even though it does not belong to the treatise which is the object of the commentary. Moreover, Kuiji takes the notion that both statements represent one and the same kind of fallacy even more seriously than his predecessor. He seems to believe that just as in the case of Sentence [1], the problem with Sentence [2] lies in the mutual disagreement between *dharmin* and *dharma*, corresponding to subject and predicate respectively. His argument can be paraphrased as follows: If Sentence [2] is true, then it contradicts the *dharmin* "all sentences", since it is no longer *all* sentences that are false. If Sentence [2] is false, then it contradicts the *dharma* "are [all] false", since it is not the case that *all* statements are *false*. In either case, the whole thesis is inconsistent because of the conflict between itself and one of its two constituent parts.

Curiously, Kuiji explicitly attributes this argument to the great Indian logician Dignāga. This attribution was challenged by Janusz Chmielewski, who pointed out that the piece of reasoning presented by Kuiji presupposes redundant quantification of the predicate in the Chinese sentence: "*All* statements are *all* false" (一切言皆是妄). According to Chmielewski, since this peculiar grammatical feature of literary Chinese is absent in Sanskrit, it is extremely unlikely that an argument of this form was really proposed by Dignāga, or for that matter, by any native user of an Indo-European language (Chmielewski, 1981: 63-66).

Even though Chmielewski's remarks cast serious doubt on the Indian origin of the ideas expressed in Passage [8b], it might be argued that they are not decisive, as the argument in question still makes sense under the assumption that the phrase "*dharma* of your thesis" originally referred

only to the predicate "false" (Skt. *mṛṣā*), to which the adverbial qua-si-quantifier "all" (*jie* 皆) was added later in the Chinese text. Never-theless, Chmielewski certainly does have a point that there is something distinctively Chinese about the rhetoric of the whole passage, especially about the parallel structure of its main argument. On the other hand, if we delete problematic references to "oppositions" with *dharmin* and *dharma*, what remains is essentially nothing other than a slightly extend-ed and improved version of Shentai's Passage [7a], supplied with an idea probably borrowed from Wengui's Passage [3b]. It might be conjectured that this common pattern of refutation of Sentence [2] was transmitted by Xuanzang to his disciples as a part of an oral commentary he had learned in India, and as such, was associated with the name of Dignāga himself.[24]

In the concluding paragraph of his commentary (not translated here) Kuiji remarks that the fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words" can also be attributed to a thesis that in any way contradicts the philo-sophical stance of its proponent (*zijiao* 自教). This means that a materi-alist who states to his Buddhist (i.e. idealist) opponent that "The four ele-ments (earth, water, fire and wind) are unreal" and a non-Buddhist skep-tic who claims that "All statements are false" can be regarded as guilty of the same kind of fallacy. They both destroy their credibility as represent-atives of one of the sides in the debate, by proposing a statement that goes against the tenets of their side, the only difference being that the skeptic simultaneously undermines the opponent's stance as well (即違自語，又違他語) (cf. T44:1840.116c). Kuiji's opinion was already chal-lenged in the eighth century by the monk Dingbin (定賓, d.u.), who

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[24] This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that a similar pattern of refutation of a statement representing the fallacy in question, translated by Th. Stcherbatsky as "whatsoever I speak is wrong" (*sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi*), appears in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* by Dharmottara (seventh or eighth century), a post-Dignāgan Indian work on Buddhist logic. Dharmottara begins his argument by pointing out that "the speaker pronounces his proposition in order to convey that these words (at least) have a true meaning" (*yo 'pi hi sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmīti vakti so 'py asya vākyasya satyārthatvam ādarśayann eva vākyam uccārayati*) and then proceeds to spell out the consequences that follow on the assumption that the speaker's words are either true or false (Stcherbatsky, 1918: 59-60; 2004: 166).

underlined the necessity of distinguishing between "inconsistency with the tenets of one's own school" (自教相違) and "inconsistency with one's own words" proper, which occurs regardless of the speaker's philosophical assumptions (T68:2270.325a20; Chen, 1974: 119).

Later Japanese and Chinese interpretations

By the beginning of the eighth century, Xuanzang's translations of the two Indian manuals, complete with a whole set of Chinese commentaries, were transmitted to Japan, which contributed to the development of an independent scholastic tradition. In the Japanese commentaries on logical works that were included in the modern edition of the Buddhist canon, the Taishō Tripiṭaka, the fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words" is mentioned quite often. However, Japanese authors were definitely not interested in challenging existing interpretations. For the most part they merely repeated in their own words the arguments of their Chinese predecessors, especially Kuiji. Exceptions can be found in the *Inmyō ron sho myōtō shō* (因明論疏明燈抄) compiled by Zenju (善珠, 723-797), a monk of the Hossō (法相) school, the Japanese counterpart of the so-called "Faxiang" (法相) school founded by Xuanzang. Zenju offers an explanation of the distinction between "total inconsistency with one's own words" (全分自語相違 or 自語全相違) and "partial inconsistency with one's own words" (一分自語相違 or 自語分相違), which was only hinted at in Kuiji's commentary (T44:1840.116c17). The first type is represented by Sentence [1] and a new example, "I am currently dumb" (我今瘖瘂).[25] The second type is illustrated by Sentence [2] and the non-Buddhist claim "I do not affirm anything" quoted from Passage [4] (T68:2270.324c). Apparently, the terms "total" and "partial" refer – in

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[25] Interestingly, a very similar pair of sentences can be found in the tenth-century Indian logical treatise *Ātmatattvaviveka* by the Nyāya logician Udayana, where they are presented as illustrations of inconsistency with one's own words (*svavacanavyāghāta*) and inconsistency with one's own actions (*svakriyavyāghāta*), respectively (Perrett, 1984: 239). This might suggest that Zenju was inspired by some unknown Indian source, although pure coincidence cannot be ruled out as well.

the manner of Kuiji – to the extent of consensus between debaters.[26] In the first case, no agreement can be reached on the thesis, and thus the fallacy is "total". In the second case, it might still be admitted by the opponent that *some* statements are false, and this makes the fallacy "partial".

After flourishing briefly in the seventh century, the study of Buddhist logic in China lost most of its original impetus. The scarce and repetitive scholarship of later periods produced hardly any original approaches to the subject of fallacious theses. During the brief period of revival of the "science of reasons" in the late sixteenth century the issue of "inconsistency with one's own words" resurfaced once again, albeit treated in a very cursory way. Ming dynasty Chinese students of Buddhist logic had no access to early Tang commentaries, some of which were preserved only in Japan. Their writings, amounting to a handful of commentaries on the *Introduction to Logic*, are generally criticized by contemporary scholars as rife with simplifications and misunderstandings (Frankenhauser, 1996: 203-205; Zheng, 2007: 278-292). The following quote from the *Yinming ru zhengli lun jie* (因明入正理論解, written around 1590 by the monk Zhenjie 真界, d.u.) can be treated as representative of the approach of Ming authors:

[9] 鞠我育我，方為我母。石女無能養育，實非我母。而言我母是其石女。豈不與自語相違哉。

It is only she who "nourished me and supported me" that can be called my mother.[27] An infertile woman cannot bring up and rear children. It is [evidently] true that she is not my mother. Now, to say that my mother is that barren woman – is this not a case of "inconsistency with one's own words"? (X53:856.912a4-7).[28]

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[26] For different analyses of the usage of the terms "partial" (*yifen* 一分) and "total" (*quanfen* 全分) in Chinese Buddhist logic, see Chen, 1974: 110-113; Zheng, 1997: 40-45; 2007: 199-200; and Frankenhauser, 1996: 42, 61.

[27] A reference to *The Book of Odes* (*Shijing* 詩經), ode 202 (Legge, 1967: 352).

[28] Zhenjie was one of the pioneers of the short-lived "revival" of logical and epistemological studies in China during the Ming period. However, his interpretation was not substantially improved upon by later authors.

The sheer contrast between the informal language of this passage and the technical vocabulary employed in Passages [3a] and [8a], written a thousand years earlier by the disciples of Xuanzang, speaks volumes about the decline of post-Tang Chinese Buddhist logic. Needless to say, this fragment offers no new insights concerning the logical aspect of the fallacy it attempts to explain.

The fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words" as a rhetorical tool

One of the first recorded cases of an East Asian author using the accusation of "inconsistency with one's own words" in the context of an actual debate appears in the *Critical Discussion on Inference* (*P'an piryang non* 判比量論) by the Korean monk Wŏnhyo (元曉, 617-686). Ironically, in this work Wŏnhyo employed Dignāga's "science of reasons" partly in order to challenge tenets specific to Xuanzang's school (Lusthaus, 2012: 284). The fallacy in question is ascribed to an unidentified opponent who holds that "words do not reveal the Pure Land". Wŏnhyo asks whether this statement was intended to deny the possibility of obtaining any sort of knowledge about the Pure Land by means of language, or rather, the possibility of conveying the "essence" (*ch'e* 體) of the Pure Land through words. On the first interpretation, the opponent cannot avoid the charge of "inconsistency with one's own words", as what he says is in fact yet another doctrinal statement about the Pure Land. On the second interpretation, his claim does not pose any challenge to the stance which, as may be surmised, Wŏnhyo regards as the orthodox Buddhist view (X53: 860.951a7-15; Lusthaus, 2012: 286).[29] The distinction made by Wŏnhyo implies that his approach to self-refuting statements was more nuanced than that proposed by Xuanzang's disciples in their discussions of Sentence [2]. This points to the specifically Buddhist context of this issue,

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[29] Since the surviving text is incomplete and not well preserved, it is difficult to determine the exact doctrinal affiliation and stance of Wŏnhyo's opponent. According to Dan Lusthaus, Wŏnhyo aimed to refute the view that "words" (Buddhist teachings?) are insufficient to prove that the Pure Land (presumably, the Western Pure Land of Buddha Amitābha) really exists.

which was not directly tackled by Wengui, Shentai and Kuiji, but which nevertheless was perceived by most Buddhist authors as much more significant than its purely logical dimension.

In all of the commentaries quoted above the self-refuting Sentence [2] is attributed to unspecified non-Buddhist "heretics" (*tīrthika, waidao* 外道). This rhetoric somewhat obscures the fact that Indian Buddhist debaters were skilled not only in refuting this kind of claim, but also in defending their own claims against similar refutations. This pertains especially to the so-called Mādhyamikas, followers of the legendary sage Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250?), who propounded the teaching of universal "emptiness" (Skt. *śūnyavāda*). Whereas the point of this core Buddhist doctrine is that nothing exists of itself and independently of something else, non-Buddhist opponents often misunderstood Nāgārjuna's thesis as a nihilist denial of existence as such. In a polemical work called *The Refutation of Criticisms* (*Vigrahavyāvartanī, Hui zheng lun* 回諍論) Nāgārjuna responds to the argument that by calling all phenomena "empty" he implies that no statement, including his own, can be true (T32:1561.15b; Perrett, 1984: 249-254). In Bhāviveka's *Light of Wisdom* (*Prajñāpradīpa, Banruo deng lun* 般若燈論), an anonymous opponent ridicules the Mādhyamikas, saying that their talk of all phenomena being empty of their own nature is as illogical as stating that someone is the child of a barren woman and a celibate monk (T30:1566.93b).

It appears that at least some Chinese commentators on logical treatises were aware that condemnation of Sentence [2] had some risky implications for the Buddhist standpoint. A response to this problem can be found in a commentary to the *Introduction to Logic* by Zhizhou (智周, 668-723), one of the last exponents of early Tang scholarship on the "science of reasons":

[10] 問:「准佛法中,所有言詮亦不得法體亦是虛妄,與外道計而何別耶」? 答:「准外道計,即喚言語總是妄語,無詮表也。今佛法言即不同彼,雖不得實體,能詮召法,還有作用。」

Question: According to the Buddhist teachings, no verbal discourse can reach the essence of phenomena, and [as such] it is false. How is this any different from the schemes of the non-Buddhists [who say that all statements are false]?

Answer: According to the schemes of the non-Buddhists, all the words and sentences that are uttered are [only] false talk. They do not convey [*quanbiao* 詮表] anything. Now, what Buddhism says is different: although we cannot reach the real essence [of phenomena by means of language], we can refer to phenomena [at the conventional level]. [Therefore, verbal discourse] still has [some] function [...] (X53:854. 858b23-c2).

Zhizhou concedes that the Buddhist view of language superficially resembles the self-refuting views of skeptical "heretics", as it stipulates that linguistic concepts cannot reflect reality as it really is. However, he stresses that unlike their opponents, Buddhists admit the possibility of meaningful communication by the means of words. This rather obscure fragment deals with crucial tenets of the Buddhist philosophy of language, and for this reason demands study in its own right. In the context of the present discussion, the most important observation regarding its content is that Zhizhou differentiates his stance from the self-refuting position exemplified by Sentence [2] by introducing a more nuanced understanding of the predicate "false". This approach is opposite to the one adopted by the fictional non-Buddhist opponent in Passages [3] and [7], where self-refutation is avoided by excluding the statement about all statements from the range of the universal quantifier "all".

Conclusions

One of the most interesting aspects of research into Chinese commentaries on the Indian treatises about the "science of reasons" is the issue of specifically Chinese developments within the system transmitted from India, that is, the "sinification" of Indian Buddhist logic. Unfortunately, as far as the topic of the present article is concerned, any conclusion regarding this point can only be tentative, due to the fact that we cannot be certain to what extent the ideas expressed by Chinese commentators in the Passages [3], [7] and [8] are really their own. As previously noted, it is not improbable that Xuanzang's disciples utilized some "unwritten" Indian sources, pieces of oral commentary which their master had learned in India. This hypothesis could be reliably tested only by pursu-

ing a much more in-depth survey of Indian logical literature than has been attempted in the present paper. The comparison between Chinese approaches to the fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words" and their possible models extracted from Indian works extant in the Chinese Buddhist canon suggests that the interpretations of Chinese monks are not only original, but also in many ways superior to their antecedents in Indian literature.

The Indian source of inspiration that presents itself as the most conspicuous in most cases is *The Treatise on Accordance with Truth* attributed to Vasubandhu. This work presents refutations of the sentences "A virgin has a child" and "I reject all that is said" in a section devoted to "sophisms" (*dūṣaṇa, wudaoli nan* 無道理難). It is not concerned with the thorough analysis of those propositions, but merely suggests a way to address claims of this kind so as to make the opponent concede defeat in debate. On the other hand, in their comments on the sentences "My mother is that barren woman" and "All statements are false" Chinese monks try to elucidate the exact nature of the fallacies exemplified therein using the technical vocabulary of the fairly advanced theoretical system of Dignāga's science of reasons. In doing this, they achieved remarkable results.

Wengui's commentary offers a convincing explanation of the difference between the two exemplifications of "inconsistency with one's own words", which is apparently unparalleled in the history of East Asian Buddhist logic before the twentieth century. He explicates Sentence [1] as a thesis whose subject and predicate are contrary terms, and Sentence [2] as a thesis that entails contradiction between itself and its "intention", which amounts to the assertion that "All statements are false" is a true statement. While these may not be Wengui's original ideas, their precise formulation is probably his own achievement.

Wengui's co-disciple Shentai views Sentence [2] as a paradoxical statement that forces its proponent to admit a self-defeating or absurd conclusion regardless of whether it is true or false. The structure of his argument resembles a similar refutation in the text attributed to Vasubandhu. Nevertheless, his own comments (logically erroneous as they are) are more profound than those of the Indian author. For one thing, Shentai's commentary deals with the abstract and difficult problem of

predicating truth and falsity of statements about all (remaining) statements, and does it to a considerable level of sophistication.

The interpretation of Kuiji, historically the most influential, is noteworthy for the clear spelling out of the contradiction underlying Sentence [1]. Otherwise it does not add much to the opinions of the two aforementioned commentators, except for a rather convoluted fragment which attributes the self-refutation of Sentence [2] to incongruence between the thesis itself and its two constituent parts. The fact that this argument was attributed by Kuiji to the "*bodhisattva*" Dignāga, and further enshrined by his own authority for the centuries to come, appears very unfortunate for the development of the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic, especially given that the theoretical grasp of its principles clearly deteriorated after the Tang period.

The findings of the present paper confirm the view that the development of Buddhist logic in East Asia was severely hindered by a lack of sustained interest in the theory of reasoning among the Chinese. Both secular Chinese culture and Chinese interpretations of Buddhist doctrine provided relatively few incentives and conceptual tools to identify and pursue the purely logical issues underlying the system of the "science of reasons". There is no way of knowing how Wengui's commentary would have looked if he had been acquainted with a living commentarial tradition on the ancient *Mohist Canons* (*Mo bian* 墨辯), where the self-refutation of Sentence [2] is noted and exposed. It is futile to speculate on the direction in which further commentaries on passages such as Shentai's Passage [7c] could have evolved if some more analytically-minded Chinese author had wanted to bother himself with carrying the fictional debate further. In fact, even accomplished scholar monks from the school of Xuanzang, often touted as the most "intellectual" and "philosophical" strand in the history of Chinese Buddhism, did not regard the logical aspect of the fallacy of "inconsistency with one's own words" as an issue of importance. As demonstrated by the case of Zhizhou, if the statement "All words are false" attracted any attention outside the context of word-by-word commentaries on Dignāga's treatise, it was not because of its self-refuting character, but rather because it could serve as an example of heterodox views concerning the relation between language and reality.

This being said, it should be noted that whenever the interpretations of Chinese commentators appear unsatisfactory or incorrect, they reveal the inherent limitations of the system they were working within, rather than their own misunderstandings of this system. Granted, if Chmielewski's criticism of Kuiji's pseudo-Dignāgan argument is accepted, Kuiji's argument could be regarded as a case of logical confusion due to the grammatical structure of the Chinese sentence (double quantification) and the typically Chinese tendency to structure arguments in parallel fashion (after all, Kuiji erroneously assumes that "inconsistency with one's own words" has to be explained as "inconsistency with the *dharmin*" *and* "inconsistency with the *dharma*").[30]

However, the commentary of Wengui discussed above provides some examples of formulations which are linguistically or conceptually more precise than the Indian text that might have inspired them. For example, whereas in Paramārtha's translation of *The Treatise on Accordance with Truth* a self-excepting statement is said to refer to "not all" statements, Wengui in a similar context uses the more explicit phrase "all other statements" (餘一切言). Although the Indian author mentions only an unspecified "mutual opposition" between the two parts of the thesis "A virgin has a child" (此二相違), Wengui explains this kind of fallacy in a more precise manner, as a semantic conflict between subject and predicate terms ([有]法之言).

These observations might be taken to suggest that, far from being constrained or limited by their language or "patterns of thought", the Chinese commentators were capable of clarifying some ambiguous theoretical aspects of the Indian "science of reasons" using their own words. However, a more definite statement regarding the independent contributions of Chinese monks would have to be corroborated by a thorough survey of passages from South Asian works that deal with similar subject matter. One of the purposes of the present article is to provide reference

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[30] Chmielewski himself, in his discussion of ancient Chinese logical thought, maintained that the rules of quantification in Classical Chinese and the frequent use of parallelism as a stylistic device have a potentially positive role in "spontaneous logical thinking" (Chmielewski, 2009: 244, 260-268).

points for those who are more competent to carry this discussion further.

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A Re-examination of the Relationship between the *Awakening of Faith* and Dilun School Thought, Focusing on the Works of Huiyuan[1]

Ching Keng

Introduction

The *Awakening of Faith* (*Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論, T1666) is widely recognized to have been a seminal text for the development of East Asian Buddhism from the Tang dynasty onwards. In at least one sense, the *Awakening of Faith* initiated a completely new direction in Buddhist thought, namely, the idea that defiled phenomena are modes of the Truth or Thusness (*tathatā*). In my 2009 PhD dissertation, I argued that it is unlikely that the *Awakening of Faith* originated with Paramârtha (Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) and his group, and that the distinctive doctrinal difference between Paramârtha and the *Awakening of Faith* lies in the question of whether a strict distinction is made between unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) and conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma*s. Paramârtha makes a strict distinction between the Dharma-body (*dharmakāya*) and the Enjoyment-body (*saṃbhogakāya*), and between innate Buddha-nature (*prakṛtistha*[*-buddha*]*-gotra*) and cultivated Buddha-nature (*samudānīta*[*-buddha*]*-gotra*);

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whereas the *Awakening of Faith* does not maintain these distinctions (Keng, 2009: 129ff. and 307ff.).

For example, the *Awakening of Faith* claims that defiled *dharma*s arise because ignorance permeates Thusness. As the text says:

> (Quotation 1)
>
> How is it that the permeation [of ignorance] gives rise to defiled *dharma*s without interruption? This means that because it is based upon the *dharma* of Thusness, ignorance exists. Because ignorance exists as the cause of defiled *dharma*s, it [ignorance] then permeates Thusness. Due to [this] permeation, deluded mind exists. Because deluded mind exists, it [deluded mind] then permeates ignorance. Because [the deluded mind] does not understand the *dharma* of Thusness, unenlightened thoughts arise and make manifest objects of delusion.
>
> 云何熏習起染法不斷？所謂以依真如法故，有於無明；以有無明染法因故，即熏習真如；以熏習故，則有妄心；以有妄心，即熏習無明；不了真如法故，不覺念起，現妄境界 (T32:1666.578a21-25).[2]

Here, the *Awakening of Faith* claims that ignorance can permeate Thusness; but the problem is that Thusness cannot be permeated, because it is unconditioned. This *Awakening of Faith* notion that Thusness can be permeated is a clear deviation from Indian Abhidharma-Yogâcāra Buddhist schools, all of which subscribe to the basic distinction between unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) and conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma*s.

Now, if the *Awakening of Faith* was not in fact translated or transmitted by Paramârtha, then what was the origin of its most distinctive doctrines? Scholars such as Mochizuki Shinkō (望月信亨),[3] Takemura Makio (竹村牧男) (Takemura, 1990), and Lü Cheng (呂澂)[4] – all strong

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[2] For variant English and French translations, see Hakeda, 1967: 56-57 and Girard, 2004: 65.

[3] For a brief review of Mochizuki's points, see Kashiwagi's summary, in particular point (10) (Kashiwagi, 1981: 152-153).

[4] Lü Cheng emphasizes the close connection between the *Awakening of Faith* and Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra*. Although Lü did not talk about the connection between the *Awakening of Faith* and the Dilun School, based on the fact that Bodhiruci was regarded as the founder of the Dilun School, we can fairly assume that Lü

supporters of the Chinese provenance of the *Awakening of Faith* – trace the *Awakening of Faith* back to the Dilun School (地論宗).[5] According to them, the *Awakening of Faith* was composed under the influence of Dilun School doctrines, which were greatly influenced by the Chinese translation of the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra.*

However, even if we agree with these scholars, we still need to answer the question of why the *Awakening of Faith* could hold this view that Thusness, an unconditioned *dharma,* is itself the basis of conditioned and defiled phenomena. This view is an apparent deviation from the basic distinction between conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*s. Now, if it is true that the *Awakening of Faith* was based on the Dilun School reading of the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra*, then unless we could somehow show that the Dilun School misinterpreted this *sūtra*, we would be forced to adopt the interpretation that the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra* itself, an authentic Indian Buddhist text, also blurs the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*s. On the other hand, if we hesitate to accept such an interpretation of the *Laṅkâvatāra-sutra*, then we should probably also consider the possibility that this interpretation is actually a result of reading the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra* through the lens of the *Awakening of Faith.*[6]

This paper argues that Huiyuan (慧遠, 523-592 CE) has a very different understanding of the origin of defiled phenomena from that described in the *Awakening of Faith.* In short, according to the *Awakening of Faith,* defiled phenomena are modes of Thusness; but for Huiyuan, they are constructed by false discrimination (*wangqing* 妄情), with Thusness as the basis. Only to the extent that Thusness serves as the ultimate basis

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would agree that the *Awakening of Faith* originated from the Dilun School (Lü, 1978: 301-307).

[5] Here the term "school" is used loosely as a "translation" of the Chinese term *zong* (宗). I do not mean to refer to an established institutional body of scholars. Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for suggesting I should make this clarification.

[6] For an excellent and up-to-date collection of essays reflecting the current state of the field in the study of the Dilun School, see Geumgang Center for Buddhist Studies, 2010. Especially relevant to my paper here is the article by Seok Gil-am (石吉岩), in which he argues that it is very unlikely that the *Awakening of Faith* was composed by *anyone in* the lineage of the Dilun School, *including Bodhiruci* (菩提流支を含む地論宗系統) (Seok, 2010: 262).

for false discrimination can Thusness be said to be related to defiled phenomena. This doctrinal difference between the *Awakening of Faith* and Huiyuan as the best-known master of the Dilun School entitles us to conclude that the *Awakening of Faith* is not a direct outgrowth of Dilun School thought.

The difficult issue at hand is to clarify how, according to Huiyuan, Thusness as an unconditioned *dharma* could serve as the ultimate basis for defiled phenomena, without itself being relegated to the status of a conditioned state. In what follows, I shall first show that, like Paramârtha, Huiyuan also draws a strict distinction between conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*s, as reflected in his distinction between two aspects of Thusness: the aspect of "natural purity" (*xingjing* 性淨) and the aspect of "expedient means" (*fangbian* 方便). Second, regarding the former aspect, Huiyuan employs the term "true consciousness" (*zhenshi* 真識) to refer to the perfect wisdom of the Buddha or the "cognition" of Thusness; and in this connection, Huiyuan cites the scriptures to insist that the true consciousness is unconditioned and unchanging. Third, I shall give an interpretation of Huiyuan's notion of the true consciousness "adjusting to falsity" (*suiwang* 隨妄), and, based on this, an interpretation of how the true consciousness serves as the substance (*ti* 體), i.e., the basis, of defiled phenomena. Fourth, at the end of this paper, I shall draw a few possible larger ramifications from my thesis.

Methodological remarks

Through an examination of Huiyuan's works, this paper aims to investigate whether the key doctrinal feature of the *Awakening of Faith* discussed above is already present in the Dilun School. A major difficulty is that we do not know much about the precise dates of Huiyuan's works, nor when he became familiar with the *Awakening of Faith*. Some of the works traditionally attributed to him apparently cite the *Awakening of Faith*, using the title *Qixin lun* (起信論, "The Awakening of Faith"), *Maming lun*

(馬鳴論, "The Treatise of Aśvaghoṣa"), or simply the name Maming (馬鳴, Aśvaghoṣa), as shown in the Table below:[7]

Table 1: The Occurrence of Citations of the *Awakening of Faith* in Works Attributed to Huiyuan

	Maming lun ("The Treatise of Aśvaghoṣa")	Maming ("Aśvaghoṣa") but not *Maming lun*	*Dasheng qixin lun* ("The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna")	*Qixin lun* ("The Awakening of Faith") but not *Dasheng qixin lun*
T1745	0	0	0	0
T1749	0	0	0	0
T1764	1	3	0	0
T1776	0	0	0	1
T1793	0	0	0	0
T1843	0	3	2	1
T1851 ex "Bashi"	5	11	0	8
"Bashi yi"	4	6	2	17
X351	2	6	0	0

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[7] In a recent article, Okamoto Ippei (岡本一平) tries to establish a chronology of Huiyuan's works (Okamoto, 2010). Interestingly, he observes that when he refers to the *Awakening of Faith*, Huiyuan uses the title *Maming lun* in his earlier works, but the title *Qixin lun* in his later works. On this basis, Okamoto further suggests that among the chapters of the *Dasheng yi zhang*, those using *Maming lun* were composed before those using *Qixin lun*. The co-existence of both titles in three chapters (i.e., "Bashi yi" 八識義, "Wu zhudi yi" 五住地義, and "Niepan yi" 涅槃義) shows that these chapters underwent revision afterwards (Ibid., 176ff.).

| X704 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| X753 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Legend: texts
T1745: *Wuliangshou jing yishu* 無量壽經義疏
T1749: *Guan Wuliangshou jing yishu* 觀無量壽經義疏
T1764: *Da banniepan jing yiji* 大般涅槃經義記
T1776: *Weimo yiji* 維摩義記
T1793: *Wenshi jing yiji* 溫室經義記
T1843: *Dasheng qixin lun yishu* 大乘起信論義疏
T1851 ex "Bashi": *Dasheng yi zhang* 大乘義章, excluding "Bashi yi" 八識義
"Bashi yi": 八識義 in *Dasheng yi zhang* 大乘義章 T1851
X351 *Shengman jing yiji* 勝鬘經義記
X704 *Dichi lun yiji* 地持論義記
X753 *Shidi jing lun yiji* 十地經論義記

Despite the evidence of these citations, we also have a few good reasons to believe that Huiyuan composed some of his texts before he learned about the *Awakening of Faith.* (1) Some of his works do not cite the *Awakening of Faith.* (2) Despite the troubling statement in the *Xu gaoseng zhuan* (續高僧傳, T2060) that Tanqian (曇遷, 542-607) had studied the *Awakening of Faith* before he fled to the South, all other historical evidence points to the likelihood that the *Awakening of Faith* came to light in the North only after Tanqian came back to Chang'an (長安) in 587.[8] Given this date, and given that Huiyuan died in 592, it is virtually certain that some of Huiyuan's works must have been composed before he knew about the *Awakening of Faith.* (3) Some of Huiyuan's works, notably his encyclopedic *Dasheng yi zhang* (大乘義章, T1851) and his commentary on the **Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (*Da banniepan jing yiji* 大般涅槃經義記, T1764), appear to have undergone ongoing revision, either by Huiyuan himself or by his disciples.[9] So despite the fact that the *Dasheng yi zhang* quotes quite a few times from the *Awakening of Faith*, this does not mean that this whole large work (20 fascicles in total) was written under the influence of the *Awakening of Faith.*

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[8] For the early circulation of the *Awakening of Faith*, see Kashiwagi, 1981: 183ff.

[9] See, for example, the report in the *Xu gaoseng zhuan* that a disciple named Shanzhou 善冑 (d.u.) began revising Huiyuan's commentary on the **Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* even before Huiyuan died; T50:2060.519b11-20.

In light of this difficulty, my working hypothesis is that if I find in Huiyuan's works any passages that show no doctrinal similarity with the *Awakening of Faith*, then I have good reason to believe that these passages could have been written before Huiyuan learned about the *Awakening of Faith,* and hence could be authentic samples of Dilun School thought before the appearance of the *Awakening of Faith.* In other words, the fact that there are elements in Huiyuan's works that go against the fundamental tenet of the *Awakening of Faith* should be strong evidence for my thesis that the *Awakening of Faith* was not a direct outgrowth from the Dilun School.

On the basis of this hypothesis, I shall avoid citing any passages from works by Huiyuan in which the influence of the *Awakening of Faith* is most obvious. These include: the "Chapter on the Eight Consciousnesses" ("Bashi yi" 八識義) in Fascicle Three of the *Dasheng yi zhang,* and *An Exegesis of the Meaning of the* Awakening of Faith (*Dasheng qixin lun yishu* 大乘起信論義疏, T1843). In addition, I shall also avoid citing passages where direct or indirect reference to the *Awakening of Faith* appears in neighboring passages.

A brief review of recent scholarship

Under my working hypothesis mentioned above, most recent scholarship turns out not to be so illuminating, because it proceeds on the assumption that it is legitimate to read Huiyuan in light of the *Awakening of Faith.* Here I briefly review the work of three scholars who have studied Huiyuan extensively: Yoshizu Yoshihide (吉津宜英), Aoki Takashi (青木隆), and Ibuki Atsushi (伊吹敦).

Yoshizu (1975) investigates Huiyuan's notion of "dependent origination [based on] Buddha-nature" (*foxing yuanqi* 佛性緣起). Yoshizu remains completely silent about the tension between Buddha-nature as an unconditioned *dharma* and Buddha-nature as the basis of dependent origination. He explains that the reason Huiyuan came up with the notion of "dependent origination [based on] Buddha-nature" was because Huiyuan was influenced by the Yogâcāra doctrine that identifies Buddha-na-

ture or *tathāgatagarbha* (*Rulaizang* 如來藏; literally, "Tathāgata-contain-ing [sentient beings]"[10]) with the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), and hence regards Buddha-nature as the substance (*ti* 體) of dependent origination (Yoshizu, 1975: 175).

The best explanation I can think of for Yoshizu's silence about the tension mentioned above is that he uncritically thinks that it is legiti-mate to interpret Huiyuan in terms of the doctrine of the *Awakening of Faith.* The identification between Buddha-nature and the storehouse con-sciousness referred to by Yoshizu can be fairly regarded as a distinctive doctrine of the *Awakening of Faith.*

Yoshizu's uncritical attitude is also reflected in the fact that he fre-quently cites from the "Chapter on the Eight Consciousnesses" while dis-cussing the notion of "dependent origination [based on] Buddha-nature". For example, when Yoshizu discusses Huiyuan's interpretation of a pas-sage from the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra*, viz. the passage stating that "both birth and death are *tathāgatagarbha*" (T12:353.222b8-9), he links Huiyuan's interpretation to the "Chapter on the Eight Consciousnesses". According to Yoshizu, Huiyuan coins the notion of "the mixture of Truth and falsity" (*zhenwang hehe* 真妄和合), and uses it to establish that, oc-casioned by causes and conditions, Buddha-nature (i.e., the Truth) is transformed into the storehouse consciousness (i.e., falsity), which pro-jects the illusion of birth and death (Yoshizu, 1975: 180-181).

As mentioned above, Huiyuan's "Chapter on the Eight Consciousness-es" – whether it was written by Huiyuan himself or not – is heavily influ-enced by the *Awakening of Faith,* and hence must not be taken as repre-sentative of Huiyuan's earlier thought, nor of Dilun School thought in general. Yoshizu's frequent or even exclusive reliance on the "Chapter on the Eight Consciousnesses" betrays his unawareness of the danger of

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[10] I agree with Michael Zimmermann (Zimmermann, 2002: 39-46) that *tathāgatagarbha* does not mean a womb or a matrix from which a Tathāgata develops. The term *-garbha* at the end of the compound should be interpreted as a marker of a *bahuvrīhi* com-pound, meaning "to contain".

reading Huiyuan exclusively from the perspective of the *Awakening of Faith*.[11]

Similarly, Ibuki (1998) overtly claims that Huiyuan introduces into his system the doctrines of the *Awakening of Faith* (Ibuki, 1998: 87). Moreover, Ibuki also relies almost exclusively on the "Chapter on the Eight Consciousnesses" in his interpretation of Huiyuan (Ibid.: 88ff.).

In a somewhat different manner, Aoki Takashi is careful to limit himself to Dilun School sources when interpreting Huiyuan. Aoki (1997) claims that there are three kinds of dependent origination according to Huiyuan: *youwei yuanqi* (有為緣起); *wuwei yuanqi* (無為緣起) and *ziti yuanqi* (自體緣起). The last, according to Aoki, contains both of the others, and is identified with "dependent origination based on *tathāgatagarbha*" (*Rulaizang yuanqi* 如來藏緣起) (Aoki, 1997: 9). When it functions wrongly, the third type of dependent origination becomes the first, i.e., "birth and death [i.e., *saṃsāra*]"; but when it functions correctly, the third becomes the second, i.e., *nirvāṇa* (Ibid.).

Thus, Aoki concludes by claiming that, for Huiyuan, "*Tathāgatagarbha* is the basis of all *dharma*s, and all kinds of defilements and false discrimination are born from Thusness, *tathāgatagarbha*. But at the same time, the storehouse consciousness is born together [with defilements and false discrimination] and becomes the foundation (*konpon* 根本) of all defilements, namely, becomes the basis that holds [others] (*eji* 依持)" (Ibid.: 10).

Aoki is cautious not to link the *Awakening of Faith* too quickly with Dilun School thought. Nevertheless, his interpretation is still not far from the idea of "dependent origination [based on] Buddha-nature" as characterized by Yoshizu. He also fails to pay sufficient attention to the question of how defilements could be born from Thusness. More importantly, he fails to doubt whether our current reading of Dilun School thought has been heavily biased by later doctrinal schemes such as that of the *Awakening of Faith*.

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[11] In Yoshizu 1974a and Yoshizu 1974b, he also exclusively relies upon the "Chapter on the Eight Consciousnesses" while discussing Huiyuan's notions of "true consciousness" (*zhenshi* 真識) and "false consciousness" (*wangshi* 妄識).

To conclude, recent scholarship on Huiyuan has not taken seriously enough the issue of how unconditioned Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha* could serve as the basis for dependent origination, which by definition is conditioned. Scholars have also not worked hard enough to dissociate Huiyuan from later doctrinal schemes such as that of the *Awakening of Faith.* In what follows, I shall venture to provide a fresh interpretation of Huiyuan's notion of "dependent origination [based on] *tathāgatagarbha*".

The distinction between the aspect of "natural purity" (*xingjing* 性淨) and the aspect of "expedient means" (*fangbian* 方便)

That Huiyuan subscribes to a dualistic scheme, instead of a monistic scheme like that seen in the *Awakening of Faith*, is evident from his repeated employment of the contrast between the aspect of "natural purity" and the aspect of "expedient means". For example, when discussing *bodhi* ("wisdom") in Fascicle 18 of his *Dasheng yi zhang*, Huiyuan distinguishes these two aspects [of *bodhi*]:

> (Quotation 2)
> Next, the third aspect, under which two [further] aspects are differentiated, i.e., the aspect of natural purity (*xingjing* 性淨) and the aspect of expedient means (*fangbian* 方便)...Regarding *bodhi* from the aspect of expedient means, its arising is initiated by conditions, and its realization is made out of its substance (*ti* 體) [i.e., Buddha-nature]. If we apprehend the merits [of *bodhi*] from [the aspect of] conditions, then [all its merits] are born from conditions, just as an ornament is made by a craftsman; if we apprehend the merits [of *bodhi*] from [the aspect of] its substance, then [all the merits] are made out of Buddha-nature (*foxing* 佛性), the True Mind (*zhenxin* 真心), just as the ornament is made of gold. Conditions can indeed make [merits], but such making must base itself on the substance; the substance can indeed make [merits], but such making must be accomplished through conditions.

Regarding *bodhi* from the aspect of natural purity, the nature [of *bodhi*] proceeds from the remote past, but it only becomes manifest through conditions.[12]

次第三門，性淨、方便二門分別...方便菩提，集從緣發、成由體起。攝德從緣，皆從緣生，如莊嚴具工匠所為；攝德從體，皆是佛性真心所作，如莊嚴具真金所作。緣雖能作，作必依體；體雖能為，為必藉緣...性淨菩提，性出自古，從緣始現[13] (T44:1851.830a1-18).

Following this, Huiyuan further divides his discussion of "*bodhi* [from the aspect of] natural purity" into two dimensions: (1) investigation of reality with reference to conditions (*yue yuan lun shi* 約緣論實); and (2) [investigation] in terms of reality [alone] without reference to conditions (*ju shi wang yuan* 據實亡緣). Under (1), Huiyuan repeats what he has already pointed out above: the manifestation of this *bodhi* must be based on the substance, and conversely, its manifestation must also be accomplished with the help of conditions. In this latter aspect, *bodhi* is likened to seven jewels lined up in a dark room, which cannot become manifest without a light (T44:1851.830a18-24). Under (2) Huiyuan says something even more illuminating:

(Quotation 3)
[Secondly,] if we [investigate] in terms of reality [alone] without reference to conditions, then [*bodhi* from the aspect of natural purity] is neither hidden nor disclosed. Under this head, two senses can be differentiated. First, if we set aside the [perspective of] person and simply investigate *dharma*s, then the nature of *dharma*s is originally calm and without conditions from beginningless time, namely, there are no conditions outside reality. With reference to what then should it be known that we talk about [its being] "hidden or disclosed", [or about] "cause and effect"? This is *bodhi* [that exists due to] the nature of *dharma*s (*dharmatā), which should be included under the aspect of

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12 All English translations of Chinese passages are mine.

13 The *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* has "從緣始起" instead. Here I follow the variant edition marked by 【甲】, which, according to T44:1851.465, n. 1, refers to 延寶二年刊，村上專精氏藏, which means "published in the second year of Enbō (1674), included in the collection of Murakami Senshō (1851-1929)".

principle (*limen* 理門) and has nothing to do with the merits of practice (*xingde* 行德). Second, if we apprehend *dharma*s from the [perspective of the] person, then the nature of *dharma*s mentioned above is realized when one attains Buddhahood. When one has realized it [i.e., the nature of *dharma*s], one looks back and realizes that, from beginningless time, there never were any conditions [for its being hidden or for its being disclosed]. Since there were no conditions from the very beginning, the state in original time without beginning was not defiled, and [the state of Buddhahood] at this time is not newly purified, and is the same nature of *dharma*s as before. [This state is] neither hidden nor disclosed; neither cause nor effect.

據實亡緣無隱顯中，義別亦二。一、廢人論法，法性本寂，從來無緣，實外無緣。知復約何說隱說顯、說因說果？此則是其法性菩提，理門可收，不關行德。二、攝法從人，則前法性至佛乃證，證已返望從來無緣。本無緣故，本則非染，今非新淨，同前法性，非隱非顯，非因非果 (T44:1851.830b3-9, my emphasis).

Here, Huiyuan emphasizes again and again that *bodhi* from the aspect of natural purity is not changed even if it is hidden or covered by defilements.[14] This is because *bodhi* that exists due to the nature of *dharma*s is unconditioned. On the side of expedient means, in contrast, *bodhi* that exists through cultivation is subject to conditions and hence is conditioned.[15] In other words, to investigate a certain *dharma* from the side of natural purity means to focus on its aspect of being unconditioned; and to investigate it from the side of expedient means boils down to focusing on its aspect wherein it somehow gets involved in a chain of conditioned causality. The crucial point here is that underlying Huiyuan's differentiation into the two aspects of natural purity and expedient means is

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[14] Cf. also T44:1851.476b24-28.

[15] This means that according to Huiyuan, for example, wisdom in a specific verbal or conceptual form (e.g. calculus in the Newtonian formulation instead of the Leibnizian formulation) results from specific conditions (e.g. different teachers, different methods, etc.). It would be interesting to explore whether these two aspects of *bodhi* correspond to the two kinds of wisdom prominent in several Yogâcāra texts, namely the non-discriminating wisdom (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) vs. the subsequently-acquired wisdom (*pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*).

his subscription to the strict distinction between unconditioned and conditioned realms.

Furthermore, we can also detect that Huiyuan makes a clear distinction between the conditioned and unconditioned realms through the contrast he makes between the Enjoyment-body (*saṃbhoga-kāya*) and the Dharma-body (*dharma-kāya*). We can easily tell that the former is conditioned for Huiyuan from his claim that the Enjoyment-body is the fruit of *bodhi* from the aspect of expedient means.

> (Quotation 4)
> Some people say that *bodhi* [from the aspect of] expedient means exists even when one is still a worldling [i.e., has not attained buddhahood]. This interpretation is not correct...Moreover, the fruit of *bodhi* [from the aspect of] expedient means is the Enjoyment[-body of the] Buddha. It is termed "enjoyment" (*bao* 報) because it is a reward following upon certain causes. If [*bodhi* from the aspect of expedient means] existed eternally from beginningless time, then there would be no cause prior to its existence. Of what, then, could enjoyment be the reward?
>
> 有人說言：方便菩提凡時亦有。是義不然...又復、方便菩提之果即是報佛。酬因名報，本來恒有，有前無因，酬誰名報？ (T44:1851.832 a28-b22).[16]

Along the same lines, Huiyuan also differentiates between two kinds of *nirvāṇa*: *nirvāṇa* [from the aspect of] natural purity and *nirvāṇa* [from the aspect of] expedient means. Under this distinction, again, we find that Huiyuan maps the Dharma-body onto the former, in contrast with the Enjoyment-body, which maps onto the latter:

> (Quotation 5)
> Third, if we discuss reality in general terms, then [we claim that] the aspect of natural purity and the aspect of expedient means are equal-

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[16] Cf. also T44:1851.832a16-20.

ly shared by three things.[17] What does this mean? [It means] the Dharma-body[18] has these two aspects: first, the *dharmatā*-body (*faxing shen* 法性身; *svābhāvika-kāya*?), which was originally hidden but now becomes disclosed…second, the Real-enjoyment-body (*shibao shen* 實報身), which is born from cultivation as an expedient means. Here, the *dharmatā*-body is included under [*nirvāṇa* from the aspect of] natural purity and the Real-enjoyment-body is subsumed under [*nirvāṇa* from the aspect of] expedient means.

三、就實通論，性淨、方便齊具三事。是義云何？法身有二：一、法性身，本隱今顯…二、實報身，方便修生。其法性身性淨所收；實報身者方便所攝 (T44:1851.822b24-29).

Huiyuan's view in these two passages may be summarized as follows:

Table 2:   The contrast between the aspect of natural purity and the aspect of expedient means

	Worldlings	After attaining Buddhahood
The aspect of natural purity (i.e., aspect of being unconditioned)	*bodhi* from the aspect of natural purity = *bodhi* that exists due to the nature of *dharmas*	*nirvāṇa* from the aspect of natural purity = the *dharmatā*-body
The aspect of expedient means (i.e., aspect involved in conditioned causal chain)	*bodhi* from the aspect of expedient means = *bodhi* that exists through cultivation	*nirvāṇa* from the aspect of expedient means = the Real-enjoyment-body

As mentioned earlier, the fundamental difference between Paramârtha's thought and the *Awakening of Faith* lies in whether a strict distinction is maintained between conditioned and unconditioned *dharmas* (see my Introduction above). To the extent that both Paramârtha and Huiyuan

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[17] See T44:1851.822b24-c18. "Three things" refers to the *dharma*-body, *bodhi* and liberation (*jietuo* 解脫). These three things are discussed here in Quotation 5, and below in Quotations 6-7.

[18] Apparently, the term "Dharma-body" here is used in its broader sense, including both its aspect of natural purity (i.e., the *dharmatā*-body) and its aspect of expedient means (i.e., the Real-enjoyment-body).

maintain this distinction, it is likely that, doctrinally speaking, Huiyuan is actually closer to Paramârtha than to the *Awakening of Faith*!

An objection may be voiced here that Huiyuan's contrast between the aspect of natural purity and the aspect of expedient means corresponds quite nicely to the contrast between the "aspect of Thusness" (*zhenru men* 真如門) and the "aspect of birth and death" (*shengmie men* 生滅門) in the *Awakening of Faith*. This can be refuted by pointing out that Huiyuan never suggests that the aspect of expedient means derives directly from the aspect of natural purity. This point will become even clearer in the following sections.

The notion of the "true consciousness" (*zhenshi* 真識)

Now let us concentrate on how Huiyuan characterizes an investigation from the side of natural purity, or from the side of the investigated *dharma,* wherein it is unconditioned. Immediately following the above Quotation (5), Huiyuan goes on to discuss how wisdom (Ch. *banruo* 般若; Skt. *prajñā*) can also be differentiated into two types based on the contrast between the aspect of natural purity and that of expedient means. Under "the aspect of natural purity", further, he introduces the intriguing notion of the "true consciousness" (*zhenshi* 真識). Also glossed by Huiyuan as *tathāgatagarbha*[19] or the "nature that cognizes [Reality]" (*nengzhi* [*zhi*] *xing* 能知[之]性)[20], the "true consciousness" refers to the inherently pure mind whose nature is to shed light on the Dharma-realm (*dharmadhātu*). He says:

> (Quotation 6)
> Wisdom also has these two [aspects, i.e., the aspect of natural purity and the aspect of expedient means]. The first is the wisdom that illuminates by its own nature (*xingzhao banruo* 性照般若), also termed

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[19] Cf. also T37:1764.691b7-9; T37:1764.692c7-11; X19:351.885c15-18.

[20] Cf. also T37:1764.828b29-c3; T37:1764.884c5-12; T44:1851.472c12-22. Note that the term "nature", as I employ it in my English translation, is intended simply to reflect the Chinese term "*xing* 性" but does not suggest in any way substantiation or reification of the function in question.

the "realized wisdom". What does this mean? [It means] that the mind, viz. the true consciousness, is pure by its own nature, but it looks as if it is impure in appearance (*xiangsi* 相似) because it is covered and veiled by false defilements (*wangran* 妄染). Only after false defilements cease is this mind disclosed for the first time. The now disclosed true mind, corresponding to its own nature, inwardly sheds light on the Dharma-realm (*dharmadhātu*), and is [therefore] named "the wisdom that illuminates due to its own nature". It is [also] named "realized wisdom" because this [illumination] matches its own nature. The second [type of wisdom is] the wisdom that illuminates by means of contemplation (*guanzhao banruo* 觀照般若)...The wisdom that illuminates due to its own nature is included under [the aspect of] natural purity; the wisdom of illuminating by means of contemplation is subsumed under [the aspect of] expedient means.

般若亦二。一、性照般若，亦名「證智」。是義云何？真識之心本
性清淨，而為妄染之所覆蔽，相似不淨。後息妄染，彼心始顯。始
顯真心，如其本性，內明法界，說之以為「性照般若」。由稱本性，
故名「證智」。二、觀照般若...性照般若，性淨所收；觀照般若，方
便所攝 (T44:1851.822b29-c10).

Note that Huiyuan does not claim here that the true consciousness itself becomes impure. Rather, he says that the true consciousness only *looks as if it is impure in appearance*, and the reason is that it is covered and veiled by false defilements. Again, we confirm that there is a clear difference between Huiyuan and the *Awakening of Faith.*

Following the above Quotation (6), Huiyuan goes on to emphasize that the true consciousness is covered but not defiled, and hence "does not only now first begin to be pure" (*jin fei shi jing* 今非始淨) when one becomes liberated, i.e., when defilements are removed:

(Quotation 7)
Liberation also has these two [aspects, i.e., the aspect of natural purity and the aspect of expedient means]: First, liberation [from the aspect of] its own nature, which can also be termed "liberation [from the aspect of] natural purity". The mind – in its literal sense (*zhishuo* 直說) – is pure by its own nature, but because it is hidden by falsity it is also said to be in bondage (*xifu* 繫縛). Later, when it eliminates the false

defilements, its nature emerges from [beneath] the layers [of defilements]. This is what is termed "liberation [from the aspect of] its own nature". Moreover, when it has attained liberation, it looks back [and realizes that] the afflictions and impurities never existed from beginningless time, and it did not only now first begin to be pure (*jin fei shi jing* 今非始淨). For this reason, it is termed also as "liberation [from the aspect of] its own nature". Second, liberation [from the aspect of] expedient means...Liberation [from the aspect of] its own nature is included under [the aspect of] natural purity; and liberation [from the aspect of] expedient means is subsumed under [the aspect of] expedient means.

解脫亦二。一、自性解脫，亦得名為「性淨解脫」。直說之心，本性雖淨而妄隱[21]，說為繫縛。後除妄染，彼性出累，名「性解脫」。又得脫已，返望惑染，從來不有，今非始淨，故亦名為「自性解脫」。二、方便解脫...自性解脫，性淨所收；方便解脫，方便所攝 (T44:1851. 822c10-17).[22]

Again, what is emphasized here is that the mind, the true consciousness, is never defiled nor impure. It is simply covered or hidden by defilements. With respect to the disclosure of the true consciousness, there is a beginning.[23] But with respect to its original natural purity, there is no beginning, nor is there an end. This is very different from the *Awakening of Faith*, which argues that it is the pure mind itself that is agitated by ignorance and projects deluded phenomena.

My point here is that, unlike Thusness as it is understood in the *Awakening of Faith*, the true consciousness as Huiyuan understands it never shares in the nature of conditioned *dharma*s. If Huiyuan had ever subscribed to the conceptual scheme of the *Awakening of Faith*, he would not have put so much emphasis on the idea that, even if a sentient being in *saṃsāra* is tainted by defilements, the true consciousness does not become tainted and, when that sentient being becomes liberated, the true

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[21] A character seems to be missing here. The variant edition marked by 【甲】 reads: 而為妄隱, see T44:1851.822, n. 8. For 【甲】, see above, n. 13.

[22] Cf. also T37:1764.816b18-20.

[23] Cf. also T44:1851.822, c21-29; T37:1764.850c14-20.

consciousness does not only then begin to be pure. According to the *Awakening of Faith*, by contrast, Thusness can be agitated by ignorance, and then it becomes defiled; and when the defilements are eliminated, Thusness does begin to become pure again.

Various formulations of the dubious idea of "adjusting to falsity" (*suiwang* 隨妄)

So far, I have shown that Huiyuan carefully distinguishes two aspects, and that the true consciousness as he understands it is unmistakably unconditioned. Now I must tackle the further issue of whether the true consciousness can be modified by ignorance, in the same way as Thusness can be agitated by ignorance according to the *Awakening of Faith*.

In order to investigate this issue, let me first note that in Huiyuan's works, there are at least five notions that seem to point to the involvement of the true consciousness in the conditioned realm: (1) [the notion that the true consciousness] adjusts to falsity (*suiwang* 隨妄); (2) [the notion that the true consciousness] adjusts to conditions (*suiyuan* 隨緣 or *yuanqi* 緣起); (3) the notion of "dependent origination [based on the] substance of *tathāgatagarbha*" (*Rulaizang ti yuanqi* 如來藏體緣起); (4) the notion that defiled consciousness is based on (*yi* 依) the true consciousness; and (5) the function (*yong* 用) of the true consciousness. For each notion, I will cite one passage from Huiyuan.

1   [That the true consciousness] adjusts to defilements:

> (Quotation 8)
> With regard to their ultimate nature, the twelve links of dependent origination arise from the true mind, just as that [illusion] which occurs in a dream arises from the mind [that is conditioned by] karmic payback (*baoxin* 報心). Therefore, the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*[24] says that the twelve links of dependent origination are all made by the true

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[24] Huiyuan seems to be alluding to the following passage: 經曰：是菩薩作是念：三界虛妄但是一心作...經曰：如來所說十二因緣分皆依一心 (T26:1522.169a15-21).

mind. [This] true mind itself is the nature, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性) which is clear at all times, pure and unchangeable. How could there be arising and function [of it] due to causes and conditions? Hence it is not existent. [But on the other hand,] it evolves by <u>adjusting to defilements</u>, and hence birth and death [i.e., *saṃsāra*] arise. For this reason it is said to be not non-existent. It is neither existent nor non-existent, and therefore, we speak of [it as] the "middle path".

十二因緣，窮其本性，真心所起，如夢所作皆報心起。故《地經》說：十二因緣皆真心作。真心即是如來藏性，古今常湛，清淨不變，何有因緣起作可得？所以非有。<u>隨妄流轉</u>，集起生死，說為非無。非有非無，故名中道 (T37:1764.825b11-16, my emphasis).

2   [That the true consciousness] adjusts to causes and conditions:

(Quotation 9)
Despite the fact that [things] such as wisdom and ignorance are distinguished and different, their real nature (*shixing* 實性) is not different. [This is because:] the same substance of the true mind (*yi zhenxin ti* 一真心體) is transformed into various *dharma*s by <u>adjusting to conditions</u>...First, the same substance of the true consciousness (*yi zhenshi ti* 一真識體) is transformed into wisdom and ignorance by <u>adjusting to conditions</u>, and hence there is no other [i.e., different] nature [in the true consciousness]. In just the same manner, water of the same nature can become clear or turbid by adjusting to conditions, and yet there is no other [i.e., different] nature of the water.

明、無明等雖復別異，實性不二。一真心體<u>隨緣</u>轉變為諸法故...一真識體<u>隨緣</u>轉變為明、無明，故性無二。如一水性，隨緣清濁，水性無二 (T37:1764.702c2-19, my emphasis).[25]

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[25] Cf. also T38:1776.497a7-9.

3   *The notion of "dependent origination* [*based on the*] *substance of* tathāga-
       tagarbha":

(Quotation 10)
Now if we explain these two [i.e., the conventional and the ultimate
truth] by recourse to dependent origination, then [we note that] it is
the dependent origination [based on] the substance of the pure Dhar-
ma-realm, i.e., the *tathāgatagarbha,* that constructs "birth and death
[i.e., *saṃsāra*]" and *nirvāṇa.* [Here] the substance of the true nature
itself (*zhenxing ziti* 真性自體) is said to be the ultimate truth; its func-
tion, i.e., dependent origination, is said to be the conventional truth.

若就緣起以明二者：清淨法界如來藏體，緣起造作生死涅槃。真性
自體說為真諦；緣起之用判為世諦 (T44:1851.483c19-21, my em-
phasis).[26]

4   *That the defiled consciousness is based on* (yi 依) *the true consciousness*

(Quotation 11)
Fourth, the permanent gives birth to the impermanent. This means
that based on the true consciousness, false consciousness is produced,
and that based on the permanent body [i.e., the Dharma-body], birth
and death [i.e., *saṃsāra*] are tranformed [by false consciousness].

四、常生無常，謂依真識，發生妄識，依於常身，起化生滅 (T44:1851.
480c24-25, my emphasis).

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[26] Cf. also T44:1851.486b19-24.

5   *The function of the true consciousness:*

(Quotation 12)[27]
Regarding the aforementioned dependent origination [based on] the true consciousness, we can differentiate two senses: first, <u>dependent origination [which is] the function of the true [consciousness]</u> (*zhen-yong yinyuan* 真用因緣). [This means that] the nature, i.e., *tathāgata-garbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性), becomes defiled even while [remaining all the while] undefiled (*bu ran er ran* 不染而染), and [together with it] arise the twelve links of dependent origination. Therefore the Scripture [i.e., the *Laṅkâvatārasūtra*[28]] says, "The nature, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性), is the cause of all good and bad. It can pervasively create [re]births in all destinies, just as an actor (*ji'er* 伎兒) can manifest himself in [the forms of] various destinies." And another Scripture [*Foshuo wushangyi jing?*[29]] also says, "Just these five destinies [arising from] spinning through the Dharma-

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[27] I am very grateful to the anonymous reviewer, who pointed out to me that the Dunhuang fragment Taishō No. 2770 in Volume 85 (Aurel Stein Collection No. 2688, henceforth abbreviated as T2770) could be a variant edition of the same text by Huiyuan. In the following, I correct T1776 by consulting T2770.

[28] For the Chinese translation of the passage from the *Laṅkâvatārasūtra*, see T16:670.510 b4-5. The Sanskrit text reads, *tathāgatagarbho mahāmate kuśalākuśalahetukaḥ sarvajan-magatikartā | pravartate naṭavad gatisaṃkaṭa ātmātmīyavarjitas tadanavabodhāt trisaṅgati-pratyayakriyāyogaḥ pravartate* (Nanjio, 1923: 220). Note that instead of the term *tathāga-tagarbha* in the Sanskrit text and *Rulai zhi zang* 如來之藏 in Guṇabhadra's translation, Huiyuan has *Rulai zang xing* 如來藏性.

[29] Note that Huiyuan also quotes the same passage at least twice in his *Dasheng yi zhang* "Chapter on the Eight Consciousnesses". See T44:1851.527a6, T44:1851.530a28-29. The source behind this quote is not clear. Thus far, the closest I have found is the following passage from the *Foshuo wushangyi jing* (佛說無上依經, T669), translated by Paramârtha, which reads, 阿難！是如來界無量無邊，諸煩惱㲉之所隱蔽，隨生死流漂沒六道，無始輪轉，我說名眾生界 (T669:16.469c17-19). In addition, the *Foxing lun* (佛性論, T1610) attributed to Paramârtha also cites the same passage from the *Foshuo wushangyi jing*: 故《無上依經》說：阿難！是如來法界，無量無邊諸煩惱㲉之所隱蔽，隨生死流。漂沒六道，無始輪轉，我說名眾生界 (T1610:31.806b2-5). If Huiyuan here is indeed citing from Paramârtha's *Foshuo wushangyi jing*, then this would imply that Huiyuan was quite familiar with the works of Paramârtha, an issue which requires further exploration.

realm are termed 'sentient beings'." [The above two passages, etc.] all refer to dependent origination [which is] the function of the true [consciousness]. [Second, regarding] dependent origination [which is] the substance of the true [consciousness, I claim], the nature, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性), is the substance of dependent origination. This is why [*tathāgatagarbha*] is named "dependent origination". But in this substance the marks (*xiang* 相) of dependent origination are absent. Just because this real nature of *tathāgatagarbha* (*zhenshi Rulaizang xing* 真實如來藏性) is the substance of dependent origination, the Scripture (i.e., the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*[30]) proclaims, "The twelve links of dependent origination are regarded as the Buddha-nature," and hence seeing the twelve links of dependent origination is termed seeing the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha.

於前真識因緣之中，義別亦二。一、<u>真用因緣</u>。如來藏性不染而染，起十二緣。故經說言：「如來藏性是其一切善、不善因，能遍興造一切趣生，猶如伎兒[31]變現眾趣。」又經亦言：「即此法界輪轉五道，名曰眾生。」 此等皆是真用因緣。[二、]真體因緣。如來藏性是因緣體，名曰因緣。而此體中，無因緣相。[32]良以真實如來藏性是緣體故，經中宣說：「十二因緣以為佛性」，見十二因緣名為見佛、見法、見僧。 (T38:1776.429c17-26, my emphasis).[33]

Despite slight differences in formulation, what is common to all of the above passages is the idea that the inherently pure true consciousness or the nature, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性) can somehow follow dependent origination or adjust to conditions, and that from this adjustment, false phenomena arise. In what follows, I shall try to show that, despite its seeming similarity with the *Awakening of Faith*, this idea of "adjusting to falsity" actually says quite the opposite.

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[30] T12:374.524a1-3.

[31] I follow *ji'er* 伎兒 in T1776 instead of *bijian* 彼見 in T2770.

[32] Here I follow T2770 instead of T1776, which reads: 如來藏性是因緣體，名因緣，而此因緣相 (T38:1776.429c23). I agree with the anonymous reviewer that T2770 makes much better sense.

[33] Cf. also X19:351.893b21-c2.

A clear separation of Huiyuan from the *Awakening of Faith*?

Now the issue is: How could we reconcile the idea that the true consciousness is unchanging with the idea that it could also become related to dependent origination, which always implies change? From the above passages, it might appear that Huiyuan does side with the *Awakening of Faith,* and tries to downplay the strict distinction between the true consciousness, which is unconditioned, and false phenomena, which are conditioned. I argue that we must firmly reject this interpretation, because I believe that Huiyuan has come up with a subtle way to deal with this difficulty without compromising the strict distinction between conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*s. But before I show how Huiyuan deals with this problem, I should note that this is not a new challenge faced by Huiyuan alone. This difficulty had already been posed in a famous passage from the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra*:

> (Quotation 13)
> O World Honored One! *Tathāgatagarbha* is "that which contains the Dharma-realm", "that which contains the Dharma-body", "that which contains the supreme supramundane [*dharma*s]", and "that which contains inherent purity". [That] this *tathāgatagarbha*, whose nature is pure, is nonetheless affected by adventitious defilements and tainted by defilements, is something inconceivable, that can be known only by the Tathāgata. Why? The mind [associated with] good mental *dharma*s is momentary, [and is therefore] not tainted by defilements; [so too,] the mind [associated with] bad mental *dharma*s is momentary, [and] is also not tainted by defilements. Defilements do not touch the mind, nor does the mind touch defilements. How could a *dharma* that it does not touch be able to defile the mind? O World Honored One! Nonetheless, there are [indeed] defilements, and there is indeed a mind tainted by defilements. [That] the mind is inherently pure and there are nonetheless taints is [something] very difficult to understand; only the Buddha, the World Honored One – who has the eye of truth and true wisdom, who is the foundation of all *dharma*s, who

knows perfectly the *dharma*s, who is the basis of all correct *dharma*s – knows and sees this as it really is.[34]

世尊！如來藏者，是法界藏、法身藏、出世間上上藏、自性清淨藏。此性清淨如來藏而客塵煩惱上，煩惱所染，不思議如來境界。何以故？剎那善心非煩惱所染；剎那不善心亦非煩惱所染。煩惱不觸心，心不觸煩惱。云何不觸法而能得染心？世尊！然有煩惱、有煩惱染心。自性清淨心而有染者，難可了知。唯佛世尊，實眼實智、為法根本、為通達法、為正法依、如實知見 (T353:12.222b22-c1, my emphasis).

Given this total heterogeneity between pure mind, i.e., the true consciousness, and defilements, how then might Huiyuan try to resolve the problem of how these two could be combined without compromising their heterogeneity?

The key here is the notion of "false discrimination" (*wangqing* 妄情), as stated in the following passages:

(Quotation 14)

Question: Dependent origination is a false *dharma*.[35] How could it [then] serve as the cause of *bodhi*? [Answer:] Those twelve links of dependent origination [within the realm of] birth-and-death [= *saṃsāra*] arise due to false discrimination and are established in dependence upon Thusness. Therefore the Scripture[36] says, "All the twelve links

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34 Part of the first underlined portion is quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, which reads: *yo 'yaṃ bhagavaṃs tathāgatagarbho lokottaragarbhaḥ prakṛtipariśuddhagarbha iti* (Johnston, 1950: 72.16-73.1). The second underlined portion is also attested in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, which reads: *kṣaṇikaṃ bhagavan kuśalaṃ cittam | na kleśaiḥ saṃkliśyate | kṣaṇikam akuśalaṃ cittam | na saṃkliṣṭam eva tac cittaṃ kleśaiḥ | na bhagavan kleśās tac cittaṃ spṛśanti | katham atra bhagavann asparśanadharmi cittaṃ tamaḥkliṣṭaṃ bhavati | asti ca bhagavann upakleśaḥ | asty upakliṣṭaṃ cittam | atha ca punar bhagavan prakṛtipariśuddhasya cittasyôpakleśārtho duṣprativedhyaḥ ||* (Johnston, 1950: 15.3-7). For Takasaki's English translation, see Takasaki, 1966: 174-175.

35 I think that Huiyuan does not mean here that dependent origination is false, but that dependent origination as it is understood by ordinary sentient beings – e.g., in terms of the twelve links of dependent origination – is not ultimately true. This is because each of the twelve links is not ultimately real.

36 Huiyuan seems again to refer here to the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*; cf. Quotation 8 above.

of dependent origination are based on true mind, i.e., mind at the level of the ultimate truth." If we speak about their false aspect [i.e., of the twelve links of dependent origination], it is true that they are unreal constructions. But if we speak about their true aspect, then because they are governed by conditions, none of them is unreal. If one exhaustively explores conditions and comes to know reality, then he will attain great awakening; for this reason, it is possible for dependent origination to be the cause of buddhahood.

問曰：因緣是虛妄法，云何能與菩提作因？然彼生死十二因緣，起由妄情，託真如立。故經說言：「十二因緣皆依真實第一義心。」就妄論之，雖是虛搆，據真緣攝，斯無不實。窮緣悟實，便成大覺，是故因緣能為佛因 (T44:1851.473c6-11, my emphasis).

(Quotation 15)
If we analyze reality according to the "Mahāyāna teaching of the disclosure of Reality" (*dasheng xianshi jiao* 大乘顯實教), then there are two [kinds of reality]: one, empty [reality]; the other, existent [reality]. To further distinguish each of these two, [in each] we can briefly differentiate [the following] two aspects [i.e., of the basis and of dependent origination]. First, the aspect of the basis (*yichi men* 依持門): Suffering, the arising of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering, which are grasped by false imagination (*wangxiang* 妄想), and hence appear to be existent for [those with false] discrimination, but are non-existent for [those who know] the Principle (*li* 理), are what is called "empty reality". The nature, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性), that is taken as the basis of false discrimination, which, although its mark (*xiang* 相) cannot be seen, nevertheless exists in reality, is what is called "existent reality". Therefore the Scripture[37] calls this "non-empty [*tathāgata-*]*garbha*" (*bukong zang* 不空藏). Second, the aspect of

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[37] Cf. the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra*: 世尊！有二種如來藏空智。世尊！空如來藏，若離、若脫、若異一切煩惱藏。世尊！不空如來藏，過於恒沙不離不脫不異不思議佛法 (T12:353.221c16-18). The Sanskrit as quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* reads, *śūnyas tathāgatagarbho vinirbhāgair muktajñaiḥ sarvakleśakośaiḥ | aśūnyo gaṅgānadīvālikāvyati-vṛttair avinirbhāgair amuktajñair acintyair buddhadharmair* (Johnston, 1950: 76, 7-9).

dependent origination (*yuanqi men* 緣起門): The nature, i.e., *tathā-gatagarbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性), whose substance (*ti* 體) is Thusness (*ru* 如) and hence is uniform in flavor, is what is called "empty reality". The functioning (*yong* 用) of dependent origination [in terms of] suffering, the arising of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering, is what is called the "existent reality". Hence the Scripture says, "Natural purity is defiled even while [remaining all the while] undefiled;" "The twelve links of dependent origination are all made of the one mind;" "The two *dharma*s – birth and death – are spinning through the Dharma-realm, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*, and are [respectively] called the Dharma-body and sentient beings." These and other similar passages refer to suffering and the arising of suffering [due to] dependent origination [based on] true reality [i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*]. The disclosure of the nature, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha* (*Rulaizang xing* 如來藏性), to become the Dharma-body, *bodhi*, *nirvāṇa*, and the merits of practice through the stages (*bhūmi*), is the cessation of suffering and the path leading to the cessation of suffering [due to] dependent origination [based on] true reality [i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*].

若就大乘顯實教中辨實亦二：一、空；二、有。於中分別，略有二門。一、依持門。妄想所取苦、集、滅、道，於情為有，於理實無，名為「空實」。妄情所依如來藏性，相雖叵見，而實是有，名為「有實」。故經說為「不空藏」矣。二、緣起門。如來藏性，體如一味，名為「空實」。緣起苦、集、滅、道之用，名為「有實」。如經中說：「自性清淨，不染而染」、「十二因緣，皆一心作」、「生死二法是如來藏法界輪轉，名曰法身、眾生。」如是等言，是其真實緣起苦、集。如來藏性顯成法身、菩提、涅槃、諸地行德，即是真實緣起滅、道（T1851:44.512a5-16）.[38]

What is impressive about Huiyuan's resolution of this difficult issue is that false discrimination works in exactly the same sense as "adventitious defilements" (*āgantuka-kleśa*): discrimination covers the true consciousness and out of the "combination" of the two all defiled phenomena – birth and death [i.e., *saṃsāra*] – arise.

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[38] Cf. also T1764:37.704c3-6; X753:45.43b22-c8; T1776:38.474b17-23.

To explain further, I construe what Huiyuan says as follows: the ultimate substance (*ti* 體) is Thusness or *tathāgatagarbha*, which refers to nothing other than Reality as governed by the principle of dependent origination. Originally, we are endowed with the correct "cognition" of Thusness, namely, the true consciousness. But due to ignorance, false discrimination is superimposed upon the true consciousness, and hence Reality is falsely grasped and designated in terms of concepts (such as "a pot"). But even when false concepts are applied to Reality, it merely *appears* to be defiled, but in fact is not changed whatsoever, inasmuch as it arises and ceases according to dependent origination. In the same way, even when false discrimination is superimposed upon the true consciousness, the true consciousness itself is never tainted. It is simply hidden or covered. That is to say, there is *no* real mixture between the true consciousness and false discrimination, because when these two come together, the latter does not change the nature of the former at all. In fact, Huiyuan follows the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra* to claim that these two do not touch each other even while being combined with one another:

(Quotation 16)
The sentence, "Defilements do not touch the mind; the mind does not touch defilements"[39] is meant to explain what was mentioned earlier, [namely, the idea of "the mind being] untainted". Defilements originate from false discrimination, and do not impinge upon the true consciousness, and hence they do not touch the mind. Since [the mind] stays in its truth without falsity, it does not touch any defilements. This is as when a worldling mistakenly sees a rope and takes it for a snake. The [cognition of the] snake arises from false discrimination, and hence it does not touch the rope; the substance of the rope is forever pure, and also does not touch the snake.

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[39] Quoted from the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra*. See above Quotation 13.

「惚⁴⁰不觸⁴¹心，心不觸惚」，釋前不染。惚出妄情， 不及真識，故
不觸心。據真无妄，故不觸惚。其猶世人見繩為虵⁴²，虵出妄情，
故不觸繩。繩躰常淨，亦不觸虵 (X19:351.894b2-5).

The idea that false discrimination does not taint the true consciousness
is strong evidence that for Huiyuan, false discrimination is *not* a mode of
the true consciousness. False discrimination is of a totally different na-
ture from the true consciousness, and hence cannot taint it. False discri-
mination remains nothing more than adventitious defilements. Con-
versely, the true consciousness does not touch false discrimination, ei-
ther. This does not imply anything like the idea that the true conscious-
ness is somehow agitated or transformed into false consciousness, as
suggested by the *Awakening of Faith*. Rather, Huiyuan simply means that
false discrimination is superimposed upon the true consciousness, and
hence Reality is falsely conceptualized and reified. In this sense, Huiyuan
can make the claim that the true consciousness adjusts to falsity without
subscribing to the doctrinal scheme of the *Awakening of Faith*.

We should certainly investigate further the problem of whether Hui-
yuan successfully resolves this difficulty, or whether he should be sub-
ject to a further request to provide an explanation of how and why false
discrimination comes into existence in the first place, if it is not a direct
derivative of the true consciousness.⁴³ But my point here is that Huiyuan
does not come anywhere near to suggesting that false discrimination is a

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⁴⁰ Given that there are 49 occurrences of 煩惚 in this text, which I assume would cor-
respond to the more common term *fannao* (煩惱), we can conclude that 惚 in X351 is
an ancient variant character for *nao* (惱). According to the *Zokuzōkyō*, this manuscript
was rediscovered in Dunhuang, and is catalogued as Pelliot Chinois No. 3308.

⁴¹ Due to shortcomings in my computer font, I can only show the modern character here.
In the manuscript, according to CBETA, this same word is written [舉-與+角], meaning
that we should remove 與 from 舉, and then put 角 to the right.

⁴² This is an ancient variant character for 蛇 (snake).

⁴³ Huiyuan faces potential difficulties here. For example: What precisely does it mean to
say that false discrimination can be superimposed upon true consciousness, without
compromising the unconditioned status of true consciousness? Perhaps we might an-
swer by saying that this is similar to the case of putting on a blindfold: when one puts
on a blindfold, one cannot see anything at all, but one's natural capacity to see is not
therefore harmed.

mode or an aspect of the true consciousness, which is the idea that characterizes the *Awakening of Faith.* Instead, Huiyuan emphasizes that the true consciousness remains untainted despite the superimposition of false discrimination upon it.

The simile of snake and rope: The indispensability of the substance

Another reason for arguing that, according to Huiyuan, false discrimination is not a mode or an aspect of the true consciousness is that Huiyuan also claims that defiled phenomena never really exist. Their seeming existence is in reality non-existence; their seeming cessation is also non-cessation. Huiyuan puts it thus:

(Quotation 17)
The substance of [all] *dharma*s, which [alone] is true, remains the same and is named "Thusness". As Thusness adjusts to false discrimination, birth and death [i.e., *saṃsāra*] arise. That defilements arise by [Thusness] adjusting to falsity is named "birth", and that purity [i.e., of Thusness] is hidden is named "death". Further, that purity manifests by adjusting to the antidotes is named "birth", and that defilements stop is named "death". Birth [in accordance with] dependent origination is [in reality] a non-birth [falsely taken as] birth, but [in reality] this [falsely taken] birth is a non-birth. Death [in accordance with] dependent origination is [in reality] a non-death [falsely taken as] death, but [in reality] this [falsely taken] death is a non-death. It is just as someone in the dark of night might see a rope and think it a snake. The arising of the [false idea of a] snake is named "birth" [of the snake], but [in reality] this [falsely taken] birth is a non-birth; when the dawn comes, the [false idea of a] snake dies, but [in reality] this [falsely taken] death is a non-death.

真法體同，名之為如。如隨妄情，集起生滅。隨妄起染，名之為生，淨隱稱滅。又隨對治，淨起名生，染息云滅。緣起之生，非生為生，生則無生；緣起之滅，非滅為滅，滅則無滅。如人夜闇見繩為蛇。蛇起名生，生則無生；至明蛇滅，滅則無滅 (T38:1776.462a1-6).

Thus, according to Huiyuan, the generating cause (*shengyin* 生因) for the arising of defiled phenomena is false discrimination. Since false discrimination never really touches the true consciousness, the latter cannot be regarded as the direct generating cause for defiled phenomena. Again, this reveals that for Huiyuan, defiled phenomena are neither modes of Thusness, nor its direct derivatives. This is a clear difference from the *Awakening of Faith.*

In the passage above, Huiyuan refers to the simile of the snake-rope, a commonly cited simile in classical Indian Yogâcāra texts. Based on Huiyuan's citation of this simile, we can better understand Huiyuan's famous claim of "joining together of truth and falsity" (*zhenwang hehe* 真妄和合), which means that neither truth nor falsity alone can produce defiled phenomena; defiled phenomena arise only by means of the "joining together" of the two.[44] In the simile, the misconstructed image of a snake cannot arise unless there is a basis, namely, the rope. Similarly, without truth, falsity would have no basis or *locus* to reside in or attach to.[45]

Further ramifications

A few significant ramifications follow from my thesis that the *Awakening of Faith* has a very different conceptual scheme from that of Huiyuan.

First, we should try separating two kinds of works traditionally attributed to Huiyuan: those evincing little or no influence from the *Awakening of Faith,* and those showing its strong influence. The former come closer to authentic Dilun School thought, but the latter, whether they

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[44] Cf. e.g., T44:1851.473b14-20; T44:1851.551a4-6; T38:1776.429b28-29; T37:1764.900b11-12; X19:351.892c12-20.

[45] An intriguing question remains to be further explored: When Huiyuan says falsity must have truth as its substance, by "truth" does he mean the ontological aspect of truth (i.e., Thusness) or the epistemological aspect of truth (i.e., true consciousness)? Here, "truth" refers to that upon which falsity or conceptualization is superimposed, and so the question becomes: Is conceptualization superimposed upon reality, or upon the correct cognition of reality? I do not yet have a ready answer to this question, but I hope to tackle this issue in future work.

were written by Huiyuan or not, should not be regarded as characteristic of Dilun School thought.

Second, we need to consider the extent to which scholars have tended to misinterpret Dilun School works by viewing them through the lens of the *Awakening of Faith.* In particular, we need to question the prevalent reading of the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra.* For example, when we read in the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra* that "*Tathāgatagarbha* is the cause of both good and bad"[46] or that "*Tathāgatagarbha* is permeated by badness due to beginningless conceptual proliferation of various kinds, and is named 'storehouse consciousness',"[47] we must not quickly jump to the conclusion that these passages claim that *tathāgatagarbha* and the storehouse consciousness are two sides of the same coin, and hence, that these passages are necessarily genuine precursors of the kind of thinking seen in the *Awakening of Faith.* We need to ask whether our overall understanding of the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra* is informed and biased by our habit of associating the *Awakening of Faith* with Dilun School doctrines.

Conclusion

This paper argues that, contrary to most scholarly opinion, there are major doctrinal differences between Huiyuan, as the best known Dilun School master, and the *Awakening of Faith.* For this reason, we must not treat the most distinctive doctrinal feature of the *Awakening of Faith* – i.e., its blurring of the strict distinction between the conditioned and unconditioned realms – as a direct outgrowth of the Dilun School.

More broadly, we should maintain a cautious and keen awareness of the influence of the *Awakening of Faith* on our fundamental understanding of such key notions in Buddhist thought as *foxing* 佛性 (*buddhagotra*), *Rulaizang* 如來藏 (*tathāgatagarbha*), etc. Much more effort is re-

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[46] The Sanskrit text reads: *tathāgatagarbho mahāmate kuśalākuśalahetukaḥ sarvajanmagati-kartā* (Nanjio, 1923: 220, lines 9-10). For the Chinese translation of the passage, see T16:670.510b4-5.

[47] The Sanskrit text reads: *anādikālavividhaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavāsanāvāsitā ālayavijñāna-saṃśabdito* (Nanjio, 1923: 220, lines 13-14). For the Chinese translation of the passage, see T16:670.510b7-8.

quired to separate later interpretations from the earlier tradition, in order for us better to understand the development of Buddhist thought in sixth century China.

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A Pivotal Text for the Definition of the Two Hindrances in East Asia: Huiyuan's "Erzhang yi" Chapter

A. Charles Muller

1 Introduction

Buddhism, especially in its meditative forms, is unique among religious traditions for the attention that it pays to the psychological aspect of human problems, and for the extent to which it distinguishes these problems into the categories of emotional and cognitive. While the general patterns of this distinction between these two aspects of mental function are discernible in early Buddhism, and become clearer in Abhidharmic scholasticism,[1] it is not until the maturation of the Mahāyāna that afflic-

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[1] Although the explicit division of all mental disturbances along the general lines of afflictive vs. cognitive is seen mainly in the Mahāyāna systems of Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha, we begin to see the formation of precursory structures in Abhidharma texts, where, for example, the afflictive hindrances (*fannaozhang* 煩惱障) are established in contrast to the hindrances to liberation (*jietuozhang* 解脱障). In this case the afflictive hindrances refer to the manifestly active afflictions that serve to obstruct the production of undefiled wisdom, and thus obstruct attainment of liberation through wisdom (*huijietuo* 慧解脱). However, even if one overcomes these hindrances and is able to attain liberation through wisdom, he may still be obstructed by the subtler hindrances to liberation, which impede the attainment of the concentration of total cessation (*miejinding* 滅盡定). Thus, the latter type (also known as the "cessation hindrances", *dingzhang* 定障) are said to impede both types of liberation (*ju jietuo* 俱解脱). The former are seen as being constituted by defiled ignorance (*wuran wuzhi* 染汚無知), and the latter by undefiled ignorance (*buwuran wuzhi* 不染汚無知). In the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* (*Apidamo piposha lun* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), the first two of the four kinds of correct elimination (*si zheng duan* 四正斷) remove the first kind of hindrance and the second two remove the second kind of hindrance (T27:1545.724b29).

tive and cognitive obstacles to liberation are formally organized under the rubrics of the "two hindrances" – the afflictive hindrances (*kleśa-āva-raṇa, fannaozhang* 煩惱障) and the cognitive hindrances (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*; *zhizhang* 智障, *suozhizhang* 所知障[2]).

While the two hindrances are understood by many scholars as hallmark concepts of the Yogâcāra school, they are actually broad Mahāyāna categories, and as we will see here, the process of refinement and fleshing out of their contents was in some cases more extensive within the texts of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition.

1.1   *Parameters for the two hindrances*

Throughout the Mahāyāna texts where the hindrances are invoked, their most common function is to serve as a means of distinguishing the content of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna paths. The general characterization describes the practices of the adherents of the two vehicles (*śrāvaka*s and *pratyekabuddha*s) to be limited in their focus and application of contemplation to the afflictive hindrances, while the practices of the bodhisattvas can be applied to both. In Yogâcāra, this accords with the basic doctrine that understands that the practitioners of the two vehicles are limited in their enlightenment to the realization of selflessness, i.e. recognition of *anātman*, and thus only attain the Hīnayāna *nirvāṇa*, whereas the bodhisattvas penetrate further, to the realization of *śūnyatā,* and can hence attain *bodhi* equal to the buddhas. While the Tathāgatagarbha texts do not define the causes of the hindrances so clearly in terms of this model of attachment to the selfhood of persons and *dharma*s, their descriptions of the hindrances basically agree with this general framework.

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[2] The rendering *zhizhang* (智障) is found in both pre-Xuanzang Yogâcāra and Tathāgata-garbha texts. *Suozhizhang* (所知障) is used in Xuanzang's translations and becomes standard in subsequent works in the East Asian Weishi (唯識) tradition. It should be noted, however, that Zhiyi (智顗) had already applied the connotation of "the known" (*suozhi,* 所知) in the sixth century in his rendering as *suozhiai* (所知礙). See, for example, T46:1911.85c18.

The development of a comprehensive systematic description of the hindrances in both Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha occurs rather late in comparison with the finalization of other facets of their respective doctrines. The hindrances are mentioned only rarely and sketchily at first, but then with increasing frequency in a broad range of texts over a period of a couple of centuries. At the earliest stages, the hindrances are mentioned with almost no explanation, usually as simple markers to indicate the completion of a certain set of practices, or the attainment of a certain stage. I have outlined the general progression of the two hindrances framework in the Yogâcāra system in another work (Muller, 2013), so I will just summarize it briefly here.

In the Yogâcāra system proper (as accepted by Kuiji [窺基, 632–682] and his colleagues) the hindrances are mentioned only briefly, and with no serious intention of establishing a system, in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra* (hereafter *YBh*), and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*.[3] The *Madhyânta-vibhāga*, while featuring an entire chapter entitled "The Two Hindrances" (the second chapter), articulates the hindrances in a way that barely relates to the rest of the Yogâcāra system at all. The full and complete definition of the two hindrances as they end up being taught in the Weishi (唯識) system appears in Xuanzang's (玄奘, 602?–664) translation of the *Fodijing lun* (佛地經論, *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra*, T1530, hereafter *FDJL*). This definition is copied almost verbatim into the *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論, T1585, hereafter *CWSL*), with a few minor, but very interesting tweaks.

As is now fairly well known, the most comprehensive articulation of two hindrances systems in the known history of Buddhism was carried out by the Korean scholiast Wonhyo (元曉, 617–686) in his *Ijang ui* (二障義, "System of the Two Hindrances", hereafter *IJU*).[4] This substantial

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[3] This does not mean, however, that the phenomena of affliction and nescience are not discussed in great detail in these texts – especially the *YBh*. For in fact, Wonhyo relies on the *YBh* more than any other text in his fleshing out of the two hindrances within the Yogâcāra system. Nonetheless, the hindrances are rarely labeled *as such* there.

[4] I have published an English study and translation of this text in the volume entitled *Wonhyo's Philosophy of Mind* (Muller, 2012a), which is part of a series-in-progress that aims at providing scholarly translations of all of Wonhyo's extant works.

treatise (twenty-five pages in the *Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo* 韓國佛教全書 – translating out to over 200 pages in English), started out as a digression written in the process of the composition of a commentary to the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* (大乘起信論 T1666, hereafter *AMF*), but grew to such a length that Wonhyo apparently decided to publish it separately. The *IJU* is of critical importance, not just for hindrances discourse, but for its thorough, non-sectarian analysis of East Asian Buddhist philosophy of mind at that point in history, in that Wonhyo was one of the first to clearly identify and discuss the two major forms of Mahāyāna philosophy of mind in a thoroughgoing, comparative, and impartial manner.[5] These two are what we now call the Yogâcāra tradition (viz., Yogâcāra as understood by the East Asian Weishi/Faxiang lineage, established based on such works as the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *YBh*, *FDJL*, etc.), and the Tathāgatagarbha tradition (in East Asia largely developed out of the Dilun 地論 tradition, based on such texts as the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* [hereafter *ŚDS*], *Ratnagotravibhāga*, *AMF*, etc.).

Wonhyo's work is typically thorough. He first distinguishes hindrances discourse into these two main streams, calling the Yogâcāra system the "explicit" (*xianliao men* 顯了門; *nītârtha*) approach and the *AMF*'s system and approach, which "requires further explanation" (*yinmi men* 隱密門; *neyârtha*). He constructs a system for each of these, based on the prominent texts from within their respective traditions. Then – as is typical for Wonhyo – he tries his best to find the ways in which key elements of the two systems can be matched up with each other. To flesh out the Yogâcāra system, he relies primarily on Xuanzang's recently-completed translations of the *YBh*, *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and so forth. And although he does not cite the *FDJL* by name, it seems that he must have had access to some draft of this text, or perhaps a draft of some of its counterpart passages that were to be included in the *CWSL*, as portions of these critical passages – the most important in

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[5] Basically, Wonhyo was the only major scriptural commentator of the period who did not belong to, and did not in an unbalanced way support, a particular school of Buddhism. I discuss this important aspect of Wonhyo's career in Muller and Nguyen (2012a): 24–42.

forming the final definitions for the hindrances in the Weishi system – appear in the *IJU* unidentified.[6]

For his articulation of the *AMF*'s system of the hindrances, Wonhyo relies on Tathatāgarbha-oriented works such as the *ŚDS*, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and works central to the Dilun school, such as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra* (菩薩地持經 T1581, hereafter *BBh*), along with the *AMF*. Those familiar with the course of translation history in East Asian Buddhism will recognize that there is also a difference of almost a century in the texts being relied on to establish these two systems, with the texts for the Yogâcāra system being almost exclusively the translations of Xuanzang, and the texts for the Tathāgatagarbha system being works that were for the most part available a century or more earlier.

In terms of relative degree of systematicity between the two systems, it is fairly easy to map out an orderly structure for the Yogâcāra system once one has access to the detailed articulation of the hindrances that appeared in the *FDJL* and *CWSL*, as one can then work from this material to locate textual support and to flesh out the development in prior Yogâcāra texts such as the *Ybh*; hence Wonhyo's label of "explicit". Doing the same for the Tathāgatagarbha system is not as easy, since where Weishi Yogâcāra is eminently systematic, the Tathāgatagarbha texts do not in themselves readily form such a tight doctrinal system when it comes to describing the causes, factors, paths, and antidotes that are related to nescience and affliction. Despite this difficulty, Wonhyo, engaging in "further explanation" creates a reasonably systematic map for the Tathāgatagarbha hindrances. But he had some help.

The earliest effort in East Asia to thoroughly define and systematize the hindrances was made by Jingying Huiyuan (淨影慧遠; 523–592) in the form of a chapter in his *Dasheng yi zhang* (大乘義章, T1851, hereafter *DSYZ*) entitled *Erzhang yi* (二障義) – the same title chosen by Wonhyo for his *IJU* (Huiyuan's text is translated in full below, p. 236 ff.). The essay in the *DSYZ* is copied as-is (aside from the unfortunate new insertion of a few dozen scribal errors) into Huiyuan's commentary on the *AMF,* the *Da-*

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[6] While Wonhyo (like most of his scholarly colleagues of the period) did not consider it especially important to cite fellow exegetes, he was especially meticulous – and unusually accurate – in his citation of scriptural sources.

sheng qixin lun yishu (大乘起信論義疏 T1843, hereafter *DQLY*).[7] This discussion, occupying three full pages in the Taishō canon, appears as a long digression within the commentary. In the *AMF* itself, the hindrances are invoked in a terse and cryptic manner, with almost no explanation. It is obviously the cryptic aspect of this presentation, along with its dissonance with the clearly articulated Yogâcāra framework, that motivated Wonhyo to conduct his own inquiry. In the case of Huiyuan's commentary, it would appear that when he (or his ghost writer) arrived at the cryptic section on the hindrances in the process of the commentary on the *AMF*, he copied in the essay that had been previously written in the *DSYZ*, adding a few sentences before and after for contextualization.

Around the same time (and probably a little after), Zhiyi (智顗, 538–597) composed a much shorter, but nonetheless valuable analysis of the hindrances in his *Mohe zhi guan* (摩訶止觀, T1911).[8]

1.2   Discrepancies

In a general sense, the systems of the two hindrances are quite similar in their structure and function in Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha. In both cases they serve to distinguish between afflictive and cognitive problems. Both systems also generally agree that the afflictive hindrances can be remedied by the practices of Hīnayāna adherents, whereas cognitive hindrances can only be removed by the compassion and insight into empti-

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[7] In 1972 Yoshihide Yoshizu questioned the accuracy of the attribution of Huiyuan's authorship of the commentary to the *AMF* (Yoshizu, 1972) and was later supported by Akira Hirakawa in his *Daijō kishin ron* (Hirakawa, 1973: 399). The argument presented there is sufficient to concede that this commentary was probably composed after Huiyuan's time. Nonetheless, no one disputes the probability that it was written by a person or persons intimate with Huiyuan's thought, quite possibly one or more of his students, and thus represents his essential teachings. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to this text as "Huiyuan's Commentary".

[8] See T46:1911.85b22–c22. This piece was the object of a study by Paul Swanson (1983). Huiyuan and Zhiyi are roughly contemporaneous, and it is not possible to know with precision who wrote first, but since Zhiyi's piece seems to be at least in part a distillation of the far more thorough work by Huiyuan, I am working under the assumption that Zhiyi read Huiyuan, and not *vice versa*.

ness possessed by bodhisattvas. They are also subjected to and inter-
twined with the whole range of other concepts that these two systems
hold in common, such as the role and extent of perfuming (*xunxi* 薰習);
distinctions between manifest activity and latency; embeddedness at
various depths of consciousness; their removal at certain stages of the
path; and their treatment by the primary antidotes *of śamatha* and *vipaś-
yanā.*

There are also a few telling *problematic* areas in defining the hin-
drances that the two traditions have in common, and their respective
approaches to the resolution of these can tell us much about their dis-
tinctive interpretations of the function of consciousness and the applica-
tions of practice. One of the most prominent of these problems is the
very basic matter (in Yogâcāra) of identifying any given negative mental
factor as being specifically afflictive or cognitive. In many cases the cate-
gorization of an affliction is obvious (such as lying, jealousy, etc.); but
there are mental factors, such as views (*jian* 見),[9] doubt (*yi* 疑), and
pride (*man* 慢), which in Yogâcāra are usually labeled as afflictions, but
which also have obvious cognitive dimensions.

Another question that arises is that regarding the limitations in po-
tential attainment assumed regarding the practitioners of the two vehi-
cles, who (as virtually every single reference work tells us) are only capa-
ble of removing the afflictions, and not the cognitive hindrances. Does
this mean that *śrāvaka*s and *pratyekabuddha*s are utterly incapable of
dealing with cognitive issues, and that the cognitive problems dealt with
by bodhisattvas are entirely bereft of afflictive implications? Finally,
how firm is the line between these two broad categories of hindrances?
Do they not in some way influence each other, or function like each
other? If so, to what extent?

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[9] I have discussed the special case of views (*dṛṣṭi*) in considerable detail in Muller (2011).

2   The *Tathāgatagarbha* system of the hindrances as explained by Huiyuan

These were precisely the sorts of questions that seem to have impelled Huiyuan to conduct his investigation of the hindrances – an investigation the likes of which was unprecedented at his time. Mainly, he wanted to understand how the Mahāyāna viewed and defined the relationship between the afflictive and the cognitive. What he found out was that there was not a single set position or framework. The understanding of this relationship depended on a variety of factors, including: to what system the practitioner was an adherent (Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna); how far he or she was along the path; what kinds of antidotes were being applied, and even the context of any given discussion.

   Huiyuan establishes the precedent (later followed by Wonhyo and scholars of Tiantai 天臺 and Huayan 華嚴) of explaining the basic framework of the hindrances relying primarily on the doctrine of the four afflictive entrenchments (*si zhudi* 四住地) and the nescience entrenchment (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地) as first articulated in the *ŚDS*, and later invoked in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (*Bao xing lun* 寶性論), *Foxing lun* (佛性論), and so forth. The four entrenchments[10] as taught in these Tathāgatagarbha texts can be understood as four underlying bases from which manifestly active afflictions are generated – and which retain the afflictions when they are in a dormant state. In other words, they are the latent aspects of the hindrances – comparable in connotation to the concept of *bīja* (seeds) in Yogâcāra.[11] In the *ŚDS* they are contrasted with active, or "arisen" afflictions (*qifannao* 起煩惱 – analogous to the Yogâcā-

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[10] My translation of *zhudi* (住地) as "entrenchment" follows that established by Alex Wayman in his translation of the *ŚDS* (Wayman, 1974). However, Wayman only used the term *entrenchment* in conjunction with nescience, referring to the four afflictive types as "static defilements". It seems to me that the meaning of *entrenchment* can be usefully applied in both cases, thus my present rendering. See Wayman, 1974: 84, n. 56. Diana Paul's rendering as "stages" does not seem to reflect a useful understanding of the meaning of this concept; Paul, 2004: 32.

[11] This matching of the entrenchments with the notion of seeds is done in the *CWSL*, in a passage that will be cited below.

ra active afflictions, *chan* 纏 or *xianxing fannao* 現行煩惱). The four entrenchments are:

1. *jian yichu zhudi* (見一處住地) entrenchment of identity-view (lit. "seeing a single basis").[12]

2. *yuai zhudi* (欲愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to objects in the desire realm.

3. *seai zhudi* (色愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to things in the form realm.

4. *youai zhudi* (有愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to objects in the formless realm.

The fifth entrenchment is entrenched nescience (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地; *avidyâvāsa-bhūmi*), referring to nescience in its latent aspect as something innate and deeply embedded in the mind, which is extremely difficult to remove. It serves as the basis for the other four entrenchments, and thus forms the basis for the production of afflictions. When entrenched nescience is added to the previous four, they are spoken of as the five entrenchments (*wu zhudi* 五住地).[13]

Taking these five entrenchments as his basic framework, Huiyuan perceives in the source texts a sliding scale of three levels of interpretation, wherein the border between afflictive and cognitive steadily advances toward the cognitive end. These are:

1. The first level, which is the most straightforward and readily apprehensible, is the one that takes the four afflictive entrenchments (*si zhu fannao* 四住煩惱) to be directly equivalent to the afflictive hin-

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[12] Based on various commentarial characterizations of this entrenchment, I take it as equivalent to the Yogâcāra notion of *satkāya-dṛṣṭi* – or at least, self-view. For example: "How does one at the mundane level eliminate the afflictive hindrances? As the *DBh* explains: 'At the first ground one eliminates the self-hindrance of worldlings. The self of worldlings is equivalent to the entrenchment of identity-view;'" 云何世間斷除煩惱障。如地論説。初地斷除凡夫我障。凡夫我是見一處住地 (*DSYZ* T44:1851.563c28–29; see Translation §3.3.2.1.1 below).

[13] The locus classicus for this structure is the *ŚDS* T12:353.220a1–8.

drances, and the nescience entrenchments to be directly equivalent to the cognitive hindrances.

2. In the second approach, the intrinsic natures of all five entrenchments are collectively understood to constitute the afflictive hindrances, while the inability to properly cognize distinct phenomena (*shizhong wuzhi* 事中無知) constitutes the cognitive hindrances. In this approach, nescience is distinguished into two types: confusion in regard to principle, and confusion in regard to distinct phenomena. Huiyuan identifies this interpretation as equivalent to the presentation of the hindrances in the *AMF* (T44:1843.191a29).

3. In the third approach, the essences of the five entrenchments, as well as obscuration of cognition in regard to both principle and phenomena, are taken to be the afflictive hindrances, leaving only the function of object-discriminating cognition itself as the cognitive hindrances (T44:1843.188c3–9).

Rendered schematically:

afflictive hindrances (*fannaozhang* 煩惱障)	cognitive hindrances (*zhizhang* 智障)
four entrenchments of afflictions (*si zhufannao* 四住煩惱)	nescience entrenchments (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地)
natures of the five entrenchments, plus confusion in regard to principle (*wu zhuxingjie* 五住性結 + *mili wuming* 迷理無明)	nescience in regard to distinct phenomena (*shizong wuzhi* 事中無知)
natures of the five entrenchments, plus nescience in regard to principle and phenomena (*wu zhuxing* 五住性 + *shiwuzhi* 事無知 + *mili wuming* 迷理無明)	object-discriminating cognition (*fenbie yuanzhi* 分別緣智)

At the first level, cognitive problems are clearly distinguished from afflictive problems. But as we move to the second and third levels, the

cognitive hindrances tend to be constituted by a narrower and subtler slice of the cognitive, with relatively coarse cognitive functions tending toward relegation in the afflictive category. At the second level, cognitive error is defined as *delusive* object-discriminating cognition, and at the third level, as object-discriminating cognition itself.

The straightforward afflictive/cognitive distinction provided at the first level, which separates the nescience entrenchments from the four entrenchments of desire and aversion toward the world, can be readily mapped in a general way to the basic Weishi-Yogâcāra explanation – which Wonhyo will later label as the "explicit" (*nītârtha*) approach.[14] The second level is the one that Huiyuan maps to the description of the hindrances in the *AMF* (T44:1843.191a29). This is in general the category that Wonhyo will later label as the approach "requiring further explanation" (*yinmi men* 隱密門).

Interesting here is the third level, which is not directly discussed by Wonhyo. This is the definition where all five of the entrenchments, plus obscuration of both principle and phenomena, comprise the afflictive hindrances, with the cognitive hindrances consisting only of object-discriminating cognition. The bar is again raised, such that the cognitive hindrances are identified in their impedimentary effect to an even narrower range of mental function, one that in itself usually carries no inherent negative connotations at all. One could argue, however, that it is not incommensurate with the basic view in the Tathāgatagarbha texts that any movement of the mind whatsoever is impedimentary to the enlightenment of the Buddha. In terms of textual sources for these three types of interpretation, it is not the case that one interpretation refers to a reading given in any particular text, or family of texts. It is a matter of Huiyuan perceiving a certain way of explaining the relationship between various forms of defilement and cognitive distortion from different sections in what is sometimes even the same text. Nonetheless, it does indicate that although Wonhyo seems to have developed the core part of his

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[14] The explanation given to this category, found both in the *ŚDS* and in Huiyuan's commentary on the *AMF*, locates the practitioners of the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas in positions analogous to that found in the Yogâcāra explanation, in terms of their ability to deal with the hindrances. See T12:353.220a13–15.

"*neyârtha*" explanation following Huiyuan's previous work, there are dif-
ferences between the two in terms of their schemas of the hindrances,
since, although the first level can be fairly easily mapped to that of the
standard Yogâcāra model, and the second to the *AMF*, the third is proble-
matic.[15]

   Huiyuan's analysis constitutes, until the time of Wonhyo's *IJU* and
Xuanzang's translation of the *FDJL*, the most highly developed articula-
tion of the two hindrances of any kind in East Asia, since, as noted, none
of the sutras or *śāstra*s available at that time, in Tathāgatagarbha or Yo-
gâcāra, contain any systematic discussion comparable to this. From the
East Asian perspective, the fully developed Yogâcāra/Weishi definition
of the hindrances (in the *FDJL*, *CWSL*, etc.) actually appears *after* that of
the crystallization of the Tathāgatagarbha version in the form of Hui-
yuan's above-introduced work. In fact, we even have cause to wonder if
Huiyuan's work may have spurred some Yogâcāra scholars into action on
this matter. As I discuss fully in Muller (2013), there is a radical leap in
precision and detail in the systematic articulation of the hindrances in
the texts of the Weishi-Yogâcāra tradition. That tradition starts with the
vague and sketchy passages found in the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, *YBh*, and *Ma-
hāyānasaṃgraha*, and then makes a sudden leap to the comprehensive
systematic exposition seen in the *FDJL* and *CWSL*. There is no pure Yogâ-
cāra text at our disposal containing an intermediate level of develop-
ment of a hindrances system that would readily serve as a bridge be-
tween these two stages. Yet during this interim period, the model of the

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[15] This difference between the two systems has been again pointed out by Seok, 2010.
Seok shows the distinctive aspects of Huiyuan's interpretation *vis-à-vis* that of the *AMF*
and that of the Dilun school, of which he was considered a representative. Dr. Seok has
made a valuable contribution to this discussion, but I do think that his attempt to set
me up as a straw man, by insinuating that I have claimed that Wonhyo copied Hui-
yuan's theory as-is, is disingenuous, as I have repeatedly pointed out the differences
between Huiyuan's and Wonhyo's approaches on this matter (and did so again in
Muller [2006], which he cites). And while he asserts that the matter of Huiyuan's influ-
ence on Wonhyo should be "reconsidered", he conveniently chooses not to discuss the
portion of Huiyuan's work that I (and others) have identified as having the most obvi-
ous influence on Wonhyo: Wonhyo's usage of the structure of the four entrenchments
(*si zhudi* 四住地) and the nescience entrenchment (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地) in defin-
ing the framework of the indirect interpretation.

hindrances in the Tathāgatagarbha texts undergoes significant development in such works as the *ŚDS*, *Ratnagotravibhāga*, *Benye jing* (本業經), *AMF*, and most importantly, in the analyses of Huiyuan and Zhiyi. Given this fact, it may be quite possible that even if the masters of the Yogâcāra/Weishi school did not really want to apply the Tathāgatagarbha structure to their own articulation of the hindrances, they may have felt pressure to flesh out their own argument to demonstrate their own level of sophistication on the matter. Argumentation attempting to support this will be given below.

3   The completed Yogâcāra system of the hindrances

Since I have already elaborated the history of the development of the Weishi-Yogâcāra system of the hindrances (Muller, 2012a, 2013), I will not repeat that information again here. The reader should mainly be aware that there is no fully developed systematic explanation of the hindrances in East Asia until the appearance of Xuanzang's translation of the *FDJL* (repeated in the *CWSL*), and that version has been handed down to the present, through Wonhyo and others in Korea, and in such works as the *Kanjin kakumushō* (觀心覺夢鈔, T2312) in Japan. As articulated in Yogâcāra works, the term *afflictive hindrances* refers primarily to all the mental factors (*xinsuo* 心所) that are of unwholesome (*bushan* 不善) quality – which bring suffering and anxiety to sentient beings. Included here are the factors enumerated in such categories as the six fundamental afflictions (*liu fannao* 六煩惱) and twenty secondary afflictions (*suifannao* 隨煩惱), along with their further derivatives. In the most standard Yogâcāra definition (as one will find in the *YBh*, *FDJL*, *CWSL*, etc.), the afflictive hindrances are said to originate in the view of the selfhood of persons (*wozhi* 我執, *wojian* 我見; *ātma-grāha*, *ātma-dṛṣṭi*, etc.). They are said to be eliminated by the practices of the *śrāvaka*s and *pratyekabuddha*s. The cognitive hindrances are said to be derived from the fundamental error of understanding phenomena (*dharma*s) to have intrinsic reality (*fazhi* 法執, *fawozhi* 法我執; *dharma-grāha*). They are conceptual errors, the most subtle of which can only be permanently eliminated by bodhisattvas who have a thoroughgoing awakening to emptiness. The cognitive hindrances serve as the basis for the afflictive hin-

drances. The five levels of Weishi practice (*weishi xiudao wu wei* 唯識修
道五位) are distinguished in terms of the bodhisattva's ability to quell
and eliminate the active manifest forms, seed forms, and karmic impres-
sions of these two kinds of hindrances.

The *FDJL* has a couple of fairly long sections that treat the hindrances
in detail from the most important perspectives, including their content,
function, and removal. It is quite clear that the summary of the hin-
drances in the *CWSL* is derived directly from the *FDJL*, or from a common
source – one that was also apparently accessible to Wonhyo, as many of
the descriptions of the hindrances found in the *FDJL* also appear in simi-
lar, but unreferenced, form in the *IJU*.

However, the *CWSL* contains one vitally important line that shows us
that Huiyuan's work was read by Xuanzang and his circle, and was con-
sidered important enough for mention, even though they did not for-
mally consider it as part of their own tradition. The critical passage on
the hindrances in the *CWSL* starts as follows:

> 煩惱障者。謂執遍計所執實我薩迦耶見而爲上首、百二十八根本煩
> 惱、及彼等流諸隨煩惱。此皆擾惱有情身心能障涅槃名煩惱障。

> What are the afflictive hindrances? With the attachment to the per-
> vasive imputations of an identity-view attaching to a true self at their
> head, [they include] the 128 fundamental afflictions,[16] as well as all
> the derivative afflictions that flow out from them. Since they all bring
> discomfort to the bodies and minds of sentient beings, and are able to
> obstruct *nirvāṇa*, they are called the afflictive hindrances (T31:1585.48
> c6–9).

> 所知障者。謂執遍計所執實法薩迦耶見而爲上首。見、疑、無明、
> 愛、恚、慢、等覆所知境、無顛倒性、能障菩提、名所知障。

> What are the cognitive hindrances? With the attachment to the per-
> vasive imputations of an identity-view attaching to real *dharma*s at

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16 This labeling of the 128 afflictions as "fundamental", as seen in the *FDJL* and *CWSL,* is
unusual, as the term *genben fannao* (根本煩惱) in these and other Yogâcāra texts al-
most always refers to the six fundamental afflictions, which are followed by the
twenty-odd derivative afflictions (*ershi suifannao* 二十隨煩惱).

their head, *views, doubt, nescience, attachment, anger, pride* and so forth
obscure the undistorted nature of objects of cognition, and are able to
obstruct *bodhi*. Therefore they are called the cognitive hindrances
(T31:1585.48c10–12; emphasis mine).

It is of critical importance to note here that in listing "views, doubt, ne-
science, attachment, anger, pride, and so forth", a set of mental factors
from the same set of *fundamental afflictions* has been included in both the
afflictive and *cognitive* categories of mental disturbances, which means
that a careful reader who is intimate with the Yogâcāra system of the
hindrances should be aware of a considerable unexplained overlap be-
tween afflictive and cognitive here. This does not go unnoticed by Kuiji,
who explains this by saying that although these afflictions are listed in
both places, we should understand that there are differences in their
subtlety, intensity, and amount in each situation.[17] Interestingly, this
way of explaining away the ambiguity is not all that different from the
way that Huiyuan deals with the same problem. And in fact, the author
of this passage (Xuanzang?) is himself well aware of the ambiguity, and
feels compelled to address it below. This brings us to the next passage,
which constitutes the crux of the present paper.

> 若所知障有見、疑、等、如何此種契經說爲無明住地。無明增故總
> 名無明。非無見等。如煩惱種立見一處、欲、色、有愛、四住地名、
> 豈彼更無慢無明等。

If the cognitive hindrances include views, doubt, and so forth, how is
it that this type[18] [of mental factor] is explained in the scriptures as

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[17] See T43:1830.560c1–4.

[18] An anonymous reviewer strongly advocated the rendering of *ci zhong* (此種) here as
"these seeds", following la Vallée Poussin's rendering (Francis Cook also rendered it
this way). However, I do not think that these venerable scholars, nor my reader, had
the opportunity to be fully tuned into the two-hindrances issues that contribute to
this discussion, where the issue is the *categorization* of certain types of hindrances as
afflictive or cognitive; it is not an issue pertaining to their *latency*. Such a rendering al-
so reflects a lack of familiarity with Yogâcāra two hindrances discourse. Where the
hindrances are discussed as being in a latent state, the terminology usually employed
is that of *suimian* (隨眠; Skt. *anuśaya*). They are rarely discussed from the perspective
of seeds.

[being included in] the nescience entrenchments?[19] As the effects of nescience expand, [these too] are generally termed nescience. Views and so forth are not excluded. [On the other hand, in] the case of hindrances of the afflictive type constituting the four entrenchments of identity-view, and attachment to desire, form, and formlessness,[20] how could they lack pride or nescience [which are understood in the *CWSL* as cognitive hindrances]? (T31:1585.48c23–26; emphasis mine).

This is a very interesting passage – one somewhat rare in the *CWSL*. First, "the scriptures" (*qijing* 契經) being referred to are obviously the *ŚDS* (and perhaps the *Ratnagotravibhāga*). But in fact, those sutras, while introducing the entrenchments, do not actually go as far as mapping the entrenchments to either afflictive or cognitive hindrances. This is done by Huiyuan, which means that the editor of this section of the *CWSL* was well aware of Huiyuan's scheme – which has here apparently even achieved the status of scriptural authority! Since the corresponding passages in the *FDJL*, which seem to be the source of this material in the *CWSL,* contain everything else *except* this statement, this has to be an insertion made at the time of the composition of the *CWSL*, in response to this specific concern. And while we would not be especially surprised to see notes to this effect in later commentaries by Kuiji *et al.* (and there are), to see mention here of the Tathāgatagarbhic entrenchments, in this, the definitive text of East Asian Weishi-Yogâcāra Buddhism, is notable. This is just one of many examples of the difficulties that Xuanzang and his colleagues were having in dealing with the scriptural authority of Tathāgatagarbha-oriented texts.

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[19] However, the "scriptures" being invoked here are not the orthodox Yogâcāra works, such as the *Saṃdhinirmocana* – it would be a reference to the *ŚDS*, or the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. The main point is that these mental functions do not fit into that framework, since there they are seen as afflictions existing outside of the nescience entrenchments.

[20] *Youai zhudi* (有愛住地) refers to attachment to existence itself, regardless of form. In some texts this is rendered as *wuseai zhudi* (無色愛住地). See, for example, the *Huayan wujiaozhang zhishi* (華嚴五教章指事) at T72:2337.261c2 and the *Tiantai sijiao yi* (天台四教儀) at T46:1931.779c1.

Thus, between Huiyuan's analysis of the hindrances, based on Tathāgatagarbha texts, and the *CWSL*'s analysis, based on Yogâcāra texts, we have a basic disparity in understanding the meaning of, and relationship between, afflictive and cognitive obstructions.

As noted above, this point ends up, for obvious reasons, being intertwined with a couple of related issues, which are: (1) Is it true that the practitioners of the two vehicles do not remove the cognitive hindrances at all? And are the bodhisattvas handicapped when it comes to dealing with afflictions? (2) Are the hindrances really two strictly separate categories? Or do cognitive and afflictive problems influence each other? If so, to what extent?

The commentators of both traditions quite readily concede that they certainly do function in both ways, but they do not necessarily agree on the depth of the overlap. Regarding point #1, the *CWSL* says:

二乘但能斷煩惱障。菩薩俱斷。永斷二種唯聖道。

The practitioners of the two vehicles are only able to remove the afflictive hindrances. The bodhisattvas remove both. It is only the holy path that is able to permanently eliminate both kinds (T31:1585.48 c29).[21]

Huiyuan takes a more nuanced position, when he writes (cf. Translation below, §1.3.1.1):

The adherents of the two vehicles only remove the afflictive hindrances, and only bodhisattvas extinguish the cognitive hindrances. It is not the case that the adherents of the two vehicles do not partially remove the cognitive hindrances. But since the hindrances that are removed are negligible, the subtle is de-emphasized in favor of the coarse, and thus they are not discussed. It is not the case that the bodhisattvas do not remove afflictions. But since those that are removed

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[21] Note that this somewhat rigid categorization, which disallows any removal of cognitive hindrances by adherents of the two vehicles, does not hold true for all of Yogâcāra. As we will see below, Wonhyo cites passages from the *YBh* that acknowledge that the practitioners of the two vehicles eliminate some cognitive hindrances. Kuiji also takes a looser position in his comment on this passage, acknowledging that the line is not so hard and fast. See T43:1830.562c17–19.

are relatively insignificant, the coarse is de-emphasized in favor of the subtle, and therefore they are not mentioned. (T44:1843.188c29–a2).

On the other hand, regarding point #2, that of the mutual relationship between the hindrances, the *CWSL* allows for a virtual overlap in function between the two, saying:

所知障亦障涅槃。如何但說菩提障。說煩惱但障涅槃。豈彼不能障菩提。應知聖教依勝用說。理實俱能通障二果。

The cognitive hindrances also obstruct *nirvāṇa*. Why is it said that they only obstruct *bodhi*? And it is said that the afflictions only obstruct *nirvāṇa*. How could they not be capable of obstructing *bodhi*? You should know that the holy teaching relies on the most prominent function in explaining the matter. In principle, both are able to overlap in their obstruction of the two realizations (T31:1585.56a3–6).

This in itself would seem to problematize the rigid position taken above regarding the distinctions between adherents of the various vehicles. Nonetheless, on this present point, the *CWSL* has no disagreement with Huiyuan, who in fact explains it even more clearly, when he writes (cf. Translation below, §1.2):

Why is it that the four entrenchments are together labeled as the afflictive hindrances, and nescience alone is taken to constitute the cognitive hindrances?

Answer: In principle, they actually function to obstruct both. However, in this case, in order to distinguish between the two hindrances, certain aspects are emphasized or de-emphasized in their naming. In the proper application of emphasis and de-emphasis, each receives its own name according to its most prominent function. The binding of the four afflictive entrenchments in their active state instigates activity that gives rise to distress. Since this connotation is strong, the tendency is to call them afflictions. The mental disturbances in the minds of unenlightened beings are substantially different from liberation. But their distant obscuration of cognition is weak and hence they are not called cognitive hindrances. Nescient obscuration direct-

ly distorts clear understanding, and closely shrouds. Here the meaning of cognitive obstruction is strong, and hence they are called cognitive hindrances. Innate nescience is not active here, and is not able to instigate activity or invite painful retribution. The distress it brings about is slight, and thus it is not called afflictive hindrances (T44:1843. 188c18–25).

Thus, both Huiyuan and the *CWSL* readily acknowledge the fact that the naming of the hindrances refers to their more prominent tendencies, and that at a deeper level of analysis, it is obvious that they cannot be separated out from each other.

4   Observations

We have focused here on a very narrow set of categories, through which we attempted to shed some light on the interactive character of the development of the two hindrances in Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought. Evidence of mutual influence and cross-fertilization is somewhat obvious, in the sense that the vast majority of what each of the two traditions have to say about the hindrances is not at odds with the other. Most telling in this regard is the shared understanding that both descriptions of the hindrances are a kind of *prajñapti* – a designatory label used to indicate distinctions among things that in reality cannot be clearly discriminated. The human mind, after all, cannot be cut into pieces, any more than reality can be cut into pieces with distinctions between the two truths, essence and function (*tiyong* 體用), or emptiness and existence, all of which just refer to distinctive aspects within a larger whole.

Appendix: Translation[22] of *The Two Hindrances*

Preface

惑體有四。一、無明地。二、無明起。三、四位[23]地。四、四住地
起。四種中無明住地、定不相應。故勝鬘云。心不相應無始無明住
地也、妄識之心體是無明故不相應。無明前起經說相應。故勝鬘云。
於此起煩惱刹那相應。而隨義細論於中亦有不相應義。是云何知。
如此論中業轉現識是不相應染。智識、相續識是相應染。然而此五、
皆此無明所起故、有無相應義。

Mental disturbances have four kinds of substance: (1) entrenched nesci-
ence; (2) active nescience;[24] (3) the four entrenchments [of affliction]; (4)
the four states of activity [of affliction]. Among the four, entrenched ne-
science is definitely not concomitant [with mind]. As is explained in the
ŚDS: As for beginningless entrenched nescience not being concomitant

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[22] Note on the translation: The source for this translation is *DQLY* (*Dasheng qixin lun yishu*
大乘起信論義疏, T1843), the commentary on the *AMF* attributed to Huiyuan (T44:
1843.188b11–191a28). Ideally, it would have been more efficient to use the version of
the text contained in *DSYZ* (T44:1851.568b18–564b28). Not only is *DSYZ* the probable
origin of the analogous section in *DQLY*, but *DSYZ* is also free from most of the scribal
errors contained in *DQLY*. It just happened that I became aware of the secondary ver-
sion in *DQLY* first, and had edited it extensively before finding out about the version in
DSYZ. Nonetheless, the version in *DQLY* has some important supplementary material
attached (see §4 of the translation below), so working from it is not without its uses. In
the process of the translation, I compared the text of *DQLY* to *DSYZ*, correcting and
annotating the scribal errors.

[23] Obviously *wei* (位) here is used for *zhu* (住).

[24] Fully written as *wuming zhudi* (無明住地). This is nescience in its latent aspect as
something innate and deeply embedded in consciousness, which is difficult to remove,
and which serves as the basis for the production of afflictions (Skt. *avidyâvāsa-bhūmi*).
This category iscussed at length in the *ŚDS*, the *Benye jing*, and this text. It is explained
as being a broad category under which the four distinct entrenchments (*si zhudi* 四住
地) are subsumed. When the nescience entrenchment is added as a separate item to
the previous four, they are spoken of as the five entrenchments (*wu zhudi huo* 五住地
惑). Sanskrit is known from citation of the *ŚDS* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*; Johnston
(1950): 33–34, Takasaki (1966): 217.

with mind: since the mental substance of the deluded consciousness is nescience, it is not concomitant. The sutra explains that which is arisen prior to nescience as being concomitant.[25] Therefore the *ŚDS* says that when it is active, affliction is momentarily concomitant. Yet if we investigate the meaning carefully, we can also discern an interpretation that allows for concomitance. How do we know this? In this treatise [the *AMF*], the activity consciousness,[26] transforming consciousness,[27] and manifest consciousness[28] are defiled without being concomitant with the mind. The discriminating consciousness[29] and the continuing consciousness[30] are defiled and concomitant. Yet since all five of these are produced by nescience, they are also interpreted as being non-concomitant.

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[25] The discussion of the nescience entrenchment (*wuming zhudi* 無明住地) in the *ŚDS* is at T12:353.220a2–b28.

[26] The "activity consciousness" (*yeshi* 業識) in the *AMF* is the mental state where, through the agency of nescience, an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed. Because of the nescience that does not perceive that the suchness of all *dharma*s is originally equal and of a single taste, there is the rising of this unenlightened, mistakenly conceptualizing consciousness. It is the first of the five kinds of consciousness explained in the *AMF*. The following four are also mentioned here in sequence. See T32:1666.577b7.

[27] In the *AMF*, the "transforming consciousness" (*zhuanshi* 轉識) is a mental state where with awareness having been stirred, the external world enters into consciousness. This is the second of the three subtle marks (*san xi* 三細) of mental evolution. See T32: 1666.577b8.

[28] The manifesting consciousness (*xianshi* 現識) or "representation-consciousness" in the *AMF* refers to the perception of an external world; the aspect of consciousness as reflecting the myriad forms in the objective realm, the way a clear mirror reflects all the objects that appear in front of it. This is the third of the three subtle marks (*san xi* 三細) taught in the *AMF*. T32:1666.577b10.

[29] The discriminating consciousness (*zhishi* 智識) is a subtle form of cognition that is capable of differentiating pure and impure *dharma*s in the objective realm. It is the fourth of the five kinds of consciousness taught in the *AMF*. Wonhyo correlates it with the *manas* (seventh) consciousness taught in Yogâcāra. T32:1666.32.577b12; HBJ 1.763 c8.

[30] In the system of the *AMF*, the continuing consciousness (*xiangxushi* 相續識 – which Wonhyo correlates to the Yogâcāra mental consciousness – *mano-vijñāna* 意識) is thinking that continues unbroken without cessation. For example, once a deluded thought arises, it continues without limit, thus carrying karma along with it. This is the fifth of the five kinds of consciousness taught in the *AMF*. T32:1666.577b13.

問曰。若爾、勝鬘何故一向說爲相應。

Question: If this is the case, then why does the *ŚDS* consistently maintain that they are concomitant?

答曰。爲別無明故偏言耳。四住地者總相麤論唯心相應。隨義細分俱有二義。現起之惑共心相應。性成之惑與心同體、名不相應。以有此義故、雜心中 一家使定心相應、一家說使定不相應。義既兩偏、不可偏執。四住所起一向相應。以彼麤起與心別故。故勝鬘云。四住起者剎那相應也。此論中就妄識明相應不相應義。

Answer: In order to specifically distinguish nescience, [the *ŚDS*] just focuses on one aspect. When one explains roughly the general aspects of the four entrenchments, they are said to be concomitant with the mind. If one investigates the meaning in detail, both interpretations are included. Active mental disturbances are all concomitant with the mind. Innate mental disturbances share the same essence with the mind, and are said to be non-concomitant. It is based on this interpretation that within the *Saṃyuktâbhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra,* one master says that [the mental disturbances] are definitely concomitant with the mind, and another says that [they] are not.[31] Since this doctrine has both aspects, we should not attach to one of them. The active afflictions produced from the four entrenchments are uniformly concomitant. This is because they arise in a coarse manner distinguished from the mind. Therefore the *ŚDS* says that the active afflictions produced from the four entrenchments are momentarily concomitant.[32] This treatise elucidates the interpretations of concomitance and non-concomitance from the perspective of the deluded consciousness.[33]

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[31] See T28:1552.907b20-22. My thanks to Michael Radich for locating this reference.

[32] See, for example, T12:353.220a5.

[33] "Deluded consciousness" (*wangshi* 妄識) is a general term commonly seen in discourse related to the *AMF*, referring to the mind that has moved from the original condition of thusness. This is correlated to the Yogâcāra notion of the mind as influenced by the belief in the inherent reality of objects (*dharma-grāha*), or in the belief in the reality of the self (*ātma-grāha*), and thus is usually a reference to the sixth (*mano*) consciousness, or the seventh (*manas*) – or both taken together.

自下第四就二障辨。前明六重攝爲二障。根本無明以爲智障。業識
以下爲煩惱障。然此二障且應廣論。夫、二障者、諸衆生等沒生死
中重網羅也。衆惑之根源、遮涅槃路之剛關也。能障聖道名之爲障。
障乃無量、取要言之凡有二。

There now follows the fourth section, where the two hindrances are explained. The previously-elucidated six levels include both hindrances.[34] [In the *AMF*] fundamental nescience is taken to be the cognitive hindrances, and everything after the activity consciousness is taken to be the afflictive hindrances. Yet these two hindrances merit a detailed elaboration. To wit, the two hindrances are the great net that keep sentient beings submerged in birth and death; they are the source of myriad mental disturbances, the hard barrier that blocks the road to *nirvāṇa*. Since they hinder the holy path, they are called "hindrances". While the hindrances are beyond counting, they generally can be summarized into two types.

一者煩惱障、二者智障。此二障義有三番釋。一者四住煩惱爲煩惱
障、無明住地以爲智障。二者五住性結[35]爲煩性障、事中無知以爲
智障。無明有二。一迷理無明、二事無知。迷理無明是性結也。三
者五住性結及事無知同爲煩惱障。分別緣智以爲智障。就初番中四
門分別。一、定障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、對障辨脫。

The first are the afflictive hindrances; the second are the cognitive hindrances. These two hindrances have three levels of interpretation. In the first, the afflictive entrenchments comprise the afflictive hindrances and the nescience entrenchments comprise the cognitive hindrances. In the second, the binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature constitutes the afflictive hindrances; ignorance[36] in regard to phenome-

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[34] It is not immediately clear here what "six levels" might refer to, since in the above section, five levels of consciousness were mentioned, and five entrenchments. There is a possibility that Huiyuan could be referring to the six coarse aspects of mind (*liucu* 六麤) of the *AMF*.

[35] Following *DSYZ*, correcting *xu* (緒) to *jie* (結).

[36] Throughout this translation, for purposes of consistency, I have translated *wuming* (無明) as "nescience", and *wuzhi* (無知) as "ignorance". It is not clear from the text that any significant difference in connotation is expressed by the usage of these two terms, but it seems to be a good idea to separate them.

na constitutes the cognitive hindrances. There are two kinds of nescience: the first is the nescience of confusion in regard to principle; the second is ignorance regarding phenomena. At the third level, the binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature as well as ignorance in regard to phenomena comprises the afflictive hindrances; discriminating conditioned cognition constitutes the cognitive hindrances. Starting from the first level, I will analyze each in four ways: (1) determining the characteristics of the hindrances; (2) defining their terminology; (3) clarifying the levels of their removal; and (4) the application of their antidotes.

1 First level

1.1 *Defining the characteristics of the hindrances*

> 言定相者云何得知四住煩惱爲煩惱障、無明住地以爲智障。以勝鬘經對地持論驗之知矣。勝鬘經中就二乘人但斷四住、不斷無明住地。地持論中説、二乘人煩惱障淨非智障淨。煩惱淨者、猶勝鬘中所斷四住。非智障淨者、猶彼不斷無明住地。故知四住爲煩惱障、無明住地爲智障也。

In defining their characteristics, how do we know that the four entrenchments of affliction comprise the afflictive hindrances and the entrenchment of nescience comprises the cognitive hindrances? We can test this by juxtaposing the *ŚDS* with the *BBh*. The *ŚDS* teaches that the adherents of the two vehicles are only able to eliminate the four entrenchments, and are unable to eliminate the nescience entrenchment.[37] In the *BBh* it is explained that the adherents of the two vehicles cleanse themselves of the afflictive hindrances but not the cognitive hindrances.[38] This "cleansing of the afflictive hindrances" is equivalent to

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[37] 阿羅漢辟支佛智所不能斷。恆沙等數上煩惱依。亦令四種煩惱久住; "It is something that the cognitive acuity of the *arhat*s and *pratyekabuddha*s is unable to eliminate. It is the basis for virulent afflictions more numerous than the grains of sand in the Ganges. It also allows the four kinds of afflictions to abide permanently" (T12:353.220a13–14).

[38] 何以故。有二種淨。一者煩惱障淨、二者智障淨。二乘種性煩惱障淨、非智障淨。菩薩種性具足二淨; "How so? There are two kinds of cleansing. The first is the cleansing of the afflictive hindrances and the second is the cleansing of the cognitive hin-

the removal of the entrenchments of afflictions in the *ŚDS*. The "non-cleansing of the cognitive hindrances" is equivalent to the non-elimination of the entrenchment of nescience. Hence we know that the four entrenchments are equivalent to the afflictive hindrances and the nescience entrenchment is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances.

1.2   Explanation of terminology

次釋其名。五住之結通能勞亂、齊能障智。何故四住遍名煩惱障、無明獨爲智障。

Next is the explanation of terminology. The bindings of the five entrenchments are all able to bring about distress as well as hinder cognition. [Question:] Why is it that the four entrenchments are together labeled as the afflictive hindrances, and nescience alone is taken to constitute the cognitive hindrances?

答。理實齊通。但今爲分二障差別隱顯爲名。等就隱顯各隨功強以別兩名。四住煩惱現起之結、發業生勞亂。義強偏名煩惱。異心之惑與解別體。疏遠翳障智微劣、故不名智障。無明闇惑正遠³⁹明解、親近翳障智義強、故名智障。任性無知非是現起　不能發業招集苦報。勞亂微劣故、不名煩惱障也。

Answer: In principle, they actually function to obstruct both. However, in this case, in order to distinguish between the two hindrances, certain aspects are de-emphasized or emphasized in their naming. In the proper application of emphasis and de-emphasis, each receives its own name according to its most prominent function. The binding of the four afflictive entrenchments in their active state instigates activity that gives rise to distress. Since this connotation is strong, the tendency is to call them afflictions. The mental disturbances in the minds of unenlightened beings are substantially different from liberation. But their distant obscuration of cognition is weak and hence they are not called cognitive hin-

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drances. Those who have a nature inclined toward the practice of the two vehicles cleanse the afflictive hindrances. Those who have a nature inclined to the bodhisattva practices cleanse both kinds of hindrances" (T30:1581.888b9–11).

³⁹ Here *DSYZ* has *wei* (違, "differ") instead of *yuan* (遠, "distance"), which makes more sense.

drances. Nescient obscuration directly distorts clear understanding, and shrouds closely. Here the meaning of cognitive obstruction is strong, and hence they are called cognitive hindrances. Innate nescience is not active here, and is not able to instigate activity or invite painful retribution. The distress it brings about is slight, and thus it is not called afflictive hindrances.

1.3   Stages of their elimination

次明斷處。略有二階。第一大小相對分別。二者直就大乘世出世間
相對分別。

Next is the elucidation of the stages of elimination. There are two main levels. The first is that of the distinctions between the greater and lesser vehicles. The second is the direct access to the distinctions between the mundane and transmundane within the greater vehicle.

1.3.1   Distinction between Greater and Lesser Vehicles

大小對中義別三門。

The distinction according to greater and lesser [vehicle] is set out in three parts.

1.3.1.1   The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。二乘之人但除煩惱、菩薩之人唯滅智障。二乘非不
分除智障。所斷微劣隱細從麤、是故不論。菩薩非不除斷煩惱。所
斷相微隱麤從細、是故不說。

First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Adherents of the two vehicles only remove the afflictive hindrances, and only bodhisattvas extinguish the cognitive hindrances. It is not the case that the adherents of the two vehicles do not partially remove the cognitive hindrances. But since the hindrances that are removed are negligible, the subtle is de-emphasized in favor of the coarse, and thus they are not discussed. It is not the case that the bodhisattvas do not remove afflictions. But since those that are removed are relatively insignificant, the coarse is de-emphasized in favor of the subtle, and therefore they are not mentioned.

1.3.1.2   Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。二乘解劣但斷煩惱。菩薩治廣二障雙除。故地持云。
聲聞緣覺煩惱障淨非智障淨。菩薩種姓具足二淨。

Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Adherents of the two vehicles are inferior in their understanding, and only remove the afflictions. Bodhisattvas subdue [mental disturbances] broadly, removing both kinds of hindrances together. Therefore the *BBh* says: "*Śrāvaka*s and *pratyekabuddha*s cleanse afflictive hindrances; they do not cleanse cognitive hindrances. Bodhisattvas thoroughly cleanse both kinds of hindrances" (T30:1581.888b10–11).

1.3.1.3   Comprehensive view from the perspective of reality

三者據實通論。二乘菩薩二障雙除。

Third is the comprehensive view from the perspective of reality. In actuality, the adherents of the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas both remove both kinds of hindrances.

1.3.2   Distinctions between mundane and supramundane in the Greater Vehicle

言就大乘世間出世間相對辨者、解行已前名爲世間。初地以上名爲
出世。於中分別乃有四門。

As for the distinctions between the mundane and supramundane in the Greater Vehicle, all stages up to the stages of understanding and practice are called "mundane". The stages from the first ground and upward are called "supramundane". There are four further distinctions to be made here.

1.3.2.1   Ignoring the coarse and elaborating the subtle

一廢麤論細。地前菩薩於彼二障一向未斷。初地以上二障竝除。故
涅槃中宣說。地前具煩惱性。

First, ignoring the coarse and elaborating the subtle. Bodhisattvas who have not yet entered the grounds do not in any way eliminate the two kinds of hindrances. But from the time they enter into the first ground and above, they remove both kinds of hindrances together. Therefore

the *Nirvāṇa Sutra* says that bodhisattvas prior to their entry into the grounds are fully afflicted in their nature (see T12:374.396c25 ff.),

1.3.2.2   The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

二者隱顯互論。地前世間但斷煩惱。初地以上唯除智障。

Second is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Those who are in the mundane levels prior to the grounds only remove the afflictive hindrances. Those in the first ground and above only remove the cognitive hindrances.

1.3.2.3   Mutual defining of superior and inferior

三者優劣相形。地前解劣唯除煩惱。地上解勝二障雙斷。

Third is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Those who are in the stages prior to the grounds are weak in their understanding and only remove afflictive hindrances. Those who are in the first ground and above are of superior understanding and remove both kinds of hindrances together.

1.3.2.4   In actuality

四者據實。通世及出世二障雙除。相狀如何。

Fourth is the actuality of the situation. In fact, practitioners at both the mundane and supramundane levels remove both kinds of hindrances. How is this explained?

1.3.2.4.1 Afflictive hindrances

煩惱障中有其二種。一者子結。二者果結。子結煩惱地前所斷。果縛煩惱地上所除。

There are two kinds of afflictive hindrances: those that are bound at the level of seed, and those that are bound at the level of fruition. Seed-bound afflictions are removed prior to the grounds. Fruition-bound afflictions are removed from the first ground and above.

1.3.2.4.1.1 Seed-bound

子結之中復有二種。一者正使作意而生。二者餘習任性而起。正使
煩惱聲聞緣覺乃至性種斷之周盡。習起之結⁴⁰種性以上乃至初⁴¹地斷
之畢竟。故地持云。「初阿僧祇過解行住入歡喜地。」 斷增上中惡
趣煩惱。不善正使名爲增上、習名爲中。入歡喜時悉皆斷也。

Within the seed-bound afflictions there are two further types. The first
are afflictions proper that arise with intentional activity. The second are
habit energies that arise without effort. The afflictions proper are fully
eliminated by *śrāvaka*s, *pratyekabuddha*s, and those with the nature [for
bodhisattvahood]. The habitually-bound afflictions are finished from the
stage of seed-nature up to the first ground. Therefore the *Bodhisattva-
bhūmi-śāstra* says: "During the first *asaṃkhya kalpa* one passes through
the stages of understanding and practice⁴² and enters into the ground of
joy⁴³" (T30:1581.945a23). One eliminates the predominating tendencies
within the afflictions of negative rebirths. Unwholesome afflictions pro-
per are called "predominating"; habituation is called "within". These are
all eliminated upon entry into the ground of joy.

1.3.2.4.1.2 Fruition-bound

果縛之中亦有二種。一者正使作意而生。二者習氣任運而起正使煩
惱。所謂愛佛愛菩提等、始從初地次第斷除。至不動地斷之周盡。
故地持云。「第二阿僧祇過第七住入第八地。」微細煩惱皆悉斷滅。
八地以上除彼餘習。故地持云。「第三阿僧祇斷除習氣入最上住。」

Within the fruition-bound, there are also two types. The first are the af-
flictions proper that are produced consciously. The second are the afflic-
tions proper that arise naturally by habituation. Attachment to the Bud-
dha, attachment to *bodhi* and so forth are gradually removed starting

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⁴⁰ Following *DSYZ*, removing the extraneous *xi* (習) here.

⁴¹ Following *DSYZ*, replacing *xiang* (相) with *chu* (初).

⁴² A reference to the ten understandings (*shi jie* 十解) and ten practices (*shi xing* 十行)
in the 41-stage or 52-stage bodhisattva path. In Mahāyāna texts, these stages are usu-
ally characterized as being the final levels of mundane (*shijian* 世間) cognition and
practice.

⁴³ The first of the ten grounds (Skt. *pramuditā bhūmiḥ*).

from the level of the first ground, up to the level of the ground of im-movability (the eighth ground, *acalā-bhūmiḥ*), at which point they are completely extinguished. As the *BBh* says: "During the second *asaṃkhya kalpa* one passes from the seventh abode and enters into the eighth ground" (similar to T30:1581.952b25). With the extremely subtle afflictions all extinguished without remainder, at the eighth ground and a-bove one removes his habit energies. As the *BBh* says: "In the third *asaṃkhya kalpa*, one removes the remaining habit energies and enters into the highest abode" (T30:1581.952b27).

1.3.2.4.2 Cognitive hindrances

> 智障之中亦有二種。一者迷相、二者迷實。情所趣法名之爲相。不
> 能悟解、云其本無、說以爲迷。如來藏性說以爲實。不能窮達說以
> 爲迷。迷相無明地前所除。迷實無明地上所遣。

There are also two kinds of cognitive hindrances. The first is confusion in regard to appearances; the second is confusion in regard to reality. The *dharma*s pursued by unenlightened sentient beings are called appearances. Not able to understand these and asserting them to be originally nonexistent is called confusion. The nature of the *tathāgatagarbha* is said to be real; not being able to fully fathom this is called confusion. The nescience of confusion in regard to appearances is removed before the grounds; nescience of confusion in regard to reality is removed after entry into the grounds.

1.3.2.4.2.1 Nescience of confusion in regard to appearances

> 迷相無明復有二種。一者迷相立性、二者迷性立相。言迷相者妄法
> 虛集以之爲相。不知虛集建立定相名之迷也。言迷性者、情而起法
> 無性爲性。迷此性故、立因緣相也。迷相無明聲聞緣覺乃至性種斷
> 之窮盡。迷性無明習種性以上乃至初地皆悉斷除。

There are two kinds of nescience of confusion in regard to appearances. The first is when, in one's confusion in regard to appearances, one posits natures. The second is when, in one's confusion in regard to natures, one posits appearances. "Confusion in regard to appearances" means that one takes the vacuous conglomerations of delusive *dharma*s as appearances. Not knowing that these are vacuous conglomerations and constructing definite appearances is called confusion. "Confusion in regard

to natures" means that the *dharma*s that arise from unenlightened discrimination, while not having a nature, are understood to have a nature. Misconstruing these [natureless *dharma*s], one posits dependently-arisen appearances. The nescience of confusion in regard to appearances is fully extinguished by *śrāvaka*s, *pratyekabuddha*s, and bodhisattvas in the stage of seed-nature. The nescience of confusion in regard to natures is thoroughly and completely eradicated from the stages of cultivation of the seed-nature up to the first ground.

1.3.2.4.2.2 Confusion in regard to reality

> 迷實無明亦有二種。一者迷實相、二者迷實性。空寂無爲是其實相、不能知是寂泊無爲故、名迷相。如來藏中恆沙佛法眞實元有是其實性。不能窮證說爲迷性。此二無明說斷不定。若依地經、初地以上乃至六地除其迷相。是故得爲明別順忍。七地以上斷迷實性。是故證得無生忍體。若依涅槃、九地以還斷其迷相。是故說爲聞見佛性。十地以上斷迷實性。是故說爲眼見佛性。　以驗求二障皆是始終通斷。治斷龘爾。

There are also two kinds of nescience of confusion in regard to reality. The first is confusion in regard to the appearance of reality; the second is confusion in regard to the nature of reality. The quiescent unconditioned state is the appearance of reality. Since one is not able to know this still unconditioned state, it is called confusion in regard to appearances. Buddha *dharma*s as numerous as the grains of sand in the Ganges in truth originally have this reality. Not being able to thoroughly realize this is called delusion in regard to the nature [of reality].

Explanations of the removal of these two kinds of nescience are not firmly set. If we rely on the *DBh*, then the confusion in regard to appearances is removed from the first ground up to the sixth ground. Therefore, its attainment is understood to clarify the tolerance of accordance.[44] In the seventh ground and above one removes the confusion in regard to the nature of reality. Therefore one realizes the essence of the tolerance based on the realization of the nonarising of all *dharma*s. If we follow the

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[44] *Shunren* (順忍): *tolerance of accordance*. The third of the five tolerances (*wu ren* 五忍). Also one of three tolerances (*san ren* 三忍). These also represent the fourth, fifth and sixth of the ten *bhūmi*s; DDB.

Nirvāṇa Sutra, the confusion in regard to the appearances of reality is removed at the ninth ground and below. Therefore it is called "seeing the Buddha Nature with one's ears". From the tenth ground and above, one removes the confusion in regard to the nature of reality. Therefore it is called "seeing the Buddha Nature with one's eyes" (T12:374.528a6). In order to seek out the two hindrances and thoroughly remove them from beginning to end, we must indeed remove the coarse!

1.4   Antidotes to the hindrances

次辨第四對障辨脫。斷煩惱得心解脫。斷除智障得慧解脫。是義云
何分別有二。

Next is the fourth part, the explanation of the antidotes to the hindrances. When one removes the afflictive hindrances, one attains the mental liberation. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, one attains the wisdom liberation.[45] How is it that liberation comes to be bifurcated into two distinct types?

1.4.1   The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。斷煩惱障、諸佛菩薩世諦心脫。斷除智障、眞諦慧
解脫。何故如是。煩惱染事故、斷煩惱、世諦心脫斷煩惱。理實雖
隨有一切德脫就主爲名、偏[46]言心脫。無明障理故、斷無明、眞諦
慧脫斷無明。時卽理所成一切德脫就主作名、偏名慧脫。

[This is explained] first [from the perspective] of that which is de-emphasized and that which is emphasized. With the elimination of the afflictive hindrances one attains the mental liberation of the buddhas

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[45] *Hui jietuo* (慧解脫): *wisdom liberation* (Skt. *prajñā-vimukti*) and the prior *mental liberation* (*xin jietuo* 心解脫; Skt. *ceto-vimukti*) are early forms of the bifurcation of liberation into the two aspects of freedom from affliction and freedom from nescience found in the Abhidharma literature, which are developed into two-hindrance theory in Tathāgatagarbha and Yogâcāra texts. In the case of the wisdom liberation, one relies on undefiled wisdom to eliminate the two mental disturbances of views and mental disturbances of perceptions (*jianhuo* 見惑, *sihuo* 思惑); DDB; see also Translation §2.4 below.

[46] Here, and in the next line, replacing *bian* (遍) with *pian* (偏), following *DSYZ*.

and bodhisattvas at the level of the conventional truth. With the elimination of the cognitive hindrances one attains the wisdom liberation at the level of the ultimate truth. How so? Since the afflictions defile at the level of phenomena, the elimination of affliction is the mental liberation at the level of conventional truth, [which] eliminates affliction. Even though in principle one is liberated while pursuing all kinds of merit, it is named based on its primary focus, and therefore is one-sidedly called mental liberation. Since nescience obstructs the principle, the elimination of nescience is the wisdom liberation at the level of the ultimate truth, [which] eliminates nescience. At this time, in principle one is liberated in the consummation of all kinds of merit, but it is one-sidedly called wisdom liberation.

1.4.2   Distinguishing the broadly and narrowly applied antidotes

二者對障寬狹分別。斷煩惱障 唯除事中染愛心故、世諦心脫。斷智障時、除無明地、及斷事中麤無明。故二諦慧脫。此初番竟。

Second is the distinction of broadly and narrowly applied antidotes. Since the elimination of the afflictive hindrances only entails the removal of attached defiled mental states with respect to phenomenal activity, it is the mental liberation in the conventional truth. When one eliminates the cognitive hindrances, one removes the entrenchment of nescience, as well as the coarse nescience that functions with respect to phenomenal activity. Therefore the wisdom liberation occurs at the level of both truths. This ends the first level of interpretation.

2   Second level

第二番中亦有四門。一、定障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、對障辨脫。

In the second level of interpretation there are also four parts: (1) defining the hindrances; (2) explanation of terminology; (3) stages of elimination; and (4) antidotes to the hindrances.

2.1   *Defining the hindrances*

> 言定相者、云何得知 五住性結爲煩惱障、事中無知以爲智障。如
> 涅槃說。斷除一切貪瞋癡等得心解脫。一切所知無障礙故 得慧解
> 脫。貪瞋癡者、卽是五住性結煩惱。一切所知得無礙者、當知卽是
> 除事無知。又、如地經以佛無礙爲慧解脫。當知卽是除事無知。遠
> 離癡染爲心解脫。當知卽是五住性結爲煩惱障。又雜心云。「如來
> 除二種無知。一者斷染污、二者斷不染污。」 染污無知卽是五住
> 性結煩惱。不染污無知卽是事中無明之心。准驗斯等當知。以彼五
> 住性結爲煩惱障、事中無知以爲智障。

As for determining their characteristics, how do we know that the binding at the level of nature of the five entrenchments constitutes the afflictive hindrances and nescience in regard to phenomena constitutes the cognitive hindrances? As the *Nirvāṇa Sutra* says: "When one eliminates all craving, ill-will, and delusion, etc., one attains the mental liberation. When there is no obstruction to be found in all knowables, one attains the wisdom liberation" (T12:374.515b14–17). Craving, ill-will, and delusion are none other than the afflictions of the five entrenchments binding at the level of nature. When one attains nonobstruction of all knowables, you should know that it constitutes the removal of ignorance in regard to phenomena. Furthermore, the *DBh* takes the nonobstruction of the Buddha's [wisdom] as the liberation wisdom. You should know that this is none other than the removal of nescience in regard to phenomena. Extricating oneself from delusional defilement is the mental liberation. You should know that this [delusional defilement] is none other than the binding of the five entrenchments at the level of nature, which is, in turn, the afflictive hindrances. As the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra* says: "The Tathāgata removes two kinds of nescience: the first is defiled; the second is undefiled" (T28:1552.921b26-27). Defiled nescience is equivalent to the afflictions bound to the natures of the five entrenchments. Undefiled nescience is equivalent to the mental state of nescience in regard to phenomena. If you see it in this way, it will be clear that the binding at the level of nature in the five entrenchments constitutes the afflictive hindrances, and the nescience that occurs in regard to phenomena constitutes the cognitive hindrances.

2.2   Explanation of terminology

次釋其名。五住性結能起分段變易生死。勞亂人故、名煩惱障。事
中闇惑能障如來種知明解、是故說此爲智障也。

Next is the explanation of terminology. The binding at the level of the
natures of the five entrenchments serves to bring about both delimited
saṃsāra and the *saṃsāra* of subtle transformation.[47] Because they bring
distress to people, they are called the afflictive hindrances. Obscuration
with regard to phenomena serves to obstruct the clear understanding of
the Tathāgata's lineage. Therefore they are called the cognitive hindran-
ces.

2.3   Stages of elimination

次辨斷處。處別有三。一者、世出世間相對分別、二者、功用無功
用相對分別、三者、因果相對分別。

Next is the articulation of the stages of elimination. There are three
kinds of distinctions in these stages. The first is the distinction between
mundane and transmundane. The second is the distinction between ap-
plication of effort and effortlessness. The third is the distinction between
causes and effects.

2.3.1   Distinction between mundane and transmundane

就初對中義別有二。

Within the first there are two further connotations.

2.3.1.1   Contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is
emphasized

一者、隱顯互論。地前斷除五住性結。以彼捨相趣順如故。初地以
上斷除智障。以彼地上契合法界了達諸法無障礙故。故地經云。「於
初地中一切世間文誦[48]咒術不可窮盡。」

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[47] See *ŚDS*, T12:353.219c20-24.

[48] Based on *DSYZ*, replacing *song* (訟) with *song* (誦). The source text says: 在其中。一切
世間書論技藝文誦咒術不可窮盡。佛子。譬如香山王。一切諸香集在其中。一切諸
香取不可盡 (T26:1522.201a16–17). Also see *DSYZ* at T44:1851.563a10.

The first is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Prior to the grounds one removes the binding to the five entrenchments at the level of nature. This is because the practitioner abandons appearances and orients himself to thusness. From the first ground and above he removes the cognitive hindrances. This is because once one is in the grounds, he aligns himself with the *dharma* realm of cognitive experience, thoroughly penetrating all *dharma*s without impediment. Therefore the *DBh* says: "At the level of the first ground one cannot fully extinguish all kinds of worldly [essays, technology,] verses, and magical arts" (T26:1522.201a16–17).

2.3.1.2   Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。地前菩薩唯除煩惱。初地以上智行寬廣、二障雙除。
Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Bodhisattvas at the level prior to the grounds only remove afflictive hindrances. From the first ground and above wisdom functions broadly, and they remove both hindrances.

2.3.2   Distinction between application of effort and effortlessness

第二對中義別有二。
Within the second, there are also two further distinctions in connotation.

2.3.2.1   The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。七地以前唯除煩惱。八地以上滅除智障。如八地中淨佛國土、斷除一切色中無知。九地之中了初心行、滅除一切心行無知。第十地中於諸法中得勝自在、斷一切法中無知。此等皆是除事無知。
First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. At the level of the seventh ground and below, one only removes the afflictive hindrances. From the eighth ground and above, one extirpates the cognitive hindrances. It is like the purification of Buddha lands that takes place within the eighth ground, where one removes nescience with respect to all kinds of physical existence. In the ninth ground one

gets through the initial mental functions, extirpating all nescience associated with the mental functions. In the tenth ground one attains mastery in regard to all *dharmas*, eliminating all nescience associated with all *dharmas*. These are all part of the removal of nescience in regard to phenomena.

2.3.2.2   Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。七地以還唯除煩惱。八地以上二障雙除。

Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. In the seventh ground and below one only removes the afflictive hindrances. In the eighth ground and above one removes both hindrances.

2.3.3   Distinction between causes and effects

第三對中義別有二。

Third is the distinction between causes and effects, which has two connotations.

2.3.3.1   The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一者隱顯互論。金剛以還斷煩惱障。如來地中種智現起。了達一切差別諸法、斷除智障。以事無知難除斷故、至佛乃盡。

The first is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. Up to the adamantine stage[49] one eliminates the afflictive hindrances. While within the ground of the Tathāgata, omniscience becomes active, and one thoroughly understands the distinctions among all phenomena, eliminating the cognitive hindrances. Since nescience in regard to phenomena is difficult to remove, it is not completely removed until one achieves Buddhahood.

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[49] The adamantine or diamond stage (*jin'gangwei* 金剛位; **vajra-bhūmi*) is the final stage of the bodhisattva path, where bodhisattvas enter into the adamantine absorption (*jin'gangyuding* 金剛喻定). In Yogâcāra, this stage is equivalent to virtual enlightenment (*dengjue* 等覺).

2.3.3.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。金剛以還、唯斷煩惱。如來果德二障雙斷。

Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. From the adamantine ground and below, one removes only the afflictive hindrances. From the point of the fruition of the merit of the Tathāgata, one removes both hindrances.

2.4 Antidotes to the hindrances

次辨對障明脫。除煩惱障、得心解脫。滅除智障、得慧解脫。言心脫者其有二種。一佛菩薩世間心。二佛菩薩第一義心。斷四住故、世諦心脫。除無明故、眞諦心脫。言慧脫者、諸照世間一切種知得解脫也。

Next is the elucidation of the antidotes to the hindrances. When one removes the afflictive hindrances, he attains the mental liberation. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, he attains the wisdom liberation. There are two kinds of mental liberation. The first is the conventional mental state of buddhas and bodhisattvas; the second is the ultimate mental state of buddhas and bodhisattvas. Because one eliminates the four entrenchments, he attains liberation from the perspective of the conventional truth. Because one eliminates nescience, he attains the mental liberation from the perspective of the ultimate truth. As for the wisdom liberation, one attains liberation by the illumination of the all-inclusive understanding of mundane phenomena.

3 Third level

第三番中亦有四門。一、定其障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、對障辨脫。

The third level again has four parts: (1) defining the characteristics of the hindrances; (2) explanation of terminology; (3) stages of their elimination; and (4) antidotes applied to specific hindrances.

3.1 Defining the characteristics of the hindrances

言定相者云何得知。五住性結及事無知爲煩惱障。分別之智以爲智障。如勝鬘云。「五住及起同名煩惱。」 明知五住及事無智是煩惱

障。言分別智爲智障者、如寶性論説。「有四種障不得如來淨我樂
常。一者緣相謂無明地。以是障故不得如來究竟眞淨。二者因相謂
無漏業。以是障故不得眞我。三者生相謂意生身。以是障故不得眞
樂。四者壞相謂變易生死。以是障故不得眞常。」

How are the characteristics defined [in this level of interpretation]? The
binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature as well as
nescience in regard to phenomena comprise the afflictive hindrances,
while discriminating cognition is regarded as the cognitive hindrances.
As the *ŚDS* says: "The five entrenchments along with their arisen states
are collectively called affliction."[50] From this we know that the five
entrenchments and nescience in regard to phenomena constitute the
afflictive hindrances. As for the association of discriminating cognition
with the afflictive hindrances, this is like the passage in the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*, which says:

> There are four kinds of hindrances that impede the attain-
> ment of the Tathāgata's purity, self, bliss, and perma-
> nence.[51] The first is the appearance of dependent origina-
> tion, which is called the ground of nescience. It is due to
> this hindrance that one does not experience the authentic
> bliss of the Tathāgata. The second is the appearance of cau-
> sation, which is called uncontaminated activity. It is due to
> this hindrance that one does not experience the authentic
> self. The third is the appearance of arising, which is called
> the mind-made body.[52] It is due to this hindrance that one

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[50] I have not found in the *ŚDS* any place where it explicitly mentions the five entrench-
ments as a unit as cited here. In the passage most similar to this in that text, it men-
tions only the four entrenchments (*si zhudi* 四住地); see T12:353.220a2.

[51] Known as the "four attributes" (*si de* 四德). Purity, self, bliss, and permanence are
four positive attributes of Buddhist religious experience that are taught as an antidote
to the negativity of teachings such as that of emptiness (Skt. *catvāraḥ guṇa*). One of the
best known sources for this notion is the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. These four notions are denied
by early Buddhism, Abhidharma, and Yogâcāra, but affirmed by Tathāgatagarbha/
Buddha Nature-based traditions.

[52] The mind-made body (*yisheng shen* 意生身, also written *yicheng shen* 意成身, Skt. *ma-
nomaya-kāya*) is a body as born out of a certain kind of intent or mindfulness: thus the
bodhisattva body, *śrāvaka* body, buddha-bodies, etc. The body of a buddha is not arisen

does not experience authentic bliss. The fourth is the appearance of disintegration, which is called *saṃsāra* of subtle transformation. It is due to this hindrance that one does not experience authentic permanence (T31:1611.830 b1–9).

彼既宣說無漏業障不得眞我。是故定知分別緣智是其智障。又如地
經六地中說智障淨因事謂不分別空三昧。以不分別爲智障淨。明知
卽用分別之智以爲智障。

Since it has been stated that the hindrance of uncontaminated activity obstructs the experience of the authentic self, we can know for certain that the object-discriminating cognition is the cognitive hindrance. This interpretation can also be seen in the teaching on the sixth ground in the *DBh*, where the causal condition for the purification of the cognitive hindrances is the nondiscriminating *samādhi* of emptiness. By not discriminating, the cognitive hindrances are purified (T26:1522.172b21–22). From this, we can clearly know that discriminating cognition constitutes the cognitive hindrances.

又楞伽經云。「妄想爾炎慧彼滅得我涅槃。」滅爾炎慧方名涅槃。 明
知所滅妄慧是障。又、龍樹說、「如彼覺觀、望下爲善、望第二禪
卽是罪過。乃至非想望下爲善。望出世道卽是罪過。」 緣智如是。
望世爲善。望其實性亦是罪過。既言罪過何爲非障。

Additionally, the *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra* says: "I attain my *nirvāṇa*/ In the cessation of the deluded intelligence that cognizes the knowable."[53] When one extirpates the intelligence that cognizes the knowable, then that is called *nirvāṇa* (T16:670.496b2). By this we clearly know that the deceptive intelligence that is extinguished is a hindrance. Furthermore, Nāgârjuna says: "This kind of initial mental application and subsequent discursive reasoning, when seen from below, is good, but when seen from the level of the second meditation, it is faulty. This is the case up to the nonconceptual state, which when seen from below is good, but when seen from the perspective of the supramundane path, is faulty" (source not loca-

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from the five *skandha*s – it is created out of consciousness. This body can also be so created by a bodhisattva in the *bhūmi* levels, in order to aid sentient beings.

[53] The line in the sutra is slightly different: 妄想爾炎識　此滅我涅槃.

ted). The discriminating cognition is like this. When seen from the conventional perspective it is good, but when seen from the perspective of reality it is also faulty. Since it has been identified as being faulty, how could it not be a hindrance?

3.2   Explanation of terminology

次釋其名。五住性結及事無知體 是闇惑勞亂之法故、名煩惱。緣智礙眞故名智障。

Next is the explanation of terminology. Since binding at the level of the natures of the five entrenchments as well as the essence of nescience in regard to phenomena are all *dharma*s of delusion and travail, they are called afflictions. Since discriminating cognition obstructs reality, it is called cognitive hindrance.

問曰。此智能顯眞、故經中說爲了因也。何故今說爲智障乎。多義如眞故復名障。如藥治病。若藥不去、藥復成患。此亦如是。云何妨眞。如維摩說。「寂滅是菩提、滅諸相故。」此智是相、所以是障。「不觀是菩提、離諸緣故。」此智是緣、所以爲障。「不行是菩提、無憶念故。」此智憶念、所以爲障。「斷是菩提。斷[54]諸見[55]故」、此智是見、所以是障。「離是菩提、離妄想故。」此知[56]妄想、所以是障。「障是菩提、障諸願故。」 此智是願、所以是障。菩提眞明。此智性闇、所以是障。如世樂受 性是行苦。如是等過、不可具陳。皆違眞德故、說爲障。

Question: This cognition is able to disclose reality, which is why it is described in the scriptures as a "cause of understanding". Why then do you here call it a cognitive hindrance?

It is because there are multiple interpretations of reality that it is called a hindrance. It is like medicine being used to cure a disease. If you do not get rid of the medicine (after the disease has been cured), then the medicine turns into an affliction. This is the same kind of case. How does it obstruct the truth? It is as the *Vimalakīrti-sūtra* says: "Extinction is *bodhi*, since it extinguishes all appearances." In this case, cognition is

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[54] The *Vimalakīrti-sūtra* has *she* (捨) instead of *duan* (斷).

[55] According to *DSYZ*, correcting *shi* (是) to *jian* (見).

[56] *DSYZ* has *zhi* (智) instead of *zhi* (知).

appearance, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. "Non-contemplation is *bodhi*, since it is free from all connections to objects." In this case, cognition is connection to objects, and thus it constitutes a hindrance. "Non-activity is *bodhi*, since there is no memory." In this case, cognition is memory, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. "Elimination [of views] is *bodhi*, since views are abandoned." In this case, cognition consists of views, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. "Extrication is *bodhi*, since one is freed from deceptive thought." In this case, cognition consists of deceptive thought, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. "Obstructions are *bodhi*, since they obstruct all wishes." In this case, cognition is a wish, and therefore it constitutes a hindrance (T14:475.542b23–28). *Bodhi* is true illumination. The nature of this cognition is obscuration, and therefore it is a hindrance. It is like the way the experience of suffering at the conventional level is in nature suffering induced by the changes that occur in conditioned existence. Examples of this sort [are so numerous that they] cannot be explained in detail, but since all act contrary to authentic virtue, they are called hindrances.

3.3   Levels of elimination

次辨斷處。斷處有二。一者地前地上相對分別。二者直就地上世出世間相對分別。就初對中義別有二。

Next is the articulation of the levels of elimination, of which there are two: the first is discrimination between being prior to the grounds or in the grounds. The second is the discrimination of mundane and trans-mundane directly attained in the grounds.

3.3.1   Comparison of elimination prior to the grounds and in the grounds

3.3.1.1   The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

一隱顯互論。解行已前增相修故斷煩惱障。初地以上捨相修故斷除智障。云何增相能除煩惱。煩惱正以闇惑爲患。從初已來修習明解緣智轉增闇惑漸捨。至解行時明解增上惑障窮盡、說之爲斷。云何捨相能斷智障。智障正以分別爲過。初地以上窮證自實緣修漸捨。分別過滅名斷智障。

First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. At the stages of understanding and practice and prior, the appearances of increase are cultivated. Hence one eliminates the cognitive hindrances. From the first ground and above the appearances of abandonment are cultivated, and hence one removes the cognitive hindrances. How is it that the appearances of increase are able to remove the afflictions? The afflictions bring distress precisely because of their obscuring activity. Up to the first ground one has cultivated clear understanding; the discriminating consciousness continues to expand as obscuration is gradually removed. When one reaches the stages of understanding and practice, one's clear understanding increases, and obscuring hindrances are totally extinguished; this is what is called "elimination". How is it that the appearances of abandonment are able to eliminate the cognitive hindrances? The cognitive hindrances are problematic precisely due to discrimination. From the first ground and above, one totally realizes the truth for oneself, and the cultivation of conditions is gradually removed. The extirpation of the error of discrimination is called the elimination of the cognitive hindrances.

3.3.1.2   Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二優劣相形。地前菩薩唯斷煩惱。初地以上對治深廣二障雙除。若論事識解滅者、地前亦得。但不論耳。

The second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Before the grounds, bodhisattvas only eliminate afflictions. From the first ground and above they counteract both kinds of hindrances extensively, such that both are removed.

3.3.2   Discrimination between mundane and transmundane in the grounds

次就地上世出世間相對分別。初二三[地名]爲世間。四地以上名爲出世。於中亦有二門分別。

Next is the discrimination between mundane and transmundane in the grounds. The first, second, and third grounds are called mundane. The fourth ground and above are called transmundane.

3.3.2.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized

3.3.2.1.1 Afflictive hindrances

一者隱顯互論。三地以還世間之行斷煩惱障。四地以上出世眞慧斷除智障。云何世間除煩惱障。如地論說初地斷除凡夫我相障。凡夫我障卽是見一處住地。第二地中斷除能犯戒[57]煩惱。犯戒煩惱卽是欲愛、色愛、有愛三種住地。第三地中斷除闇相聞思修等諸法妄障。闇相卽是無明住地。是故明地世間但斷煩惱障也。

First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. The mundane practices from the third ground and below remove the afflictive hindrances. The supramundane authentic wisdom operating in the fourth ground and above removes the cognitive hindrances. Why is it that the mundane practices remove the afflictive hindrances? As the *DBh* explains, in the first ground, one eliminates the hindrances of the appearance of self that is experienced by the unenlightened worldlings (T26:1522.127a12). The hindrance of the unenlightened view of self is none other than the entrenchment of reifying views. In the second ground, one removes the afflictions that have the potential to lead to infractions of the Vinaya. Afflictions that lead to infractions of the Vinaya are included in the entrenchments of attachment to desire, attachment to form, and attachment to objects in the formless realm. In the third ground one removes the hindrances of delusion in regard to *dharma*s such as those that obscure the marks of hearing, consideration, and practice of the Buddha's teachings. Obscuration of marks is equivalent to the entrenchment of nescience. Hence it is clear that in the mundane level of the grounds one only eliminates the afflictive hindrances.

3.3.2.1.2 Cognitive hindrances

云何出世能斷智障。智障有三。

How is it that [supramundane wisdom] is able to remove the cognitive hindrances? There are three kinds of cognitive hindrances.

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[57] Here and in the next phrase I replace *huo* (惑) with *jie* (戒), following *DSYZ*, which allows this line to make sense.

3.3.2.1.2.1 Hindrance of knowing

一是智障、所謂空有之心。

First is the hindrance of knowing, which means the mental states of [attachment to] emptiness and existence.

3.3.2.1.2.2 Hindrance of essence

二是體障、所謂建立神智之體。相狀如何。謂彼緣智正觀諸法非有非無、捨前分別有無礙。雖捨分別有無之礙而猶見已以爲能觀、如爲所觀。見已能觀、心與如異。如爲所觀。如與心別。由見已心與如別故、未能泯捨神知之礙、說爲體障。

The second is the hindrance of essence, which means the essence of constructed spiritual cognition. What sort of thing is this? It means that this object-discriminating cognition accurately observes that all phenomena are neither existent nor nonexistent, which means that one lets go of the prior obstruction of discrimination between existence and non-existence. Even though one lets go of the obstruction brought about by the discrimination between existence and nonexistence, it is still the case that seeing is already taken to be subjective observation, with thusness being the object of that observation. When seeing is already subjective observation, the mind differs from thusness. When thusness is taken as the object of observation, thusness is distinguished from the mind. Since, in seeing, the mind is already distinguished from thusness, one is not able to dissolve the obstruction of the constructed spiritual cognition and this is called the hindrance of essence.

3.3.2.1.2.3 Hindrance due to notions of correction

三是治想。通而論之向前二種俱是治想。但此一門治中究竟偏與治名。然此治想[58]亦是緣智。對治破前神智之礙、實心合如。雖復合如論其體、猶是七識生滅之法。障於眞證無生滅慧故、名爲障。

The third is the [hindrance due to] notions of correction. If we discuss [all three types] together, we can say that the prior two kinds of cognitive hindrances also include this notion of correction. It is just that in this particular case, this aspect is disclosed thoroughly, and thus it is

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[58] Replacing *xiang* (相) with *xiang* (想), following *DSYZ*.

one-sidedly labeled "[hindrances due to the notion of] correction". Yet this notion of correction is also [a kind of] discriminating cognition. In getting rid of the prior obstruction of the spiritual cognition, the true mind merges with thusness. Even though it returns to its unity with thusness, if we discuss its essence, it is none other than a *dharma* of the arising and ceasing of the seventh consciousness. Since it obstructs the authentic realization of the wisdom of neither arising nor cessation, it is called a hindrance.

> 障別如此。治斷云何。始從四地乃至七地斷除智障。入第八地斷除體障。八地以上至如來地斷除治想。

So much for the distinctions between the cognitive hindrances. What about their removal? Starting from the first ground, continuing up to the seventh ground, the hindrance of knowing is eliminated. Entering into the eighth ground, one removes the hindrance of essence. From the eighth ground up to the ground of the Tathāgata, one removes the hindrance of the notion of correction.

3.3.2.1.3 Removal of the three kinds of cognitive hindrances

3.3.2.1.3.1 Removal of the hindrance of knowing

> 云何斷智障。四五六地觀空破有。捨離分別取有之智。故地經中廣明。四地觀察諸法不生不滅、捨離分別解法慢障。第五地中觀察三世佛法平等、捨離分別身淨慢心。第六地中觀法平等、捨離分別染淨慢心。此等皆是觀空破取有之心。第七地中觀諸法如、捨前分別取空之心。離如此等名斷智障。

How does one remove the hindrance of knowing? At the fourth, fifth, and sixth ground one contemplates emptiness and refutes existence, discarding the cognition that discriminates and grasps at existence. Therefore this is elaborated in detail in the *DBh*. At the fourth ground one penetratingly observes that all *dharma*s neither arise nor cease, discarding the hindrance of pride in one's understanding of the Dharma. In the fifth ground one penetratingly observes the equality of the Buddhadharma of the three divisions of time, and thus discards the pride resulting from discriminating the purity of one's body. In the sixth ground one penetratingly observes the equality of all *dharma*s, and thus discards the pride resulting from the discrimination of defilement and purity. These

are all states of mind where the observation of emptiness destroys attachment to existence. In the seventh ground one observes the thusness of *dharma*s, discarding the prior mental state of discriminating and grasping at emptiness. Freedom from these obstructions is called the elimination of the hindrances of knowing.

3.3.2.1.3.2 Removal of the hindrance of essence

云何八地斷除體障。前七地中、雖觀法如、猶見已心、以爲能觀、如爲所觀。以是見故、心與如異、不能廣大任運不動入第八地。破此等礙、觀察如外由來無心、心外無如。如外無心、無心異如。心外無如、無如異心。無心異如、不見能知。無如異心、不見所知。能所既亡、泯同一相。便捨分別功用之意。捨功用故行與如等、廣大不動名入八地。此德成時名斷體障。

What is the removal of the hindrance of essence in the eighth ground? While in the prior seventh ground, even though one observes the thusness of *dharma*s, this is still a mental state of "having seen", and is to be regarded as a subjective observation, with thusness being that which is observed. It is based on this seeing that the mind differs from thusness, and one is unable to exercise the vast, effortless immovability that places one into the eighth ground. In breaking this kind of obstruction, one penetratingly observes that outside of thusness, there is originally no mind, and that outside of the mind, there is no thusness. [Given that] outside of thusness, there is no mind, there is no mind that differs from thusness; [given that] outside of the mind, there is no thusness, there is no thusness that is different from the mind. With there being no mind that differs from thusness, one does not see subjective knowing. With there being no thusness that differs from mind, one does not see that which is known. With subjective and objective already gone, they vanish into the same single mark. This is the meaning of directly abandoning the exertion of discrimination. Since one abandons this exertion, activity is the same as thusness, and the resultant vast immovability is called entry into the eighth ground. The moment this merit is complete it is called the elimination of the hindrances of essence.

3.3.2.1.3.3 Removal of the hindrance due to the notion of correction

云何八地至如來地斷除治想。向前八地雖除體障、治想猶存。故八
地云。此第八地雖無障想⁵⁹非無治想。然此治想八地以上漸次除至
佛乃盡。彼云何斷者。分別息故眞相現前。覺法唯眞本末無妄。以
此見眞、無妄力故能令妄治。前不生後。後不起前。於是滅盡也。

How does one eliminate the notion of correction from the eighth ground
up to the ground of the Tathāgata? Even though one has been removing
hindrances of essence up to the level of the eighth ground, the notion of
correction still lingers. Therefore the exegesis of the eighth ground says:
"At this level of the eighth ground, even though there are no notions of
hindrance, it is not the case that there are not notions of correction"
(source not found). Yet this notion of correction is, from the eighth
ground, gradually removed, until it is fully exhausted at the ground of
the Tathāgata. How is it eliminated? Because discrimination subsides,
the real appears directly before one. The *dharma* of enlightenment is
only real; from beginning to end it lacks falsity. With this vision of the
real there is no power in the false, and therefore one is able to cause the
false to be corrected. The former does not produce the latter, and the lat-
ter does not give rise to the former. In this, they are completely extin-
guished.

3.3.2.2   Mutual defining of superior and inferior

二者優劣相形。初二三地對治微劣、唯斷煩惱。四地以上對治深廣
二障雙除。若通言之、始從初地乃至佛地當知念念二障竝斷。緣智
漸明斷煩惱障。眞法漸顯滅智障。治斷如是。

The second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. In the first,
second, and third grounds one overcomes the weaker hindrances, only
eliminating the afflictions. From the fourth ground and above one
deeply and widely treats the two hindrances, removing both of them.
Comprehensively speaking, you should know that from the first ground
up to the Buddha ground both hindrances are removed together in every
thought-moment. Discriminating cognition gradually clarifies, elimi-
nating the afflictive hindrances. Real *dharma*s gradually manifest, extin-

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⁵⁹ Following *DSYZ*, changing *xiang* (相) to *xiang* (想).

guishing the cognitive hindrances. Correction and elimination occur like this.

3.3.3   Application of antidotes

次對障辨脫。就此門中除斷煩惱二脫俱生。息除智障二脫俱顯。相狀如何。前修對治斷煩惱時能治之道必依眞起。所依之眞恆隨妄轉。故以妄修動發眞心。令彼眞中二脫德生。眞德雖生、與第七識緣智和合、爲彼隱覆眞德不顯。息除彼智眞德方顯。其猶臘[60]印印與泥合、令彼泥上文像隨生。泥文雖生臘印覆[61]之不得顯現、動去臘印其文方顯。彼亦如是。二障之義難以測窮。且隨大綱略標[62]旨況。

Next is the articulation of the application of antidotes. From this perspective, when one eliminates the afflictive hindrances, both kinds of liberation arise together. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, both kinds of liberation appear together. How does this happen? When the previously applied corrective practices eliminate the afflictive hindrances, the path that is the agent of the elimination must arise in dependence on the real. The real that is depended upon always adjusts according to falsity. Therefore, based on deluded practice, one motivates the real mind. This allows it to be that within this reality, the qualities of the two kinds of liberation are produced. Even though the qualities of the real are produced, they become blended in with the discriminating cognition of the seventh consciousness, and due to this, they cover the real so that its true qualities are not apparent. When one removes this cognition, the qualities of the real become apparent. It is like when one presses a seal of completion of the summer retreat onto clay, giving rise to text and image on the clay. Even though there is now text on the clay, while the seal is still on the clay it is not yet visible – and it only becomes visible after one removes the seal. The result of removing the discriminating cognition is like this.

The system of the two hindrances is difficult to fathom, so for the time being let us just be satisfied with a brief summary of the main

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[60]   Following *DSYZ*, changing *la* (臈) to *la* (臘) here and next instance.

[61]   Following *DSYZ*, changing *fu* (覆) to *fu* (覆).

[62]   Following *DSYZ*, changing *shu* (樹) to *biao* (標).

points. [This is where the discussion of the hindrances in the *DSYZ* ends. The initial part of the discussion that continues from this in the commentary on the *AMF* still has some relevance, so we follow this a bit further, stopping at the point where the commentary on the *AMF* returns to the explication of the main text (*ci sui wen shi* 次隨文釋).]

> 今此論中辨二障者是第二番也。　五住相望四住及起同爲煩惱障、無明及起齊爲智障。故地持無明以妄同爲智障。就無明中隨義更論、所起恆沙復爲煩惱。無明住地獨爲智障。故此論中。但無明地以爲智障、染心恆沙以爲煩惱障也。

The two hindrances as introduced in the *AMF* are the same as those of the second level of interpretation provided here. i.e., the manifest aspects of the five entrenchments (the four entrenchments, including their active manifestations) are equivalent to the afflictive hindrances, and nescience, including its active manifestations, is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances. Therefore the in *BBh*, nescience, regarded as delusion, is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances. If we discuss this again following the interpretation from the perspective of nescience, then the myriad troubles that arise from nescience can also be called afflictions, with the entrenchment of nescience alone being regarded as the cognitive hindrances. Therefore in this treatise, the nescience entrenchments alone are regarded as the cognitive hindrances, while the myriad troubles that defile the mind are the afflictive hindrances.

> 問曰。於彼事識之中取性無明是何地收。妄識之中所有愛見是何地收。斷言。不定、略有二義。一隱顯互論。彼事識中取性無明。以本後末攝爲四住。彼妄識中所有愛見。以末從本收爲無明。二隨義通論。妄識之中所有見皆四住收。事識中所有無明亦無明攝。

Question: In this case, into which of the entrenchments does the nescience of grasping at natures within the phenomenal consciousnesses fall? And into which of the entrenchments does the view of attachment to desire within the false consciousness fall?

Answer: There is no fixed answer to this, but there are two general interpretations. The first is that from the perspective of what is de-emphasized and what is emphasized. The nescience of grasping at natures within the phenomenal consciousnesses prioritizes what is fundamental, and subordinates what is derivative in assimilating the four en-

trenchments. The view of attachment to desire within the false consciousness prioritizes the derivate and subordinates the fundamental in assimilating all into nescience. If these two interpretations are considered together, all of the views in the false consciousness are included in the four entrenchments, and the nescience within the phenomenal consciousness is also included within nescience.

Abbreviations

AMF	*The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, Dasheng qixin lun* (大乘起信論) T1666
BBh	*Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra* (菩薩地持經) T1581
CWSL	*Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論) T1585
DBh	**Daśabhūmika-sūtra-śāstra* (十地經論) T1522
DDB	*Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.* http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb. A. Charles Muller, ed. (2012).
DQLY	*Dasheng qixin lun yishu* (大乘起信論義疏) T1843
DSYZ	*Dasheng yi zhang* (大乘義章) T1851
FDJL	*Fodi jing lun* (佛地經論) T1530
HBJ	*Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo* [*The Collected Texts of Korean Buddhism*] (1984). Seoul: Dongguk University Press.
IJU	*Ijang ui* (二障義)
T	*Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* (大正新脩大藏經) [*Japanese Edition of the Buddhist Canon*] (1924–35). Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankō-kai.
ŚDS	*Śrīmālādevī-(siṃhanāda-)sūtra*
YBh	*Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra*

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On the Notion of *Kaidaoyi* (*Avakāśadānāśraya*) as Discussed in Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun*[1]

Junjie Chu

1   Introduction

In Xuanzang's (玄奘, 602–664) *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論, hereafter CWSL), a kind of digest of commentarial materials on Vasubandu's *Triṃśikākārikā* (hereafter TrK), in the context of an explanation of the basis (*āśraya*) of the seventh awareness, i.e. the defiled mind, a general discussion of the three bases of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaitta*) is presented, namely, **hetupratyayāśraya*, **adhipatipratyayāśraya*, and **samanantarapratyayāśraya* (cf. below §3.1. and n. 28). In the case of the third basis, the whole discussion is interestingly held under the heading of *kaidaoyi* (開導依, literally, "opening-leading basis", or "basis in terms of opening the way for the subsequent awareness and leading it to arise", cf. Kuiji's explanation quoted below in n. 5). Three different opinions concerning the interpretation of this special term are presented, with sources to back each up, and detailed argumentation on the issues at the center of the debate. This discussion is important because it concerns the way we should understand this technical term, which is otherwise called the "similar-immediate condition" (*samanantarapratyaya*), as it is in the Abhidharma system. That is to say, this discussion is related to the controversy about the function of the awareness in the antecedent mo-

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ment, in respect of the awareness subsequent to it, namely the contro-versy about the relationship between two kinds of awareness in a thought series (*cittasaṃtāna*), such as sensory awareness and mental a-wareness. This topic was hotly discussed in the Buddhist epistemological school beginning with Dignāga (c. 480–540), which flourished particular-ly with Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660).

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the meaning of the two elements of the term *kaidaoyi*, namely *kaidao* and *yi*, analyzing their pos-sible origin in the Indian sources of both the Abhidharma and the Yogā-cāra, and to propose a reconstruction of their original Sanskrit forms. Further, the controversy between the three opinions about this term will also be discussed. It is hoped that this study will shed some light on the above-mentioned issue as it was discussed in the Buddhist epistemologi-cal tradition.

2   *kaidao = avakāśadāna*

2.1 In CWSL, although three different interpretations of the function and the nature of this *kaidaoyi* are introduced, the exact meaning of this term is not explicitly explained. Kuiji (窺基, 632–692), who is traditionally re-garded as the most authoritative interpreter of Xuanzang, offers us quite a comprehensive explanation of the term *kaidaoyi* in his commentary on CWSL, *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (成唯識論述記, hereafter CWSL-SJ), where he explains the sentence on the third basis, **samanantarapratyayāśraya,* in CWSL. Let us begin with his explanation, which reads as follows:

> Now, the word *kai* means that [the preceding awareness] leaves its place, i.e., makes way for the [subsequent awareness]. Again, the word *dao* means that [the former] leads [the latter] to arise; [that is to say,] leads and causes [the latter] to be born in its place.
>
>   Thus, in Sanskrit [*kaidao*] is said *jielanduo* (羯爛多, **krānta*). Here [in China], this can be rendered as *cidiyuan* (次第緣, *krāntapratyaya*?[2]).

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[2] Kuiji seems first to confuse *krānta* with *krama,* which is usually translated as *cidi* (次第), and then to confuse *cidi* with the same characters in the compound *cidiyuan* (次第緣), another standard translation of *samanantarapratyaya* used in Paramārtha's (真諦, 499-

For example, "in reverse order" is said **anukrānta*; *anu* means "reverse", **krānta* means "in order"; "in due order" (順次第: 須次第) is said **pratikrānta*; *prati* means "due".[3] When the condition is referred to as *samanantara*, it refers to *dengwujianyuan* (等無間緣), "similar-immediate condition", because *sam-* means "similar", *a-* means "un-", *antara* means "mediate".[4]

2.2 The first part of this passage is just a literal explanation of the two Chinese characters (*kai-dao*) in the first element of the term. In the second part of this passage, interestingly, a phonetic transcription of the Sanskrit form of the term is provided. In this regard, two points should be clarified.

First, based on Kuiji's phonetic transcription of the Sanskrit form, *jielanduo*,[5] given in this explanation, La Vallée Poussin suggests that the term *kaidaoyi* can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as **krānta* (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 228, n. 2). This is of course correct, and I also follow this reconstruction. However, this Sanskrit term, used in this sense, is not to my knowledge attested in any Indian sources, and Kuiji's phonetic transcription is dubious.

Second, two terms appear here: **krāntapratyaya* (according to Kuiji!) and *samanantarapratyaya*; in this passage, Kuiji seems not to care about

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569) translations of AKBh (AKBh P), corresponding to *dengwujianyuan* (等無間緣) in Xuanzang's translation (AKBh X).

[3] It is possible that this reversed placement of the characters *ni* (逆) and *shun* (順) is a result of miscopying during the process of textual transmission. My thanks to Dr. Hong Luo, who reminded me of this possibility.

[4] CWSL-SJ 379a8-15: 今言開者。離其處所即開彼路。復言導者引彼令生。引導招彼令生此處。故梵言羯爛多。此可言次第緣。如逆次第云阿奴羯爛多。阿奴是逆義。羯爛多云次第。須次第者。云缽刺底羯爛多。缽刺底是順義。此緣既云三摩難咀囉故。言等無間緣也。三是等義。摩是無義。難咀囉是間義故.

[5] It is almost needless to mention that the initial sound *j-* is to be pronounced in Middle Chinese as *k-*. The pronunciation of the character *jie* (羯) in Middle Chinese is reconstructed in Pulleyblank, 1991: 154 as **kiat*, etc. Cf. also the remark in ibid.: 19: "The graph 迦, now pronounced *jiā*, is found almost exclusively in Buddhist transcriptions, where it represents the Indian (Sanskrit or Prakrit) syllables *ka* or *kā*. In the *Guangyun*, it has the reading E. **kia*, which according to the expected regular development ought to give Mandarin *jiē*."

the difference between *yi=āśraya* (依) and *yuan=pratyaya* (緣), but rather, tries to differentiate **krānta-* from *samanantara-*. He emphasizes that here *kaidaoyi* (**krāntāśraya*) can be understood as **krāntapratyaya,* while *samanantara-* refers to the "similar-immediate condition". That is to say, according to him, it is not correct to use the term *kaidaoyi* (**krāntāśraya*) or **krāntapratyaya* (次第緣) to refer to *samanantarapratyaya*, "similar-immediate condition". Although the form *cidiyuan* (次第緣) is also well attested as a Chinese translation of *samanantarapratyaya* in texts of both the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra, according to Kuiji this Chinese phrase can only be used as the translation of **krāntapratyaya*. The sub-commentary authored by Ruli (如理, whose dates are unknown), in explaining this sentence in Kuiji (羯爛多至是間義故者), also says that, here, Kuiji's intention is to point out the mistake of the "old tradition" in calling the similar-immediate condition *cidiyuan*; thus, the Sanskrit term is introduced as a comparison, for the purpose of differentiating what is correct from what is wrong.[6] This assertion that **krāntapratyaya* should be separated from *samanantarapratyaya* also seems implausible to me.

2.3 Indeed, the words *kaidao,* "making way and leading to arise", in the term *kaidaoyi,* express a very common idea, which had already taken root in the old Abhidharma tradition, where the similar-immediate condition is often described as performing the function of "giving way" or "leading to arise" in respect to thought and thought concomitants in the subsequent moment. According to a principle widely accepted by Buddhist philosophical systems from the Sarvāstivāda down to the Yogācāra, the awareness that passed away in the antecedent moment is called "mind" (*manas*). This principle is based on the idea that the five types of sensory awareness have two kinds of "basis", namely, the material sense faculties and the mental faculty. This is explained in AKBh as follows:

> Of these [six awareness-elements] (*ṣaḍvijñānadhātu*)], the visual sense is the co-nascent basis of the visual awareness, and so on, up to the tactile sense [which is the co-nascent basis] of the tactile awareness. In addition, for these [five types of sensory awareness], mind also

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6 Cf. CWSL-SYY 591b19: 羯爛多至是間義故者，此文來意者謂舊喚等無間緣為次第緣謬也。今謂辨其邪正故引梵本對明.

[constitutes] a past basis. Thus, these five groups of [sensory] awareness have two faculties as their bases.[7]

This idea can be traced back to the scriptural tradition – the widely quoted scriptural statement: "Bhikṣus! Visible matter is grasped by means of two [things], i.e., by visual awareness and by mind (*manas*) which is brought into use (*ākṛṣṭa*) by that [visual awareness]."[8] Here, "visual awareness" refers to the present awareness, and "mind" refers to the previous awareness.

2.4 The statements of this principle can be found in various Abhidharma treatises. PVVibh already speaks of the five sensory awarenesses as each having two kinds of "basis", the one arising simultaneously, i.e., the five sense faculties such as visual sense, and the other ceasing in the immediate antecedent moment, i.e., the mental sense.[9] In AMV there is a more detailed discussion. There, a question is asked: "Why is it only said that the thought series (*cittasaṃtati*) of the living being in the sensual realm (*kāmadhātu*) and the form realm (*rūpadhātu*) takes a body as its basis (*āśraya*), although it also takes [conditioning forces dissociated from thought] such as the vital faculty (*jīvitendriya*) and group-commonality

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[7] AKBh 34.9-10 (ad AK 1.44d): *tatra cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣuḥ sahaja āśrayo yāvat kāyavijñānasya kāyaḥ. atītaḥ punar eṣām āśrayo mana ity apy ete pañca vijñānakāyā indriyadvayāśrayāḥ*. Cf. the similar idea stated in AMV 137b9: 若生欲界。眼識現在前。此識以眼及無間滅意為依及所依...

[8] Quoted in DhPr 62.21 (=NBṬṬ 26.10=TBh 15.17-18 with slight deviation): *dvābhyāṃ bhikṣavo rūpaṃ gṛhyate, cakṣurvijñānena tadākṛṣṭena ca manaseti*. In this sentence, the word *ā-√kṛṣ* means literally "to draw towards oneself", but here it must mean "to bring into use", "to make something active" or "to realize the function of a thing". In NBṬṬ, the word *manas* is replaced with *manovijñāna*; the meaning then becomes completely different. In that case, the *cakṣurvijñāna* is the past awareness and the *manovijñāna* the present awareness, and the word *ā-√kṛṣ* means "to cause something to arise", "bring something into being". However, this change seems to me to be the result of the influence of Dharmakīrti's theory that mental awareness is caused by visual awareness as the similar-immediate condition.

[9] Cf. PVVibh 991b14-15: 或復五識各二所依。一俱時生。謂眼等五。二無間滅。謂即意根.

(*nikāyasabhāga*) as its basis (*niśritya*)?"[10] In answering this question, one explanation is noted as follows: For living beings in these two realms, the present (*pratyupasthita*) sensory awarenesses, such as visual awareness, take both sense faculties, i.e., the visual sense and the mind that ceased in the immediately antecedent moment (*anantaranirodhamanas*), as the basis (with the exception that there is no olfactory awareness and gustatory awareness in the form realm); and in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), the present mental awareness takes the mind that has ceased in the immediately antecedent moment as its basis.[11]

A clear and straightforward expression of this principle can be found in Vasubandhu's AK 1.17ab: "In fact, [the element of] mind is any of the six [groups of] awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment."[12] Vasubandhu further explains the relativity of the awareness that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment to the present awareness, saying that just like a person who is himself a son, but is also the father of another person, the awareness that itself is a fruit is also the seed of another fruit.[13] And Saṅghabhadra also explains the same idea. In answering the question of why the awareness that has ceased to exist is called the basis of the present awareness, he says that this is because this ceased awareness is the immediate condition (*linjinyuan* 鄰近緣) for the present awareness to arise; just as visual awareness, even though it has visible matter [as its condition *qua* object-support (*ālambanapratyaya*)], needs the visual sense as its basis for arising, in the

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[10] AMV 137b2-3: 問欲色二界心相續轉亦依命根眾同分等。此中何故但說依身; cf. AKBh 112.11-13: *nikāyasabhāgaṃ jīvitendriyaṃ ca niśrityety ābhidhārmikāḥ. rūpiṇām api tarhi sattvānāṃ kim arthaṃ na tad eva dvayaṃ niśritya pravarttate cittasantatiḥ.* In AKBh 62.11-15 (ad AK 2.35-36a) fourteen conditioning forces dissociated from thought are mentioned; cf. Cox, 1995: 182, n. 1, Dhammajoti, 2009: 292-293.

[11] Cf. AMV 137b9-20: 若生欲界。眼識現在前。此識以眼及無間滅意為依及所依...如眼識耳鼻舌識應知亦爾。若身識現在前。此識以身及無間滅意為依及所依...若意識現在前。此識以無間滅意為依及所依...如生欲界。生色界亦爾。差別者。彼無鼻舌識。若生無色界。意識現在前。此識以無間滅意為依及所依...

[12] AKBh 11.22 (AK 1.17ab): *ṣaṇṇām anantarātītaṃ vijñānaṃ yad dhi tan manaḥ.*

[13] AKBh 11.23-24): *yad yat samanantaraniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ tan manodhātur ity ucyate* ([Ejima ed.: 18.2]: *ucyeta). tadyathā sa eva putro 'nyasya pitā bhavati, tad eva phalam anyasya bījam iti.*

same way, the awareness in the subsequent moment needs the mind that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment as its basis for arising; therefore, the phrase "the mind that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment" (read 前念無間滅意 for 前言無間滅意) serves the purpose of excluding the thought interrupted in the antecedent moment. Although [this mind] gives way [in order for the subsequent awareness to arise] (read 開避 for 聞避), it does not directly produce the subsequent awareness; for this reason, the six awarenesses that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment provide the basis for the present awareness and are called the "element of mind" (*manodhātu*).[14]

2.5 This principle is also clearly stated in the *Yogācārabhūmi* as follows:

Then what is the similar-immediate condition? Those factors of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaittā dharmāḥ*) from which [other] factors of thought and thought concomitants arise are called "the similar-immediate condition" of the latter. Thus, those six awarenesses which are the similar-immediate condition of the [other] six awarenesses are mind, designated as "mind" (*manas*) [i.e. the mental faculty (*manaindriya*)], "mental sphere" (*manaāyatana*) and "mental element" (*manodhātu*).[15]

A similar statement can also be found in a passage of MS, where Asaṅga explains two aspects of the meaning of "mind" (*manas*): (1) the term refers to the "mind" (*manas*) or thinking faculty in accordance with the theory shared generally also by the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika,

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[14] Cf. NA 342b21-25: 如何已滅名現識依。是現識生鄰近緣故。如雖有色而要依眼眼識 得生。如是雖有所緣境界。而後識生。要依前念無間滅意。是故前言無間滅者。為 遮前念有間滅心。雖先聞避而未生故。由此無間。已滅六識。為現識依。說為意界.

[15] YBh (T) Zhi 16a2-3: *de la mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen gang zhe na | sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos gang dag gi mjug thogs su sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos gang dag 'byung ba de dag ni | de dag gi mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen zhes bya'o || de la rnam par shes pa drug po gang dag yin pa de dag ni rnam par shes pa drug po de dag mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen yin te | de dag ni yid la yid ces bya ba dang | yid kyi skye mched ces bya ba dang | yid kyi khams zhes bya bar yang gdags so*; =YBh (C) 584b28–c2: 復次云何等無間緣。謂此諸 心心所無間。彼諸心心所生。說此為彼等無間緣。若此六識為彼六識等無間緣。即 施設此名為意根。亦名意處亦名意界.

which holds that thought (*citta*), mind (*manas*) and awareness (*vijñāna*) have the same meaning (*paryāyā*); and (2) it also refers to the defiled mind (*kliṣṭamanas*), in accordance with the theory unique to the Yogā-cāra. Asaṅga says with regard to the first aspect: "Because it comprises the basis (*āśrayībhūta*) by virtue of performing the function of the imme-diate condition, the awareness that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment (*anantaraniruddha*), named 'mind' (*manas*), is the ba-sis for the arising of awareness."[16]

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[16] MS 5.10-13: *de ma thag pa'i rkyen byed pas | gnas su gyur pa'i phyir | rnam par shes pa 'gags ma thag pa yid ces bya ba rnam par shes pa skye ba'i gnas dang...* Cf. also YBh (ed.) 11.6-7: *manaḥ katamat. yat ṣaṇṇām api vijñānakāyānām anantaraniruddhaṃ...* Xuanzang's trans-lation of this passage is worth discussing briefly. According to the Tibetan translation, it is only stated here that the awareness in the immediately antecedent moment is the similar-immediate condition for "awareness", that is, any kind of awareness. However, in Xuanzang's translation, this "awareness" is specified as "mental awareness" (*yishi* 意識, *manovijñāña*, cf. MS (X) 133c6-7: 第一與作等無間緣所依止性。無間滅識能與意 識作生依止); but Paramārtha's translation is similar to the Tibetan (MS (P) 158a21-22: 一能與彼生次第緣依故。先滅識為意。又以識生依止為意). Based on the Tibetan translation, the last part of this sentence can be reconstructed as something like **an-antaraniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ mano nāma vijñānasyotpādāśrayaḥ*; probably Xuanzang had a text something like *...*manovijñānasyotpādāśrayaḥ*, that is to say, *manas* is not construed with the first part of this sentence. This interpretation is also followed by Lamotte in his translation (cf. Lamotte, 1973: 16: "...est le support de naissance [*utpattyāśraya*] de la connaissance mental [*manovijñāna*]"). Nagao does not accept this interpretation, and maintains that *manas* provides the basis for the arising of all of the first six kinds of awareness (Nagao, 1982: 92, n. 2; 93-94, n. 4). Xuanzang's translation is probably influenced by Vasubandhu's interpretation. In MSBh Vasubandhu explains this sentence as follows: "Of these [different meanings of "mind"], because of the fact that it performs the function of the similar-immediate condition, the awareness that already ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment comprises the cause of the mental awareness [in the subsequent moment]; this is one [meaning] of 'mind';" MSBh 150b1-2: *de la mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen byed pa nyid gyi phyir rnam par shes pa gang de ma thag par 'gags pa nyid ni yid kyi rnam par shes pa'i rgyu 'gyur bas de ni yid gcig go* (cf. also Xuanzang's own translation of this sentence in MSBh (X) 325b15: 謂無間滅 識與意識為因是第一意). However, Paramārtha's translation of MSBh is different from that of Xuanzang; the second part of this sentence is translated by Paramārtha as: "Again, the mind is the basis for the awareness that is currently arising" (MSBh (P) 158a24: 復有意能作正生識依止). Ui Hakuju (宇井伯壽) interpreted this "awareness that is currently arising" as referring to *ālayavijñāna*, but as is pointed out in Nagao, 1982: 93, n. 2, this is not correct. Nagao interpreted it as referring to "the six aware-nesses that are arising". However, the reading 正生識依止 = **vijñānasyotpadyamāna-*

2.6 Already in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the similar-immediate condition had been linked with the function of "giving way". For example, in AMV it is said that the similar-immediate condition is like the [preceding] factor (*dharma*) that gives way [to the subsequent factor].[17] Saṅghabhadra also mentions this idea. However, based on the Sarvāstivāda/ Vaibhāṣika's theory that a factor is present when it exercises its activity (*kāritra*) (cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 126ff), he emphasizes that only a present factor can perform the function of giving way. Needless to say, this present factor is a past factor by the time the result it brings about is active. Saṅghabhadra says:

> It is called "similar-immediate condition" on account of its power of giving way. It is not the case that [something] in the state of just arising (**utpadyamānāvasthā*) has the capacity of giving way; it has the power of giving way only when it has been already produced; and when it is already in the state of having ceased to exist, it is said to have already performed the function of giving way.[18]

The same idea is also stated in AK(Bh) 2.63, starting with the question: In respect to a factor in what temporal state (*kimavastha*) do these [four] conditions (*pratyayāḥ*)[19] perform their activity (*kāritra*)?[20] Different tem-

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syāśrayaḥ seems to me implausible; probably it is just a misreading of **vijñānasyotpādā-śrayaḥ*. For the time being, since no Sanskrit text is available, a satisfactory explanation of the disagreement of these translations cannot be offered. I wonder if it is possible that Paramārtha omitted the word *manas* in his translation of the MSBh in order to make it concordant with the *mūla*-text of MS. If Vasubandhu's text really read *manovijñāna*, then a question may be asked: Is it a special theory which holds that the awareness in the antecedent moment provides the similar-immediate condition for the arising of mental awareness only?

[17] AMV 109a26: 等無間緣如開導法. Cf. also ibid. 284a19, 285b6: 等無間緣如開避法.

[18] ANA 422c29-23a2: 等無間緣。據開避力。非正生位。有開避能。要已生時。有開避力。若至已滅。名已開避.

[19] I.e., "condition *qua* cause" (*hetupratyaya*), "similar-immediate condition" (*samanantarapratyaya*), "condition *qua* object-support" (*ālambanapratyaya*) and "dominant condition" (*adhipatipratyaya*). For a discussion of the doctrine of these four conditions, cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 169-175.

[20] AKBh 100.19: *atha saite pratyayāḥ kāritraṃ kurvantaḥ kimavasthe dharme kurvanti*.

poral relationships between the conditions and the conditioned factors are discussed. It is said that of the five types of condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*),[21] the co-existent cause and the associated cause perform their activities in respect to factors that are "ceasing to exist", i.e., the "present" factors, while the homogeneous cause, omnipresent cause and maturation cause perform their activities on the factors that are "arising", i.e., the "future" factors.[22] The text then turns to discuss the other three conditions. It is said that the similar-immediate condition performs its activity in respect to factors that are arising, i.e., future factors; the condition of object-support performs its activity in respect to factors that are ceasing to exist, i.e., present factors; further, the dominant condition performs its activity in respect to factors in all temporal states. Interestingly, in talking about the similar-immediate condition, it is explained why this condition performs its activity in respect to "arising" or "future" factors: "because it gives way [to the factors in respect to which it performs its activity]" (*avakāśadānāt*).[23] These factors refer to thought and thought concomitants caused by this condition.

2.7 In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* section of YBh this idea is described as follows:

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[21] I.e., five of the six "causes" treated in AK(Bh) 2.49-55ab, with the exception of the "efficient cause" (*kāraṇahetu*), namely: "co-existent cause" (*sahabhūhetu*), "homogeneous cause" (*sabhāgahetu*), "associated cause" (*saṃprayuktakahetu*), "universal cause" (*sarvatragahetu*) and "retributive cause" (*vipākahetu*). For a discussion of the definition of these six causes, cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 149-156.

[22] Cf. AK(Bh) 100.19-25 (AK 2.63a-c): *hetupratyayas tāvat pañcavidha uktaḥ. tatra nirudhyamāne kāritraṃ, dvau hetū kurutaḥ ॥ nirudhyamānaṃ nāma varttamānam. nirodhābhimukhatvāt. tatra sahabhūsaṃprayuktahetū kāritraṃ kurutaḥ. sahotpanne 'pi phale tayor vyāpāraḥ. trayaḥ jāyamāne ॥ jāyamānaṃ nāmānāgatam utpādābhimukham. tatra sabhāgasarvatragavipākahetavaḥ kāritraṃ kurvanti. evaṃ tāvad dhetupratyayaḥ.*

[23] AKBh 101.3-5: *samanantarapratyayālambanapratyayau veditavyau. samanantarapratyayo jāyamāne kāritraṃ karoty avakāśadānāt. ālambanapratyayo nirudhyamāne, varttamānaiś cittacaittair grahaṇāt. adhipatipratyayas tu sarvasyāṃ avasthāyām anāvaraṇabhāvenāvasthita ity etad evāsya kāritram. uktāḥ sakāritrāḥ pratyayāḥ.* In this passage, the phrase *avakāśadāna* is translated by Xuanzang *yu qi chu* (與其處, AKBh X 37c3), but it is explained in Yuanhui's (圓暉, 8th c., exact dates unknown) commentary as *kaipilu* (開避路): "It gives way, because it makes way immediately upon the arising of the resulting factor" (JSLS-Slb 859b4: 以等無間。果法生時。開避路故。與其處也).

Only the factors of thought and thought concomitants have both a similar-immediate condition and a condition *qua* object-support.[24] To wit: the factors of thought and thought concomitants, being supported (*parigṛhīta*)[25] by [thought and thought concomitants] born previ-

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[24] This statement can be compared with AK 2.34bcd quoted below at the end of n. 42.

[25] Here the word *parigṛhīta* or *parigraha*, used also below in the compound *parigrahahetu*, has a special meaning, different from its normal use in the sense of "taking possession" as in the compound *ātmabhāvaparigraha* (the meaning and use of this compound is discussed at length in Schmithausen, 1987: 552-566). *Parigrahahetu*, as the fourth or fifth cause of the ten causes (*daśa hetavaḥ*), is explained elsewhere in YBh in the context of discussion of the ten causes along with four conditions (*catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ*) and five fruits (*pañca phalāni*). It seems to me that, in this context, this term is used to encompass all secondary causes, apart from the main cause that is usually referred to as the "generative cause" (*nirvṛttihetu*) or "seed" (*bīja*). In the BBh, seed (*bīja*), which should be understood as condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*), is regarded as the projecting cause (*ākṣepahetu*) or the generative cause (*nirvṛttihetu*), while *parigrahahetu* refers to other conditions that are separate from "seeds" (cf. BBh 97.24-26: *tatra bījam āvasānikasya svaphalasyākṣepahetuḥ. bījanirmuktaḥ tadanyaḥ pratyayaḥ parigrahahetuḥ. tad eva bījaṃ svaphalasaya nirvṛttihetuḥ*). Furthermore, *parigrahahetu* is explained in another passage as "conditions in the manner that earth and rain [are conditions] for the appearance of a sprout" (BBh 99.22-23: *pṛthivīvṛṣṭyādikaḥ pratyayo 'ṅkuraprādurbhavāya parigrahahetuḥ*). In the *Maulī bhūmi* section it is said: "Of them, that which produces is the generative cause. The remainder are causes of means. Any (*ekatya*) *parigrahahetu* is a coexistent cause. Just as the visual sense is [the *parigrahahetu*] of the visual awareness, in the same way also the auditory sense, etc., [are the *parigrahahetu*] of the other awarenesses [respectively]" (YBh (ed) 111.9-11: *tatra janako abhinirvṛttihetuḥ. avaśiṣṭā upāyahetavaḥ. sahabhūtāḥ* [em: *sahabhūhetuḥ*, Tib.: *lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgru*] *tad yathā ekatyaḥ parigrahahetuḥ. tad yathā cakṣuś cakṣurvijñānasya, evaṃ śrotrādayas tadanyeṣāṃ vijñānānām*). In another passage of this section *parigrahahetu* is explained in more detail, and it is connected with "the basis of cause that passed away contiguously" (*śliṣṭanirodhaṃ hetvadhiṣṭhānam*), and "the basis of cause which is the object-field, sense faculty, action, human effort, and view of reality" (cf. YBh (ed) 108.12-20: *tatra śliṣṭanirodhaṃ hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya tathā viṣayam indriyaṃ kriyāṃ puruṣakāraṃ tattvadarśanaṃ ca hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya parigrahahetuḥ prajñāpyate. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathā hi. kāmapratisaṃyukteṣu dharmeṣu samanantaranirodhaparigṛhītā saṃskārāṇāṃ pravṛttir bhavati. viṣayaparigṛhītendriyaparigṛhītā kriyāparigṛhītā puruṣakāraparigṛhītā ca. yathā kāmapratisaṃyuktānām evaṃ rūpapratisaṃyuktānām ārūpyapratisaṃyuktānām. tattvadarśanaparigṛhītā vā punas tadanyeṣām apratisaṃyuktānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ pravṛttir bhavati. tasmāc chliṣṭanirodhaṃ viṣayam indriyaṃ kriyāṃ puruṣakāraṃ tattvadarśanaṃ cādhiṣṭhāya parigrahahetuḥ prajñāpyate*); cf. also La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 457ff., where he translated the passage talking about the ten causes, among which *parigrahahetu* is translated "cause adjuvante".

ously which give way to (*avakāśadāna*) [their successors] and [also being] supported by the object-support, become manifest and come forth. For this reason, the similar-immediate condition and the condition *qua* object-support are to be known as included in the supporting cause (*parigrahahetu*).[26]

In this passage, the phrase *avakāśadāna* is translated in the Chinese version as *kaidao* (開導), the same characters that comprise the first part of the term *kaidaoyi*; and as we have seen above (§2.1 and n. 5), the idea of "making room" or "giving way" is also employed by Kuiji when explaining the meaning of this term.

3   *kaidaoyi* = *avakāśadānāśraya[27]

3.1 With regard to the causes of the arising of thought and thought concomitants, in the Yogācāra system, another set of terms, with "basis" (°*āśraya*) at end of the compound, is introduced, although the old terms of the Abhidharma system with "condition" (°*pratyaya*) at the end are also still in use. Under this circumstance, we need to explain why "basis" is preferred instead of "condition". The reason is probably that, according to the Yogācāra, awareness needs a basis (*āśraya*) or substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) to perform the function of a condition, and the notion of "basis" is also somewhat related to the gradual development of the idea of the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*) which is finally regarded as the basis of personal existence.[28] As we have mentioned above, in CWSL,

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[26] BBh 99.3-8: *samanantarapratyayaś cālambanapratyayaś ca cittacaitasikānām eva dharmāṇāṃ. tathā hi cittacaitasikā dharmāḥ prāgutpannāvakāśadānaparigṛhītā ālambanaparigṛhītāś ca prādurbhavanti pravartante ca. tasmāt samanantarapratyaya ālambanapratyayaś ca parigrahahetunā saṃgṛhītau veditavyau.* = YBh (C) 501.15-17: 等無間緣及所緣緣。唯望一切心心法說。由彼一切心及心法前生開導所攝受故。所緣境界所攝受故。方生方轉。是故當知等無間緣及所緣緣。攝受因攝.

[27] The word *avakāśadānāśraya could be two separate words: *avakāśadāna āśrayaḥ*, as in the case of *samanantara āśrayaḥ* (cf. n. 32 below). For convenience I use only the compound form throughout this paper. This also holds for *krāntāśraya.

[28] Cf. Schmithausen, 1987: I:51: "Therefore, it would seem that in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (referring to the first half of the second part of *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, see ibid. 299, n. 226 - Chu) *ālayavijñāna* has, at least *de facto*, transcended its original feature of essen-

in the context of explaining the basis (*āśraya*) of the seventh awareness, i.e. the defiled mind, a general discussion of the basis of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaitta*) is provided, and there the word "basis" (*āśraya*) is added to a term ending with "condition" (*pratyaya*). It is said there that all thought and thought concomitants have their basis, and three kinds of basis are mentioned: (1) **hetupratyayāśraya*, or "basis of condition *qua* cause", which refers to each individual seed (*svabīja*) of conditioned factors (*saṃskṛta*), because the latter arise on this basis and do not arise without their condition *qua* causes; (2) **adhipatipratyayāśraya*, or "basis of dominant condition", which refers to the six internal cognitive spheres (*ādhyātmikaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ*, i.e., five material sense faculties and one mental sense faculty), because all thought and thought concomitants arise on this basis and do not arise without the co-existent (*sahabhū*) sense faculties; and (3) **samanantarapratyayāśraya*, or "basis of similar-immediate condition", which refers to the mind that ceased to exist in the previous moment (*pūrvaniruddhamanas*),[29] because all thought and thought concomitants arise on this basis and do not arise

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tially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter, and has rather in its turn become a fundamental constituent of personality, on a par with corporeal matter and eventually even superseding the latter in its function of basis[-of-personal-existence] (*āśraya*)."

[29] According to Kuiji, the element *samanantarapratyaya* in the compound *samanantara-pratyaya-āśraya* is indispensable, because by using the term, one can specifically refer to the awareness (i.e., *citta*, the principal thought) that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, and both the seed that ceased to exist in the previous moment and thought concomitants (*caitta*) can be excluded. Cf. CWSL-SJ 379.22-25: 若言無間依即前滅種子望後種子應是此依。簡異彼故言等無間緣依。若爾前念心所應是此依。是此緣故。不爾心所非是所依。言等無間復是所依故復雙簡也; "If it were called the 'immediate basis (*anantara-āśraya*)', the seed that ceased to exist in the previous moment could be this kind of basis in respect to the seed in the subsequent moment. In order to exclude this possibility, it is called the 'basis of similar-immediate condition'. [Objection:] In this case, thought concomitants (*caitta*) should also be this kind of basis. [Reply:] That is not correct, because the thought concomitants cannot function as a basis [because only the principal thought (*citta*) can perform this function]. It is called 'similar-immediate', also, because [the awareness that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, called 'mind'] can be the basis [and the thought concomitants are excluded]. [Thus, by this term], a double exclusion is effected."

without this past mental faculty which performs the function of *kaidao*, "making way and leading to arise" (*kaidaogen* 開導根).[30]

3.2 From the perspective of the structure of the text, this discussion in CWSL seems to be an unnatural insertion – independent of the main context of discussing the basis of the defiled mind; and indeed, it is just an adapted version of the idea stated in YBh. Actually, in YBh, the relationship between "basis" (here, *adhiṣṭhāna*, "substratum" is used instead of *āśraya*) and "condition" is explained as follows.

> Further, based on the seed as the substratum *qua* condition (*pratyayādhiṣṭhāna*), the "condition *qua* cause" is designated; based on [the factor that has] passed away immediately (*śliṣṭanirodha*) as the substratum *qua* condition, the "similar-immediate condition" is designated; based on the object as the substratum *qua* condition, the "condition of object-support" is designated; based on the substratum *qua* condition other than these [i.e., sense faculties], the "dominant condition" is designated.[31]

"Substratum *qua* condition" refers surely to the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) based on which the conditions perform their function; probably it im-

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[30] Cf. CWSL 19b22-27: 諸心心所皆有所依。然彼所依總有三種。一因緣依。謂自種子。諸有為法皆託此依。離自因緣必不生故。二增上緣依。謂內六處。諸心心所皆託此依。離俱有根必不轉故。三等無間緣依。謂前滅意。諸心心所皆託此依。離開導根必不起故; cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 227ff. In his commentary, while explaining the "basis" of the eight awarenesses, Yuance (圓測, Wŏnch'uk) mentions also three kinds of basis equivalent to those three in CWSL, but he uses the term **sahabhūr āśraya* for **adhipatipratyayāśraya,* and *kaidaoyi* for **samanantarapratyayāśraya.* He explains the term *kaidaoyi* as follows: "The second is the basis that gives way to [the subsequent awareness] (**avakāśadānāśraya*). This means that each of the eight groups of awareness that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment is the basis that gives way to [the awareness] in the subsequent moment. For this reason it is said in [Xuanzang's] *Vijñaptimātratā*[*siddhi*]…" Cf. JSMJS 241b5-10: 八識所依。各有三種。一因緣依…二開導依。謂前念滅自類八識。各望後念。為開導依。故唯識云。三等無間緣依。謂前滅意諸心心所。皆託此依。離開導根。必不轉故。三俱有依…

[31] YBh (ed.) 110.18-21: *tatra bījaṃ pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya hetupratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. śliṣṭanirodhaṃ pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya samanantarapratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. viṣayaṃ pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya ālambanapratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. tadanyāni pratyayādhiṣṭhānāny adhiṣṭhāya adhipatipratyayaḥ prajñāpyate.*

plies here the idea which is expressed later with the term *ālayavijñāna*, the substratum from which the various psycho-physical factors arise.

3.3 In the standard Yogācāra texts, these three bases are usually mentioned as *bījāśraya* ("basis in the sense of seed"), *sahabhūr āśrayaḥ* ("co-existent basis") and *samanantara āśrayaḥ* ("similar-immediate basis") respectively. In fact, these three bases are already mentioned in the *Maulī bhūmi* of the YBh, where it is said that for visual awareness, the visual sense is the co-existent basis, and mind is the similar-immediate basis, while the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*), qualified as "containing all seeds", "appropriating the basis of personal existence" and "comprised in the category of maturation", is the basis in the sense of seed.[32] The "mind" is further described as "the awareness [i.e. any one of the six kinds of awareness] that passes away immediately before the visual awareness [arises]".[33] It seems to be quite possible that, in the discussion of CWSL mentioned above, in the context of discussing the "basis" of the arising of thought and thought concomitants, the theoretical model of "four conditions" that was available in the traditional Abhidharma system was replaced with the new model of "three bases". Of the four Abhidharma conditions, the Yogācāra texts fail to take up only the "condition *qua* object-support" (*ālambanapratyaya*), for the reason that this condition, which the realistic systems maintained was eternally existent, does not serve the purposes of an idealistic analysis of the arising of thought and thought concomitants.[34] The traditional term *hetupratyaya* is now newly defined as the "basis in the sense of seed" (*bījāśraya*), referring the new element *ālayavijñāna*; while the other two elements, *adhipatipratyaya* and *samanantarapratyaya*, are described as *sahabhūr āśrayaḥ*, "co-existent basis", and *samanantara āśrayaḥ*, "similar-immediate basis" respectively. In the case of these last two bases, notably,

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[32] Cf. YBh (ed.) 4.6-7: *cakṣurvijñānasya āśrayaḥ katamaḥ. cakṣuḥ sahabhūr āśrayaḥ, manaḥ samanantara āśrayaḥ, sarvabījakam āśrayopādātṛ vipākasaṃgṛhītam ālayavijñānaṃ bījāśrayaḥ.* This passage is also quoted and analyzed in the context of discussion of the occurrence of *ālayavijñāna* in Schmithausen, 1987: 110ff.

[33] Cf. ibid. 4.11-12: *manaḥ katamat. yac cakṣurvijñānasyānantarātītaṃ vijñānaṃ.*

[34] As is well-known, in Dignāga's ĀP all possibilities for the existence of an external "condition *qua* object-support" are negated.

only the temporal aspect is taken into consideration, i.e., the fivefold material sense faculty is regarded as the present basis and the mental faculty ("mind") as the past basis. Also worth mentioning is that the traditional *samanantarapratyaya* is now referred to as *āśraya*; however, the function it performs is still the same, viz. *avakāśadāna*, "giving way".

3.4 Thus far, we can conclude that *kaidaoyi* refers to a preceding awareness that has ceased to exist, which is called "mind" (*manas*);[35] this mind "gives way" in order for the subsequent awareness to arise. It is also worthwhile to note that the idea that the awareness that had passed away in the previous moment is called "mind" with the function of giving way to the subsequent awareness, although it is well accepted in Yogācāra texts, is in fact an old traditional interpretation of the similar-immediate condition in the Abhidharma tradition. Indeed, this generally accepted idea is now expressed by the term *avakāśadānāśraya* in the commentarial materials on Vasubandhu's TrK passed down to Xuanzang. For this reason, it seems to me that we should probably put aside Kuiji's rendering of *kaidaoyi* with *jielanduo* or **krānta*, and take the Sanskrit word **avakāśadānāśraya*, "basis that gives way to [the subsequent awareness]", or more concisely, "basis that gives way", as the original form of the Chinese term *kaidaoyi*. It seems to me also possible that "basis that gives way" is a new expression used in Yogācāra texts to describe a factor that is understood as the "basis" (*āśraya*) and performs the function of *avakāśadāna*, "giving way [to subsequent awareness]", which is parallel to *samanantarapratyaya*, "similar-immediate condition", in traditional Abhidharma texts. That is to say, it is new only in the terminological sense, while the idea expressed by the term is adopted from the old system.

As for Kuiji's phonetic rendering of the first part of the compound *kaidaoyi* as *jielanduo* = **krānta*, if we assume that he has some kind of information from commentarial materials which are not available to us, the form **krāntāśraya* could be at most a variant of *samanantara āśraya*. In that case, the word **krānta*, "preceding", was probably used in these

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[35] Thus, *manas* or "mind" has a double nature: it refers to the mental faculty, the sixth cognitive sphere; and it is also the designation of all awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment.

commentarial materials to explain the word *samanantara,* "immediately antecedent", in the term *samanantara āśrayaḥ.* This probably led Kuiji to consider that **krāntāśraya* should be rendered as *cidiyuan,* and *samanantara āśraya* as *dengwujianyuan.*[36]

3.5 With regard to the difference between **avakāśadānāśraya* or "basis that gives way" and the traditional form, *samanantarapratyaya,* "similar-immediate condition", we find some interesting discussions. In fact, the former is easily confused with the latter.[37] However, if we read the materials carefully, we find that they differ.

According to the interpretation attributed to Dharmapāla, the basis that gives way must be a special kind of similar-immediate condition, but not that condition itself. He states clearly that being a similar-immediate condition is only one of three *sine quibus non* of being a basis that gives way. He says:

> Being a basis that gives way means: (1) being a factor that possesses an object-support (**sālambana*)[38]; (2) being the principal [thought, i.e. *citta,* opposed to *caitta,* "thought concomitant"][39]; and (3) having the function of similar-immediate condition.[40]

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[36] Cf. above n. 5 and §2.2.

[37] For example, the Chinese term *kaidaoyi* is translated directly in Yao, 2005: 139-140 as "immediate contiguous conditions (*samanantarapratyaya*)".

[38] AK(Bh) 23.1-3 (AK 1.34ab): <u>*sapta sālambanāś cittadhātavaḥ. cakṣuḥśotraghrāṇajihvākāya-manovijñānadhātavo manodhātuś ca ete sapta cittadhātavaḥ sālambanā viṣayagrahaṇāt.*</u> "<u>Seven thought-elements (*cittadhātu*) have an objective support</u> (1.34ab). The thought-elements, i.e., the elements of [the six internal cognitive spheres (*āyatana*), i.e.,] visual awareness, auditory awareness, olfactory awareness, gustatory awareness, tactile a-wareness, mental awareness, and mind-element, have an object-support, because they grasp an object."

[39] Cf. CWSL-SJ 390a13-15: 為主者。即簡一切心所法等。彼非主故。要主有力方可為依; "<u>Being the principal thought</u> means all thought concomitants are excluded, because they are not the principal thought. Only those which are the principal thought have the power [to be *āśraya*], and thus can be taken as the basis."

[40] Cf. CWSL 21b13: 開導依者謂有緣法為主作等無間緣 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 246). In AMV the *sine quibus non* of being the similar-immediate condition are also mentioned: being associated (*saṃprayukta*), having a basis (*sāśraya*), having an aspect (*sākāra*), being active (*ābhoga*) and having an object-support (*sālambana*) (cf. AK 2.34

Kuiji, in commenting on this passage, also says:

> The basis that gives way (*krāntāśraya=cidiyuan*) is different from the similar-immediate condition (*samanantarapratyaya=dengwujianyuan*), which is one of four conditions (*catuḥpratyaya*). Any basis that gives way must be a [similar-]immediate condition, but some of the [similar-]immediate conditions are not a basis that gives way.[41]

3.6 The difference between the terms "basis that gives way" and "similar-immediate condition" is obvious: The former term indicates the function and the latter the temporal property; the former has "basis" (*āśraya*)

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bcd: *cittacaitasāḥ | sāśrayālambanākārāḥ saṃprayuktāś ca;* "Thought and thought concomitants have a basis, an object support and an aspect, and are associated"); thus, the dissociated conditioning factors ([*citta*]*viprayuktasaṃskāra*) cannot be the similar-immediate condition. Cf. AMV 52b3-7: 問何故不相應行。非等無間緣。答若法相應。有所依有行相。有警覺有所緣。彼法可立等無間緣。不相應行不爾。故非等無間緣 (partly translated in Dhammajoti, 2009: 174). In another place in AMV, in replying the objection that the factors of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaittā dharmāḥ*) in the antecedent moment could not be the similar-immediate condition of those in the subsequent moment, since such factors arise spontaneously on the strength of the retributive cause (**vipākahetubalāt*), the same idea is repeated, but there it is added that these kinds of associated factors in the antecdent moment can serve the function of the similar-immediate condition, because they have the power of leading-arising and giving way to those in the subsequent moment, while the dissociated factors do not have such power, so they cannot be the similar-immediate condition. Cf. AMV 52c7-11: 問若爾異熟心心所法。由異熟因勢力引起。任運而轉。前應非後等無間緣。答心心所法。是相應有所依。有行相有警覺。有所緣故。前念於後有勝勢力。引發開避。故皆是後等無間緣。不相應行與此相違。不可為例. On the issue of whether or not, in order to serve as the similar-immediate condition, the factor in the antecedent moment must be of the same kind as that in the subsequent moment, a divergence of opinions is presented in AMV; there an opinion related to this topic is reported (相似相續沙門說曰), which seems to maintain that only the principal thought (and not thought concomitants such as *vedanā*) can serve the function of the similar-immediate condition, and it is also emphasized that the capacity of giving way is the characteristic of the similar-immediate condition. Cf AMV 50c19-26: 問為心與心。作近等無間緣非受等。受等與受等。作近等無間緣非心等。為不爾耶。相似相續沙門說曰。心與心作近等無間緣非受等。受等與受等。作近等無間緣非心等。彼不應作是說。所以者何。前已說能開避義是等無間緣相。開避義中。無遠近故。應作是說。前生心聚與後生心聚。作等無間緣。無有差別。如豆等聚.

41 CWSL-SJ 390a8-10: 開導依者。與四緣中無間緣別。但是開導依必是無間緣。有是無間緣非開導依.

at the end and the latter has "condition". Besides this, the difference lies also in the fact that the former has a narrower extension than the latter – the former is included in the latter, but not *vice versa*. Indeed the term *āśraya* in the sense referring to past mind is used in AKBh. In AKBh 34. 9-16 (*ad* AK 1.44d) there is a discussion about the difference between the basis and the similar-immediate condition. It is said first that the five types of sensory awareness have the sense faculties as their co-nascent basis (*sahaja āśrayaḥ*), and also have "mind" as their past basis (*atīta āśra-yaḥ,* cf. AKBh 34.9-10 quoted above in n. 6). Next, a dialectical apparatus of four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*) is used to explain the relationship between them. They are represented respectively by:

(A) the visual sense;

(B) the mental function (*caitasika*)[42] as the element of factor (*dharma-dhātu*)[43] that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment;

(C) the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment; and

(D) factors other than those mentioned above.[44]

According to Yaśomitra's commentary, in the case of (A), the visual sense is the basis for visual awareness, but not the similar-immediate condition. In the case of (B), the mental function as the element of factor that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment is the similar-immediate condition, but not the basis, because only the six faculties, i.e.,

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[42] Just as in the case of "(A)", where only "the visual sense" is mentioned, but the mental faculty (*manas*) should also be implicated, here also "mental function" (=*caitta* "the thought concomitants") must be representative in nature, not excluding thought (*citta*); because Vasubandhu also says in AK 2.62ab that all arisen thought and thought concomitants, except the final one [i.e., that of an Arhat] are similar-immediate [conditions] (*cittacaittā acaramā, utpannāḥ samanantaraḥ*).

[43] Of course, here *dharmadhātu* should be understood in the *ābhidharmika* sense of the term, i.e., as one of the eighteen elements (*aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ*), different in technical meaning from the more familiar Mahāyāna *dharmadhātu*.

[44] AKBh 34.12-13: *catuṣkoṭikaḥ. prathamā koṭiś cakṣuḥ. dvitīyā samanantarātītaś caitasiko dharmadhātuḥ. tṛtīyā samanantarātītaṃ manaḥ. caturthī koṭir uktanirmuktā dharmāḥ.*

the five sense faculties and the mind, are accepted as the basis of aware-
ness. In the case of (C), the mind that has passed away in the immediate-
ly antecedent moment can be both basis and similar-immediate condi-
tion. And in the case of (D), factors other than those mentioned above
refer to the dissociated factors, such as unconditioned factors.[45] This dis-
cussion in the *catuṣkoṭi*-form can also be found in AMV[46] and ADV.[47]

3.7 Here, through the formulation of four alternatives, the difference
between the basis and the similar-immediate condition is clearly demon-
strated: all parts of C (the mind that has passed away in the immediately
antecedent moment) must be A (a kind of sense faculty), but only part of
A can be C, this part being the mind (*manas*); and on the other hand, all
parts of C (the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent

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[45] Cf. AKV 99.30-100.13: *prathamā* <u>*kotiś cakṣur iti. cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣur āśrayabhāvena, na*</u>
samanantarapratyayabhāvena. na hi cakṣuś cittacaittasvabhāvam. cittacaittā acaramā utpan-
nāḥ samanantaraḥ [AK 2.62ab] *iti ca samanantarapratyayalakṣaṇam.* <u>*dvitīyā kotih samanan-*</u>
<u>*tarātītaś caitasiko dharmadhātuḥ.* </u>*tasya samanantarabhāvena. ṣaḍ eva hy āśrayā vijñānasyeṣ-*
yante cakṣurādayo manaḥ paryantā nānye. <u>*trtīyā samanantarātītam manaḥ.* </u>*ubhayalakṣaṇa-*
yuktatvāt. <u>*caturthī uktanirmuktā dharmāḥ.* </u>*koṭitrayamuktā viprayuktā asaṃskṛtādayaḥ.*

[46] Cf. AMV 369c22-27: 以是因緣應作四句。有法是眼識所依非等無間緣。謂俱生眼。
有法是眼識等無間緣非所依。謂無間已滅諸心所法。有法是眼識所依亦是等無間緣。
謂無間已滅意界。有法非眼識所依亦非等無間緣。謂除前相。乃至身識四句亦爾.

[47] Cf. ADV 40.6-15: *kiṃ punar eṣāṃ cakṣurvijñānādīnāṃ sahaja evāśrayaḥ, āhosvid atīto 'pi? tad*
ucyate – <u>*paścimasyāśrayo 'titaḥ.* </u>*manovijñānasya kriyāvato nityam āśrayo 'titaḥ.* <u>*pañcānāṃ*</u>
<u>*taih sahāpi ca* </u>|| *pañcānāṃ vijñanakāyānāṃ taih sahāpi cātītaś ceti caśabdāt. evaṃ catuṣkoṭika*
ārabhyate. ye dharmā vijñānaniśrayāḥ samanantarā api te. praśnaś catuṣkoṭikaḥ. niśraya eva
cakṣurādayaḥ. samanantarā eva vedanādayaḥ. ubhayaṃ samanantaraniruddhaṃ vijñānam.
nobhayam etān ākārān sthāpayitvā. "Further, do these visual awareness, etc., have only a
co-nascent basis, or also a past one? The answer is as follows: <u>The last [of the six</u>
<u>awareness-elements] has the past [factor] as its basis.</u> [This means,] the active (*kri-*
yāvat) mental awareness always has a past basis. <u>The five [groups of sensory aware-</u>
<u>ness] are also simultaneous with their [bases].</u> The five groups of [sensory] awareness
are simultaneous with their [bases], and yet they also have a past basis, because [the
word] *ca* is used. [A discussion] in the form of four alternatives is formulated as fol-
lows: Are all factors that serve as the bases of awareness also immediate antecedents?
This question [comprises] four alternatives: (A) [Sense faculties] such as the visual
sense are only the bases; (B) [Mental factors] such as sensation are only immediate an-
tecedents; (C) Awareness [any of the six awarenesses] that has ceased to exist in the
immediately antecedent moment is both [basis and immediate antecedent]; (D) [Any
factor] other than these forms is neither."

moment) must be B (all mental factors including both thought and thought concomitants), but only part of B can be C, this part referring to "principal thoughts", namely the first six awarenesses; thus, C has a narrower extension than B. This coincides nicely with Kuiji's statement quoted immediately above.

In summary, the relationship among the *avakāśadānāśraya* or basis that gives way, the similar-immediate condition and their product, that is, awareness including visual awareness and mental awareness, can be illustrated as follows:

moment 1   → moment 2
samanantarapratyaya =   → *citta/caitta*
(*citta* [*manas*: *avakāśadānāśraya]   (*indriyavijñāna/manovijñāna*)
   + *caitta*)

4 Three interpretations of *avakāśadānāśraya

4.1 As mentioned above, in Xuanzang's CWSL it is reported that there are three divergent opinions about the nature and function of the *avakāśadānāśraya, "basis that gives way", which reflect in fact the different understandings of the relationship between two awarenesses in a thought series.

It is well known that in CWSL, when a topic is under discussion, if there are a number of different interpretations they are normally reduced to several opinions attributed to groups headed by important interpreters, such as Nanda, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla. Also, Dharmapāla's opinion is normally given after that of Sthiramati or others, and is regarded as the final and decisive voice; for Dharmapāla is seen as the orthodox interpreter of Vasubandhu's TrK, among the ten interpreters whose views are canvassed.[48] Furthermore, throughout the whole work, on numerous topics, the opinion of Sthiramati is reported as a criticism of Nanda's interpretation, and Dharmapāla's interpretation is in turn

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[48] CWSL-SJ 232a8-12: 製此釋者雖十論師。於中護法聲德獨振。故此論題特以標首。此師所說最有研尋。於諸義中多為南指。邪徒失趣正理得方。迴拔眾師穎超群聖者。其惟一人乎.

presented as a criticism of Sthiramati. Indeed, there are controversies between Sthiramati and Dharmapāla regarding many crucial issues; however, as we will see below, in the case of the interpretation of the function of the basis that gives way, they do not differ sharply.

4.2 The first opinion is attributed in Kuiji's commentary to Nanda *et al.*[49] The main position of this opinion is explained in CWSL as follows:

> Some say: The five [sensory] awarenesses cannot continue from a previous moment to a subsequent moment as the same type [such as visual awareness in the previous moment and subsequent moment] or as different types [such as visual awareness in the previous moment and auditory awareness in the subsequent moment], since they come into being necessarily through the projecting force (*yinsheng* 引生, **ākṣepābhinirvṛtta*) of the sixth awareness [in the previous moment]; therefore, they take exclusively the sixth awareness as their basis that gives way. [On the other hand,] because the sixth awareness can continue as the same kind [of awareness in previous and subsequent moments], and because it also comes into being through the projecting force of the five [types of] awareness [in the previous moment], it takes the first six types of awareness [in the previous moment] as its basis that gives way. [Furthermore,] because the seventh and eighth awarenesses can maintain continuity as the same [type of awareness in previous and subsequent moments], and because they do not come into being through the projecting force of other awarenesses, they take only themselves as the basis that gives way.[50]

4.3 Nanda's opinion can be summarized as follows: The five types of sensory awareness cannot continue for two moments; consequently they come into being in dependence on the "projecting force" (*ākṣepa*) of mental awareness and take only this awareness as their basis that gives way; while mental awareness takes the five types of sensory awareness

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[49] CWSL-SJ 387c19-20: 云後開導依至不相續故。述曰。即是難陀等長徒之義.

[50] CWSL 21a4-8: 有義五識自他前後不相續故。必第六識所引生故。唯第六識為開導依。第六意識自相續故。亦由五識所引生故。以前六識為開導依。第七八識自相續故。不假他識所引生故。但以自類為開導依 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 242).

as well as another mental awareness, i.e., the same kind of awareness in the antecedent moment, as its basis that gives way. This opinion is indeed, as I see it, close to the *Maulī bhūmi* of YBh, which reflects the realistic aspect of the earlier Yogācāra, where it is said:

> And it is not the case that the five groups of awareness arise simultaneously (*saha*) in two moments, nor is it the case that they arise one from the other immediately one after the other; [rather] immediately subsequent to the five groups of awareness that arise in a single moment, mental awareness necessarily arises. Sometimes, immediately subsequent to these [five groups of awareness, attention (*manaskāra*)] is distracted [elsewhere], and an auditory awareness or any other one of the five groups of awareness may arise thereafter. When this [attention] is not distracted, only mental awareness, called "discerning [thought]" (*niścita*), [would arise] thereafter. Two kinds of mental awareness, i.e., searching [thought] (*paryeṣakaṃ* [*cittam*]) and discerning [thought] (*niścitam* [*cittam*]), conceptualize the object.[51]

To a certain extent, this opinion is also similar to Dharmakīrti's explanation of the similar-immediate condition, i.e., mental awareness (or "mental perception") is produced by sensory awareness (or "sensory perception") in the immediately antecedent moment, functioning as the similar-immediate condition.[52]

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[51] YBh (ed.) 58.13-19: *na ca asti pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ saha dvayoḥ kṣaṇayor utpattiḥ, na apy anyonyasamanantaram anyonyotpattiḥ. ekakṣaṇotpannānāṃ pañcānāṃ kāyavijñānānām* (read *vijñānakāyānām*, cf. YBh (T) 30a4: *rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag gi*, YBh (C) 291b3: 五識身) *anantaraṃ manovijñānam avaśyam utpadyate. tadanantaraṃ kadācid vikṣipyate, tataḥ śrotravijñānaṃ vā anyatamānyatamad vā pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānām. sa cen na vikṣipyate. tato manovijñānam eva niścitaṃ nāma. tābhyāṃ ca niścitaparyeṣakābhyāṃ manovijñānābhyāṃ sa viṣayo vikalpyate.* For a detailed discussion of the earlier Yogācāra position with regard to the relationship between two awarenesses in two moments in connection with the theory of the five types of thought (*citta*) including the "discerning thought" and "searching thought" mentioned here, cf. Chu, forthcoming.

[52] Cf. PVin 19a-c (19.3-4): *mānasaṃ cākṣavijñānānantarapratyayodbhavam | tadarthānantaragrāhi.* "And mental [perception] arises from sensory awareness as its immediate condition, and grasps the object-referent of the latter in the immediately subsequent moment." Cf. also PVin 19.5-6: *mānasam apīndriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena svaviṣayānantarakṣaṇasahakāriṇā janitaṃ pratyakṣam.* "Also mental [awareness], produced by sensory cognition as its similar-immediate condition with its own object-field in the

As a matter of fact, in the earlier period of development of the Yogā-cāra system, to which the *Maulī bhūmi* of the YBh belongs, the Yogācāras share the same doctrines in many aspects with the realistic systems, the Sautrāntika, or the Sarvāstivāda. In AMV we read an interesting passage which mentions the different opinions between the Yogācāra and the Abhidharma teachers with regard to the same topic:

> Question: Does [each type among] the five awarenesses, such as visual awareness, come forth (*pratyupasthita) immediately one after the other (*anyonyasamanantaram*) [and thus maintain its continuity]? Answer: The Yogācāra teacher says that [each type among] the five awarenesses, such as visual awareness, does not come forth immediately one from the other, because they all arise immediately from mental awareness. However, the Abhidharma teachers say that [each of] the five [types of] awarenesses, such as visual awareness, can arise immediately [one from the other].[53]

Here, it is also clearly said that Yogācāra maintains that the five groups of awareness do not arise from the same kind of awareness; rather, they are necessarily produced by mental awareness, a position similar to Nanda, *et al.* This can be regarded as the position of the Yogācāra at its early stage.[54]

Disregarding the point that mental awareness can additionally have an awareness of the same kind in the immediately antecedent moment as its basis that gives way, the salient point of Nanda *et al.*'s position is that the five types of sensory awareness (symbolized as "S") and mental awareness (symbolized as "M") come forth one after another in succession, which can be represented thus:

> Nanda: S(/M)→M→S(/M)→M→ ...

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immediately subsequent phase as the auxiliary factor [for its arising], is a kind of perception." Cf. also the similar statement in NB 1.9: *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāri-ṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam.*

[53] AMV 682b2-4: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。

[54] I will discuss this topic in more detail in Chu, forthcoming.

["(/M)" indicates the disregarded requirement that mental awareness can have another mental awareness in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way.]

4.4 This opinion is criticized and refuted by the second opinion, attributed in Kuiji's commentary to a group of interpreters headed by Sthiramati *et al.*[55] The refutation starts straightforwardly as follows:

Some [others] maintain: The above-mentioned opinion is not characterized by thorough reasoning (**pariniṣṭhayukti*). Granted that, when the first five groups of awareness are in the state (*avasthā*) of not possessing supernatural power (**a-vaśitā*), obtaining (**lābha*, etc.) [an object spontaneously] or [obtaining] a non-distinctive object (**a-viśiṣṭārtha*), [they can be non-continuous], as [the opponent] says.[56] But, when they are in the state of possessing supernatural power, as in the case of Buddhas and so on who possess the supernatural power in respect to the object, [i.e., cross-modality,] employing any sense faculty [in respect to any object] interchangeably, determining [objects] effortlessly (*anābhogena*) without the medium of seeking [thought]

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[55] Cf. CWSL-SJ 388a16: 論。有義彼說未為究理。述曰。安惠等解 (in Yao, 2005: 139–140, this opinion is incorrectly attributed to Dharmapāla; in fact, Dharmapāla's opinion is reported in the next passage, beginning with the phrase "someone else maintains", 有義; cf. CWSL 21b12). In CWSL, the discussion of Sthiramati *et al.*'s opinion is extended with quotations from YBh, and some special theories are also involved, such the theory of five types of thought (*citta*) and the theory of mental awareness accompanying the five groups of sensory awareness; furthermore, this opinion is associated in Kuiji's commentary with Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccya*, etc. (cf. CWSL-SJ 420c21-22: 集量論等五俱意識定現量者。必同緣故). All of these points require a separate study, which is provided in Chu, forthcoming.

[56] Cf. Kuiji 388a25-388b1 (*ad loc.*:且前五識未自在位。遇非勝境可如所說): 一未自在位。二率爾遇境位。三遇非勝境位。上一位言通下二處。次一遇言貫下第三。後境之言復通第二; "[Here, three mental states are mentioned]: First, the state of not having supernatural power; second, the state of obtaining the object spontaneously; third, the state of obtaining a non-distinctive object. [In this sentence] the word *wei* (位, **avasthā*) in the first item also applies in other two; and the word *yu* (遇, *lābha*, etc.) in the second item also applies in the third; further, the word *jing* (境, *viṣaya*) in the last item applies in the second." According to this explanation the sentence should be read as: 五識未自在位、遇、非勝境.

(*_paryeṣakaṃ_ [_cittam_]), why [then] would these five groups of aware-
ness not be continuous?[57]

As we mentioned above, the key point of the opinion of Nanda _et al._ is
that the five types of sensory awareness and mental awareness take each
other as their basis, and arise one after the other; that means, of course,
that the five types of sensory awareness are not continuous, but rather,
are interrupted by mental awareness while proceeding from the first
moment to the second moment in the series. By contrast, according to
Sthiramati _et al._, sensory awareness, accompanied by mental awareness,
can be continuous; only in the special cases where sensory awareness
grasps the object spontaneously or the object is not a distinctive one, so
that cognition involves no mental activity such as attention (which is
mental awareness by nature), can sensory awareness be non-continuous;
but, even so, this holds good only for those who have not arrived at the
stage of possessing the supernatural power of controlling their sense fa-
culties, and not for the Buddha, and so on.

Further, according to the principle of mental awareness accompany-
ing sensory awareness, the opinion of Nanda _et al._ is challenged by Sthi-
ramati _et al._ as follows:

When the five [types of] awareness arise, there must be a mental
awareness to give rise to the mental awareness of the subsequent
moment. Why does [this later mental awareness] need the five [types
of] awareness as its basis that gives way?[58]

4.5 In the opinion of Sthiramati _et al._, the five types of sensory awareness
take the same kind of awareness in the antecedent moment as their basis
that gives way, so that they maintain their continuity; and immediately

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[57] CWSL 21a9-12: 有義前說未有究理。且前五識未自在位。遇非勝境可如所說。若自
在位。如諸佛等於境自在。諸根互用任運決定不假尋求。彼五識身寧不相續 (cf. La
Vallée Poussin, 1928: 242f.).

[58] CWSL 21a27: 五識起時必有意識能引後念意識令起。何假五識為開導依.

after their arising they are accompanied by mental awareness.[59] The conclusion of Sthiramati *et al.* is summarized in CWSL as follows:

> It should be said that the five [types of] awareness take all six aware-nesses in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way; [be-cause the five types of sensory awareness are themselves continuous, and also come into being through the projecting force of another awareness, i.e., the mental awareness, they can arise without inter-ruption[60]]. The sixth awareness takes the antecedent [awareness] of its own kind as its basis that gives way, or takes the seventh and the eighth awarenesses [when it arises in the five thought-free (*acittakam*) states, i.e. the ideationless realm, absorption in ideationlessness, ab-sorption into the cessation of ideation, sleep, and fainting].[61]

That is to say, the relationship between sensory awareness and mental awareness is that they are not temporally separated in two different moments; rather, they exist in tandem in both moments: in the ante-cedent moment, both of them serve the function of the basis that gives way for their successors in the subsequent moment; in the subsequent moment, sensory awareness, being the extension of the same kind of awareness in the antecedent moment and continuously produced by mental awareness in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way, is further accompanied upon its arising by a mental awareness which takes the awareness of its own kind in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way. This opinion can be presented as follows:

Sthiramati: S/M→S/M→S/M→ ...

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[59] These two points in Sthiramati *et al.*'s opinion, i.e., (1) the five types of sensory aware-ness are continuous and (2) they are accompanied by mental awareness, along with other relevant theories, are discussed in more detail in Chu, forthcoming.

[60] Cf. Kuiji's comment in CWSL-SJ 389c18-19: 五識以前六識皆得為依。自相續故。他引生故。得次無間生.

[61] CWSL 21b8-9: 應說五識前六識內隨用何識為開導依。第六意識用前自類或第七八為開導依; cf. CWSL-SJ 389c22-23: 五位無心時。或第七。八為依; cf. also the five thought-free states listed in TrK, 16 where it is stated that mental awareness arises in every case with the exception of these five thought-free states (*acittaka*): *manovijñāna-saṃbhūtiḥ sarvadā āsaṃjñikād ṛte | samāpattidvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt.*

["/" means the simultaneity of the two events.]

4.6 Finally, this second opinion, in its turn, is criticized and refuted by the third opinion attributed to the group of interpreters led by Dharmapāla.[62] This third opinion reads as follows:

> Some say: This theory is not reasonable, either...One [awareness] can be explained as having the power of giving way to the other [awareness], when it does not occur simultaneously with the latter. Since the eight awarenesses in one personal existence (*ekakāye*) are accepted as arising simultaneously, how can these heterogeneous [awarenesses] (*visabhāga*) be the basis that gives way [of one other]? If they are regarded as the basis [that gives way for one other], they should not occur simultaneously; but then, [the resulting doctrine] would fall into line with the other [Hīnayāna] schools (*parapakṣa*),[63] which maintain that thoughts do not occur simultaneously.[64]

Here, Dharmapāla's point is that awarenesses of different kinds, such as sensory awareness and mental awareness, since they exist simultaneously, cannot serve as the basis that gives way for one other.

Dharmapāla continues by saying that in one personal existence different kinds of awareness occur simultaneously, and their number is indeterminate, i.e., the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*) exists together with anything from one to seven kinds of awareness; if they are all

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[62] CWSL-SJ 390a2-4: 論。有義此說亦不應理。述曰...此護法釋.

[63] The Dārṣṭāntika takes the clear position that thought and thought concomitants do not arise simultaneously; cf. AMV 79c7-11: 謂或有執心心所法。前後而生非一時起。如譬喻者。彼作是說。心心所法依諸因緣前後而生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度無二並行。心心所法亦復如是; "That is to say, there are some who hold that thought and thought concomitants arise one after the other, and do not arise simultaneously. For example, the Dārṣṭāntika say that thought and thought concomitants arise in the antecedent or subsequent moments according to causes and conditions. It is just as, when the members of a caravan go through a narrow mountain pass, they pass through one by one, but not two side by side; thought and thought concomitants are the same."

[64] CWSL 21b13-17: 有義此說亦不應理...若此與彼無俱起義。說此於彼有開導力。一身八識既容俱起。如何異類為開導依。若許為依應不俱起。便同異部心不並生 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 246).

regarded as similar-immediate conditions of one another, then the number of the antecedent awarenesses serving as similar-immediate condition and of the subsequent awareness would be unequal, and also matter, etc. (*rūpādi*) could be a similar-immediate condition, as is maintained in the Hīnayāna system; this would be contradictory to the noble treatise (聖説, *śāstra*) that accepts only thought and thought concomitants as the similar-immediate condition.[65] Here, the argument apparently has as its background a discussion presented in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha.* In that text, the Hīnayāna[66] idea is refuted that material and thought (*rūpacitta*) is the "seed" (*bīja*) or the condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*), and thus the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*) postulated by the Yogācāra does not need to exist; in this context it is said that material and thought can be at most the similar-immediate condition, but never the condition *qua* cause.[67] Thus, it is said in CWSL that in that text the mentioning of mat-

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[65] CWSL 21b18-20: 又一身中諸識俱起。多少不定若容互作等無間緣。色等應爾。便違聖説等無間緣唯心心所. Here, "noble treatise" refers to the passage in YBh; cf. above n. 14.

[66] According to the sub-commentary, this refers to the Sautrāntika, who maintain that matter in the antecedent moment immediately produces matter in the subsequent moment; also thought and its associated (*saṃprayukta*) *dharma* in the antecedent moment immediately produces thought in the subsequent moment… cf. Lamotte, 1973: 77.

[67] Cf. MS §1.55 (TP 221.2.4-6): *gang yang gzugs dang sems kyi mjug thogs su 'byung ba chos rnams kyi sa bon nyid du rtog pa de yang gong ma bzhin du mi 'thad kyi steng du gzugs med pa dang | 'du shes med pa nas shi 'phos pa dang | 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa las langs pa'i de yang mi rung ngo | de ma thag pa'i rkyen du rung ba ma gtogs par dgra bcom pa'i tha ma'i sems kyang mi rung bar 'gyur ro*; = MS (X) 137a15-17: 若復有執色心無間生。是諸法種子。此不得成如前已說。又從無色無想天沒。滅定等出不應道理。又阿羅漢後心不成。唯可容有等無間; "Again, also the idea (*vikalpa*) [of the Sautrāntika] that the uninterrupted production (*anantarotpāda*) of matter and thought is the seed of the *dharma*s is not correct, as stated above (in MS 1.23). Furthermore (*upari*), it is also impossible [for this matter and thought to be the condition *qua* cause] in cases [where no matter and thought exist, such as in] those who have transmigrated (*cyuta*) into the formless (*ārūpya*) and ideationless [realms], and those who have arisen (*vyutthita*) from the meditative attainment of cessation [of ideation] (*nirodhasamāpatti*), etc. It is also impossible that the final thought of an Arhat (*antyacitta*) [should be a condition that gives rise to another thought,] except that it is possible for it to be the similar-immediate condition" (cf. Lamotte, 1973: 77, Nagao, 1982: 244).

ter as similar-immediate condition is a concessionary statement for the sake of argument; that is to say, it grants the Hīnayāna idea that matter and thought in the antecedent and subsequent moments are in the relation of similar-immediate condition, for the purpose of refuting the claim that they are the condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*); but, in fact, matter cannot be regarded as the similar-immediate condition, for in that case the number of the antecedent awarenesses serving as similar-immediate condition would be unequal to the number of the subsequent awareness (since besides thought, matter would also be taken as a similar-immediate condition), and thus the element "similar" (*sam-*) in the term "similar-immediate condition" would serve no purpose; if Sthiramati *et al.* were to say that *sam-* does not limit the number of similar-immediate conditions, but simply indicates the homogeneity (*sabhāga*) of similar-immediate conditions, this would be contradictory to their own assertion that a heterogeneous awareness can be the similar-immediate condition.[68]

4.7 Dharmapāla *et al.*'s position concludes as follows:

> Therefore, each of the eight kinds of awareness has only the [awareness] of its own kind (**svajāti*) as its basis that gives way. This conforms very well to the scriptural tradition as well as to reasoning, because [awareness], insofar as it is of the same kind, cannot occur simultaneously.[69]

Thus, Dharmapāla *et al.*'s position is that mental awareness cannot be caused by sensory awareness as its similar-immediate condition, or *vice versa.* That is to say, Dharmapāla *et al.* hold to the strict principle that each kind of awareness can only have its own kind of awareness in the antecedent moment as its similar-immediate condition. This opinion can be represented thus:

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[68] 然攝大乘說色亦容有等無間緣者。是縱奪言。謂假縱小乘色心前後有等無間緣，奪因緣故。不爾等言應成無用。若謂等言非遮多少但表同類。便違汝執異類識作等無間緣. For the interpretation of this passage, cf. CWSL-SJ 390b8-18; cf. also La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 247.

[69] Ibid., 21b25: 是故八識各唯自類為開導依深契教理。自類必無俱起義故.

Dharmapāla: S→S→S→ ... / M→M→M→ ...

["/" means the parallelism of the two series of events]

4.8 For Sthiramati, when the five awarenesses take awareness of their own kind in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way, being always accompanied by mental awareness, they by definition also take mental awareness in that moment as their basis that gives way, since mental awareness and sensory awareness are never separated. However, Dharmapāla perceives a contradiction between the fact that one awareness is the basis that gives way of another awareness, and the fact that these two still occur simultaneously.

In fact, however, the difference between these two interpreters is trifling. Both of them accept the simultaneous arising of multiple kinds of awareness. The point on which Dharmapāla disagrees with Sthiramati is that Sthiramati accepts that five types of awareness also take mental awareness, in addition to sensory awareness, as their similar-immediate condition; that is to say, Sthiramati does not strictly enforce the principle that the function of the similar-immediate condition can be performed only by an awareness of its own kind. Indeed, Sthiramati himself does not reject the idea of "similarity" (*sam-*) between the antecedent awareness functioning as the similar-immediate condition and the subsequent awareness conditioned by the antecedent one, for he also stipulates, in his own work, that a thought, being the similar-immediate condition of the subsequent thought, cannot be separated from that subsequent thought by any other kind of thought;[70] however, in contrast to

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[70] Cf. ASBh 37.23-28.1 (ad AS 29.9-10): <u>*nairantaryasamanantarato 'pīti nāvaśyaṃ kṣaṇanairantaryaṃ kiṃ tarhi cittāntaranairantaryam apy atra nairantaryaṃ draṣṭavyam itarathā hy acittikasamāpattau vyutthānacittasya samāpatticittaṃ na samanantarapratyayaḥ syāt. bhavati ca. tasmād ekasmin saṃtāne paścimasya cittasya pūrvakaṃ cittaṃ cittāntareṇānantaritaṃ samanantarapratyayaḥ. yathā cittam evaṃ caitasikā api veditavyāḥ.*</u> "<u>Due to its being similar-immediate, viz. without interval, as well as...</u>This does not necessarily mean [that there is] no interval between moments; rather, here, [a state in which there is] no interval between thoughts [even if other moments do intervene] is also to be regarded as the immediate. For otherwise, the thought at [the inception of the thought-free] meditative attainment (*samāpatticitta*) would not be the similar-immediate condition of the thought [after] arising (*vyutthānacitta*) from that thought-free meditative attainment (*acittikasamāpatti*) [since there is an interval of thought-free moments between these two thoughts], but [in fact] it is. [This is because there is no other kind of

Dharmapāla, he places the emphasis on the continuity of thought. In the case of the five awarenesses, as discussed above, even though they take mental awareness in the antecedent moment as their similar-immediate condition, they can maintain continuity under the condition that they are accompanied by mental awareness, and are not separate from the latter.

4.9 The fact that Dharmapāla does not disagree with Sthiramati on the fundamental point that sensory awareness and mental awareness can arise simultaneously, and thus can have a common object, can be confirmed in his commentary on Dignāga's ĀP. Commenting on the meaning of the word "etc." (等 = *la sogs pa*) in the first sentence "those who maintain that the external object is the object-support of the visual cognition, etc.",[71] he introduces an interesting discussion. Although the meaning of this passage is not completely clear to me in every detail, the gist is surely as follows. According to Dharmapāla, realistic systems hold that the object of the five types of sensory awareness is real, while that of mental awareness is unreal – they make a clear-cut distinction between the nature of the object of sensory awareness and that of mental awareness.[72] Based on this assumption, it is held that the target of Dignāga's refutation is merely the existence of the object of the five types of sensory awareness, and not the object of mental awareness, because the latter does not need refutation.[73]

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thought between them.] Therefore, within one [thought-]series, the antecedent thought, not being separated by any other kind of thought, is the similar-immediate condition of the subsequent thought. Thought concomitants are also to be understood in just the same way as thought." A similar idea can also be found in Yaśomitra's commentary on AK 1.17a, AKV 41.28-32. For a more detailed study of Sthiramati's position in this regard, see Chu, forthcoming.

[71] ĀPV TD 86a6-7: *gang dag mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa phyi rol gyi don yin par 'dod pa de dag...*

[72] Cf. GSYYL-SJ 821a8: 此推他宗執根識不同意識所緣; and ibid. 821a12: 此句。乃護法師。斥他宗一向執眼等五識。緣極微和合為真實之事。意識不然非一向故者.

[73] Cf. ĀPṬ 889a23-c4: 此中等言。謂攝他許。依其色根五種之識。由他於彼一向執為緣實事故。意識不然。非一向故。許世俗有緣車等故。縱許意識緣實事境。有其片分。亦能將識相似之相。離無其境。於眼等識。境不相離。得成就已。方為成立。是故於此不致慇懃。又復於串修果。智所了色。誠非咀迦所行境故。及如所見。而安立

However, according to Dharmapāla, such a clear-cut distinction is problematic in respect to the relationship between sensory awareness and mental awareness. He continues by pointing out that in that case the following problem would arise:

> If this were the case [i.e. if mental awareness never grasped the real object that is cognized by sensory awareness], how could it be possible that mental awareness in every case comes into being through the projecting force (*ākṣepābhinirvṛtta) of sensory awareness? [Mental awareness cannot come into being through the projecting force of sensory awareness, for in that case] this [mental awarenesses] could neither [arise] simultaneously with sensory awareness, nor in the im-

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故。今此但觀聞思生得智之境也。如斯意識所緣之境。全成非有。此於自聚。不能緣故。復緣過未。非實事故。猶若無為。為此*等*言。攝五識身; "Here, the word 'etc.' includes all five types of awareness based on the material sense faculties (*rūpiṇām indriyāṇām) as accepted by other realist systems [such as the Sarvāstivāda]. This is because according to these systems, this kind of awareness always takes really existent things as its object-support; mental awareness is different, because it does not always do so, [that is to say,] because it can also take conventionally existent things, such as a chariot, as its object-support. Even if it were accepted that mental awareness can take a real thing as its object-support in one moment, [after that moment (cf. GSYYL-SJ 821a18: 此謂意識緣境。一剎那頃。即離境而緣)] it would still grasp a mental image similar to [that object], separate from that object; [whereas] in the case of visual awareness etc., [the awareness] is never separated from the object. Since [the doctrine of the realistic systems] can be established only by taking this [distinction between the object of sensory awarenesses and that of mental awareness] for granted, no effort needs to be made [to examine the object of mental awareness]. And this is also because the visible matter [consisting in atoms (cf. GSYYL-SJ 821b6: 即假想觀中極微色也) apprehended through cognition resulting from contemplation is definitely not the field (*gocara) of [mental awareness such as] reasoning (*tarka) or the [verbal] determination of the [imagined] view [of atoms (cf. ibid. 821b9: 是意識緣本質色安立名言。即彼妄執假想觀中分析極微)]. Only by observing the object of hearing and thinking can [mental] cognition arise (ibid. 821b14: 意謂但觀聞思境。生得意識智). Thus, the object taken by mental awareness [in the distracted state (*vikṣiptaṃ)] as object-support is completely non-existent, because in this [awareness] both [the atom] itself and the aggregate [of atoms] cannot be apprehended (cf. ibid. 821b17-18: 此於自聚不能緣故者。自乃極微。聚名和合。此又謂意識不能緣極微和合為境), and because the object-support in the past or the future is not really existent, just like the unconditioned [factor] (*asaṃskṛta). For these reasons, through the use of the word 'etc.' all five groups of sensory awareness are included [but mental awareness is excluded]."

mediately subsequent moment, because in both cases it takes the visible matter, etc., that have ceased to exist (*niruddha), as its object-support. Or [you may say:] it takes the present thing as its object-support; then, because this [object-support] has not been experienced (*anubhūta) by sensory awareness, the mental awareness itself would take the external object *per se* directly as its object-support [independent of the sensory awareness]. This would lead to the unwanted consequence (*iti prasajyate) that there was no blindness, deafness, etc.[74]

4.10 According to the sub-commentary, this passage serves the purpose of refuting the doctrine of other systems (他宗, *parapakṣa), which do not accept that the mental awareness takes the five [sensory] object-referents (*pañcārthāḥ) as its object-field simultaneously with the five [sensory] awarenesses.[75] "Other systems" here refers, of course, to the realistic systems that assume the separation of sensory awareness from mental awareness. Indeed, for these systems, it is a problem to explain causality between these two kinds of awareness, but not for Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, who both follow the Yogācāra. The Yogācāra, which

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[74] ĀPṬ 889b4-8: 若爾根識引生所有意識。斯乃如何。非此共其根識同時。或復無間。皆滅色等為所緣故。或緣現在。此非根識。曾所領故。斯乃意識自能親緣外境體性。此則遂成無聾盲等. A similar problem is also discussed by Jinendrabuddhi in his PSṬ: cf. PSṬ 51.13-52, 1: *tatra manovijñānam indriyagṛhītam evārthaṃ gṛhṇāti tato vānyam iti dvayī kalpanā. yadi pūrvā, tatas tasya prāmāṇyam eva na syāt, gṛhītagrahaṇāt smṛtyādivat. atha dvitīyā, tadāndhāder apy arthagrahaṇaṃ syāt. indriyajñānanirapekṣaṃ hi manovijñānaṃ yadi bāhye 'rthe pravartate, tadā cakṣurādivikalasyāpi darśanaṃ prāpnoti.* "In this regard there are two alternatives – namely, mental awareness grasps precisely the object that is grasped by the sensory [awareness]; or [an object] other than that. If the first were the case, this [mental awareness] would certainly not be a valid means of cognition, because it is an apprehension of what has already been apprehended, like recollection. Alternatively, if the second [alternative] were the case, then a blind person etc. could also grasp the object. For, if mental awareness, independent of sensory awareness, came forth in respect to the external object, then a person without the visual sense would have sight." This is based on PV 3.239: *pūrvānubhūtagrahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā | adṛṣṭagrahaṇe 'ndhāder api syād arthadarśanam;* "If mental [awareness] apprehended what had already been previously apprehended, it would not be a valid means of cognition; [on other hand,] if it apprehended what is not seen, a blind man would also see things." The argument is valid only under the assumption that mental awareness apprehends an external object.

[75] GSYYL-SJ 821c4: 此破他宗。不許意識。與五識同時緣五塵為境.

regards the object of sensory awareness as equally unreal with that of mental awareness, can solve this problem easily by maintaining that mental awareness, as a phase of the continuum, is caused by the awareness of the same kind that arose simultaneously with sensory awareness in the antecedent moment, and accompanies the present sensory awarenesses. Thus, mental awareness and sensory awareness share the same object. Dharmakīrti's solution is different: he says that mental awareness arises from sensory awareness as its immediate condition, and it grasps a different object than that which has been grasped by sensory awareness. Thus, since mental awareness also depends on sensory awareness, the unwanted consequence that a blind man would also perceive the object is avoided.[76] This approach is evidently based on the Sautrāntika position.

5   Conclusion

On the basis of the above study, we can arrive at the following conclusions:

1. The Chinese term *kaidaoyi* reflects a different version of *samanantarapratyaya*, referring to the awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, called "mind", which has the function of giving way in order for the subsequent awareness to arise. The first part of the compound, *kaidao,* expresses exactly this function; thus, it must be a translation of the Sanskrit word *avakāśadāna.* This word is widely used in the texts of both the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra to describe the function of the so-called "mind" that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment.

2. In the Yogācāra system, a set of terms is used to describe the cause of the arising of thought and thought concomitants (*cittacaitta*), which

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[76] Cf. PV 3.243: *tasmād indriyavijñānānantarapratyayodbhavaṃ | mano 'nyam eva gṛhṇāti viṣayaṃ nāndhadṛk tataḥ*; However, "grasps a different object" is omitted in his later work, cf. NB 1.9: *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇā indriyajñānena | samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam*; "The mental awareness is engendered by the sensory awareness as its similar-immediate condition with the object-field of the latter in the immediately antecedent moment as the auxiliary [condition]."

end with "basis" (*āśraya*), such as "basis in the sense of seed" (*bījāśraya*), "co-existent basis" (*sahabhūr āśrayaḥ*) and "similar-immediate basis" (*samanantara āśrayaḥ*). This is parallel to the fourfold "condition" (*pratyaya*), i.e., condition *qua* cause (*hetupratyaya*), dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*), similar-immediate condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) and objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), which was already used in the old Abhidharma texts. It is exactly the "similar-immediate condition" that is now named in CWSL the "basis that gives way"; both of them refer to the same thing: that awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, which is called "mind". Thus, the special term *kaidaoyi*, which is introduced into the discussion of the relationship between mental awareness and the five types of sensory awareness in Xuanzang's CWSL, is not a translation of the Sanskrit word **krāntāśraya,* as Kuiji's phonetic transcription *jielanduo* suggests, but rather, of **avakāśadānāśraya*, "basis that gives way".

3. Concerning the function and the nature of this **avakāśadānāśraya,* controversies among three different interpretations are reported in CWSL. The first opinion, represented by Nanda *et al.*, holds that the five types of sensory awareness cannot continue for more than one moment, and come into being in each moment in dependence on the "projecting force" (*ākṣepa*) of mental awareness, taking only mental awareness as their basis that gives way; while mental awareness takes the five types of sensory awareness as well as another mental awareness (of its own kind) in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way; thus, the five types of sensory awareness and mental awareness come forth one after another in succession. The second opinion, attributed to Sthiramati, *et al.*, maintains that the five types of sensory awareness take the same kind of awareness as well as mental awareness that accompanies the sensory awareness in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way, so that they maintain their continuity; and upon their arising they are accompanied by a further mental awareness; thus, sensory awareness and mental awareness are not temporally separated in two different moments, but rather, always arise in tandem. Finally, the third opinion, promoted by Dharmapāla, *et al.*, holds that each of the eight kinds of awareness has only the awareness of its own kind as its basis that gives way; thus mental awareness cannot be caused by sensory awareness as

its similar-immediate condition, or *vice versa*; this opinion adheres to the principle that each kind of awareness can only have its own kind of awareness in the antecedent moment as its similar-immediate condition. The difference between the last two opinions is not significant; both of them accept the simultaneous arising of multiple kinds of awareness. The point on which they differ is that the second opinion accepts that the five types of awareness also take mental awareness, in addition to sensory awareness, as their similar-immediate condition, while the third opinion strictly adheres to the principle that the awareness serving as similar-immediate condition must be of the same kind as the subsequent awareness. However, Dharmapāla does not differ on the fundamental point that mental awareness and sensory awareness arise simultaneously, for he also considers that the mental awareness, arising simultaneously with sensory awareness, can share the same object with the latter.

Abbreviations and primary literature

ADV   *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. Edited by Padmanabh S. Jaini. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 4. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Insititute, 1977.

AKBh   *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: in Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam *of Vasubandhu*. Edited by P. Pradhan. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.

AKBh/Ejima Abhidharmakośabhāṣya *of Vasubandhu*, Chapter I: *Dhātunirdeśa*. Edited by Yasunori Ejima. Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1989.

AKBh P   *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* = *Apidamo jushe shilun* (阿毘達磨俱舍釋論), Chinese translation made by Paramārtha (真諦), T1559.

AKBh X   *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* = *Apidamo jushe lun* (阿毘達磨俱舍論), Chinese translation made by Xuanzang (玄奘), T1558.

AKV   *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: in *The* Abhidharmakośa *&* Bhāṣya *of Ācārya Vasubandhu with* Sphuṭārthā *Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Edited by S. D. Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1998.

AMV   *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā = Apidamo dapiposha lun (阿毘達磨
           大毘婆沙論), Chinese translation, T1545.

ANA   Abhidharmanyāyānusāra = Apidamo shun zhengli lun (阿毘達磨
           順正理論), Chinese translation, T1562.

ĀP   Ālambanaparīkṣāṭīkā, Ālambanaparīkṣā in Frauwallner, 1930:
           176–179.

ĀPṬ   Ālambanaparīkṣāṭīkā = Guan suoyuan lun shi (觀所緣論釋),
           Chinese translation, T1625.

ĀPV   Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti = dMigs pa brtag pa'i 'grel pa, Tibetan
           translation, in D Ce, 86a5-87b2 (= TP Vol. 130, 177b5-179a3).

AS   Abhidharmasamuccaya, in Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga.
           Critically edited and studied by P. Pradhan. Santiniketan: Visva-
           Bharati, 1950.

ASBh   Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya, in Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāṣ-
           ya. Deciphered and edited by N. Tatia. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal
           Research Institute, 1976.

BBh   Bodhisattvabhūmi, in Bodhisattvabhūmi, a Statement of Whole
           Course of the Bodhisattva (Being Fifteenth Section of Yogācāra-
           bhūmi). Edited by U. Wogihara. Tokyo: [press unknown],
           1930-1936. Reprint: Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store,
           1971.

CWSL   Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論) = Vijñānamātrasiddhiśāstra, by
           Xuanzang, T1585.

CWSL-SJ   Cheng weishi lun shuji (成唯識論述記), by Kuiji (窺基). T1830.

CWSL-SYY   Cheng weishi lun shu yiyan (成唯識論疏義演), by Ruli (如理).
           X815.

D   Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Derge Edition, in Sde dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka
           Bstan 'gyur - preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of To-
           kyo. Edited by J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima. Tokyo: Se-
           kai Seiten Kanko Kyokai Co., Ltd. for the Faculty of Letter,
           University of Tokyo, 1981 ff.

GSYYL-SJ   Guan suoyuanyuan lun shiji (觀所緣緣論釋記), by Mingyu (明
           昱). X832.

JSLS-Slb   Jushe lun song shu lun ben (俱舍論頌疏論本), by Yuanhui (圓
           暉). T1823.

JSMJS   *Jie shenmi jing shu* (解深密經疏), by Yuance (圓測, Wŏn-ch'ŭk). X369.

MS   *Mahāyānasaṃgraha = Theg ma chen po bsdus pa*, Tibetan translation, in Lamotte, 1938 (= TP 5549, vol. Li, 215.1.1-226.5.6)

MS (P)   *Mahāyānasaṃgraha = She dacheng lun* (攝大乘論), Chinese translation made by Paramārtha, T1593.

MS (X)   *Mahāyānasaṃgraha = She dacheng lun ben* (攝大乘論本), Chinese translation made by Xuanzang, T1594.

MSBh   *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya*, in *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d' Asaṅga* (Mahāyānasaṃgraha), Tome I: Versions Tibétaine et Chinoise (Hiuan-Tsang), Louvain-la-Neuve: Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1973.

MSBh (P)   *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya = She dacheng lun shi* (攝大乘論釋), Chinese translation by Paramārtha, T1595.

MSBh (X)   *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya = She dacheng lun shilun* (攝大乘論釋), Chinese translation by Xuanzang, T1597.

NBṬṬ   *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī: Tolkovanie na sočinenie Darmottary* Nyāyabinduṭīkā. *Sanskritskij tekst s priměčanijami.* Ed. F. I. Ščerbatskoj. St. Pétersbourg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1909.

PSṬ   *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā.* In *Jinendrabuddhi's* Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1, Part I: Critical Edition. Edited by E. Steinkellner *et al.* Beijing–Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House, Austrian Academy of Science, 2005.

PV   *Pramāṇavārttika*: in PVV.

PVin 1, 2   *Dharmakīrti's* Pramāṇaviniścaya, *Chapter 1 and 2.* Edited by E. Steinkellner. Beijing–Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House, Austrian Academy of Science, 2007.

PVV   *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: in *Dharmakīrti's* Pramāṇavārttika, *with a Commentary by Manorathanandin.* Edited by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna: Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society: New Series 24-26, 1938–1940.

PVVibh   **Pañcavastukavibhāṣā-śāstra = Wushi biposhalun* (五事毘婆沙論), Chinese translation by Xuanzang, T1555.

T   Taishō Tripiṭaka, in *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* (大正新脩大藏經). Edited by Takakusu Junjirō (高楠順次郎) and Watanabe

Kaikyoku (渡邊海旭). Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1932.

TBh   *Tarkabhāṣā*, in Tarkabhāṣā *and* Vādasthāna *of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda.* Edited by H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore: The Hindusthan, 1952.

TrK   *Triṃśikākārikā*, in TrBh.

TrBh   *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*: in *Sthiramati's* Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣ-ya: *Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation.* Edited by H. Buecher. Wien: Verlag Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007.

X   *Shinsan zokuzōkyō* = 卍 *Xuzangjing* (卍續藏經).

YBh (ed.)   *Yogācārabhūmi*, Sanskrit edition, in *The* Yogācārabhūmi *of Ācārya Asaṅga.* Edited by V. Bhattacharya. Calcutta: Univ. of Calcutta: 1957.

YBh (C)   *Yogācārabhūmi = Yuqieshi dilun* (瑜伽師地論), Chinese translation. T1579.

YBh (T)   *Yogācārabhūmi = rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa*, Tibetan translation, in D Vol. 39-40, nr. 4035-4042 (Tshi 1a-, Dzi, Wi, Zhi, Zi, 'I 68b7).

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Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths

Zhihua Yao

1   Introduction

More than a decade ago, I went to Boston University to study Buddhist philosophy with M. David Eckel. In one of our first conversations, he said to me, "Madhyamaka is easy. On the level of the ultimate truth, you can say nothing. But on the level of the conventional truth, you can say anything."[1]

Even if Madhyamaka can be put as simply as that, however, I have still had problems with it over the years. Why two truths? What could it mean for there to be two truths? Two different perspectives? Or two different realities? If the former, then the notion of two truths implies perspectivism. But in that case, why is truth limited to only two types? Why not three, or four, or more? If it is the latter, then it is even more troublesome. Reality is reality; how can there be two different realities? And can both claim to be true?

The Mādhyamikas seem to insist that "truth" (*satya*) here implies both perspective *and* reality. But this intertwinement between perspective and reality only makes things worse. It leads at least to this problem: to claim that there are two truths, in the perspectivist sense, is a way of evaluating or prioritizing different views or perspectives, and of passing judgment on right or wrong views, desirable or undesirable perspectives. In this sense, it might be possible for us to commit to a wrong view or perspective; but how can reality itself be wrong?

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[1] In a recent conversation, he said that he would rather express the second alternative by saying, "At the level of the conventional truth, you can say *something*."

Yijing (義淨, 635-713), a Chinese pilgrim to India in the seventh century, pinpointed the main difference between the two philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. He said, "For Yogācāra, what pertains to the ultimate [level] exists, but what pertains to the conventional [level] does not exist; and [Yogācāra] takes the three natures as foundational. For Madhyamaka, what pertains to the ultimate [level] does not exist, but what pertains to the conventional [level] does exist; and it is in fact the two truths that are primary."[2] This suggests that if there were any key disagreements between these two schools, they should have to do with the two truths and the three natures. As Eckel (2008: 68) points out: "At its most basic level, the dispute between these two traditions (as it was formulated in the sixth century) can be understood as a conflict between these two interpretive principles: the Yogācāra doctrine of 'three natures' versus the Madhyamaka doctrine of 'two truths.'"

On the Madhyamaka side, Bhāviveka, who is believed to be the first thinker who explicitly engaged in Madhyamaka-Yogācāra controversy, did fiercely attack the Yogācāra theory of the three natures in Chapter 5 of his *Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā* and *Tarkajvālā,* and in Chapter 25 of his *Prajñāpradīpa.* The other major Yogācāra theory under attack was the doctrine of mind-only. It is only reasonable to assume that the Yogācāra side should have fired back, as turns out in fact to be the case with Dharmapāla, who is believed to be responding to Bhāviveka's criticism in the last chapter of his commentary to Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* (see Keenan, 1997).

However, it has been a matter of debate among contemporary scholars whether Bhāviveka, being a rather energetic critic of almost all Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools of his time, started his attack without warning, or was responding to some criticisms of Madhyamaka that were initiated by the Yogācāras themselves.[3] If the Yogācāras had ever criticized the Mādhyamikas before Bhāviveka, then the theory of the two truths would have been an obvious target; the other target, as I will show later, was the concept of emptiness.

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[2] 瑜伽則真有俗無，以三性為本。中觀乃真無俗有，寔二諦為先; T40:1817.783a29-b1.

[3] See Hanson, 1998 for a summary of the view that Bhāviveka initiated the controversy. For the opposite view, see Eckel, 1985; Eckel, 2008: 65-81.

In his recent study of the two truths in early Yogācāra, Lusthaus (2010) focuses on the writings of Asaṅga (and Maitreyanātha, if we follow the Chinese tradition of ascribing the encyclopedic *Yogācārabhūmi* to Maitreyanātha rather than Asaṅga). In this rather comprehensive survey of the writings of these founding masters of Yogācāra, however, Lusthaus says nothing about this conflict with the Mādhyamikas. Instead, he demonstrates that the Yogācāras incorporated the two truths rather neatly into their more complex conceptual frameworks, where we can find paradigms of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten truths. They even admit that "such distinctions can be extended without limit (*apramāṇa*)" (Lusthaus, 2010: 105).

Is it really true that the early Yogācāras did not say anything negative about the two truths as understood by the Mādhyamikas? Is there any trace of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka controversy before Bhāviveka formally launched his criticism of Yogācāra? To answer these important questions, I turn to some texts of Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu that have escaped Lusthaus's attention.

2   Against nihilism

First of all, a passage from the Tattvārtha Section of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which is part of the *Yogācārabhūmi* ascribed to Maitreyanātha, holds great importance for the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra controversy. It was quoted indirectly in the *Tarkajvālā* 5.83ab by Bhāviveka, who thinks that "These angry words are like vomit, [which] shows the undigested pride [of the Yogācāras]."[4] The original passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi* reads:

> Therefore, when some people hear the difficult and profound Mahā-
> yāna *sūtra*s that deal with emptiness and are considered to convey a
> meaning that needs to be interpreted, they do not discern the correct
> meaning of that which is spoken [in the *sūtra*s]. They develop false
> concepts, and with mere logic (*tarka*) that is unreasonably performed,
> they come to have the following view and make the following state-

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[4] *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* 5.83cd: *iti dveṣāmiṣodgāro 'bhimānājīrṇasūcakaḥ*. See Eckel, 2008: 282, 432.

ment: "All is nothing but a designation (*prajñaptimātra*), and that is reality. Whoever sees it this way, sees correctly." For these people there is no real thing itself (*vastumātra*) that serves as the basis of that designation. [But] this means that there cannot be any designation at all. Moreover, how can reality be nothing but a designation? In this way, they end up denying (*apodita*)[5] both designation and reality. Someone who denigrates (*apavāda*) designation and reality should be known as the worst kind of nihilist (*nāstika*).

　　Since he is a nihilist, those who are wise and practice a religious life should not speak or share their living community with him. He causes himself to fall, and [causes] people who follow his views to fall as well.[6]

This passage is one of the key pieces of evidence for Eckel's (2008: 65-66) argument that there was a Yogācāra-Madhyamaka controversy before Bhāviveka. Putting aside the interesting historical and textual significance of this short passage, let us focus on its philosophical implications.

　　The thesis held by the Mahāyāna nihilists is formulated thus: "All is nothing but a designation, and that is reality" (*prajñaptimātram eva sarvam etac ca tattvaṃ*). This statement echoes Nāgārjuna's famous verse in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* 24.18: "We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness, it [emptiness] is a dependent designation (*prajñapti*), [and] it itself is the middle way."[7] However, the Mādhyamikas

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[5] The Chinese translation *bang* (謗) and the Tibetan translation *skur ba btab pa* support the alternative reading *apavāditaṃ,* suggested by the Wogihara (1930-1936: 46) and Dutt (1978: 31) editions of the text.

[6] The Sanskrit edition of the text is based on Takahashi, 2005: 99-100: *ato ya ekatyā durvijñeyān sūtrāntān mahāyānapratisaṃyuktāṃ gambhīrāṃ śūnyatāpratisaṃyuktān ābhiprāyikārthanirūpitāṃ śrutvā yathābhūtaṃ bhāṣitasyārtham avijñāyāyoniśo vikalpayitvāyogavihitena tarkamātrakeṇaivaṃdṛṣṭayo bhavanty evaṃvādinaḥ prajñaptimātram eva sarvam etac ca tattvaṃ yaś caivaṃ paśyati sa samyak paśyatīti teṣāṃ prajñaptyadhiṣṭhānasya vastumātrasyābhāvāt saiva prajñaptiḥ sarveṇa sarvaṃ na bhavati || kutaḥ punaḥ prajñaptimātraṃ tattvaṃ bhaviṣyati || tad anena paryāyeṇa tais tattvam api prajñaptir api tadubhayam apoditaṃ bhavati || prajñaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhāno nāstiko veditavyaḥ || sa evan nāstikaḥ sann akathyo bhavaty asaṃvāsyo bhavati vijñānāṃ sabrahmacāriṇām || sa ātmānam api vipādayati | lokam api yo 'sya dṛṣṭyanumatam āpadyate.*

[7] Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18: *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe | sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā*, see La Vallée Poussin, 1913: 503.

themselves did not normally describe their view of reality in terms of "nothing but a designation" or "designation-only" (*prajñaptimātra*). Instead, they were fond of two other key terms, i.e., "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*) and "the middle way" (*madhyama*); therefore, they were known as Śūnyavāda or Madhyamaka. But as shown in Nāgārjuna's statement, "designation" is a concept as fundamental as "emptiness" and "the middle way" to the Mādhyamikas.

The Yogācāras seem less upset when Madhyamakas couch their claims in terms of "emptiness" and "the middle way", as the Yogācāras have their own way of using these terms that eventually asserts the existence of consciousness (see further below). However, they are very critical of the notion that "all is nothing but a designation". The reason for this criticism is a foundationalist dogma inherited from the Abhidharma tradition: there has to be some real thing (*vastu*) that can serve as the basis of the designation. For instance, both the Yogācāras and the Ābhidharmikas would agree with the Mādhyamikas in regarding a "person" as a designation. They would further hold that a person is designated on the basis of real *dharma*s, which, in the current case, include all the five aggregates, namely, form, feeling, conception, volition, and consciousness. But the Mādhyamikas would plainly deny this. They see the five aggregates as just as unreal as a person; therefore, *all* of reality is only a designation. For the Yogācāras, by contrast, this would mean the denial of real things, and therefore the denial of reality itself. In terms of their own position, as the Yogācāras are committed to foundationalism, if there is no real thing to serve as the basis of designation, then there cannot be any designation at all. In this way, the Mādhyamikas also have to deny designation itself. By holding that "All is nothing but a designation," the Mādhyamikas are led into a paradoxical situation in which both designation and reality are denied.

3   The nihilists's two truths

In the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, another passage is devoted to arguing against the Mahāyāna nihilists. In his commentary on the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Dunnyun (遁倫, d.u., alias Doryun 道倫), quoting contemporaneous Yogācāra scholars of the Tang Dynasty, iden-

tifies this passage as a hypothetical dispute between Maitreyanātha and Bhāviveka *et al.*[8] This time it focuses on their theory of the two truths, which is here formulated in a similar way as in Yijing: "Some nihilists in the Mahāyāna[9] hold that [seen] from the [standpoint of the] conventional [truth], all things exist; [seen] from the [standpoint of the] ultimate [truth],[10] nothing exists."[11] The proponent further requests clarification of the two truths, and proposes a hypothetical answer for the opponent as follows:

> If they [i.e., nihilists] would answer: The fact that all *dharma*s are devoid of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) is called the ultimate [truth]. The fact that intrinsic nature can be apprehended within these *dharma*s that are [thus] devoid of intrinsic nature is called the conventional [truth].[12] Why? Because conventions (*shisu* 世俗, *kun rdzob*, *saṃvṛti), designation (*jiashe* 假設, *'dogs pa*, *prajñapti), linguistic expressions (*mingyan* 名言, *mngon par brjod pa*, *abhilāpa), and verbal conventions (*shuo* 說, *tha snyad*, *vyavahāra) are imposed on nonexistents.[13]

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8 "This [object of critique] is the views held by Bhāviveka *et al.*, who are refuted by Maitreyanātha" (此是清辨等計，被慈氏所破; T42:1828.770c17)

9 Literally, those among the Mahāyāna who understand emptiness wrongly (*e qu kong* 惡取空, *durgṛhītā śūnyatā*, *stong pa nyid la log par zin pa*). Its Sanskrit equivalent is attested in the *Yogācārabhūmi* cited in n. 33 below. The Tibetan translation reads differently: *theg pa chen po pa la la rang gi nyes pa gzung nas*, which suggests a meaning similar to Paramārtha's rendering of "some Mahāyānas who are attached to [their own] wrong views" (大乘中學有偏執者) in his translation of the same passage in the **Buddhadhātu-śāstra* (*Foxing lun* 佛性論) (T31:1610.793c8, see Part 4 below for more discussion).

10 I supply "truth" on the basis of Paramārtha's renderings: "conventional truth" (*sudi* 俗諦) and "ultimate truth" (*zhendi* 真諦) (T31:1610.793c9).

11 復次於大乘中，或有一類，惡取空故，作如是言：由世俗故，一切皆有；由勝義故，一切皆無, T30:1579.713b2-4; *theg pa chen po pa la la rang gi nyes ba gzung* nas 'di skad ces kun rdzob tu ni thams cad yod la | don dam par ni thams cad med do zhes zer ro*, D4038: zi 42b5-6 (*nye bar bzung D; *nyes pa gzung* Q).

12 Paramārtha renders "the conventional truth" (*sudi* 俗諦) (T31:1610.793c12), while the Tibetan translation reads *kun rdzob* (conventions).

13 彼若答言：若一切法皆無自性，是名勝義；若於諸法無自性中，自性可得，是名世俗。何以故？無所有中建立世俗、假設、名言而起說故, T30:1579.713b5-8; *gal te de 'di skad ces chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yin la | ngo bo*

As we see, the latter formulation is more in line with the terms of Madhyamaka itself. Viewed from the perspective of the ultimate truth, all *dharma*s are devoid of intrinsic nature, and therefore they are empty. This emptiness is in turn understood by their Yogācāra opponent to mean that "nothing exists" (*yiqie jie wu* 一切皆無, *thams cad med*). Those who are sympathetic to the Madhyamaka position may find this characterization inaccurate. But as I have argued elsewhere (Yao, 2010: 84-85), although Nāgārjuna and his followers were not willing to commit to this position, their view of emptiness eventually leads to this nihilist end.

The two parties do not exchange too much fire over the ultimate truth. Instead, they argue more extensively about the conventional truth. The Yogācāra again asks of designation by means of linguistic conventions: "Do you mean to say that linguistic expressions and conventions arise from a causal relation, and intrinsic nature can be apprehended therein; or that they are merely linguistic expressions and conventions?"[14] In his commentary, Dunnyun quotes another Yogācāra scholar of the Tang Dynasty named Huijing (慧景, d.u.) to explain the implications of this question. If conventional existents arise from material or mental elements (*dharma*s) that are dependent in nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), then they are in a causal relation and have an identity or intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). On the other hand, if conventional existents are merely words, that means that they arise without a cause and are not bound by a causal relation (see T42:1828.770b22-24).

If the Mahāyāna nihilist holds to the former alternative, that is, that linguistic conventions arise from a causal relation, then the Yogācāra would say, "If linguistic expressions and conventions arise from a causal relation, then it is unreasonable to regard [such] linguistic expressions

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nyid med pa'i chos de dag la ngo bo nyid du dmigs pa gang yin pa de ni kun rdzob yin no || de ci'i phyir zhe na | 'di ltar de ni yod pa ma yin pa dag la kun rdzob tu byed pa dang | 'dogs pa dang | mngon par brjod pa dang | tha snyad du byed pa'i phyir ro zhes lan 'debs par gyur na, D4038: zi 42b6-7. To help make sense of Xuanzang's obscure translation of the final sentence, I have followed the Tibetan translation.

14 汝何所欲？名言、世俗為從因有，自性可得？為唯名言、世俗說有？ T30:1579.713 b8-10; *ci ngo bo nyid du dmigs pa de mngon par brjod pa dang kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba yin par 'dod dam | 'on te mngon par brjod pa dang | kun rdzob tsam zhig yin par 'dod*, D4038: zi 42b7-a1.

and conventions, which arise from a causal relation, as nonexistents."[15]
The Mādhyamika might refer to Nāgārjuna's foundational verse 24.18 in
the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (already cited above): "We state that what-
ever is dependent arising, that is emptiness;" and argue that even that
which causally arises can be empty. The Yogācāra would further ask
whether that which causally arises is an existent or a nonexistent. If it is
a nonexistent, then absolute nonexistents, such as the hair of a turtle or
the horn of a rabbit, would also arise from a causal relation. But this is
certainly absurd. If that which causally arises is an existent, on the other
hand, then it is an existent *dharma,* and cannot be empty or nonexistent.

Dunnyun again explains the dispute in the explicitly Yogācāra terms
of the three natures: "Any *dharma* that arises causally is dependent [in
nature, **paratantra*]. There is in a dependent *dharma* neither the deter-
minacy nor the nature of spontaneous arising, and therefore [Nāgārjuna]
says: 'We state that [whatever is dependent arising], that is emptiness.'"[16]
Here, Dunnyun interprets that which causally arises in terms of the de-
pendent nature, and he also gives a Yogācāra account of "emptiness" by
reference to the "non-arising-ness" (*utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*) of the depen-
dent nature, one of the "three naturelessnesses" (*triniḥsvabhāva*).

If the Mādhyamika holds to the latter alternative, namely, that lin-
guistic conventions are merely words, the Yogācāra would say that "It is
unreasonable that linguistic expressions and conventions should exist
without a real thing (*vastu*) [as their basis (*gzhi*)]."[17] This objection ech-
oes the passage from the Tattvārtha Section of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that
we discussed earlier. The rationale is that any linguistic convention or
designation has to be based on something real (*vastu*). Now, if linguistic

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[15] 若名言、世俗從因有者，名言、世俗從因而生，而非是有，不應道理, T30:1579.713
b10-11; *gal te mngon par brjod pa dang | kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba yin na ni des na
mngon par brjod pa dang | kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba yin pas yod pa ma yin pa zhes byar
mi rung ngo*, D4038: zi 43a1-2.

[16] 因緣生法者，即是依他。依他法上無決定無自然生性，故云「我說即是空」，
T42:1828.770c1-3. 我說即是空 = *śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe*, i.e. MMK 24.18b (cited
above n. 7).

[17] 名言世俗無事而有，不應道理, T30:1579.713b12; *des na gzhi med par mngon par brjod pa
dang | kun rdzob ces byar mi rung ngo*, D4038: zi 43a2. The Tibetan translation reads alter-
natively: "without [a real thing as] their basis" (*gzhi med par*).

conventions are merely words and bear no causal relations, then no *dharma* can arise from causal relations. But these *dharma*s are exactly the real things that would serve as the basis of linguistic conventions and designations.

The Yogācāra then puts forward a second question, regarding an epistemological issue: "Venerables, why is it that knowables (*zhu kede zhe* 諸可得者, *gang dmigs pa*) are devoid of intrinsic nature?"[18] In other words, if things are knowable, then they should not be nonexistent or empty. The Mādhyamika opponent hypothetically answers: "Because of the perverted view [that there are] real things (*vastu*)."[19] According to the Buddhist teachings, sentient beings are always perverse, owing to their ignorance. It is this perversion that contributes to our attachment to notions of self, permanence, and happiness, with regard to a reality that is in fact without self, impermanent, and characterized by suffering. So the Mādhyamika is saying that things are in reality empty and devoid of intrinsic nature, but because of our perversion, they are known as something, or are something knowable.

The Yogācāra goes on to ask, in the same manner as for designation, "Do you mean to say that this perversion (*phyin ci log*)[20] is existent, or that it is nonexistent?"[21] As in the earlier case of linguistic expressions and conventions, the Yogācāra again forces the Mādhyamika into a dilemma, and thereby claims victory over his opponent. If the Mādhyamika says that perversion is existent, "then it is unreasonable to say that all *dharma*s are devoid of intrinsic nature in the sense of the ultimate

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18 (又應告言)：長老！何緣諸可得者，此無自性? T30:1579.713b12-14; (*de la 'di skad ces*) *tshe dang ldan pa ci'i phyir na gang dmigs pa de med pa yin zhes kyang* (*brjod par bya'o*) D4038: zi 43a2-3. The Tibetan translation omits "of intrinsic nature".

19 (彼若答言)：顛倒事故, T30:1579.713b14; (*gal te de 'di skad ces*) *phyin ci log gi dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro zhes* (*lan 'debs par gyur na*), D4038: zi 43a3.

20 Xuanzang's translation reads: "this perverted view of real things". The simpler "this perversion" is supported by the Tibetan translation and Paramārtha's rendering (T31: 1610.793c19).

21 汝何所欲？此顛倒事，為有？為無？ T30:1579.713b14-15; *ci phyin ci log de yod par 'dod dam 'on te med par 'dod*, D4038: zi 43a3.

[truth]".[22] This is because if perversion is admitted to be an existent thing, then all causally-based *dharma*s would also be existent, and it would be self-contradictory to say that they are ultimately empty or nonexistent. Note that the Yogācāra here does not embrace the two-tiered perspectivist analysis of the conventional and the ultimate, as adopted by the Mādhyamika. Instead, by "ultimate" or "ultimately" the Yogācāra usually means the Abhidharmic sense of "analyzing things to their ultimate end".

If the Mādhyamika holds to the other horn of the dilemma, namely, that perversion is nonexistent, "then it is unreasonable [to say] that because of the perverted view of real things, these knowables are devoid of intrinsic nature".[23] This again calls for an epistemological consideration of the question of whether nonexistents can be knowable. In this context, the Yogācāra seems to hold that nonexistents cannot be knowable. For him, if perversion is nonexistent, then it should be as inapprehensible as the horn of a rabbit, a standard example of something that absolutely does not exist. This position is stated more explicitly in Dunnyun's commentary: "If the perverted view of real things is absolutely nonexistent, then it should be as inapprehensible as the horn of a rabbit. Now it is evident that [perversion] can be apprehended, so it is unreasonable to say that it is nonexistent."[24] Note, however, that as I have discussed elsewhere, a variety of Yogācāra arguments do claim that it is possible to cognize nonexistent objects (Yao, 2014). For the present, I have no idea how to make sense of this discrepancy.

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[22] (若言有者)，說一切法、由勝義故、皆無自性，不應道理, T30:1579.713b15-16; (*gal te yod na ni*) *des na chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ni don dam pa'o zhes byar mi rung ngo*, D4038: zi 43a3-4.

[23] (若言無者)，顛倒事故，諸可得者此無自性，不應道理, T30:1579.713b17-18; (*gal te med na ni*) *des na phyin ci log gi dngos po yin pa'i phyir gang dmigs pa de ngo bo nyid med do zhes byar mi rung ngo*, D4038: zi 43a4.

[24] 若顛倒事畢竟無者，應不可得，猶如兔角。今現可得而言無者，不應道理, T42:1828. 770c15-17.

4   The two truths and the three natures

The passage from the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*
that we have just discussed is quoted in its entirety in the **Buddhadhātu-
śāstra* (*Foxing lun* 佛性論 T1610), a work ascribed to Vasubandhu and
translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) between
557 and 569.[25] Compared to its original form in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, this
quotation features a number of important variations. First of all, as we
have seen, the target of the criticism is identified as "some Mahāyānas
who are attached to [their own] wrong views" (*dasheng zhong xue you
pianzhi zhe* 大乘中學有偏執者, T31:1610.793c8; see n. 9 above), rather
than explicitly as "Mahāyāna nihilists". This expression of Paramārtha's
is supported by the Tibetan translations: "some Mahāyānas who grasp
their own wrong views" (*theg pa chen po pa la la rang gi nyes pa gzung nas*;
see n. 11 above). Nonetheless, we can safely assume that the opponents
are the Mādhyamikas.

In the first set of arguments, i.e., about whether linguistic conven-
tions and designations exist or not, Vasubandhu's recension is barely in-
telligible to me. Maybe the translation is corrupt, and we should simply
follow the clearer expression in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

However, in the introduction to the second set of arguments, i.e.,
about whether perversion exists or not, Vasubandhu's recension seems a
bit clearer. He says: "Again, you state that there is a designation of in-
trinsic nature on the basis of that which lacks intrinsic nature; this is
called conventional [truth]. [But] if the designation exists, how could it
be nonexistent?"[26] In his answer, Vasubandhu gives some further details
that are not found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*:

Answer: Because of perversion, one designates existents on the basis
of nonexistents, [or] permanence and other such qualities on the ba-
sis of *dharma*s that are impermanent, suffering and without self.

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[25] Some scholars have questioned the ascription of this text to Vasubandhu, but, as I
have explained elsewhere (Yao 2005: 127), I follow Takemura (1977: 36-38) and others
in insisting on the traditional attribution to Vasubandhu.

[26] 又若汝謂於無自性中，執有自性，是名為俗。若執有者，云何是無？ T31:1610.793
c17-18.

Those [things which are designated] actually do not exist, and they are only considered existents provisionally. Such a designation is part of the four perversions. Therefore, although the designation exists, what is designated does not.[27]

Subsequently, the two horns of the dilemma are also formulated in a slightly clearer way:

Question: Does perversion exist or not? If it does, then it contradicts [your view] that all *dharma*s are devoid of intrinsic nature. If it does not, then designation cannot be considered a perversion, and it is wrong to hold that the conventional truth is a designation of intrinsic nature where there is [in fact] no intrinsic nature.[28]

After this long quotation, we come to Vasubandhu's own rather sophisticated remarks:

Why [does the text give the above criticism of the two truths]? We can say neither that the two truths exist, nor that they do not exist, because they are neither existent nor nonexistent. As for the fact that we cannot say that the ultimate truth exists or does not exist: 1) we cannot say that [the ultimate truth] exists, because there are no persons or *dharma*s; [but] 2) we cannot say that [the ultimate truth] does not exist, because of the demonstration of the emptiness of the two [i.e., persons and *dharma*s]. The same is true of the conventional truth. Because of its imagined nature, we cannot say that [the conventional truth] exists. Because of its dependent nature, we cannot say that it does not exist. Moreover, the ultimate truth is not definitely existent or nonexistent. Persons and *dharma*s do not exist, and yet they are not nonexistents. The emptiness of the two [i.e., persons and *dharma*s] exists, and yet it is not existent. The same is true of the conventional

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27 答曰：為顛倒品類故，故無中說有，乃至於無常樂我等諸法，說言皆有常等諸德，其體實無，但假說有。如此執者，為四倒攝。是故雖執是有，而得是無，T31:1610.793c18-22.

28 問曰：如此顛倒，為有？為無？若是有者，一切諸法無有自性，是義不然。若是無者，此執顛倒亦不得成。若無性中，執有自性，為俗諦者，是義不然，T31:1610.793c22-25.

truth. It is not definitely nonexistent because of its imagined nature. Nor is it definitely existent because of its dependent nature.[29]

These remarks of Vasubandhu's are probably the very first attempt on the Yogācāra side to incorporate the two truths into their more complicated structure of the three natures. Based on these remarks, we can draw the following diagram:

ultimate truth ⤴	emptiness of persons & *dharmas*	—existent(?)
⤵	no persons or *dharmas*	—nonexistent(?)
conventional truth ⤴	dependent nature	—existent(?)
⤵	imagined nature	—nonexistent(?)

As we see, the conventional truth is described as having two aspects. Viewed as the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), it does not exist; while viewed as the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), it does exist. So conventional reality cannot be one-sidedly taken as purely imaginary or illusory; this would be to fall into nihilism. Nor can conventional reality be taken as utterly existent, on the other hand, because the imagined nature does not exist. That is why the Yogācāra criticizes both of the extremes into which his Madhyamaka opponent tends to fall.

As compared to the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths, one of the major contributions of the Yogācāra paradigm of the three natures is to introduce the dependent nature to the picture, thereby reinstating a more robust worldview against the illusory worldview to which most Mādhyamikas are committed. Kenshū (賢洲, ?-1812), a Japanese commentator on the *Buddhadhātu-śāstra*, explicitly pointed out that the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths implies an illusory worldview. He says:

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[29] 何以故？二諦不可說有，不可說無，非有非無故。真諦不可說有，不可說無者，無人法故，不可說有；顯二空故，不可說無。俗諦亦爾，分別性故，不可說有；依他性故，不可說無。復次真諦不定有無，人法無、不無，二空有、不有。俗諦亦爾，分別性故，非決定無；依他性故，非決定有, T31:1610.793c25-794a2.

However, the two truths, as delineated by the beginning teaching [of the Mahāyāna], take the ultimate and the conventional truths as sharply distinct from each other. The so-called "conventional truth" is imagined illusory phenomena, which are conventionally taken to be real existents. In conformity with [the usage of] worldly persons, the sage calls them the conventional truth. In conformity with his own understanding, [however,] the sage calls that which is ultimately nonexistent the ultimate truth. These are the two truths as established on the basis of the imagined nature.[30]

Having learned that the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths is actually based on the imagined nature, and therefore commits to an entirely illusory worldview, we can now understand better why the Yogācāra criticism of the two truths focuses exclusively on the conventional truth, and especially on issues such as whether designation or linguistic conventions exist or do not. This is because in the Yogācāra system, designation or linguistic conventions themselves are of the dependent nature and therefore exist, but whatever is designated *by* linguistic conventions is of the imagined nature and does not exist. When Maitreyanātha, Vasubandhu and Yijing characterize the Madhyamaka position by saying, "Viewed from the perspective of conventional truth, all things exist," this does not mean that the Madhyamaka sense of the conventional truth embraces the dependent nature and takes it as genuinely existent. Rather, things are seen as real existents only conventionally, by those worldlings who dwell in the imagined nature. Therefore, this characterization does not contradict the Yogācāra criticism of the Mādhyamikas as nihilists, since a commitment to an illusory worldview necessarily leads to nihilism.

Note that Yijing characterizes the Yogācāra view, by contrast, by saying, "What pertains to the ultimate level exists, but what pertains to the conventional level does not exist." Here the "conventional", which does not exist, refers to the aspect of the imagined nature, and the "ultimate",

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[30] 然始教分齊之二諦，真俗條然不融。所言俗諦是偏計妄法，世俗認爲實有。聖順世間說者為之俗諦，依自所知說畢竟無體者為之真諦，是於分別性所立二諦. Quoted from Takemura, 1977: Appendix, 29.

which does exist, refers to the third perfected nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). In the above diagram, this third nature is not explicitly indicated. The perfected nature is roughly equivalent to the ultimate truth. But unlike the ultimate truth, the perfected nature is not a distinctive layer of reality or perspective. Instead, it is usually defined as the dependent nature when it is devoid of the imagined nature, so the perfected nature can be the same as the dependent nature when the latter is not affected by the imagined nature. In this very subtle way, the Yogācāra theory of the three natures rejects the two-tiered reality suggested by the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths, and restores the holistic worldview that prevails among the mainstream Buddhist philosophical schools. This is probably the reason that the perfected nature cannot be separately indicated in the diagram.

Although the perfected nature is roughly equivalent to the ultimate truth, as pointed out by Yijing, there is at least one major difference between the two, that is, for the Yogācāras what pertains to the ultimate, i.e., the perfected nature, exists, but for the Mādhyamikas what pertains to the ultimate, i.e., the ultimate truth, does not exist. In Vasubandhu's remarks, and my diagram characterizing them, this point is shown by acknowledging that the ultimate truth means first and foremost that self and *dharma* do not exist. The standard Madhyamaka expression of the ultimate truth would be that intrinsic nature or self-nature (*svabhāva*) does not exist. Since the Yogācāras still adhere to the positive Ābhidharmika usage of self-nature, e.g., in the usage of the terminology of the three "natures" (*trisvabhāva*), they substitute the often negatively colored terms "self" and *dharma* for self-nature. But what they mean is the same: imagined illusory things do not exist. The ultimate truth in this sense means merely the negation of what does not exist at all, so that the ultimate truth is negative and nonexistent in its very nature. This is why we say that for the Mādhyamikas, what pertains to the ultimate does not exist. But for the Yogācāras, this purely negative characterization of reality falls into nihilism. According to Vasubandhu, there does exist one way to restore a robust sense of ultimate reality. He thinks that "the emptiness of self and of *dharma*s" is something existent, and he therefore presents a positive characterization of the ultimate reality.

5   A robust sense of emptiness

Some may wonder what on earth is the difference between these two expressions: "Self and *dharma*s do not exist" and "the emptiness of self and *dharma*s". And why is one negative, while the other becomes positive? This has to do with the way the Yogācāras treat "emptiness" as a positive concept, and their distinction between the right and wrong understandings of emptiness. In the Tattvārtha Section of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, we see a classical definition of two conceptions of emptiness:

> [This (*x*)] is empty of that (*y*), because that (*y*) does not exist. And this (*x*) is empty, because this (*x*) does exist.[31] In this way, emptiness is justified. If everything does not exist, what is empty? Where is it empty? What is it empty of? For [the notion of] emptiness of exactly this (*x*) itself (*eva*) of this (*x*) [itself] is not coherent. Hence, this is a wrong understanding of emptiness (*durgṛhītā śūnyatā*).
>
> What, then, is the right understanding of emptiness (*sugṛhītā śūnyatā*)?[32] One rightly observes that because something (*y*) does not exist in a given place (*x*), [therefore] this [place] (*x*) is empty of that [thing] (*y*). Moreover, one knows in accordance with reality that whatever remains in this place (*x*) [apart from that thing (*y*)] still exists, and it is something that exists in this place (*x*). This is called the unmistaken understanding (*avakrānti*) of emptiness, which is in accordance with reality.[33]

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[31]   See Willis's (1979: 162) translation: "One thing is empty of another because of that [other's] absence and because of the presence of the void thing itself."

[32]   The Derge edition of the Tibetan translation reads *stong pa nyid la log par zin pa* (= *durgṛhītā śūnyatā*) (D4037: wi 26b5), and should be corrected by the Peking edition, which reads *stong pa nyid la legs par zin pa* (= *sugṛhītā śūnyatā*) (Q5538: zhi 31b6).

[33]   Takahashi, 2005: 101: *yena hi śūnyaṃ tadasadbhāvāt yac ca śūnyaṃ tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā yujyeta || sarvābhāvāc ca kutra kiṃ kena śūnyaṃ bhaviṣyati || na ca tena tasyaiva śūnyatā yujyate || tasmād evaṃ durgṛhītā śūnyatā bhavati || kathaṃ ca punaḥ sugṛhītā śūnyatā bhavati || yataś ca yad yatra na bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati | yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti || iyam ucyate śūnyatāvakrāntir yathābhūtā aviparītā.*

Here, the Yogācāra advocates the right understanding of emptiness, which is actually rooted in our ordinary usage of this term: This (*x*) is empty of that (*y*), which means that that (*y*) does not exist in this (*x*), but this (*x*) does exist. For instance, when we say, "The bottle is empty (of water)," we mean that water does not exist in the bottle, but the bottle is certainly there. But if the sentence is understood to mean that "*x* itself is empty of *x*," then the bottle would not exist either, which would sound absurd.

The Yogācāra definition of the right understanding of emptiness can be rephrased in the following way: If something (*y*) does not exist in such-and-such a place (*x*), one rightly observes this place (*x*) to be empty of that thing (*y*). Moreover, whatever remains in this place (*x*), apart from that thing (*y*), still exists; it is known in accordance with reality to be something that exists in this place (*x*). This definition (*yad yatra na bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati | yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti*) is actually a direct quotation from the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta*: *iti yaṃ hi kho tattha na hoti, tena taṃ suññaṃ samanupassati, yaṃ pana tattha avasiṭṭhaṃ hoti, taṃ santaṃ idaṃ atthīti pajānāti.*[34] Interestingly, in all their rather extensive discussions on emptiness, the Mādhyamikas never referred to this passage, even though it is attributed to the Buddha himself and makes more sense in light of our ordinary usage of the term "empty"; probably because it would undermine their interpretation of emptiness (see Nagao, 1991: 210).

Another classical definition of the Yogācāra sense of emptiness is found in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, a work ascribed to Maitreyanātha and transmitted by Asaṅga: "The defining characteristic of emptiness is the nonexistence of the duality [of subject and object], and the existence of that nonexistence."[35] In their epistemologically oriented project, subject and object are regarded as conceptual constructions on the basis of existent processes in consciousness. The concept of emptiness denies the ex-

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[34] *Majjhima-nikāya* III 104. The translation by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995: 966ff) reads: "Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: 'This is present.'"

[35] *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.13ab: *dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇam*; see Nagao, 1964: 22.

istence of these conceptual constructions, yet asserts the existence of consciousness (*vijñāna*), thusness (*tathatā*), or the *dharma*-realm (*dharma-dhātu*). In this respect, emptiness is a positive characterization of reality.

The Madhyamaka and Yogācāra senses of emptiness were characterized rather neatly by later Tibetan scholars as respectively "self-emptiness" (*rang stong,* i.e. the emptiness of the thing itself) and "other-emptiness" (*gzhan stong,* i.e. the emptiness of the thing of anything other than it); and the mainstream Tibetan Buddhists considered the former (i.e., "*x* is empty of *x*") to be the authentic Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness, while condemning the latter (i.e., "*x* is empty of *y*") as heretical. For the Yogācāras, however, the Madhyamaka sense of emptiness is a wrong understanding of emptiness and leads to nihilism. Their own sense of emptiness, i.e. "other-emptiness", by contrast, is the right understanding of emptiness, and is capable of retaining the positive character of ultimate reality as existent. Therefore, in the above diagram, "the emptiness of self and *dharma*s" is characterized as something existent, and acts as a distinctive aspect of the ultimate truth.

6   A holistic worldview

The four question marks in the brackets in my diagram are a way of capturing the latter part of Vasubandhu's remarks, where he seems to cast doubt on everything he said earlier. Self and *dharma*s do not exist, and yet they are not nonexistents; the emptiness of self and *dharma*s exists, and yet does not exist. The imagined nature is not definitely nonexistent, and the dependent nature is not definitely existent either. Everything becomes indefinite now. So what is going on here?

In order to understand this, we need to move on to a passage from the *Madhyamakānusāra* (*Shun zhong lun* 順中論 T1565), a work ascribed to Asaṅga, and translated into Chinese by Gautama Prajñāruci (Jutan Boreliuzhi 瞿曇般若流支, fl. 538-543) in 543. This text is intended to be a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*, but it does not comment on the entire work. Instead it only explains a few important verses from this work. After a lengthy introduction to and debate on proper methods of argumentation, which takes up more than half of the

entire text, Asaṅga jumps to two verses in Chapter 24 that discuss the foundational Madhyamaka view of the two truths. He says:

> *Proponent*: What *dharma* does not cease? What *dharma* does not arise?
> *Opponent*: The ultimate truth.
> *Proponent*: If this is the case, then there are two truths, i.e., the so-called conventional and ultimate truths. If there are two truths, then your thesis will be proven.
> *Opponent*: If there is ultimate truth distinct from conventional truth, then it proves my thesis. What is wrong with that? As [Nāgārjuna] says in the following verses:
>> When the Tathāgata teaches the *dharma*, he relies on the two truths: first, conventional truth; second, ultimate truth. Those who do not thus know the two kinds of reality (*liangzhong shi* 兩種實) [expressed] by the two truths cannot understand the real truth (*shidi* 實諦) in the Buddha's profound teaching.[36]

The opponent here can be identified as a Mādhyamika, who supports himself with verses 24.8-9 of the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*. As we know, these two verses are one of the few occasions when Nāgārjuna elaborates his theory of the two truths, and they thus hold great importance for the Madhyamaka tradition. I have translated them literally, closely following the Chinese, which apparently overinterprets these verses by holding that there are "two kinds of reality" (*liangzhong shi* 兩種實) expressed by the two truths. Interestingly, verse 24.9 is quoted again by the Yogācāra

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[36] 答曰：何法無滅？何法無生？
問曰：第一義諦。
答曰：若如是者，有二種諦。所謂世諦、第一義諦。若有二諦，汝朋則成。
問曰：若異世諦，有第一義諦，成我朋分，為有何過？如說偈言：
　　　如來說法時　　依二諦而說
　　　謂一是世諦　　二第一義諦
　　　若不知此理　　二諦兩種實
　　　彼於佛深法　　則不知實諦; T30:1565.45a13-21.
See *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* 24.8-9, La Vallée Poussin, 1913: 492-4:
　　　dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |
　　　lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthaḥ ||
　　　ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ |
　　　te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane ||

proponent in his response, but with slightly different wording, which does not imply two levels of reality: "Those who do not know the meaning (*yi* 義) of the two truths cannot understand the true reality (*zhenshi* 真實) of the Buddha's profound teaching."[37]

Asaṅga goes further, to criticize the two truths by means of a focus on non-duality:

> Proponent: Your thesis is pleasing; but so is mine; it is based upon the two truths, a doctrine expounded by the Tathāgata. When [the Tathāgata] teaches the thusness of *dharmas* through the two truths, he does not destroy non-duality. If there were two [truths], then the conventional thusness of *dharmas* would be distinguished from the ultimate thusness of *dharmas*. Now, even one thusness of *dharmas* is inapprehensible; how, then, could one apprehend two thusnesses of *dharmas*? If we are to talk about the two truths, we should say that there is no ultimate truth other than the conventional truth, because there is only one characteristic, which is no characteristic at all.[38]

A few lines later, Asaṅga again emphasizes this point of non-duality: "Opponent: What is not destroyed by these two truths? Proponent: The one characteristic, which is no characteristic and no intrinsic nature."[39] Finally, he overthrows Nāgārjuna's claim that the Buddha's teaching relies on the two truths by insisting: "All the Tathāgatas have nothing that they rely on; [they] rely upon neither the conventional truth nor the ultimate truth. When the Tathāgatas teach, their minds have nothing that they rely on. What use is there in saying any more?"[40]

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[37] 若人不知此　　二諦之義者
彼於佛深法　　則不知真實 (T30:1565.45a29-b1).

[38] 答曰：汝快善說，我說亦爾。依於二諦，如來說法。依二諦說，說法真如，不破不二。若其二者，異第一義法真如，別有世諦法真如。一法真如尚不可得，何處當有二法真如而可得也？若說二諦，此如是說：不異世諦，而更別有第一義諦，以一相故，謂無相故, T30:1565.45a22-27.

[39] 問曰：此之二諦，何物不破？答曰：一相，所謂無相、無自體, T30:1565.45b2-4.

[40] 一切如來皆無所依。不依世諦，亦復不依第一義諦。如來說法，心無所依。何用多語？ T30:1565.45b8-10.

As we see, Asaṅga tries to maintain a holistic and yet non-dualistic worldview, by refusing the Madhyamaka paradigm of two truths, which tends to introduce a two-tiered structure into reality. This, as I see it, is one of the main agendas of the Yogācāra arguments against the Mādhya-mikas. In this light, we can now understand that Vasubandhu's earlier remarks are also intended to resist a dualistic tendency towards positing existence versus nonexistence, and to maintain a holistic worldview by going beyond this dualistic tendency.

7   Conclusion

In the wake of the widespread influence of Madhyamaka philosophy, the paradigm of the two truths has become a common way of characterizing the Buddhist approach to reality. But, as I have shown, this two-tiered paradigm contributed to a great extent to the illusory worldview to which the majority of Mādhyamikas subscribe.

One of the goals of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures was to improve on this two-tiered paradigm, and to restore a more robust and holistic worldview. My study of some scattered sources from Maitreya-nātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu has demonstrated that they criticized the Madhyamaka version of two truths doctrine on the basis of the Yogā-cāra theory of the three natures. I hope that this study will help correct some misconceptions concerning the Buddhist approach to reality a-mong contemporary scholars who have fallen under the influence of Ma-dhyamaka.[41]

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Philosophical Aspects of Sixth-Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on "Mind and Consciousness"

Hans-Rudolf Kantor

1   Introduction

Buddhist treatises and *sūtra* commentaries composed in the sixth century in China often deal with the nature, potential, and functioning of "mind and consciousness" (*xinshi* 心識), and discuss the process of salutary transformation and liberation called "becoming (a) Buddha" (*chengfo* 成佛). Many of these scriptures hold that the realization of truth and Buddha wisdom cannot be separated from the experience of the delusive world of sentient beings. This is also clearly expressed in early Mahāyāna *sūtra* texts. The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*, for example, explains that delusion is the inversion of wisdom, just as wisdom is the transformation of delusion (T14:475.544c3-7; 548c29-549b15). To "become (a) Buddha" is to perform a turn (*zhuan* 轉) from a non-awakened to an awakened state of mind, which implies seeing both of these aspects of mind as a whole. In the sixth century, the Chinese Dilun masters (*Dilun shi* 地論師) created the term "conjunction of truth and falsehood" (*zhen wang hehe* 真妄和合) to hint at the inseparability of these opposite aspects in/of our mind and understanding.

This expression seems first to be mentioned in those parts of the Dilun master Huiyuan's (慧遠, 523-592) works which elaborate on the relationship between the doctrines of *ālaya*-consciousness and *tathāgatagarbha*. However, the fact that the term was adopted not only by the Huayan (華嚴) masters, but also by the Sanlun (三論) master Jizang (吉藏 549-623), as well as later Tiantai (天臺) thinkers – all descending from different exegetical traditions – shows that it may point in the direction of an

essential and general feature of Chinese Mahāyāna thought, and that in a broader sense, it also refers back to the conceptual roots developed in many of the Chinese Buddhist scriptures prior to that period. The present paper therefore uses the English term "*inseparability* of truth and falsehood" to signify this general issue, whereas the expression "*conjunction* of truth and falsehood", in a more specific or narrow sense, is rooted in Huiyuan's view of the relationship of *ālaya*-consciousness and *tathāgatagarbha* (a view Huiyuan probably shared with other Dilun masters).

In the exegetical traditions and indigenous schools of China, the understanding of this inseparability nevertheless differs considerably, and is variously discussed. Zhiyi (智顗, 538-597) and other Tiantai masters, for example, hold that "ignorance and the [true] nature of *dharma*(s) are indivisible"; the notion of the "single mind disclosing the two *dharma*-gates of arising and non-arising" is first developed in the *Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Great Vehicle* (*Dasheng qi xin lun* 大乘起信論) and then adopted by the Huayan masters and combined with the doctrine of the "conjunction of truth and falsehood"; the relationship between the mind as *ālaya*-consciousness and the "three natures" accounts for the Yogācāra view of truth and falsehood; and the differentiation between "two truths" discussed in almost all Chinese Madhyamaka scriptures also implies a notion of inseparability.

All these examples together reveal both the general relevance of that idea, and the diversity of the ways in which it was interpreted. Inseparability correlates with the basic insight of Mahāyāna soteriology that falsehood is a heuristic principle which is essential in disclosing to us the path of liberation from suffering. Moreover, this also implies the ambiguity of falsehood, as is expressed by the famous Huayan master Fazang (法藏, 643-712):

> If we follow the stream [and transmigrate through] life/birth and death, then falsehood has effect; [but] although [in these circumstances] it is falsehood that has effect, it cannot arise apart from truth. If we go against the stream [of life/birth and death], and are released from its fetters, then truth has effect; [but] although [under these circumstances] it is truth that has effect, it cannot be manifested apart

> from falsehood...It is like the water of the great ocean: there is the motion of the waves owing to the wind, but the mark of the wind and that of the water are inseparable.[1]

Falsehood can be deceptive and harmful, as it entails suffering experienced in the form of birth and death; and yet, it may be seen as a heuristic principle, disclosing by inversion the path to true liberation. It thus hints at its opposite and harbors a hidden potential to instruct us; in this sense its ambiguity correlates with the inseparability of truth and falsehood.

Moreover, due to this ambiguity, there are a variety of Buddhist terms throughout the Mahāyāna scriptures accentuating various connotations of falsehood. Characterizing it as unawareness of the delusory state of mind in which sentient beings dwell, falsehood is referred to as "inversion" (*diandao* 顛倒), in the sense of mistaking the unreal for the real. Inversion represents a mode of falsehood in which the very falsehood of falsehood is concealed, and it is thus deceptive. The Chinese term *xuwang* (虛妄), often used in conjunction with inversion, signifies that this soteriologically negative falsehood is deceptive. According to the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras,* "inversions and deceptive discrimination" (*diandao xuwang fenbie* 顛倒虛妄分別) prevent sentient beings from understanding true emptiness, leading them astray so that they form harmful attachments and clinging.[2]

Like falsehood, the term "discrimination" (*fenbie* 分別) seems to be ambiguous as well. On the one hand, as we have just seen, discrimination can be soteriologically negative; but on the other hand, Nāgārjuna paradoxically teaches us to differentiate between two realms of truth, pre-

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[1] These are two separate quotations from Fazang's commentary on the *Awakening of Faith,* both of which explain the functioning of *ālaya*-consciousness in the light of the "conjunction of truth and falsehood"; see the *Dasheng qi xin lun yi ji* 大乘起信論義記, T44: 1846.275a3-5, and T44:1846.254c13-14, quoting from the *Awakening of Faith,* T32:1666.576 c11-12.

[2] One of the larger versions of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* translated by Xuanzang (玄奘, 602-664) states: "All kinds of deluded beings variously produce attachments; in virtue of their differentiations and inversions the thought of real existence arises where there is no real existence...unreality is said to be reality in virtue of deceptive differentiations and inversions within the realm of all constructed *dharma*(s);" *Da bore boluomiduo jing* (大般若波羅蜜多經) (T7:220.418c25-419a4).

cisely in order to understand the profundity of the Buddha-*dharma* beyond all deceptive discrimination (*Zhong lun* 中論 Chapter 24, T30:1564. 32c18-19). In a similar manner, in the Tiantai teaching, the highly ambiguous term "false/provisional" (*jia* 假) includes the sense of a pragmatic instructiveness, that is, a positive falsehood similar to the useful fiction of "skillful means".[3] The Huayan term "illusory existence" (*huanyou* 幻有) seems to hint at the existential relevance and ontological status of a falsehood which inevitably pervades the way we relate to our worlds. Moreover, in contrast to truth or reality, falsehood is never associated with such meanings as indestructibility, permanence, invariability and immutability; the only things that display these features, on a Mahāyāna view, are reality and truth.

Thus, Buddhist discussions of the meaning of truth often analyze falsehood as an inevitable and essential factor in our existence, which bears not only a negative but also a positive significance for our salutary transformation. Hence, the present article attempts to highlight the philosophical implications of the "inseparability of truth and falsehood", as they were understood by Chinese Buddhist masters elaborating on Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and Tathāgatagarbha sources from India. This paper also tries to show that many of the philosophical views that address ontological issues are, in fact, closely bound up with a soteriology which tends to ultimately suspend and deconstruct apodictic claims, or metaphysical positions concerning the nature of reality.

The next three sections of this paper (Sections 2 to 4) discuss sources from the Madhyamaka, Tathāgatagarbha, and Yogācāra traditions which deal with the relationship between truth and falsehood in various ways and from different points of view. Section 5 outlines the positions of Huiyuan (Dilun) and Zhiyi (Tiantai). This article does not attempt to trace the chronological development of thought, nor does it try to reconstruct the transmission of Indian Buddhist doctrines into the Chinese context, or determine the degree of continuity or transformation which that process entailed. Rather, it aims to discuss, analyze, compare, and identify, from a philosophical point of view, similarities and differences between

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[3] This term corresponds to the Sanskrit *prajñapti,* which unlike the Chinese *jia*, does not combine the meaning of "false" and "borrowing".

the various views of the relationship between truth and falsehood preva-
lent in Mahāyāna Chinese Buddhist debates on "mind and consciousness"
in the sixth century.

2   Truth and falsehood according to the Madhyamaka view in the *Zhong Lun*[4]

Mahāyāna Buddhism primarily examines the issue of mind from the so-
teriological point of view. Deluded, mind accounts for the source of our
suffering; enlightened and awakened, it guarantees liberation. According
to Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, mind is both the agent and
the object of our soteriological transformation, which is called "becom-
ing (a) Buddha". However, the Mādhyamika's notion of transformation
does not stress the concept of mind and consciousness; instead, proper
understanding of the emptiness of all things is much more important
and fundamental than insight into this issue. In Madhyamaka, then, the
issue of "mind and consciousness" is subordinated to that of "emptiness",
owing to the fundamental and sustaining significance of the latter for
things rooted in interdependent arising.

Many Mahāyāna Buddhists emphasize that the way things appear to
us is contingent upon the way our perceptions, thinking, and language
refer to them. Everything we encounter or experience in the world we
inhabit comes to our attention as a referent of our own intentional acts.
This implies that all things are compound phenomena, built upon a ma-
nifold of interrelated components. The apparently particular identity
which each such thing implies for us in fact involves patterns of inter-
dependence and extrinsic relationships. The first chapter of the *Zhong
lun* illustrates this by the example of the correlative dependency be-

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4 The Chinese *Zhong lun* (中論) is Kumārajīva's (344-413) translation of Nāgārjuna's (ca.
150) *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*, transmitted together with *Piṅgala's (3rd century) com-
mentary. The Chinese tradition considered the *Zhong lun* as a unitary and homogeneous
text. Together with the *Da zhi du lun* 大智度論 (Sanskrit: *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*) –
a commentary on one of the large *Prajñāpāramitā sūtra*s, also translated by Kumārajīva –
the *Zhong lun* belongs to those early Madhyamaka sources only known and transmitted
in the Chinese tradition. These two texts were fundamental for the development of the
Chinese Sanlun, Tiantai, Huayan, and Chan schools.

tween "causes and results" (*yinguo* 因果): A certain thing may appear to be a cause only if there is another thing identified as the result following it; the same also applies in reverse, that is, without a cause preceding it, a certain thing cannot be identified as a result; the identity of things cannot be established beyond such mutual dependency, and nor can their existence.[5]

Emptiness sustains the interdependent arising of all things, thus making it impossible that any particular or specific thing in our world abides in an intrinsic, independent, or invariant nature.[6] None of the particular things which we identify in virtue of our intentional acts, and to which we refer by means of linguistic expression, is intrinsically, ultimately, and really the thing it appears to be, nor is it self-identical due to the irreversible and unceasing changing in/through time. In other words, none of these things is inherently existent. This emptiness of inherent existence accounts for the unreality or falsehood of all ephemeral things rooted in interdependent arising, and yet it does not equate with the complete nonexistence of things either. Rather, such unreality does have a certain existential relevance, as is proven by the unenlightened or non-awakened way that each of us exists in this world.

In light of that relevance, the interdependent arising of things cannot be confused with the realm of ultimate truth, and hence does not reach beyond the conventional realm of our existence. Pervading the way we conventionally exist, unreality persists, and rests upon true emptiness in the specific sense that emptiness ultimately sustains the interdependent arising of things in our illusory and ephemeral world. In other words, emptiness implies that truth and falsehood are inseparable. Yet according to the *Zhong lun,* a genuine understanding of true emptiness cannot confuse the two, and therefore must differentiate between the realms of

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[5] See Piṅgala's commentary in the first chapter of the *Zhong lun* (T30:1564.2c13-18).

[6] Chapter 24 in the *Zhong lun* expresses the sustaining significance of emptiness: "[Only because] there is the meaning of emptiness/ Can all *dharma*(s) [interdependently arising] be complete" (T30:1564.33a22). Similarly, the chapter on "Sentient Beings" in the Kumārajīva version of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* states: "All *dharma*(s) are set up owing to (the root of) non-abiding" (T14:475.547c22). Here, emptiness means "non-abiding" [= not abiding in an intrinsic nature], which is the "root" of the interdependent arising of all things.

the conventional and ultimate.[7] This differentiation between the two truths realizes and expresses an insight into the inevitable falsehood of the language upon which we must rely even while explicating that sense of true emptiness.

The term "conventional truth" is ambiguous, as truths of this kind are only modifications of the ultimate meaning of the Buddha-*dharma*, and thus cannot be taken literally. Ultimately, they are not true, but false. However, conventional falsehood may inversely point back towards or lead to that truth, and in this sense, it is instructive and not deceptive.[8] As an instructive sign, such conventional falsehood may carry a truth value in a provisional and limited sense, and only in view of those limitations can we refer to the "conventional" as "truth".[9] By the same token, such truth does not become even provisionally true until its limitations are made completely transparent; that is to say, like the deceptive views of the heretics, it must finally be deconstructed – its falsehood must be revealed, as is demonstrated, for instance, by Nāgārjuna's refutations of the viewpoints of "Small Vehicle" or Abhidharma Buddhists in his *Middle Stanzas* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (*Huizheng lun* 迴諍論).[10]

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[7] See Chapter 24 in the *Zhong lun*: "If a person does not understand how to differentiate between the two truths, he/she does not understand the true meaning of the profound Buddha-*dharma*" (T30:1564.32c18-19).

[8] The Buddhist notion of "dependent co-arising" is an example of this. From a Madhyamaka point of view, all arising involves patterns of interdependence, and interdependent arising is sustained by emptiness, which yet denies the reality of things based on those patterns. Hence, ultimately, there is no real arising. Dependent arising is a conventional truth which points back to what ultimately is non-arising. See for example the *Da zhi du lun*: "A 'mark of arising' is not really comprehensible; therefore, it is called 'non-arising'" (T25:1509.319a13).

[9] This conforms to Brook Ziporyn's explanation, according to which the conventional is "locally coherent, but globally incoherent" (Ziporyn, 2009: 238).

[10] The major content of the *Zhong lun* (*Middle Stanzas*) deals with the refutation of the views ascribed to heretics and the critique of Abhidharma concepts. The first chapter, *Contemplating Causes and Conditions*, for example, starts by refuting heretical views of "arising" (*sheng* 生). These are the four notions of "self-arising", "arising in virtue of something else", "both self-arising and arising in virtue of something else", and "arising without any cause", classified according to the four alternatives of the *cātuṣkotika* (*si jufa* 四句法).The next step embraces the critique and deconstruction of the Abhidharma understanding of "arising" which is based on the "four conditions" (*catvāraḥ*

All referents of our linguistic expression(s) imply conventional false-
hood, as they are built upon interdependencies and correlative opposi-
tions (*xiangdai* 相待) sustained by (their) emptiness. Like "up" and
"down", Buddhist terms such as "suffering" and "liberation", *saṃsāra*
and *nirvāṇa*, "ignorance" and "wisdom", "sentient being" and "Buddha",
or "noble" (*sheng* 聖) and "common" (*fan* 凡) are merely correlative op-
posites, exclusively referring to each other via mutual negation, and thus
mutually implying one another. Given that each of these pairs is rooted
in emptiness, neither part of each pair can be independently sustained;
either one, separate from the other, lacks a core of reality; neither is real;
both are empty. If they were not empty, but real, they would not be con-
stituted as opposites via correlative dependency. This means, as was

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pratyayāḥ, *si yuan* 四緣). Similarly, the following chapters deconstruct other Abhi-
dharma categories such as the "five aggregates", "cause and effect", "three marks of
time", etc. However, there is a significant difference between refuting heretical views
and deconstructing Abhidharma notions. While all heretical views must be abandoned,
the usage of Abhidharma terms cannot completely be denied. The critique or decon-
struction of the latter just clarifies, outlines, and specifies the limited validity of the
conventional truths upon which we must rely to realize the ultimate truth. In other
words, the deconstruction of the Abhidharma concepts discloses the permissible and
salutary way of dealing with the conventional, and prevents us from mistaking it for
the ultimate. Hence, in order for us to realize the true sense of "non-arising", that is,
ultimate truth or true emptiness, it is necessary to maintain a certain sense of "aris-
ing", cleansed from the distorting views of the heretics and the inverse use of the
conventional. The *Zhong lun's* strategy of "deconstruction" (*po* 破) is a constructive
critique which grounds the conventional truths in this specific sense of ultimate truth.
Piṅgala's commentary on the first chapter expresses this (T30:1564.1b23-c7), stressing
that the initial verse of the "eight negations" (*babu* 八不) fully realizes ultimate truth
(T30:1564.1c12). This initial verse is the point of departure from which the *Zhong lun*
proceeds with its deconstruction, which discloses and sets up the realm of the conven-
tional truths and justifies their correct use. This also fits with Zhiyi's Tiantai view in
the *Great Calming and Contemplation* (*Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀) where he stresses the
"indivisibility of deconstructing and setting up" (*jipo jili, jili jipo*, 即破即立, 即立即破),
in order to clarify the relationship between the two truths (T46:1911.55a15-24). Also,
the whole text of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (*Huizheng lun* 迴諍論) consists of Nāgārjuna's
invalidating the objections and arguments of his opponents, which serves the purpose
of strengthening and revealing his own view. The sense of truth that these two texts
address requires a deconstructive strategy exploiting the instructive force of false-
hood. Hence, their compositional structure incorporates the method of refutation as a
means of constructive critique.

stated by the early Chinese Mādhyamika Sengzhao (僧肇 374-414), that names are not in conformity with reality, and things designated by names are not real.[11]

Moreover, the unreality of names and linguistic expressions also applies to the term "emptiness"; hence true emptiness or ultimate truth is inexpressible, inconceivable, and irreducible. "Ultimate emptiness" cannot be conceived of as correlatively opposed to or dependent on non-emptiness, because emptiness itself sustains correlative oppositions such as "emptiness" and "non-emptiness". In order to accomplish our liberation from suffering via insight into ultimate truth, however, we must terminate our clinging onto such conventional falsehood, including even the term "emptiness", and realize ultimate true emptiness even within the realm of our ordinary world. We must find the path that dissociates our understanding from all the deceptive influences of the falsehood and reifications which inevitably pervade the linguistic means by which we shape and relate to our world. In spite of these problems, all Mādhyamikas insist on using the "false" expression "emptiness" when disclosing and explicating the realm of liberation. They even admit that this term may become deceptive and harmful to our understanding and path of liberation, if used in an improper way, that is, if taken literally.[12]

In other words, the differentiation between the conventional and ultimate must also be applied to the term "emptiness". Understood or seen as a "provisional/false name" (*jiaming* 假名), "emptiness" may have an instructive effect on our efforts to realize ultimate truth,[13] for in most cases, conventional falsehood evades our awareness; even if we point to it, we do this, too, by means of our conventional language. Like a blind

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[11] See Sengzhao's dictum, "names and reality do not conform to each other" (*ming shi wu-dang* 名實無當) (T45:1858.152c23).

[12] *Zhong lun*, in Chapter 1 and 24, points to the deceptive and harmful implication of the term emptiness: "Those of lower capabilities do not properly master the contemplation of emptiness, and thus may harm themselves, just like those who are not skilled in using magic spells or those who unskillfully grasp a poisonous snake" (T30:1564.33 a8-9).

[13] See *Zhong lun* (T30:1564.30b23). The Sanskrit term is *prajñapti*, and the Chinese translation according to Kumārajīva is *jiaming* (假名). The Chinese term *jia* implies two meanings, "false" and "borrowing". We will return to this ambiguity in the term below.

spot, it is concealed from us on the level of linguistic expression(s). However, the term "emptiness" may shed light on this problem by falsifying even itself. It paradoxically denies what it simultaneously signifies, to bring about our genuine understanding of the true and ultimate meaning beyond linguistic expression(s). Such self-falsification via "performative contradiction" reveals what the term "emptiness" truly is: It is a "false name" which lays out the inseparability of truth and falsehood in our understanding.

When we attempt to ascertain the ontological status of that falsehood, we also see that emptiness of inherent existence implies ontological indeterminacy. The specific term for this indeterminacy is the "middle way" (*zhongdao* 中道), which denies both the real existence and the complete nonexistence of things rooted in patterns of interdependence. Furthermore, no thing that pertains to the conventional realm has any invariant or definite identity (*juedingxiang* 決定相), which also means that those things are ontically indeterminate. All this correlates with the pragmatic sense of the Buddhist soteriology of detachment and liberation. For instance, a given person may appear to be a teacher in a certain regard and a student in another; ultimately, however, this person must be empty, in order to be constantly ready to adopt either role, contingent upon the ever-changing circumstances.

In a similar fashion, falsehood, though it persists in the conventional realm, is empty or devoid of any invariant or definite quality, since it can be either deceptive or instructive, depending upon the circumstances. Concealed from us, falsehood is deceptive, and may entice us to cling onto the unreal as if it were real, which entails harmful effects. However, falsehood revealed, as is the case with the self-falsifying and conventional term "emptiness", can be instructive – it may cause us to dissociate our understanding from all deceptive influences or reifying tendencies, and thus trigger or inspire our realization of ultimate truth.

What is crucial here is our insight into this ambiguity of falsehood, which may convert the deceptive into something instructive, as when a medicine is made from poison. Consequently, the *Zhong lun* stresses that we depend upon the conventional, in order to accomplish the ultimate:

To accomplish ultimate truth is to reveal all conventional falsehood, precisely on the basis of the instructiveness of this self-same falsehood.[14]

This same approach also seems to be expressed in the way the *Lotus Sūtra* talks about the "ultimate meaning", the "rare treasure", or the "One Vehicle". On the one hand, we are recommended not to take the Buddha's teachings literally, and not to regard his performances as reflecting the way he truly is in his nature. On the other, the *sūtra* stresses that all the Buddha's words and appearances are nonetheless trustworthy and not deceptive; indeed, they are even indispensable or essential to our understanding. Because it is inexpressible, the definite content of the "ultimate meaning" is nowhere directly explicated in this *sūtra*; instead, our understanding is guided by the instructiveness of conventional falsehood, here termed "skillful means" (*fangbian* 方便), and the deployment of those means obviously restricts the devaluation of the negative sides of our life.

In a similar way, the *Da zhi du lun* stresses that there is no medicine without sickness; the two, as opposites, are correlatively dependent; also, the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* and other *sūtras* state that delusions incorporate wisdom. Inversely pointing back to its opposite, the negative aspect of things reveals an instructive, salutary, or positive aspect, which highlights the inseparability of truth and falsehood in Mahāyāna soteriology. Consequently, to understand the positive significance of true emptiness, and thereby to discern an indestructible core that sustains reality in our existence, is always to see fully pervasive falsehood and ever-changing illusion as a constantly present inverse form of instructiveness. However, this realization does not really reach beyond the soteriological point of view in our understanding; any attempt to interpret that reality in ontological or metaphysical terms inevitably provokes us to cling onto reifications, which, instead of revealing falsehood, conceal it, and thus entail further "inversions" and other harmful effects.

Our "inversions", which are closely bound up with our clinging, mistake falsehood for truth. In other words, we confuse the conventional,

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14 Chapter 24 in the *Zhong lun* says: "If we do not rely upon the conventional truth, we cannot realize the ultimate; without realizing the ultimate, we cannot accomplish *nirvāṇa*" (T30:1564.33a2-3).

upon which we rely, with the ultimate. Therefore, we must constantly differentiate between the two truths, to avoid clinging onto the unreality and reifications which inevitably arise from the conventional level of our linguistic expression(s). To differentiate between the two truths is to rely upon the conventional, and yet maintain the awareness of its emptiness and falsehood. This, effectively, brings about our insight into the ultimate – that is, paradoxically enough, differentiating in this manner in fact *realizes* inseparability, whereas separating, or seeing truth and falsehood as independent or mutually excluding realms, entails reifications *confusing* the two. Such differentiation does not really reach beyond the level of linguistic expression, and thus cannot be taken literally; yet in a provisional sense, it is necessary, in order for us to highlight the inevitable falsehood in our linguistic way of understanding true emptiness.

From the viewpoint of the Chinese sources, the differentiation between the two truths suspends any apodictic claim implying metaphysical or ontological significance. According to Jay Garfield's and Graham Priest's dialetheist reading of the Indo-Tibetan sources of Nāgārjuna's thought, the realms of the conventional and ultimate account for the inconsistent nature of reality; however, even that view contravenes the sense of true emptiness.[15] From the pragmatic point of view in the Chi-

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[15] On the basis of Tibetan and Sanskrit sources, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest develop the understanding that Nāgārjuna defends the idea of "true contradictions at the limits of thought". This further implies that the Madhyamaka notion of the two truths has a metaphysical or ontological significance. That is to say that although two truths doctrine is coherent in terms of rationality, it leads to inconsistency regarding the nature of reality; there must be "two realities", one indicated by each of the conventional and ultimate respectively, and this is called "di-aletheism". Such an ontological interpretation of "true contradictions" subsumes the Madhyamaka concept under one of the modern views of logic called "para-consistent logic" (Deguchi, Garfield and Priest, 2008: 395-402; Garfield, 2002: 86-109). Priest explains the ontological implications of this contradiction: "Nāgārjuna's enterprise is one of fundamental ontology, and the conclusion he comes to is that fundamental ontology is impossible. But that is a fundamental ontological conclusion – and that is a paradox" (Priest, 2002: 214). For a critical discussion of Garfield and Priest's interpretation, see Tillemans, 2009: 83-101. Moreover, the Chinese exegetical tradition of the early Madhyamaka works does not conform to this interpretation; Sengzhao's *Emptiness of the Unreal* (*Buzhen kong lun* 不真空論, T1858:45.152a2-153a6) explicitly denies the understanding of the two truths as two realities, or the inconsistency of the nature of reality.

nese *Zhong lun,* by contrast, differentiating in this manner realizes "the profundity of the true Buddha-*dharma*", enacting an awareness of the inseparability of truth and falsehood in our understanding (*Zhong lun,* Chapter 24, T30:1564.32c18-19).

3 Reality and falsehood according to *Tathāgatagarbha* doctrine

As explained above, emptiness sustains the interdependent arising of things, while denying that any of those things inherently or really exists. In order to understand fully, we must realize both the sustaining and the nullifying significance of emptiness. Deconstructing the views of heretics (non-Buddhists) and the Abhidharma, the *Zhong lun* stresses the "skill of extinguishing discursive fiction" (*shan mie zhu xilun* 善滅諸戲論), and seems thereby to expound the nullifying or negative significance of emptiness. On the other hand, the explication of the eighteen types of emptiness in the *Da zhi du lun* includes an account of the positive aspect of emptiness, which it calls "the nature of *dharma*(s)" (*faxing* 法性, **dharmatā*) and "the real characteristic of all *dharma*(s)" (*zhufa shixiang* 諸法實相) etc. However, these exceptions in the *Zhong lun* aside, the sustaining aspect of emptiness seems more to be the primary focus of the scriptures expounding *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, and the texts of the Chinese Dilun and Huayan masters influenced by that teaching.[16]

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[16] *Tathāgatagarbha* scriptures often incorporate elements of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka teachings, which represent the two major Indian Mahāyāna schools. Yet *tathāgatagarbha* certainly also implies specific characteristics distinct from these other views. In his discussions on the classification of doctrines, Fazang seems to be the first observer to set the particular features of *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine apart from those of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. In his commentary on the *Awakening of Faith,* he reviews the debates between the Indian Madhyamaka and Yogācāra and concludes: "*Sūtra*s and *śāstra*s nowadays prevalent in the East encompass the Small and the Great Vehicles; this includes the paths of four [types of] school: first, schools which follow marks and cling to *dharma*(s), namely, all the Abhidharma of the Small Vehicle; second, schools which teaches true emptiness and the nonexistence of the marks, as explicated by the *Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*s and the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* etc; third, the school teaching the *dharma*-marks of mere consciousness, as explicated by the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* as well as the *Yogācārabhūmi* etc; fourth, the school teaching dependent co-arising sustained by *tathāgatagarbha*, as explicated by the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the *Ghanavyūha-sūtra,* the *Awakening of Faith*, and the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*" (T44:1846.243b23-27).

Huayan Buddhists stress the inseparability of "illusory existence and true emptiness" (*zhen kong huan you* 真空幻有).[17] Things that arise interdependently, and are thus ever changing, are illusorily and not inherently existent; thus each, in its specific way, manifests what truly sustains all unreality - namely, "true emptiness" (*zhenkong* 真空), which is not the same thing as complete nonexistence. Such a manifestation of true emptiness is an inexhaustible and yet inverse form of instructiveness, which we can only disclose if we fully realize the ambiguity of all falsehood – that is, if we always see the instructive and salutary side of unreality, in addition to its deceptive and harmful aspects. According to those who expound *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, this means that there *really* is an indestructible and all-pervasive potential to become (a) Buddha in every sentient being, since our ever-changing and unreal world, which we constantly produce, must be seen as inverse manifestations of buddhahood.[18]

Hence, the potential for buddhahood indestructibly persists in our world and, in that sense, is equivalent to the reality that constitutes the positive aspect of true emptiness, sustaining our realm of falsehood and impermanence. This notion calls for further clarification. Buddhists correctly argue that things cannot really exist if they are contingent upon something unreal; hence, the idea of a reality correlatively opposed to and thus dependent upon falsehood is not coherent. Rather, what is meant – reality in the proper sense – is "ultimate emptiness" (*bijing kong* 畢竟空) which is "devoid of both falsehood and reality" (*fei xu fei shi* 非

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[17] See, for example, Fazang's and Chengguan's (澄觀, 738-839) discussions of "illusory existence and true emptiness", which are almost identical; Fazang, *Huayan you xin fajie ji* (華嚴遊心法界記) (T45:1877.649c27-650a10); Chengguan, Commentary on the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* called *Da fangguang Fo huayan jing shu* (大方廣佛華嚴經疏) (T35:1735.604 b28-c9).

[18] *Tathāgata* is used as a synonym for Buddha, and one of the meanings of *garbha* is "embryo"; the compound expression *tathāgatagarbha* seems to imply that all the delusions and defilements of sentient beings nonetheless contain the potential to become a Buddha, probably on account of their nature as inverse instructiveness. The Chinese translation *rulaizang* literally means "store of the *tathāgata*" and is often used in the sense of storing the innumerable Buddha-virtues and achievements that mark the whole path of transformation of all sentient beings.

虛非實).[19] As demonstrated in the *Da zhi du lun*, terms such as reality or emptiness must be used in this ambiguous way, to reveal their inseparability from falsehood and to realize the inconceivability of what is intended. Consequently, the only thing that can truly constitute the sustaining ground of such opposites as *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa,* as well as all types of interdependence, is reality in this inconceivable sense.

This seems to be the view that may have inspired the discussion about "birth/life and death" in the chapter "Inversion and Reality" in the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra*, a part of which will be examined below. The *sūtra* text refers to inconceivable and indestructible reality as *tathāgatagarbha,* specifying that without it, neither our transformation into the state of liberation, nor the interdependent arising of things, could be grounded and sustained. If we seek to properly comprehend the intention behind the doctrine of this chapter, we must become fully aware of both our inversions, which shape the way we exist in our world, and the real ground which sustains it all. Moreover, on the ordinary or conventional level, which does not consider these crucial issues, our existence seems to be a constant alternation of arising and deceasing, that is, we regard birth/life and death – synonymous with *saṃsāra* – as real.

However, according to both Mahāyāna scriptures expounding true emptiness, as well as the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra,* which deals with related issues, our concepts of beginning and ending, such as birth and death, are false constructions, since no thing that really exists arises from or completely disappears into nonexistence. Consequently, finitude or temporality, in the sense of the limited duration of our existence, as well as discontinuity, interruption, separation, and difference, are all falsely constructed. Many Mahāyāna scriptures stress a) that the interdependent arising of all things entails continuity; and b) that we must face impermanence, or the unceasing change in our worldly realm, in order to achieve liberation from suffering.

As pointed out in the *Zhong lun*, continuity cannot be confused with duration, and the temporality of our existence is devoid of marks quali-

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[19] See the *Da zhi du lun*: "Again, all *dharma*(s) are ultimately empty; this ultimate emptiness is also empty; as emptiness is devoid of *dharma*(s), it is also devoid of [the mutual interdependence] of falsehood and reality" (T25:1509.290a4-5).

fying and quantifying time.[20] Like any change, the whole process of transformation from an unenlightened into an enlightened being implies both continuity and impermanence. The *Zhong lun* calls all this "neither arising nor cessation, neither permanence nor discontinuity", and according to the *Da zhi du lun*, Fazang, Chengguan (澄觀, 738-839), Jizang, Zhiyi, and Zhanran (湛然, 711-782), this insight constitutes one of the hallmarks of Mahāyāna thought.[21] On this basis, *sūtras* such as the *Śrīmā-lādevī-sūtra* as well as the Northern and the Southern versions of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* point to two types of inversions: 1) those of worldly beings who mistake the unreal for the real, that is, they deludedly ascribe duration or permanence to things that are in fact unceasingly changing; and 2) the mistake of taking the real for the unreal, which means not seeing the indestructibility, continuity, permanence and reality of *tathāgatagarbha,* in addition to having insight into worldly impermanence.[22]

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[20] See Chapter 19 of the *Zhong lun* on time, refuting the real existence of marks qualifying time, which, however, at the same time does not deny the temporality of our existence.

[21] See the statement in the *Da zhi du lun*: "Despite emptiness there is no discontinuity; yet continuity does not equal permanence; in this sense, neither sins nor meritorious action disappear completely" (T25:1509.64c9-10). According to the Tiantai master Zhanran, commenting on Zhiyi's *Mohe zhi guan* (摩訶止觀): "All things taught by the Buddha are beyond discontinuity and permanence" (T46:1912.198a14).

[22] The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* talks about the "four inversions" in two different senses. There are inversions such as the false views of "permanence, bliss, self, and purity" held by sentient beings in bondage to the three realms of desire, form, and formlessness. There are also a further "four inversions", namely, false views of "impermanence, sorrow, non-self, and impurity", held by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas who are beyond these three realms. See the discussion in the Northern version (T12:374.377 b25-c14) and in the Southern version (T12:375.617a26-b16). Chapter 12 of the *Śrīmālā-devī-sūtra* (T12:353.222a9-26) essentially endorses the same view; however, the use of terminology differs from the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*: There are "inversions" in terms of "the two extreme views" (*erjian* 二見) of "permanence (*changjian* 常見)" and "discontinuity (*duanjian* 斷見)" which seems to refer to views held by sentient beings in the realm of *saṃsāra*, while the wisdom of the Arhat and Pratyekabuddha, although it is called clear and pure, still fails to realize the "realm of universal wisdom and the *dharmakāya* of *tathāgatagarbha*", which the *sūtra* describes elsewhere as permanent and invariant. Moreover, the subsequent passage stresses that "some of the sentient beings who believe in the Buddha's Word develop the thought of permanence, bliss, self,

These considerations seem to aim at a deeper understanding of emptiness. The term *tathāgatagarbha* in the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra,* and the concept of "Buddha-nature" in the two versions of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, though not completely identical with one another, are predicated upon the same argument, namely, that the term "emptiness", if taken only as the denial of the reality of all the referents of our intentional acts, tends to overshadow the positive or sustaining significance implicit in the same concept.[23] These two scriptures, as well as the *Awakening of Faith*, stress both "emptiness" (*kong* 空, *śūnya*) and "non-emptiness" (*bukong* 不空, *aśūnya*). According to all these texts, these two terms do not exclude one another, but rather, complement each other. "Non-emptiness" highlights the sustaining aspect of ultimate emptiness, while "emptiness" highlights its nullifying aspect. The two terms thus seem to relate to each other in a dynamic way; the complete nullification of all reifications in our understanding turns into full insight into the sustaining aspect, and *vice versa*; "emptiness" which nullifies all deceptiveness, discloses "non-emptiness", which is what truly sustains our becoming a Buddha in this specific way.

According to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, those holding to a view that excludes non-emptiness one-sidedly cling onto insights into impermanence, while others, who do not realize emptiness at all, are one-sidedly attached to views of permanence. Therefore, the right view (*zhengjian* 正見, **saṃyagdṛṣti*), which is empty of all clinging, does not fall prey to either type of inversion, instead realizing the dynamics of "the wisdom of the supreme meaning of emptiness" (*diyi yi kong* 第一義空, **para-*

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and purity; this is not an inverse view; it is called 'right view'." Hence, the text seems to be ambiguous regarding its distinction between the "extreme view of discontinuity" and the deficient type of "wisdom" of the Small Vehicle. Apparently, this *sūtra* uses the term "inversion" only for sentient beings in the *saṃsāric* realm, while the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* seems to apply it to both sentient beings and the Two Vehicles. Nevertheless, the two *sūtra*s do not differ in their essential meaning.

23   See the discussion about the relation of non-exclusion between emptiness and non-emptiness in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (T12:374.395b13-c2).

mārthaśūnya), which includes both sides, and is also called "Buddha-nature" and the "middle way".[24]

Similarly, the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* mentions two sides of the "emptiness-wisdom of *tathāgatagarbha*". There is "empty *tathāgatagarbha*" and "non-empty *tathāgatagarbha*", and the opposition between these two seems to correlate with the distinction between "emptiness in accordance with reality" and "non-emptiness in accordance with reality" in the *Awakening of Faith*. These two scriptures thus explain the significance of "emptiness" in a very similar way: Emptiness, understood as the emptiness of our false views, seems to reflect a kind of *a posteriori* viewpoint. Defiled by inversions as we are, reality can only be achieved or accomplished for us *after* our understanding of *tathāgatagarbha* has been dissociated from or *emptied* of the deceptive influences in our thought (*liwang* 離妄). This is important to mention, because as soon as we refer to it in our usual conceptualizing way, *tathāgatagarbha* is inevitably covered up by falsehood and reifications. Consequently, prior to the view of *tathāgatagarbha* emptied from inversions, there is also the unaffected way *tathāgatagarbha* originally and constantly is. This is invariable reality, which is devoid even of an emptiness nullifying unreality, and is thus called "non-emptiness".[25] Yet, unless we empty our inverse views, we cannot really disclose that aspect of non-emptiness.

These dynamics in our understanding mean that our emptying, or becoming aware of, all inversions, and our seeing the reality of *tathāgatagarbha* are coextensive; this might be the reason why the chapter of the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* in question is called "Inversion and Reality". In other

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[24] "Buddha-nature is called the supreme meaning of emptiness. The supreme meaning of emptiness is called wisdom. What we call 'emptiness' means not to view emptiness and non-emptiness [as mutually excluding, as in a contradiction]. The wise person sees emptiness and non-emptiness [without contradiction], permanence and impermanence [without contradiction], suffering and bliss [without contradiction], self and non-self [without contradiction]...Seeing the emptiness of all things, but not [their] non-emptiness, cannot be called the Middle Way...The Middle Way is called the Buddha-nature. For that reason, the Buddha-nature is permanent and does not [really] change" (T12:374.523b12-19).

[25] See the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra,* T12:353.221c16-17, and the *Awakening of Faith,* T32:1666.576 a27-b5.

words, when we see that *tathāgatagarbha* is the true and real nature of
what we inversely consider as life and death, we realize that we perceive,
think and talk in such inverse ways only on account of that reality. This
level of insight reveals the side of reality which Huiyuan, in his com-
mentary on the *Śrīmālā,* calls the "functioning of the ground" (*yiyong* 依
用) (X19:351.892c11-893a20). Huiyuan emphasizes that all falsehood is
sustained by reality in this manner, in the same way that when we mis-
take a rope for a snake in the dark, the snake that we mistakenly see is
only seen in virtue of the fact that the rope in fact exists.[26] Without a re-
ality of this sort as their basis, none of our misperceptions could arise
from our deluded mind. Similarly, the chapter "Inversion and Reality"
explains:

> O World Honored One, birth/life and death means to be grounded on
> *tathāgatagarbha*. On account of *tathāgatagarbha*, we say that their ini-
> tial limit is unknowable. O World Honored One, since there is *tathā-
> gatagarbha*, we speak of birth/life and death; this may be called speak-
> ing in a skillful way. O World Honored One, when we say, "birth and
> death, birth and death", this means that the sense faculties (*gen* 根,
> **indriyāṇi*) already apprehending [the sensory realms] pass out of
> existence, and subsequently, sense faculties that have not [yet] appre-
> hended arise; this is called birth/life and death. O World Honored One,
> these two *dharma*(s) [called] birth/life and death are, [in fact], *tathā-
> gatagarbha*. According to worldly speech, there is death and there is
> birth/life, [where] "death" means the passing away of sense faculties,
> while "birth/life" implies the arising of new sense faculties. However,
> it is not [really] the case that there is birth/life and death [in the
> realm of] *tathāgatagarbha* (T12:353.222b5-10).

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[26] See Huiyuan's commentary on the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra,* explaining that life and death are
not intrinsic or real features of our existence; they are only marks (*xiang* 相) inversely
hinting at the reality (*shi* 實) of *tathāgatagarbha*. In the genuine sense, they are no-
thing but *tathāgatagarbha*, similar to the false snake that is in fact the rope, or the
falsely perceived North Pole that is in fact the South Pole. Huiyuan stresses that these
images illustrate what the *sūtra* means by the "inseparability (*buyi* 不異) of falsehood
and reality" (X19:351.893a10-13).

In order to see what really grounds our false constructions, such as birth/life and death, we must dissociate our understanding of *tathāgata-garbha* from all those views. Hence, the text proceeds:

> *Tathāgatagarbha* is beyond the mark of [false] construction(s); *tathā-gatagarbha* constantly endures and never changes; therefore, *tathā-gatagarbha* grounds, sustains, and sets up; O World Honored One, it neither leaves, nor interrupts, nor separates, nor differs; it is the inconceivable Buddha-*dharma*; O World Honored One; what reaches beyond interruption, separation, difference, and [thus] grounds, sustains and sets up the constructed *dharma*(s), is *tathāgatagarbha* (T12: 353.222b11-14).[27]

The phrase describing the nature of *tathāgatagarbha* as "neither leaving, nor separating, nor differing, thus being the inconceivable Buddha-*dharma*" occurs in this *sūtra* three times, and has also been incorporated into the texts of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *Awakening of Faith*. Furthermore, most of the eminent Chinese Buddhist masters, such as Huiyuan, Jizang, Fazang, Kuiji (窺基, 632-682) and many others, quote or comment on it. The Chinese wording is rather ambiguous, and allows for different readings. However, all those Chinese commentaries understand this phrase as a predication about the nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, which expo-

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[27] The *Ratnagotravibhāga* also incorporates this passage; however the wording in the Chinese version of the *sūtra* is differently arranged. Moreover, some of the expressions in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* differ from the *sūtra* text. The only extant Sanskrit version of this passage is that in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, where the first and second parts of the initial phrase are apparently be connected in a genitive relationship, of which Hui-yuan, Jizang, Kuiji, and others in their Chinese commentaries were obviously not aware. The translation of the present article follows the "Chinese understanding", since the wording of the Chinese *sūtra* text does not really match with the reading in Takasaki's English translation based upon the Sanskrit *Ratnagotravibhāga*: "Therefore, O Lord, the Matrix of the Tathāgata is the foundation, the support, and the substratum of the immutable elements (properties) which are essentially connected with, indi-visible from [the Absolute Entity], and unreleased from Wisdom." Quoted after the *Bibliotheca Polyglotta, Thesaurus Literaturae Buddhicae* (http://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/ index.php?page=fulltext&vid=61&view=fulltext, last accessed June 24 2013).

ses five of its major properties.[28] Perhaps Kuiji's reading might best represent the way the phrase has been usually understood:

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[28] The Chinese wording of the *sūtra* text reads: 是故如來藏，是依、是持、是建立。世
尊。不離、不斷、不脫、不異(、)不思議佛法。世尊。斷、脫、異外有為法依持、
建立者，是如來藏. If related to the slightly differing phrase in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*
(T31:1611.839a24-29), this would mean that *tathāgatagarbha* is the ground of both what
is never different or separate from the Buddha-*dharma,* and what is different and sepa-
rate from it. Therefore, it could be also translated as "(2)": "*Tathāgatagarbha* is the
ground, support, and basis, O World Honored One, of what neither leaves, nor inter-
rupts, nor separates, nor differs from the inconceivable Buddha-*dharma*; O World Hon-
ored One, *tathāgatagarbha* is [also] the ground, support, and basis of [all] constructed
dharma(s), in addition to [the views that there is] interruption, separation, and differ-
ence." The crucial point is the Chinese *wai* (外) in the second part of the phrase. Ac-
cording to the reading of the *Ratnagotravibhāga,* it would mean "besides" or "in addi-
tion to." However, the commentaries of Huiyuan, Jizang, and Kuiji obviously read *wai*
in a different sense, though their understanding of the whole phrase does not really or
fundamentally differ from that of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. Jizang, Huiyuan, and Kuiji
univocally state that "interrupting, separating, differing (*duan* 斷, *tuo* 脫, *yi* 異)" are
the features of the inverse and constructed realm of life and death from which our un-
derstanding of *tathāgatagarbha* must be dissociated. According to them, the character
wai indicates precisely that *tathāgatagarbha* goes "beyond" that realm characterized by
these three aspects.

There is also a third possible reading "(3)" suggested by some of the commentaries:
"*Tathāgatagarbha*...is the inconceivable Buddha-*dharma* which neither leaves, nor
interrupts, nor separates, nor differs..."

Nevertheless, all three readings do not differ in essence. The translation first given
in the main text of the present article "(1)", following the Chinese commentaries,
stresses that *tathāgatagarbha* is the ground of the realm of life and death; the subse-
quent phrase in the *sūtra* proceeds with the explanation that it is also the ground of
the path leading to *nirvāṇa*. In the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, however, that explanation pre-
cedes the phrase in question. The differing compositional arrangements in the two
scriptures, therefore, suggest differing understandings; however, the two are, never-
theless, unanimous concerning the meaning of *tathāgatagarbha* as the ground of both
the constructed and unconstructed realm. See Huiyuan's commentary on the *Mahā-
parinirvāṇa-sūtra* (T37:1764.701c9-15) as well as his commentary on the *Śrīmālādevī-sū-
tra* (X19:351.888a3-b2), both of which come close to (3), while his remarks at X19:351.
893a21-b12 come close to (1); Jizang's commentary on the *Śrīmālā* actually suggests
two opposite readings (T37:1744.74a24-b2, T37:1744.83a19-28; the latter is also men-
tioned in Shōtoku Taishi's 聖德太子 commentary, X19:353.970c21-24); Kuiji's *Śrīmālā*
commentary comes close to (1) (X19:352.922b13-23); and an anonymous Dunhuang *Śrī-
mālā* commentary also fits this reading (T85:2762.276c24-277a2). Of course, practically
speaking, the English translation must choose one of the three readings, but the Chi-
nese phrase can be and has been understood in this ambiguous yet consistent way;

> The second phrase outlines the essentials of this *dharma* of the ground: Owing to its true suchness, permanence, and oneness, it is called "not leaving"; as no falsehood can defile it, it is called "not interrupting"; as it is non-constructed, it is called "not separating"; it is homogeneous and therefore called "not differing"; it is incomprehensible to any of our sense consciousnesses, and thus is called "inconceivable Buddha-*dharma*" (X19:352.922b13-23).

Again, the Chinese *sūtra* passage as a whole describes *tathāgatagarbha* as that which really sustains our experiences of birth/life and death. Those apparent experiences are features empty of an intrinsic nature, and are thus not essentially different from *tathāgatagarbha*. All arising and cessation, as well as all finitude, separation, and discontinuity are unreal; there is only the "non-arising and non-cessation" of *tathāgatagarbha*, which is the true nature of all inversions. However, as inverse modes, our views, constructions, and experiences of birth and death veil that nature and conceal its reality; therefore they are not really and completely identical to it. According to Huiyuan's commentary, birth/life and death are constructed or inverse "marks" (*xiang* 相), while *tathāgatagarbha* is the non-constructed and real "ground" (*yi* 依). The constructed and non-constructed realms relate to each other as marks and ground, which are "neither different nor identical" (*bu yi bu yi* 不異不一). This means, for our defiled understanding, that they are inseparable, and yet must nonetheless be differentiated from each other.[29]

Huiyuan further points out that this passage refers to *tathāgatagarbha* not only as the "ground in its defiled mode" (*ranyi* 染依), but also as the "ground in its pure mode" (*jingyi* 淨依) (X19:351.893b9-11). Indeed, the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* text goes on to explain that without *tathāgatagarbha*,

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that is, according to commentators such as Huiyuan, the nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, based on this phrase, could be understood in this threefold way. Translation (3) seems to fit the first time the phrase occurs in the Chinese *sūtra* text (T12:353.221c7-11); Translation (2) seems to fit the second time (T12:353.221c17-18).

    See also the quotation in the *Awakening of Faith* (T32:1666.579a12-20), Fazang's commentary on that passage (T44:1846.273b26-c3), and the quotation in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (T31:1611.839a24-29).

29 See Huiyuan's commentary on the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* (X19:351.892c11-893b12).

our "dislike of suffering" and "delight in the search for *nirvāṇa*" would be groundless (T12:353.222b14-16). "*Tathāgatagarbha*" signifies what really sustains the entire continuing yet changing process of our transformation from a non-awakened into an awakened being: Our ignorance and inverse views are the causes and conditions which lead to harmful fruits full of suffering and our dislike of it, and this in turn triggers or brings about delight in the search for *nirvāṇa* and its ultimate realization, as well as the exploration of the Buddha-*dharma.* In such a way, the "functioning of the ground" (*yiyong* 依用) embraces both the "defiled" and the "pure mode". The two are interdependent and opposite links, neither of which alone can express a true understanding of the functioning of *tathāgatagarbha* as a whole.

When we understand *tathāgatagarbha* as the ground of both the defiled and the pure mode, it also means that those opposites are not essentially different, that is, not different in nature. Yet the two cannot be viewed as identical either, since as soon as our conceptualizing mind construes identity in seeking to comprehend the inconceivable sense of that reality, we must realize that this is a construction which differs from what is not constructed. In the process of adopting and internalizing the Buddha-*dharma*, we must see our own (mis-)understanding(s) as being sustained by the functioning of *tathāgatagarbha,* which is constantly present to us in the form of such inverse instructiveness. The viewpoint from which the *sūtra* expounds that doctrine is that of our non-awakened mind. As it undergoes the transformation into the state of awakening, this defiled understanding must realize the inseparability of reality and falsehood, precisely by means of differentiating between the constructed and the non-constructed realms.

Consequently, for Huiyuan, who explains that the two stand in a mutual relation of "neither identity nor difference", such differentiation does not constitute a real duality, nor does their inseparability imply any sense of monism. It would be misleading to propose a polarized opposition between a dualistic pattern in this *sūtra* and a monistic scheme in the *Awakening of Faith,* which stresses the aspect of inseparability. The *Awakening of Faith* expounds the "single mind disclosing the two *dharma*-gates of arising and non-arising", and thus takes the aspect of differentiation into account, just as our passage from the *Śrīmālā* also considers

inseparability. The viewpoints expressed in the two scriptures are not contradictory, nor do they imply a metaphysical position.

Rather, according to the *sūtra*'s view of *tathāgatagarbha*, the seemingly paradoxical coincidence of inseparability and differentiation accounts for the dynamics of the awareness which is essential if we are to realize the inconceivability of the Buddha-*dharma.* Such a realization must be aware of both the inevitable inversions defiling our understanding and the coextension of those defilements with the undefiled ground sustaining them. In other words, *tathāgatagarbha* must be seen as the intrinsic nature of our ordinary mind, because all the falsehood that inevitably arises as soon as we act upon our conceptual understanding also enfolds within itself an inverse instructiveness embodying the truth and reality that sustains such inversions. Consequently, *tathāgatagarbha,* as the intrinsic nature of our delusions, is the pure mind; in the following section, the *sūtra* speaks of the "intrinsically clear and pure mind which is nonetheless covered up by defilements".[30]

Fazang also elaborates on this idea. In his commentary on the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*, the *Huayan jing tan xuan ji* 華嚴經探玄記, he uses the *sūtra*'s image of an artisan painting on the surface of a wall to illustrate the way that our defiled understanding can be grounded in the functioning of pure mind. In this same connection, he also quotes the well-known passage expounding the "single mind disclosing the two gateways" (*yixin kai ermen* 一心開二門) from the *Awakening of Faith.*

> The *Awakening of Faith* says: "There are two gateways based on the *dharma* of one single mind: first, the mind as the gateway to reality; second, the mind as the gateway to arising and cessation." However, this statement only expresses the point that the two gateways equally embrace all *dharma*(s) [only seen from different points of view]. The image of the painting in the *sūtra* text, further, implies these two meanings: first, on the basis of the wall [itself,] there is nothing more than an even surface; second, it only seems that there are differences

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30 T12:353.222b28. "Intrinsically clear and pure mind" is referred to literally as "the mind clear and pure by nature" (*zixing qing jing xin* 自性清淨心).

of high and low due to the skillful mind of the artisan (T35:1733.215 b17-21).

According to Fazang, in actual fact, there exists nothing but the even surface of the wall; yet we tend to see the three-dimensional objects in the painting, because we falsely separate these figures from that wall. Conversely, without the wall, which is in fact even, no image of those illusorily three-dimensional objects would be possible; the three-dimensional space, which is unreal, is grounded upon the even wall, which is real. In the same way, our defiled mind, and its unreal world of the arising and cessation of entities, is grounded upon the intrinsically clear and pure mind, which is devoid of those apparent entities.

The focus on the nature of this pure and clear mind reveals a major difference between the *tathāgatagarbha* view of the process of becoming (a) Buddha, and the Madhyamaka understanding of the same transformation. Both the Madhyamaka teaching of the two truths, and the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine alike, are based on the "inseparability of reality/ truth and falsehood". However, they deal with this underlying common ground in opposite ways. The Madhyamaka view seems to emphasize that our realization of truth relies upon the instructiveness of falsehood, while the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, conversely, holds that all falsehood rests upon a reality which, though beyond conceptualization, is essential to our understanding. In other words, the two seem to represent two opposite approaches: The Mādhyamika tries to completely unveil falsehood as falsehood, and seems thereby to focus on the nullifying significance of emptiness; whereas those following the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine intend to expose reality as reality to/in our understanding, that is, they elaborate on the sustaining significance of emptiness, pointing to our indestructible potential to become (a) Buddha. However, this does not necessarily imply that they are contradictory and exclude each other. Rather, the two probably simply stress the epistemic conditions of our realization of the ultimate realm of liberation from opposite points of view. Nevertheless, the two seem to be equally based on the ambiguity of falsehood. The *tathāgatagarbha* approach to transformation develops the view that we must restore an original purity, by seeing that this is the intrin-

sic nature of our deluded mind, which is also our potential for becoming
(a) Buddha.

However, we still must reconsider the question of why this pure mind
undergoes action and falls into the defiled mode, construing illusory
worlds inhabited by suffering beings. If there is nothing real apart from
pure mind itself, from where does the impulse emerge that stirs up the
pure mind's unreal alter ego? These are the questions which inevitably
occur when reading, for example, *The Awakening of Faith,* a Chinese scrip-
ture that blends *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine with the Yogācāra concept of
ālaya-consciousness.

This text simply explains that the pure mind, which is originally de-
void of arising and cessation, turns into the *ālaya*-consciousness, which
performs the functions of arising and cessation, when it is exposed to the
influences of ignorance and delusions. Thus covered by delusions, it
gives rise to the various realms of our sensory world, and all the unreal
apparitions that make up this world, as well as to the ongoing experience
of suffering, and birth and death. The concept of mind expounded in this
text, also, follows the paradigm of the inseparability of truth/reality and
falsehood. The *Awakening of Faith* coins the notion of "the single mind
disclosing two gateways" – mind as the gateway to the illusory realm of
arising and cessation, and mind as the gateway to the true realm of non-
arising and non-cessation. The illusory realm is said to arise from "igno-
rance without beginning" – a gloss on *ālaya*-consciousness, which, how-
ever, does not seem a satisfying or clear answer. In that case, then, can
we find an explanation that ultimately clarifies the previously mention-
ed questions, and yet is consistent with the true meaning of this doc-
trine?

Indeed, from the viewpoint of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, any ques-
tion involving concepts of beginning and ending, or arising and cessa-
tion, is just symptomatic of the delusion of our mind; and yet such an
aporetic condition may push our conceptual understanding to the limits
of thought and induce an "initial awakening" (*shijue* 始覺), as is de-
scribed by the *Awakening of Faith.* The scripture discusses the mind's ori-
ginal, pure, and undefiled nature in terms of "original awakening" (*ben-
jue* 本覺) and the "source of the mind" (*xinyuan* 心源), while it calls the

actual and true understanding "ultimate awakening" (*bijing jue* 畢竟覺).
The scripture explains:

> The expression "awakening" means that the essence of mind is sepa-
> rate from thought [= our conceptual understanding]. [In] this mark of
> being separate from thought, [it] is like the element of space, which
> extends everywhere; [it is] the unitary mark of the realm of [all]
> *dharma*(s), which is the same as the identical *dharma*-body of [all] the
> *tathāgata*s. On the ground of this *dharma*-body, we refer to it in terms
> of "original awakening". Why is it so? The doctrine of original awa-
> kening is taught as a counterpart to "initial awakening"; initial awa-
> kening means becoming identical with original awakening. [As for]
> the doctrine of initial awakening, "non-awakening" exists on the basis
> of original awakening, and on account of such non-awakening we say
> that there is initial awakening. Again, awakening to the "source of the
> mind" is called "ultimate awakening"; not being awakened to the
> source of the mind is not ultimate awakening (T32:1666.576b11-18).

When the text says that "non-awakening exists on the basis of original
awakening", this is another expression for the "inseparability of truth/
reality and falsehood". "Original awakening" constitutes the reality that
sustains falsehood or "non-awakening"; this falsehood, in turn, mani-
fests the reality that grounds it in its role as inverse instructiveness.
Such falsehood or non-awakening constantly points back to reality or
original awakening, and so implies that there must be an initial awak-
ening which will accomplish the ultimate awakening after it has restored
or become equal to the original nature of mind, that is, original awak-
ening. The original nature of mind is thus what sustains the whole pro-
cess of transformation from the non-awakened into the awakened state
of mind. This passage simply explains that transformation as the restor-
ation of our mind's original nature is based on the paradigm of the "in-
separability of truth/reality and falsehood".

4   Truth and falsehood according to the Yogācāra doctrine of mind

This section discusses truth and falsehood as they are viewed according to the Yogācāra concept of mind in Asaṅga's *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (*Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra*, *She dasheng lun* 攝大乘論) which centers on the doctrine of *ālaya*-consciousness. This scripture is extant in Chinese and Tibetan. In the sixth century, Paramārtha's (Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) translation of this treatise (T1593), along with the commentary by Vasubandhu (T1595), had a major influence on the doctrinal development of Chinese Buddhist thought. In addition to this and Buddhaśānta's translation of that time (T1592), there is also Xuanzang's (玄奘, 602-664) version (T1594), produced almost one century later; in addition, Xuanzang also retranslated the commentary of Vasubandhu (T1597),[31] and another by *Asvabhāva (T1598). Modern scholarship does not regard all of Paramārtha's explanations and the views transmitted in the commentaries of his disciples (known as the the Shelun 攝論 masters, after the Chinese title of the *Compendium*) as identical with Asaṅga's interpretation of the text.[32]

The term *ālaya*-consciousness, as is discussed in the *Compendium of the Great Vehicle*, obviously does not imply the notion of a pure mind, constituting reality/truth, and at the same time sustaining worldly falsehood. However, seen from the viewpoint of the Yogācāra conception of transformation, the *ālaya*-consciousness is a crucial link in the process of transforming our deluded mind into a state of true wisdom and realizing

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[31] A third Chinese "translation" of Vasubandhu's commentary is also extant, T1596, ascribed to Gupta (笈多, ?-619) and his collaborators under the Sui.

[32] Paramārtha's translation of Vasubandhu's commentary includes interpolated portions expressing his own point of view. Those referred to as the "Shelun shi" (= masters commenting on the *Compendium*) in the ancient sources deal with Paramārtha's but not with Buddhaśānta's translation. The only extant source by one of Paramārtha's direct disciples is Huikai's (慧愷, d.u.) introduction to the *Compendium*. However, there exist later Chinese commentaries composed, for example, by Daoji (道基, 577-637), and Fahu (法護, d.u.), who were recognized as Shelun shi in the sense that they are Paramārtha's indirect disciples in the fourth generation.

the realm of liberation. In this sense, it also has to do with the relationship of the two aspects of reality/truth and falsehood.

Ālaya-consciousness, according to the second chapter of the *Compendium*, refers to a subtle or deeper level of our consciousness, which evades the surface level of our conventional, ordinary, or everyday awareness. Moreover, it is the receptacle of all of our impressions and "habitual forces" (*xiqi* 習氣, *vāsanā*),[33] which shape the way we act, speak, think, and feel, as well as the way we perceive, respond to and build up the world in which we live. Another related term is that of "defiled seeds" (*zaran zhongzi* 雜染種子). In a metaphorical sense, the *ālaya*-consciousness is like a storehouse where those impressions and habitual forces are collected and stored, like seeds in the ground, until all the conditions necessary for their fruition are fulfilled. In this process of ripening, they turn into the fruits that surface on the level of our sensory consciousness, and make up the delusory world of external objects. In addition, our sensory perception, experience, and discrimination of these external but unreal objects are also subject to the same process. Collected and stored as habitual forces, they too undergo the process of ripening, like seeds developing into fruits, and turn into the varying types of sensory consciousness that unfold their cognizing activity on the surface of our conventional awareness. All sensory function and all objects of conventional experience arise from that subtle level of mind. In this sense, *ālaya*-consciousness is called the "ground", the "storehouse consciousness", and also "fundamental consciousness".

In analyzing the surface level of our conventional awareness, Yogācāra scriptures, such as the *Jie shen mi jing* (解深密經 T676, *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*), generally enumerate six types of sensory consciousness. These are specified as the five sense-organs and, sixth, "intentional consciousness", which performs the function of "discrimination" as soon as at least one of the other five is activated. To be present as a particular object means for us that some item or component of our sensory environment comes into sharp focus for our awareness; identified as a cer-

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[33] Chinese *xiqi,* which equates to Sanskrit *vāsāna,* is often translated as "impressions"; however the contexts in which it occurs often imply the continuous influences of those impressions and their significance as a habitual force.

tain single thing, it overshadows other things also belonging to its immediate environment. This selection and concentration on the part of our awareness consists of an intentional act of discrimination ascribed to this sixth sense (T16:676.692b20-28). Its function is inseparable from that of the other five, though distinguishable from them; however, all six of these senses are fruits that arise on the surface level of our mind from its more subtle levels.

The *Compendium* designates the *ālaya*-consciousness as the cause which gives rise to both our sensory capacities and to the world of external objects disclosed by the senses. As that which is capable of resuming the influential or habitual forces from such sensory functioning, this same *ālaya*-consciousness is then in addition called "fruit", or result. This is because its content consists of those impressions which, in a metaphorical sense, it collects and stores like seeds in the ground. In other words, there is a dynamic or interactive relationship between the two levels: The subtle level gives rise to the surface level of our sensory manifold, and the habitual forces of that fruition, in turn, "fumigate" (*xunxi* 熏習) or permeate the subtle level, which is receptive to all impressions. This model of mutual conditioning seems to constitute a circular system of self-perpetuating unreality, which also fits the image of *saṃsāra* – the defiled and self-perpetuating world in which we live. Hence, *ālaya*-consciousness also accounts for the continuous and unceasing process whereby things arise and cease. Moreover, *ālaya*-consciousness is also considered the principle which sets up the life of sentient beings.

The external world, as it is presented to our sensory capacities, is called "defiled" or deceptive, because its unreality and emptiness evades our sensory awareness. Things are mistaken as real entities belonging to an external and independent world; hence, the unreality with which the sensory realm is shot through is beclouded on that level of awareness. Moreover, not only are the external objects of our perceptions illusory and deceptive; the perceiving subject, believed to be the "self" sustaining our sensory functioning, is so, too. The falsehood of this self, which also evades our awareness, represents a source of defilements or deception even deeper than the world of external objects. Chinese Yogācāra scriptures, such as the *Compendium*, often refer to this false self as "defiled intentionality" (*ranwuyi* 染污意, *kliṣṭamanas*). It designates a level of

consciousness which clings onto an illusive self, taking the continuous functioning of the *ālaya*-consciousness as the object of its clinging.[34] Though it is the ground of the defiled or deceptive realm that we experience as the world we inhabit, *ālaya*-consciousness does not constitute subjectivity in the sense of a persistent or real self. Our false assumption of a self or subject sustaining our experiences of arising and cessation results from the habitual influences of "defiled intentionality". Moreover, defiled intentionality is also involved in all delusions related to both selfhood and selfishness.

In many Yogācāra scriptures transmitted in the Chinese tradition, the concept of mind and consciousness is often discussed in terms of three successive levels: 1) Chinese *xin* (心, *citta*), translated as "mind", represents the level that collects and stores, that is to say, is receptive to the impressions and habitual forces of the other levels and gives rise to them; 2) Chinese *yi* (意, *manas*) constitutes "defiled intentionality", which constructs selfhood and selfishness; and 3) Chinese *shi* (識, *vijñāna*) refers to the sensory functioning of our conventional awareness.[35] Furthermore, perceived objects as well as the perceiving subject or self, both of which make up the world experienced and disclosed through the senses, are nothing but an illusory projection arising from the *ālaya*-consciousness. Given the unreality that permeates our sensory functions, the world, as we experience it, amounts to nothing more than "mere consciousness" or "mere imagination" (*weishi* 唯識, *vijñaptimātra/vijñānamātra*). Viewed from this standpoint, there in fact exists only the projecting activity of self-perpetuating unreality, of which we are unaware on the sensory level.[36]

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[34] The Chinese term *ranwuyi* corresponds to the Sanskrit *kliṣṭaṃ manas*; my English translation follows the Chinese of Xuanzang.

[35] This scheme is mentioned in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,* the *Cheng weishi lun* and many other scriptures. However, its implications often differ in these respective contexts.

[36] The Chinese expression literally means "mere consciousness" and corresponds to the Sanskrit *vijñapti-mātra* which signifies "mere imagination"; others translate it as "mere representation".

In addition to "*ālaya*-consciousness", the *Compendium* also uses other terms, dependent upon the aspect of the subtle level of our mind and consciousness to which the respective characterization refers. In virtue of its receptiveness to both defiled and pure forces, that mind stores the seeds of our future positive and negative karmic retribution. Defiled seeds are divided into good, evil, or neutral qualities. From the perspective of our transformation, this receptive capacity itself is neutral and unobstructive (*wufu wuji* 無覆無記) to the sacred path (*āryamārga*, *shengdao* 聖道), and hence it is called "consciousness as result of differing maturation".[37] The Chinese term used by Xuanzang stresses that the "result of karmic maturation" (*yishuguo* 異熟果) *differs* from its causes, even though the two correspond to each other. Evil karma, for instance, precipitates (*gan* 感) a sorrowful existence, but this existence itself is neither evil nor good, otherwise our future states of existence could never change to become blissful (in other words, if the results of karmic maturation were always of the same type as their causes, we would be doomed to suffer forever). The last section in the second chapter of the *Compendium* explains:

> Why are good and evil *dharma*(s) capable of precipitating (*gan* 感) maturation that differs [in kind from the *dharma*s themselves, as cause] (*yishu*)? [Why is] the "otherwise [i.e. differently] maturing result" (*yishuguo*) neutral, and without obstruction [for the sacred path]? Because the result of differing maturation is neutral and without obstruction, it contradicts neither the good nor the evil, whereas good and evil are contradictory with one another. If the result of differing maturation were good or evil by nature, the extinction of defilements could not be completed. Therefore, consciousness as result of differing maturation [*yishuguoshi* = *ālaya*-consciousness] is only neutral and without obstruction (T31:1594.137c14-18).

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[37] The Chinese terms for the Sanskrit *vipāka-vijñāna* mentioned in the compendium are *yishushi* 異熟識 and *yishuguoshi* 異熟果識; Schmithausen translates *vipāka-vijñāna* as the "subliminal mind as the result of karmic maturation" (Schmithausen, 1987: 372, n. 580). The Sanskrit term for the Chinese *wufu wuji* (無覆無記) is *anivṛtāvyākṛta*.

In other words, if *ālaya*-consciousness were not thus karmically neutral, it would unceasingly continue to produce either negative or positive karmic retribution. Defiled consciousness could not be turned into pure wisdom, nor could our world of suffering be transformed into the realm of liberation. Equally, the Buddha would never have experienced the transformation from a non-awakened into an awakened being. Again, this means that the receptive function of subtle mind itself is always neutral, even while the defiled seeds contained by it differ in terms of "moral" quality. From the viewpoint of their function, then, mind and seeds can and must be distinguished, even though in fact, they are not really separate entities. The *Compendium* describes their dynamic functioning in terms of interdependent causation (*genghu wei yin* 更互為因). This is similar to the way pieces of bamboo set in an upright bundle support one another, so that the whole bundle does not fall over; or, more dynamically, like the mutual interdependence, in the burning of a lamp, between the flame that continues to come into being, and the candle wick that gradually disappears to make the flame possible.[38]

The functions and patterns of activity ascribed to the *ālaya*-consciousness are expounded from the soteriological point of view; this implies a concept of transformation, by which deluded sensory consciousness turns into true wisdom. The model of this transformation envisioned by the Yogācāra masters emphasizes that this turn or shift concerns the tendency or quality of the "fumigating" (influential) forces (*xunxi* 熏習). The negative forces or defiled seeds must be diminished by increasing the positive or pure seeds, because the quality of fruition generated by the *ālaya*-consciousness corresponds to and depends upon the quality of the forces to which this receptive level of consciousness has been exposed. However, how can such a shift in quality be accomplished, if the *ālaya*-consciousness has been generating defiled fruition for all time, and thus is constantly exposed to nothing but the negative tendencies of these influential forces? In other words, how can this self-perpetuating

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[38] The *Compendium* uses many images and illustrations to discuss the interdependent causation between these aspects of the functioning of the subtle level of mind (T31: 1594.134c11-20).

circle of unreality and unwholesome existence be deconstructed and replaced with true wisdom and liberation?[39] The *Compendium* explains:

> If...consciousness as result of differing maturation is the cause for all defiled *dharma*(s), how can it also serve as the seed for the pure mind, [which is] beyond worldliness and capable of healing all defilements? Again, if the mind beyond worldliness has never been cultivated, those habitual forces certainly would not exist. Since there are [then] no habitual forces, from where does [the mind beyond worldliness] arise? Therefore, we respond: It arises from the seeds and influential forces of correct listening [to the Dharma], which stem ["flow"] directly from (*dengliu* 等流, **niṣyanda*) the clearest and purest *dharma*-realm (T31:1594.136b29-c4).

It is listening to the Buddha-*dharma* that generates the seeds and habitual tendencies based upon which the purified mind gradually evolves. The text proceeds to explain the heterogeneity between those pure seeds and the nature of *ālaya*-consciousness: the seeds merely reside in *ālaya*-consciousness, without really merging into it. Conjoined in mutually conditioning function and operation, the two poles of this relation, seeds and *ālaya*-consciousness, are described as differing from one another like the two constituents in a mixture of milk and water (T31:1594.136c8-11). However, the pure seeds impede the further collection and storage of defiled seeds, and thus exert a healing effect upon the *ālaya*-consciousness, and induce a qualitative transformation in the nature whereby it sustains our world. The increase of the pure seeds thanks to the "habitual forces of correct listening" entails the decrease of the defiled seeds. This gradually terminates the functioning of "consciousness as result of differing maturation", since that consciousness ceases to function as the cause of all arising defilements.[40] With the ultimate disappearance of the defiled seeds, the qualitative change of the root of the

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[39] See also the crucial passage discussing this question in the *Compendium,* T31:1594.136 b29-c11.

[40] "Consciousness as result of differing maturation" gradually decreases until all defiled *dharma*(s) disappear, that is, it ceases to function as the cause for the defiled *dharma*(s), and dissociates from further rebirth (T31:1594.136c22-25, T31:1594.137a4-5).

life of sentient beings is completed, and no further life of suffering arises from the defiled *ālaya*-consciousness; instead, the realm of the existence of sentient beings is now sustained by pure and true wisdom.

This concept of transformation, which is also called "turning deluded consciousness into true wisdom", implies the replacement of the defiled with the pure seeds. The *Compendium* uses various terms to expose the complexity of the subtle mind, which not only sustains our unreal world but also undergoes this purifying transformation. The terminology seems to differ in accordance with the varying features characteristic of the respective part of the whole process. We encounter such terms as "fundamental consciousness", "consciousness of all [defiled] seeds", "consciousness as result of differing maturation" (also referred to as the cause of all defilements), and "*ālaya*-consciousness", which stresses the function of appropriation and storing; yet the distinctions between these expressions are not always clear or consistent.

However, all of these terms point to the essential role of the consciousness in question, as it is named in the title of this second chapter of the *Compendium*, as "the ground of what is known" (*suozhiyi* 所知依, **jñeyāśraya*). The whole process of purification culminates in "transforming the ground" (*zhuanyi* 轉依, *āśrayaparāvṛtti/āśrayaparivṛtti*), but this does not mean that there is no ground any more after the defiled seeds has been replaced with pure seeds. Despite the fact that it undergoes this purifying transformation, the nature of this consciousness whereby it is a ground does not really change. Both purified wisdom and defiled consciousness arise from the ground qualified by the seeds each respectively contains.

This makes it somewhat difficult to determine whether or not the *ālaya*-conciousness is held to continue to "exist" after the transformation of the ground. In characterizing the process of transforming the ground(s), the scripture sometimes hints at the limitations of using a certain term denoting a specific function or feature of mind, such as "consciousness as result of differing maturation". However, the text mentions no explicit restriction with regard to the use of the term "*ālaya*-consciousness". This could mean that the ground it denotes may also include its mode of transformation, because that transformation, radical though it may be, nonetheless does not really affect the basic nature of that con-

sciousness whereby it is a ground. This is indeed a contentious question; however, it could be misleading to say that *ālaya*-consciousness completely ceases to exist after the transformation of the ground, as this would imply discontinuity.

According to the *Compendium*, the aforementioned "neutrality and non-obstruction" of the ground(s) that undergoes transformation is a *conditio sine qua non* for this very process of purifying transformation. The nature of the ground(s) simply consist(s) in containing either kind of seeds and giving rise to the corresponding fruition. The pure seeds are generated by correct listening to the teaching, which issues like a stream directly from "the purest and clearest [*dharma*-]realm"; and the reality of true wisdom seems to be embodied in this realm, which is not imbued with any of the falsehood arising from the *ālaya*-consciousness. In this sense, reality/truth and falsehood seem to constitute a duality, as they represent two realms which do not mutually permeate or penetrate one another. Yet the existence of sentient beings, as it emerges within the circular system of self-perpetuating unreality, cannot completely be separated from that reality/truth, otherwise correct listening would bear no fruit, and transformation would be impossible. The existence of sentient beings must therefore somehow include the potential for both reality/truth and falsehood. The teaching of the "three natures" represents the Yogācāra attempt to elucidate this potential of/in the existence of sentient beings.

Compared to that of Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha, the Yogācāra interpretation of the relationship between truth and falsehood seems to resort to a more dualistic explanatory pattern. According to the Tathāgatagarbha model, reality/truth sustains falsehood; while the Yogācāra view excludes relationships such as dependency or interfusion between the two terms of the relation. Again, this does not really imply that the negative and positive are completely separated from each other. Based on the teaching of the "three natures" (*trisvabhāva, svabhāvatraya*) or "three marks" (*trilakṣaṇa, lakṣaṇatraya*), the *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* explains that the negative and positive, though neither interfused nor interdependent, are also not completely separated from each other.

This scripture discusses the concept of *ālaya*-consciousness in conjunction with the doctrine of the "three natures" called "the nature of

other-dependent arising" (*yitaqixing* 依他起性, *paratantrasvabhāva*), "the nature of attachments to what is thoroughly imaginary" (*bianji suozhixing* 遍計所執性, *parikalpitasvabhāva*), and "the nature of perfected reality" (*yuancheng shixing* 圓成實性, *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*).[41] These "three aspects" characterize the nature of the existence of sentient beings as it arises from the *ālaya*-consciousness. This schema also implies the inseparability of emptiness and unreality. Moreover, the relationship between the "three natures" reflects the Yogācāra view of the relationship between truth/reality and falsehood, or the defiled and pure aspects of the existence of sentient beings. The *Compendium* explains the first "nature" (of other-dependent arising) thus:

> This refers to all the various consciousnesses embraced by unreal discrimination (*xuwang fenbie* 虛妄分別), which have the *ālaya*-consciousness as their seeds...In this way, the various consciousnesses [and things perceived by the senses] all fall within the embrace of unreal discrimination; their nature is mere consciousness [= imagination]; they are devoid of [real] existence; they are not intrinsically real and true; [and] they manifest that which they are dependent upon. This is what is called the mark of other-dependent-arising (T31: 1594.137c29-138a11).

The term "mark of other-dependent-arising" thus implies that things are not really what they seem to be, but rather, are mere images or mere consciousness. These things thus point back to what sustains them or sets them up, or manifest that upon what they depend, which is the *ālaya*-consciousness that is receptive to the habituating forces of these images. If the unreality of these things, which is sustained by the "nature of other-dependent-arising", is not realized, and instead, is confused with reality - that is, if things are seen as real entities inherently existing - then this nature is not pure but veiled or defiled; it appears in the deceptive mode of falsehood called "the nature of attachments to what is thoroughly imaginary". However, complete awareness of the unreality and emptiness of these apparent things amounts to the realization of the

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41 My English translation of these Chinese expressions follows Xuanzang's Chinese translation.

true, pure, or undefiled mode called "the nature of perfected reality". The *Compendium* also explains that these three natures must be distinguished, and yet they are in truth inseparable.

However, the crucial point is that the other-dependent nature cannot itself be viewed as neutral, or neither defiled nor undefiled, since it is not a mode beyond or separate from the other two natures; it appears either in the defiled (deceptive) or in the undefiled/purified mode. Hence, it potentially includes both components – the pure (true) and the defiled (deceptive) (T31:1594.140c7-11). The way in which sentient beings exist in their unreal world that arises from the *ālaya*-consciousness includes the potential for both of these opposites; they are not interfused, and once ripened to fruition, they stand out against each other. The two are opposite and potential modes built into the nature of our existence, which does not extend beyond mere consciousness, and which emerges from the seeds or habitual forces that are collected and stored in the *ālaya*-consciousness.

This key concept accounts for the circle of self-perpetuating unreality in the world of sentient beings. In conjunction with the doctrine of the "three natures", it also addresses the soteriological conditions of our transformation, implying the potential to develop in the direction of the opposite aspects of truth and falsehood according to which sentient beings variously shape their existence.

5   Truth/reality and falsehood in the Chinese debates on mind

The viewpoint of Huiyuan

In addition to the Chinese *Awakening of Faith*, the earlier Indian *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* also discusses the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine in conjunction with the Yogācāra term "*ālaya*-consciousness". This habit was also adopted by the sixth-century Chinese Dilun masters, who elaborated on the concept of "*ālaya*-consciousness" under the influence of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.*

Several decades earlier than Paramārtha's translation of Asaṅga's *Compendium*, in 509, Bodhiruci and Ratnamati translated Vasubhandu's commentary on the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* (Chinese *Dilun* 地論, whence the name for the eponymous exegetical tradition), and this was the first time

that the term "*ālaya*-consciousness" was transmitted from India to China. Their disciples, who were known as the "Dilun masters", shaped an exegetical tradition in China which focused on scriptures closely related to Yogācāra and *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines. This section discusses the concept of mind according to Huiyuan, known as a third generation Dilun master; and Zhiyi, the principal founder of the Tiantai school, who criticized the Dilun viewpoint.

   Several sources indicate that the Dilun masters split into two groups, called the "Southern" and "Northern Way" (*beidao* 北道, *nandao* 南道), and that their differences probably had to do with differing interpretations regarding the concept of "*ālaya*-consciousness". According to the account of the ninth Tiantai Patriarch Jingxi Zhanran (荆溪湛然, 711-782), one of the contentious points that they debated was the question of whether the *ālaya*-consciousness is constituted of both reality and purity, and is identical with the pure mind (Southern Way), or whether it comprises exclusively falsehood, and is a mind of defilements giving rise to the unreal world of sentient beings (Northern Way).

As Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) points out, it is very likely that this controversial question results from the ambiguous nature of occasional remarks about the meaning of *ālaya*-consciousness in the **Daśabhūmika-sūtra-śāstra*. Mou further claims that the author of the **Daśabhūmika-sūtra-śāstra*, Vasubandhu, must have written the text during the early period of his career, when his understanding of Yogācāra concepts still lacked systematic consistency, and was immature, i.e. not as fully developed as in his later works (Mou, 1981: 277).[42] Vasubandhu's commentary apparently does not provide a consistent view of *ālaya*-consciousness, nor is it a crucial term in this scripture, being mentioned only occasionally - even though it became a key concept in the Chinese exegetical traditions based upon the text. This is why Mou considers the question of whether the split of the Dilun masters took place on account

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[42] Mou mentions that Vasubandhu uses the term "mind of intrinsic purity and clarity" very rarely and only in his *Daśabhūmika* commentary; he never combines it with the expression *tathagatāgarbha*; in his other works, *ālaya*-consciousness is never linked with the pure mind and *tathāgatagarbha*.

of this inconsistency; at least some of the ancient records, like that of
Zhanran, seem to support Mou's interpretation.

In Buddhist debates on "mind and consciousness" in sixth-century
China, the Dilun and the Shelun masters agreed in assuming that the
mind was fundamentally pure, even though they obviously defended
contrary positions regarding the interpretation of the concept of *ālaya*-
consciousness. On the other hand, the notion of a pure mind was also
criticized by those who defended Madhyamaka views based on
Kumārajīva's translations, and developed the teachings of the early
Chinese Buddhist schools of the Sanlun and Tiantai. These critics
developed their own views about the issue of mind, and often framed
their views as criticisms of the Dilun and Shelun masters. In contrast to
this again, the Huayan masters, at the beginning of the Tang, adopted
and further developed the way the idea of pure mind had been
previously expounded by the Dilun masters. Another of their sources in
this endeavor was the *Awakening of Faith*, which modern scholarship
generally agrees must have been composed by authors closely related
with the Dilun and Shelun exegetical traditions.

As previously mentioned, the *Awakening of Faith* combines the doc-
trine of the fundamental purity of mind with the Yogācāra doctrine of
ālaya-consciousness. However, unlike the *Compendium*, this text consi-
ders the pure mind and not the *ālaya*-consciousness as fundamental; the
pure mind is devoid of arising and cessation, and the *ālaya*-consciousness
gives rise to the modification into the defiled "gateway of arising and
cessation". Many of the functions ascribed to the *ālaya*-consciousness in
the *Compendium* are attributed to the other levels of mind in the *Awak-
ening of Faith*; moreover, this scripture does not mention the expression
"defiled intentionality" (*ranwuyi, kliṣṭamanas*).

Huiyuan seems to be partly influenced by the *Awakening of Faith*,[43] but
when he explicates his concept of mind and consciousness in his famous
Treatise on the Meaning of the Great Vehicle (*Dasheng yi zhang* 大乘義章), he
also quotes from and refers to the *Compendium*.[44] Though he also adopts

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[43] On this question, see the paper by Keng in this volume – ed.

[44] For the development of Huiyuan's works see Liao, 1999: 27-37.

and modifies the three-level scheme of mind and consciousness, which is variously expounded in the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Compendium*, his interpretation of *ālaya*-consciousness obviously follows the viewpoint of the Southern Way, identifying it with pure mind and *tathāgatagarbha*.

Quoting the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (T44:1851.524b26-27),[45] Huiyuan distinguishes eight aspects of consciousness divided into three levels (T44:1851.525a1-8): first, the eighth aspect, viz. the *ālaya*-consciousness, which is identical with pure mind; second, the seventh aspect, viz. *ādāna*-consciousness, which is the source of falsehood and similar to "defiled intentionality";[46] and, third, the six sensory aspects of consciousness (T44:1851.524b29-c3). Moreover, in the section about mind and consciousness in his *Treatise*, he also lists eight alternative designations for the *ālaya*-consciousness, all of which emphasize its purity and the sense of its reality and truth, or the fact that it is the root or sustaining ground, and the storehouse of all accomplishments (T44:1851.524c18-525a1); whereas the eight alternative names for the *ādāna*-consciousness point rather to a complex range of features and functions of falsehood (T44:1851.524c7-18). Alternatively, in other sections of his *Treatise,* Huiyuan also discusses the three-level scheme of mind and consciousness in terms of "consciousness of reality/truth" or "true consciousness" (*zhenshi* 真識), "consciousness [full of] falsehood" (*wangshi* 妄識), and "consciousness of particular things" (*shishi* 事識) (T44:1851.568a26-28, 686b8-10, 718b17-18, 815c16-29).

In these discussions, Huiyuan emphasizes the significance of the "inseparability of truth/reality and falsehood".[47] Although he uses many

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[45] The phrase quoted is used to confirm that the aspects of consciousness are eight in number, and comes from Guṇabhadra's (求那跋陀羅, 394–468) translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (T16:670.496a21-22). However, the *sūtra*-passage does not really mention the eight types that appear in Huiyuan's list.

[46] Huiyuan's understanding of the *ādāna*-consciousness (T44:1851.524c7-18, 528c7-9) differs from that of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* (T16:676.692b14-16, b18-19, c4-6).

[47] The way in which Huiyuan conceives of inseparability seems to imply that ontological and epistemological issues coincide. Truth and falsehood as correlative opposites are mutually constitutive and inter-referential. This inseparability, in an epistemological sense, implies that falsehood manifests truth as an inverse form of instructiveness, that is, our understanding of and insight into truth requires and includes the experi-

technical expressions from the Yogācāra tradition, his understanding obviously differs from that tradition, and essentially represents the *tathāgatagarbha* scheme of the pure mind and the inseparability of truth/reality and falsehood. The following passage may exemplify this:

> It is as the *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* says: first, [there is] the fundamental consciousness; second, the *ādāna*-consciousness; third, the six operative types of sensory consciousness. These three are like the differentiation that has been previously used with regard to the nature of being dependent on others.[48] Because falsehood embraces truth/reality, truth/reality develops in accord with falsehood, and, in conjunction (*gong* 共), [the two] constitute sentient beings. Within this conjunction (*gong*), the mind of true consciousness, imbued with the negative karmic habituation that [has existed from] beginningless time, generates the "ground" [or "stage"] of ignorance (*wumingdi* 無明地); but the ignorance so generated [in reality] never departs from the mind of truth/reality; in conjunction, they comprise the root of

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ence of falsehood. Moreover, the way we relate to and shape the world we inhabit correlates with the degree to which we realize such an understanding and insight. This means, in an ontological sense, that falsehood is a significant feature of that reality which constitutes the way we exist in our world. Hence, from this ontological point of view, reality and falsehood are also inseparable. The epistemological sense of inseparability coincides with the ontological sense, because both the present world and the way we exist in it are dependent upon our epistemic stance in relation to it. I use the term "inseparability of truth/reality and falseness" to indicate this coincidence of ontological and epistemological issues.

48 Trying to specify inseparability and differentiation (*bu yi bu yi* 不異不一) between truth and falsehood in a more elaborated way, Huiyuan also classifies the three levels of consciousness in reference to the Yogācāra concept of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*) (T44:1851.528a9-529c6). His terminology relies on Paramārtha's translation: "nature of false discriminations" (*fenbie xing* 分別性) corresponds to Xuanzang's "nature of attachments to what is thoroughly imaginary"; the second and third natures, "nature of being dependent on others" (*yita xing* 依他性) and "nature of truth and reality" (*zhenshi xing* 真實性) do not differ much from Xuanzang's translation. The core of Huiyuan's discussion could be summarized as follows: "nature of false discriminations" implies "consciousness full of falsehood" and "consciousness of particular things"; "nature of being dependent on others" embraces "fundamental consciousness", "*ādāna*-consciousness", and "the six types of sensory consciousness"; "nature of truth and reality" means "consciousness of reality/truth" (T44:1851.529a7-16).

the spirit (*shenben* 神本), which is called fundamental consciousness (*benshi* 本識, *mūlavijñāna), which is also called "ālaya-consciousness". Therefore the *Awakening of Faith* explains: "*Tathāgatagarbha* is a *dharma* beyond arising and cessation, which, in conjunction (*he* 合) with arising and cessation, is called 'ālaya-consciousness'."[49] Permeated by the false view that there is a self [which has existed] from beginningless time, this *ālaya*-consciousness constitutes the seeds of self. On account of the influential force of these seeds, the mind of [the] *ādāna*[-consciousness], which clings onto the self, emerges. Based on this [false] mark of a self, the view [that there is] a self, the conceit of self, and self-love arise. What [then] can be taken to be this self? Based on that fundamental consciousness, a transformation [takes place which] produces the body comprising the [physical and mental traits] of the five aggregates; [sentient beings] are not aware of the fact that this [self] does not [really] exist, and, instead, cling onto it as if it were a [real] self. Again, this fundamental consciousness, because it is permeated from beginningless time by the names of the six sensory consciousnesses, [their respective] sense-organs, and [their respective] objects, constitutes the seeds of those [consciousnesses, sense-organs and sense-objects]; and due to the force of those seeds, [it is] transformed [so that] the six operative consciousnesses, the six sense-organs, and the six sense-objects arise (T44:1851.529c9-21).

Though this passage uses patterns of explanation rooted in the Yogācāra tradition, it clearly stresses the *tathāgatagarbha* concept of a true and fundamental mind. This also implies the inseparability of reality/truth and falsehood. On these points, Huiyuan's view actually differs from the viewpoints of the *Compendium*. Liao Minghuo claims that Huiyuan's remarks on the *ālaya*-consciousness are not consistent, as this concept seems to be understood in terms of the "pure mind", but also, as described in the passage quoted above, in terms of the fundamental consciousness implying falsehood. Hence, Liao distinguishes between two different threefold schemes, according to which Huiyuan discusses two different versions of mind and consciousness which are not exactly con-

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[49] See the *Awakening of Faith* (T32:1666.576b6).

sistent with one another. Liao thinks that Huiyuan's inconsistency has to do with the fact that he alternates between resorting to Yogācāra and *tathāgatagarbha* sources to develop his views (Liao, 1999: 63).

However, as I explained above, the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine of the "pure mind" implies the "inseparability of truth/reality and falsehood". "Purity by nature", that is, "intrinsic purity" does not really exclude "inseparability". When he interprets the *ālaya*-consciousness in the sense of the pure mind, Huiyuan realizes this, and therefore takes into account the mind's relationship to the aspects of both reality/truth and falsehood. Hence, his exposition is not really inconsistent, just because the way he explains *ālaya*-consciousness varies. His exposition merely indicates that it is necessary for him to adopt various or different viewpoints in the course of his deliberations. The fundamental or sustaining aspect of the mind must be seen in combination with the functions whereby it becomes manifest, which means that it must be seen in terms of inseparability of reality/truth and falsehood.

Huiyuan further specifies how he understands the meaning of the "inseparability of reality/truth and falsehood". He discusses the above-mentioned threefold scheme of the "consciousness of truth/reality, consciousness full of falsehood, and consciousness of particular things" (*zhenshi, wangshi, shishi*) from multiple points of view, and includes in his deliberations such issues as "dependency and sustaining" (*yichi* 依持) and "root and branch" (*benmo* 本末). However, Huiyuan's discussion of these points does not really go beyond the idea of *tathāgatagarbha*; nor does it bring to light any essentially new thought. It simply testifies to his attempt to reconcile or harmonize the *tathāgatagarbha* concept of a pure mind, on the one hand, with the Yogācāra doctrine of the *ālaya*-consciousness that constitutes the circle of self-perpetuating unreality, on the other. Huiyuan's threefold model of consciousness interprets the conjunction of reality/truth and falsehood in terms of the fundamental mind, which is truth/reality, and yet nonetheless grounds the circle of self-perpetuating unreality.

Thus, when Huiyuan expounds the relationship between reality/truth and falsehood in terms of "dependency and sustaining" or "root and branch", he just reiterates the argument that the "pure mind" implies

the "inseparability of reality/truth and falsehood". For instance, Hui-yuan says:

> [Discussion of the] branch (*mo* 末) arising from the root (*ben* 本) can be divided into three parts: 1. Discussing [only] the root and setting aside the branch, meaning that the nature of mind, which is originally pure, through interdependent conditions gives rise to and constitutes the inexhaustible *dharma*-realm; this is the consciousness of truth/reality (*zhenshi*). 2. The arising of the branch based on the root, meaning mistaking the real for the illusory and considering what does not [really] exist as if it [really] exists; this is the consciousness full of falsehood (*wangshi*). 3. [Once more] the arising of the branch based on the root, which also means mistaking the illusory for the real, and considering unreality as reality; this is the consciousness of particular things (*shishi*) (T44:1851.526a26-29).

This passage emphasizes precisely that the "consciousness of truth/reality" (*zhenshi*) must be discussed in terms of two inseparable yet distinguishable aspects: the nature of intrinsic purity beyond falsehood, and the falsehood which it sets up and sustains. This is important, because we cannot avoid falsehood when discussing that truth/reality. The first aspect, which is called the "root" (*ben*) represents the viewpoint of the "sustaining ground"; and the second, which is referred to as the "branch" (*mo*), accounts for that which is "dependent" upon this root. The "consciousness full of falsehood" (*wangshi*), which corresponds in Huiyuan's understanding to the *ādāna*-consciousness, confuses the reality of that sustaining ground with the illusory self, while the "consciousness of particular things" (*shishi*) mistakes the unreal apparitions of external objects on the level of our sensory awareness for real things. Similarly, the relationship between reality and falsehood in terms of "depending and sustaining" (*yichi*) means both that reality sustains falsehood, and that falsehood is dependent upon reality, which just reiterates the point that this reality is inseparable from the unreality dependent upon it (cf. T44:1851.532c17-533b4).

Huiyuan also discusses a threefold scheme of "dependent origination" in a similar way as he deals with the concept of mind and consciousness, and there too, he articulates a notion of "interdependence between

truth/reality and falsehood" (*zhen wang xiang yi* 真妄相依), which is compatible with the relationship of "depending and sustaining" (*yichi*) (T44:1851.551a3-25). Truth/reality, which equals emptiness but not complete non-existence, is dependent upon falsehood only insofar as falsehood manifests emptiness in its role as inverse instructiveness; this is not the same thing as the way that falsehood is dependent upon or rooted in that reality. This anticipates the explanation we already encountered above in Fazang, which holds that the two are inseparable from each other like the water and waves of the ocean.[50]

The Tiantai viewpoint of Zhiyi

In this final part of this section, we will discuss the Tiantai critiques of the Dilun concept of mind, and elucidate Zhiyi's view regarding the "indivisibility of truth/reality and falsehood". Unlike Jizang, Zhiyi never explicitly mentions Huiyuan in his critiques; nor does he directly refer to the *Awakening of Faith* in his works. His comments on the Dilun masters are exclusively polemic, and often appear in his discussions about mind and consciousness. He does not explicitly mention the split into the two groups of "Northern" and "Southern Way"; he only states that the Shelun and Dilun masters hold opposing positions concerning the concept of the "sustaining ground". In what follows, I will explain how Zhiyi presents the views of these two exegetical traditions as he develops his Tiantai doctrine of mind.

In the section "Contemplating the Mind as the Inconceivable Realm" ("Guan xin jishi busiyi jing" 觀心即是不思議境) in his *Great Calming and Contemplation* (*Mohe zhi guan* 摩訶止觀), Zhiyi holds, based on his understanding of Madhyamaka thought, that the root of the interdependent arising of all things cannot simply be reduced to the sustaining function of a pure mind devoid of falsehood, but nor can the source of all things be viewed as solely constituted by the *ālaya*-consciousness that sustains self-perpetuating falsehood without including the realm of purity (T46:

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[50] See above n. 1.

1911.54a23-b8).[51] He claims that the Dilun masters nevertheless adhere to the first view, and the Shelun masters defend the second. Moreover, the Dilun view that the pure mind is the ground amounts to saying that the "[true] nature of all *dharma*(s)" (*faxing* 法性, **dharmatā*) sustains all things, while the Shelun position, that the ground is the *ālaya*-consciousness, equals the view that "ignorance" (*wuming* 無明, **avidyā*) is the source from which everything arises.[52] Zhiyi presents the two in such a way that they deny and exclude each other.

Quoting the *Zhong lun*, Zhiyi emphasizes that these mutually exclusive ways of discussing the source of all things imply the same type of fallacy: Given that they deny each other, *dharma*-nature and ignorance are correlative opposites, no one of which can be regarded as the ultimate source of all *dharma*(s) apart from the other. The fact that we cling to either one while excluding the other prevents us from seeing the "inconceivable realm" (*busiyi jing* 不思議境), which is devoid of all reifications. *Dharma*-nature, that is, the true nature of all things, in which they are equally empty and unreal, does not reach beyond the ignorance which is the source of that unreality. Conversely, such ignorance cannot be separated from the nature of things, in which they truly are empty, which sustains the interdependent arising of all unreal things. Briefly, *dharma*-nature and ignorance are indivisible, and the same also applies to truth/reality and falsehood. Only if we understand that *dharma*-nature and ignorance are indivisible can we realize insight into the "inconceivable realm". This means that when we see all things in each single thing, we really are aware of the falsehood of everything we see, and are thus capable of responding to all contingency in the most salutary possible way. It is the Tiantai contemplation of the "perfect/round teaching" (*yuanjiao* 圓教) that accomplishes the "inconceivable realm". According to Zhiyi, the Dilun and the Shelun expositions, by contrast, do not realize this crucial point, and thus cannot achieve or enact the ultimate or in-

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[51] For a translation of this passage, see Kantor 2009: 334.

[52] Zhiyi regards the terms *ālaya*-consciousness and ignorance as synonymous: see *Mohe zhi guan* (T46:1911.54a23-b8) and *Fahua xuan yi* 法華玄義 (T33:1716.699c15-16). Similarly, the section in the *Mohe zhi guan* criticizing the Dilun view seems to consider the term "*dharma*-nature" as equivalent to the "pure mind".

conceivable realm. Thus, so long as they are presented as mutually exclusive opposites, the two views are prey to the same type of fallacy.

This is not to say that Zhiyi denies the relevance of the concept of mind in his vision of soteriological transformation. However, like Jizang, he denies the reality of what is signified by the name "mind".[53] Though he denies the existence of a real mind, he points out that we cannot deny the existential relevance of this false view, as it ineradicably shapes the way we perceive and think of ourselves and our world. We cannot avoid thinking that all things that concern our life, existence, and awareness are comprehended, understood, and judged by an entity that we believe to be our real mind. He therefore holds that, in our practice of contemplation and introspection, the "false/provisional mind" may provide a point of departure for the realization of the full awareness of that falsehood which constantly pervades the way we relate to our world. Zhiyi's "Contemplating the Mind as the Inconceivable Realm" examines and uses "mind" as a provisional means or useful fiction, by means of which we can reveal the persistent falsehood that would otherwise evade our conventional awareness like a blind spot.

Zhiyi calls the skillful and wholesome way of contemplating "mind" "the threefold contemplation" (*san guan* 三觀). The first mode of this contemplation, which is called "contemplation of emptiness" (*kong guan* 空觀), realizes truth/reality by deconstructing the falsehood of all linguistic expression(s). This nullifies all reifications, but overlooks the instructiveness of that falsehood. Hence, the second mode of contemplation, in opposition to the first, is called "contemplation of the false/provisional" (*jia guan* 假觀), and terminates the previous and one-sided devaluation of falsehood, realizing instead its ambiguous and instructive

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[53] See Jizang's argument in his commentary on the *Diamond Sūtra*: "Why is it called the inverted mind? Because no mind can be found if we investigate it with respect to the three temporal marks [consisting of the past, the present, and the future]; yet according to the viewpoint of sentient beings, the mind does exist. However, this is just an ascription of existence to something that does not [really] exist; therefore it is called inversion" (T33:1699.120b12-13). Similarly, Zhiyi comments on the *Golden Light Sūtra* (*Suvarṇaprabhāsottama*): "Mind arises from conditions, therefore it is empty. Since we only say that mind exists in a forced sense, it is provisional/false. This does not extend beyond the [true] nature of all *dharma*(s), therefore it is the middle" (T39:1783.8a1-4).

side. The Chinese *jia*, which I have translated as "false/provisional", mirrors this ambiguity, since it means both "false" and "to borrow [as a skillful means]". However, these first two modes are correlative opposites, and hence do not embody the inconceivable realm, nor do they completely realize the indivisibility of *dharma*-nature and ignorance. For this reason, the third mode of contemplation, called "contemplating the middle way" (*zhongdao guan* 中道觀), goes beyond both the emptiness that terminates or nullifies falsehood, and the provisional that reifies false names. Its primary focus is the "real mark" (*shixiang* 實相), because the middle way sees the fallacy and limitations in the notion of the first two contemplations and their contents as mutually exclusive, and thus goes beyond both. Even so, it too still does not truly realize the indivisibility between truth/reality and falsehood, or *dharma*-nature and ignorance.

The ultimate step thus consists of realizing that emptiness and the provisional are equally relevant, since each restricts and complements the other. It is this reciprocal relationship that is called the "middle way"; that is to say, the understanding that emptiness and the provisional are *opposite* modes that nevertheless *include* each other. Each of the three terms in this schema – emptiness, the provisional, and the middle – simultaneously incorporates and reveals all three. To realize this dynamic is to contemplate mental activity on the ultimate level, and this is what is called the "threefold contemplation". It contemplates the nature of the mind as inverse instructiveness, that is, it achieves insight into the indivisibility of truth/reality and falsehood, and realizes the inconceivable realm in the sense of seeing all things in each single thing that we see. The ambiguous Chinese expression "one-moment-thought [as/and/in/of] three-thousand-worlds" (*yi nian sanqian* 一念三千) is the epitome of this insight. It denotes exactly the utmost skill in responding dynamically to all kinds of contingency as we contemplate the "provisional/false, empty, and middle" mind.

To find support in canonical sources for this understanding of mind or mental activity, Zhiyi uses the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* and also resorts, according to Zhanran's commentary, to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (T46:1912.318c10-14); he does not, by contrast, rely on Yogācāra or *tathāgatagarbha* scriptures. For Huiyuan and others, pure mind in the sense of

the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, and *ālaya*-consciousness according to the Yogācāra teaching, represent a Mahāyāna insight into the nature of mind, which is superior to that of the Small Vehicle Buddhists who lack those terms. In his threefold contemplation, however, Zhiyi simply addresses the sixth consciousness of intentionality, as is evident from the discussions in the *Great Calming and Contemplation* (T46:1911.63c23-64a4) and Zhanran's commentary (T46:1912.318c10-14). This aspect of consciousness, he argues in a pragmatic way, is always accessible to those who are ready to cultivate mind-contemplation, because it certainly operates in each moment of their awareness, and is present as long as the five aggregates arise (T46:1911.52a24-b1). The basis or starting point of his argument is the passage in Buddhabhadra's translation of the *Avataṃsaka* that states that there is no essential difference between Buddha (truth, reality), sentient beings (falsehood), and mind, and that all things are modifications arising from our mind.[54] Each single moment of our mental activity and awareness contains the potential to transform itself into any of the existential possibilities implicit in the "tenfold *dharma*-realm" (*shi fajie* 十法界), which embraces the whole range of all beings, from those dwelling on the lowest stage of ignorance up to the highest Buddha-wisdom.

Unlike Huiyuan's view, which stresses that truth/reality sustains falsehood and that falsehood is dependent upon truth/reality, the Tiantai concept of indivisibility thus implies the mutual inclusion of both sides; truth/reality and falsehood are completely interfused. In the dynamic performance of the "threefold contemplation within/of/*qua* one-in-stant-of-mental-activity" (*yi xin san guan* 一心三觀), mind recognizes itself as the source of all delusions and falsehood, and at the same time, thereby realizes that this same delusion is precisely identical to the true potential for our transformation. This is regarded as the ultimate skill in dealing with all types of contingency in a soteriologically salutary manner. Achieving the insight that this ambiguity or ontological indeterminacy of mental activity is irreducible – that it is neither mere falsehood nor mere reality/truth – is precisely what is referred to, in the title of

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[54] See T9:278.465c29-466a1 and Zhiyi's reference to it in the *Mohe zhi guan*, T46:1911.52c7-9.

Zhiyi's work, as "mental activity contemplated as the inconceivable realm".

6   Conclusion: The Buddhist constructivist approach to the sense of reality

The conceptual context in which Buddhists discuss the nature, activity, and functioning of mind and consciousness concerns the soteriological process of our transformation and liberation, called "becoming a Buddha". From this point of view, Buddhists further develop a specific way of dealing with the ontological and epistemological implications of truth, reality, and falsehood. Buddhists emphasize that our epistemic stance to the world we inhabit gives rise to the constructive force which shapes this world and all the things existing in it. This ground of all construction is called "mind". Most importantly, reality in the sense of what constitutes this world and the way in which things and sentient beings exist in it incorporates falsehood sustained by that mind. The functioning of the *ālaya*-consciousness, for instance, enforces our bondage to a circle of self-perpetuating unreality pervading the worldly realm, while the *tathāgatagarbha* sense of truth and pure mind accounts for reality, which grounds the false world of the arising and cessation of entities, as well as the realm of liberation.

   In other words, Mahāyāna Buddhists describe our transformation as a turn from the non-awakened to the awakened state of being, and thereby, uphold a constructivist position, according to which ontological and epistemological issues coincide. The "inseparability of truth/reality and falseness" is an epitome for this type of Mahāyāna constructivism. Yet the aforementioned Buddhist models differ considerably regarding their respective understandings of inseparability. However, none of them harmonizes with a metaphysical approach which conceives of ultimate reality as a transcendent realm of truth separated and independent from our illusory world. The true and real nature of mind is empty of any characteristic, and thus cannot be conceptualized in a distinctive way, because falsehood sustained by that mind is never nonexistent in our conceptualizations. Consequently, we must become aware of the inseparability of our mind from falsehood, always seeing its persistent delusiveness. Para-

doxically, such awareness consists in constantly differentiating falsehood from the true sense of reality.

Viewed from the constructivist models discussed in the present paper, "ultimate reality" is ontologically indeterminable, due to its inclusion of, or inseparability from, falsehood. Neither the monistic interpretation of a sustaining and real mind, nor the dualistic view of truth separated from the realm of falsehood reaches beyond our conceptualizing way of understanding. The true sense of reality, according to the previous discussions, just evades those forms of mental construction, which, again, does not mean that our illusory and constructed world constitutes a separate realm of itself. "Ultimate truth", in this specific sense of inseparability from falsehood, is simply inconceivable, and this excludes the metaphysical concept of transcendence. Zhiyi hints at this, quoting the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*'s statement that there is no essential difference between Buddha, mind, and non-awakened beings. Yet, this does not deny a sense of difference from the epistemological and soteriological point of view. We dynamically realize inseparability by constantly differentiating our never-ending constructions from what is unconstructed.

The *tathāgatagarbha* and Madhyamaka teachings explicitly point to this dynamic manner in which our understanding must deal with the conjoined aspects of truth and falsehood. If we are to realize inseparability *qua* differentiation, we must constantly perform a change of aspects in our understanding, since to understand ultimate truth is to understand persisting falseness, and *vice versa*. Hence, in contrast to the Yogācāra viewpoint, the two teachings take the ambiguity of falsehood into account, and explore this inverse form of instructiveness to acquire wisdom and truth. Our discernment of ambiguity is a crucial step towards this wisdom, and the insight that fully realizes inseparability. The resulting dynamic or reciprocity in our understanding is similar to the way in which sickness and healing relate to one another. Only if we entirely understand the state of sickness can we really master the process of healing, which also requires the reverse: In our controlling the whole process of healing, we fully realize the nature of sickness. To truly understand the one side is to thoroughly discern the nature of the other. This dynamic could be described as a hermeneutical circle, which our understanding must adopt to realize the full sense of ultimate truth.

In the last section of his famous treatise on the meaning and teaching of the One Vehicle (*Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章), Fazang – influenced by *tathāgatagarbha*, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka alike – illustrates the dynamics between "truth embracing the branches of falseness, and falseness pervading the source of truth" (T45:1866.499a 22-23):

> It is like the bright surface of the mirror, which causes purified and defiled images to appear upon it. Even though the purified and defiled images appear on this surface of the mirror, it never loses its brightness and purity. Only thanks to the brightness and purity of the mirror, which is never lost, can the purified and defiled images appear. We realize the brightness and purity of the mirror due to the appearing of purified and defiled images. Conversely, thanks to the brightness and purity of the mirror, we realize that the purified and defiled images are just apparitions. Hence, the two meanings are of one single nature. Despite the apparition of purified *dharma*s, the brightness of the surface does not intensify. Even though defiled *dharma*s appear, the purity of the surface remains undefiled. Not only is the surface undefiled, on the contrary, it is just because of these [images] that the brightness and purity of the mirror become evident.
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> We must realize that the principle and way of true suchness is like this. Not only does its immutability and intrinsic purity bring about defiled and purified arising, but also, it is due to this accomplishment of defiled and purified [states] that its intrinsic purity becomes fully evident. Not only does the defiled and purified [arising], which never fully passes away, shed light on that intrinsic purity, but also, it is on account of the intrinsic purity that the defiled and purified [arising] can be accomplished. Therefore, the two meanings entirely embrace each other within one single nature, which is devoid of duality (T45: 1866.499b2-12).

This explanation presents Fazang's view of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*) interpreted after the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha*. The two meanings or aspects of purified truth and defiled falsehood embody non-duality *qua* polarity (inseparability *qua* differentiation), which characterizes not only each of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), but also all three toge-

ther as one dynamic nature in the interplay of distinguishable aspects (T45:1866.499a13-b12).[55] In the same section, Fazang extends this dynamic perspective also to Madhyamaka and *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines, quoting from the *Dazhi du lun* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. The two aspects of truth and falsehood, or purified and defiled *dharma*s, are correlative opposites, which in fact are equally unreal and empty, like all apparitions. The two are not essentially different from each other, even though they must be differentiated to point back to what truly sustains their interdependency, which is true emptiness (not the same thing as nonexistence), and is here called "intrinsic purity". Hence, the way in which Fazang describes this dynamic of non-duality *qua* polarity involves three aspects: the two correlative opposites, and intrinsic purity; however, he mentions only two aspects – the two correlative opposites, on the one side, and intrinsic purity, on the other – which actually implies the same meaning. Their interplay in a dynamic whole is also called "the single one nature devoid of duality". None of the three can be constituted and understood apart from the other two, and neither can the single one nature.

However, the whole section aims at portraying the dynamics of the "*dharma*-realm as interdependent arising" (*fajie yuanqi* 法界緣起) which basically implies the endless interplay of an infinite number of elements, viewpoints, and perspectives mutually constituting, referring to, and mirroring each other, explained in terms of "interpenetration and integration without obstruction and obstacles" (通融無障無礙 *tongrong wuzhang wuai*) (T45:1866.499a23) etc. In order to describe and analyze its differing but interrelated parts, Fazang often uses the two opposite categories "sustaining force of identity" (*tongti* 同體; literally "common body") and "sustaining force of difference" (*yiti* 異體; literally "differing

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[55] The "two meanings" or "two aspects" of the "nature of perfected reality", here identified with *tathāgatagarbha*, are called "[change] in accordance to conditions" (*suiyuan* 隨緣) and "invariability" (*bubian* 不變); those of the "nature of other-dependent-arising" are called "apparent existence" (*siyou* 似有) and "emptiness of self-nature" (*wuxing* 無性); those of the "nature of what is thoroughly imaginary" are called "imagined existence" (*qingyou* 情有) and "non-existence in the sense of principle" (*liwu* 理無). Fazang seems to combine or harmonize the *trisvabhāva* (*sanxing* 三性) and *trividhā niḥsvabhāvatā* (*san wuxing* 三無性) doctrines with one another (T45:1866.499a13-15).

bodies"), both of which are coextensive and coexistent and, therefore, without mutual obstruction. To apply these insights to the previous discussion, these two are inseparable in constituting "the single one nature devoid of duality". In their dynamic interplay, all the differing elements together realize the "one single nature devoid of duality" due to this "sustaining force of identity". Conversely, in this form of interplay there are differing elements relating to one another only thanks to the "sustaining force of difference". The two aspects are equally relevant for this dynamic as a whole, which not only integrates but also specifies all elements; in this way, the two also specify each other, while mutually integrating without obstruction.

Oneness in terms of wholeness, on the one side, and diversity in the sense of complexity, on the other, are interdependent. All the uncountable aspects together constitute the dynamic of the interplay between them, in the same way that their interplay constitutes each of those aspects. This is also the case with each single event that arises due to the concurrence of multiple circumstances. Even though those circumstances occur prior to the event that they cause, their meaning and identity as certain circumstances becomes evident only due to the event that follows after them. Both sides must equally be taken into account if we are to see either one of them; non-duality must be seen in terms of polarity in the same way that we must see non-duality to understand polarity; the same is true of inseparability and difference, and of past, present, and future, etc. In our efforts to see and understand our world detached from delusions, clinging, and reifications, we must adopt this dynamic, by constantly performing a change of aspects in our understanding. In the same section, Fazang explains that the number "ten" is the numeric symbol for the complexity in the interplay of differing aspects, while the number "one" stands for the oneness and wholeness of its dynamic nature (T45:1866.503c4-20). Hence, the two are mutually complementary and each embraces the other. This further means that each of the ten embraces all ten, since oneness (= the one) contains all ten, and each of the ten contains the one (T45:1866.503c19). Such mutual embracement marks the oneness of the "*dharma*-realm" as an "inexhaustible complexity of mutually constitutive layers" (*chongchong wujin* 重重無盡).

If adapted to a strategy by means of which the meaning of "*dharma*-realm as interdependent arising" can be fully presented, this insight must be explicated according to ten aspects or viewpoints that simultaneously realize both the infinite complexity and the oneness of that meaning. This furthermore implies that each of these ten aspects must be capable of mirroring or embracing all ten of them. A presentation of this kind would truly realize the sense of "*dharma*-realm as interdependent arising", and thus conform to the way in which the enlightened being sees the realm of enlightenment – ultimate truth, according to Fazang. With the intention of clarifying this ultimate viewpoint, at the end of the same section, Fazang discusses his master Zhiyan's (智儼, 602-668) scheme of "interdependent arising viewed from the [perspective of the] tenfold profundity" (*shixuan yuanqi* 十玄緣起) (T45:1866.505a11-507c3). In the tradition of the Huayan school, this scheme is considered to embody the essential tenet of the *Huayan jing* (*Avataṃsaka-sūtra*) – the immediate and most complete expression of the viewpoint from which the enlightened being sees the realm of enlightenment.

Fazang's discussion of the ninth link in this scheme refers to the aspect of mind and the way it functions as the unifying and diversifying force in the complex dynamic of interdependent arising (T45:1866.507a8-15). This short passage particularly emphasizes that all the other nine meanings variously manifest "the one single *tathāgatagarbha* as the intrinsically pure and clear mind". Diversified into ten virtues (*shide* 十德), this mind is the single force that embraces all ten, in the same way that each of the ten also embraces this mind; thus, it fully realizes the inexhaustible sense of the *dharma*-realm. However, Fazang's view, which represents the way in which the fully awakened being realizes ultimate truth/reality, does not allow for the ontological primacy of mind, since all ten aspects are equal in realizing their mutual embracement, even though they vary from each other. This could have been the major reason why, in his commentary to the *Huayan jing* (*Huayan jing tanxuan ji* 華嚴經探玄記), Fazang replaced the ninth link, the "gateway of skillful accomplishing through the rotating manifestation of mere-mind" (*weixin huizhuan shancheng men* 唯心迴轉善成門), with the term "gateway of embracing all virtues through the perfect illumination of the mutuality

between the primary and secondary" (*zhuban yuanming jude men* 主伴圓明具德門).[56]

In this scripture, Fazang's comments on the *sūtra* chapter of the ten *bhūmi* discuss the topic of mind in a modified way, which he calls "mere-consciousness according to the ten gateways" (*shimen weishi* 十門唯識) (T35:1733.346c26-347c24).[57] The term "mere-consciousness" is explained in the light of various meanings, based on Fazang's fivefold classification of the doctrine: (1) Small Vehicle Teaching; (2) Initial Great Vehicle Teaching of [*Prajñāpāramitā* and Yogācāra]; (3) Final Great Vehicle Teaching of [*tathāgatagarbha*]; (4) Sudden Teaching [of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*]; and (5) Perfect Teaching [of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*]. The varying meanings of "mere-mind" refer only to the four teachings of the Great Vehicle. In the explication of the "perfect teaching", the two terms "mind and consciousness" do not occur any more, since this ultimate level discloses the "*dharma*-realm as interdependent arising", and hence accomplishes the "inexhaustible complexity of mutually constitutive layers". In other words, this level, which presents the viewpoint from which the fully awakened being sees the nature of ultimate reality in its inexhaustible complexity, sublates the concept of "mere-mind". Fazang seems to see the difference between his teaching (= the perfect teaching of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*) and the *tathāgatagarbha* meaning of pure mind as a question of viewpoint.

The *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine aims at disclosing a sense of ultimate reality for that type of understanding which, even while it is defiled, seeks to accomplish transformation into the state of full awakening by restoring the sense of the intrinsically pure and true nature of mind. By

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[56] Jingyuan's (淨源, 1011-1088) Song commentary on Fazang's *Treatise on the Golden Lion* (*Jin shizi zhang yunjian leijie* 金師子章雲間類解) mentions that Chengguan recorded that it was Fazang who made this change (T45:1880.666b3-5). Hence, the Huayan tradition distinguishes between two versions of the "tenfold profundity": (1) "the old tenfold profundity" in Zhiyan's commentary to the *Huayan jing* (T35:1732.15a29-b21), his treatise on the tenfold profundity in the *Huayan jing* (T1868), and Fazang's presentation in his treatise on the One Vehicle; and (2) "the new tenfold profundity" in Fazang's commentary on the *Huayan jing* (T35:1733.123a27-b5) and in the discussions of later Huayan masters.

[57] The term *shimen weishi* (十門唯識) occurs at T35:1733.347b28.

contrast, Fazang's understanding of reality suspends and goes beyond the distinction between defiled and pure mind. His inexhaustible sense of "*dharma*-realm as interdependent arising" accounts for the perspective through which the already fully awakened being entirely oversees the realm of awakening, devoid of any limits and without obstruction and discrimination. This is complete insight, in the sense that such a view embraces not only the *tathāgatagarbha* meaning of ultimate truth, but also the Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and Hīnayāna (= Small Vehicle) types of understanding. According to this completely awakened state of being, diversity in manifesting the full sense of ultimate reality is coextensive with oneness realized via the mutual reflecting and mirroring of all the various views that aim at disclosing the nature of reality. In other words, Fazang does not really deviate from the constructivist paradigm that understands reality and truth as a system of mutually constituting views and aspects of observation.

This also comes close to Zhiyi's Tiantai view of "contemplating the mind as the inconceivable realm", which highlights the Mahāyāna sense of ontic-ontological indeterminacy. Yet, in contrast to Fazang, Zhiyi's discussion does not really integrate the *tathāgatagarbha* and Yogācāra doctrines of mind into the Tiantai classification of teachings. However, the common basis of all the models discussed in the present paper is the constructivist approach to the sense of reality, which specifically examines the inseparability of truth and falsehood in both our understanding and the way we exist in our world. In this particular respect, all the aforementioned viewpoints are incompatible with the metaphysical concept of transcendence. Constructivist theory in Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism thus claims that cognitive systems of sentient beings are not capable of distinguishing between the conditions of real objects and the conditions of their cognition, because their cognition does not have independent access to a reality extrinsic to that cognition. According to those models, without this fundamental insight into the nature of our cognition, which shapes the way we exist in our world, the Mahāyāna sense of awakening, as well as its soteriological significance, cannot be fully realized.

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The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang's Philosophy of Ontic Indeterminacy[1]

Chien-hsing Ho

1

Jizang (吉藏, 549-623) is the principal philosophical exponent of the Sanlun (三論) tradition of Chinese Buddhism and is the most creative and important Chinese Mādhyamika thinker. In developing his philosophy, he drew to a great extent on his reading of the works of Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250), the founder of the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhism, and some other Indian Mādhyamikas. His thinking was also shaped by the ideas and teachings of several Sanlun thinkers before him, chiefly Sengzhao (僧肇, 374?-414), Sengquan (僧詮, d.u, early fifth century), and Falang (法朗, 507-581). Most notable among these thinkers was Sengzhao. A key forerunner of the Sanlun tradition, Sengzhao set the tone for the development of Sanlun thought with his widely influential work, the *Zhao lun* (肇論). He was influenced in his philosophical thinking and phrasing by the contemporary current of thought known as "arcane learning" (*xuanxue* 玄學). Jizang, by contrast, may appear consciously to distance himself from non-Buddhist Chinese thought. However, inheriting a tradition of somewhat Sinicized Mādhyamika thought, Jizang's own philosophy remains different in a few aspects from that of Indian Madhyamaka.

According to Jizang, all things are empty of determinate form or nature. For him, much of what things are taken to be is such only relative to the current situation and the observer's conceptual scheme or perspective; there is no ultimate, perspective-free determination of things as they truly are. We may thus ascribe to Jizang the indeterminacy thesis, such that all things are ontologically indeterminate: given any *x*, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to *x* in the sense of positing a determinate form or nature therein.

Jizang's philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with his views on the Way (*dao* 道) and nonacquisition (*wude* 無得).[2] In his construal of the Indian Mādhyamika doctrine of twofold truth, the conventional and supreme truths are actually two expedient teachings meant to make explicit the Way, which seems to be a kind of ineffable principle (*li* 理) of actuality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition, which is roughly a conscious state of freedom from any attachment and definite understanding whatsoever.[3] The issue then becomes pressing as to how we are to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Is it actually a skillful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete spiritual freedom? Again, how is this issue related to Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy? Unlike Nāgārjuna, whose works have been studied intensively by modern scholars, Jizang's philosophy has received only scant attention. Herein, I examine Jizang's key writings in an attempt to clarify his ontological position.

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[2] Jizang's notion of nonacquisition will be explained in Section 3. Briefly, the terms "nonacquisition", "nonabidingness" (*wuzhu* 無住), "nonattachment" (*wuzhi* 無執), and "nondependence" (*wuyi* 無依) are, for him, interchangeable; see his *Bai lun shu* (百論疏), T42:1827.234c21–22. Given this interchangeability, and because Jizang occasionally couples "nonacquisition" with "correct intuition" (*zhengguan* 正觀), it would seem that the notion concerns a certain conscious state of mind.

[3] Definite understanding (*jueding jie* 決定解) is basically people's conventional understanding that takes things as definitely such and such. Regarding the Mādhyamika notion of linguistic fabrication (*prapañca*) as a root cause of our being entangled in the cycle of rebirth, Jizang distinguishes between linguistic fabrication (*xilun* 戲論) based on craving and that based on understanding: the former concerns people's grasping attachment to things, the latter refers to people's definite understanding. See *Zhongguan lun shu* (中觀論疏), T42:1824.12b25–27.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I first elucidate briefly Nāgārjuna's doctrine of emptiness, and then, in view of the remarkable resemblances between Sengzhao's and Jizang's Sanlun thought, I elaborate on Sengzhao's interpretation of the doctrine. In Section 3, I discuss and examine Jizang's philosophy in relation to nonacquisition and ontic indeterminacy. Section 4 deals with the central issue of this paper; here, I offer a sustained analysis of Jizang's notion of the Way, in order to clarify his ontological position. Section 5 concludes the paper with final remarks.

2

As noted above, Sengzhao had a tremendous influence on the subsequent development of the Sanlun tradition, so it is advisable in any investigation of Jizang's thought first to present Sengzhao's. Now, both Jizang's and Sengzhao's thought owe a great debt to the works of early Indian Mādhyamika thinkers, so we first review the doctrine of emptiness propounded by Nāgārjuna in his *magnum opus*, the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*.

For Nāgārjuna, all things originate dependently (*pratītyasamutpanna*) in that their coming to be, changing, and perishing depend on various causes and conditions. The relationship of dependency includes not only sequential causal relations, and mereological relations between an object and its parts, but also relations of notional codependence.[4] On the ground that they originate dependently, things are said to be empty (*śūnya*) in the sense of being devoid of self-nature (*svabhāva*) where by "self-nature" Nāgārjuna means, roughly, a self-existent, causally unconditioned, and unchanging nature or existence that a thing may be believed to possess. In his view, putative self-natures are conceptual constructs that are illicitly reified and embedded in the world.

Significantly, the dependent origination and consequential emptiness of a thing strips it of any unchanging, substantial ground, and allows its

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[4] Nagao (Nagao, 1989: 12, 40) takes the relationship to be mutual relativity and dependence (*parasparāpekṣā*). For a discussion of notional dependence, see Westerhoff, 2009: 26–29, 95–98.

deeply illusory character to be recognized. Thus, Nāgārjuna resorts to the analogies of a phantom, a dream, a reflection, bubbles, and so forth, to indicate the ultimately illusory character of things. However, he upholds a doctrine of twofold truth, which draws a thin line between supreme truth (*paramārthasatya*) and conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*). From the perspective of conventional truth, things in the world are (conventionally) real. It is only from the perspective of supreme truth that they are said to be illusory.

For Nāgārjuna, it seems, supreme truth is simply Suchness (*tattva*) as the true nature of things, the *way* things really are, the characteristics of which are indicated in MMK 18.7, 18.9 to be that they are ineffable, inconceivable, quiescent, and undifferentiated. Later Mādhyamikas equate Suchness with *emptiness.* However, Nāgārjuna also holds that emptiness is itself empty. This, above all, has led a number of contemporary scholars to interpret him as repudiating anything metaphysical and to contend on his behalf that the supreme truth is that there is no supreme truth, that there is no such thing as the way things really are (Siderits, 1989; Garfield, 2002; Westerhoff, 2009). This interpretation is in direct contrast to the metaphysical interpretation, adopted by some scholars, that takes Suchness to be an objective reality or principle, the intuition of which can bear one across the ocean of *saṃsāra.* However, I shall not discuss this intricate issue here (see Ho, 2012).

Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, 344–413), a prestigious scholar and translator of Indian extraction, and a teacher of Sengzhao, translated into Chinese the MMK together with a commentary attributed to an Indian commentator named *Piṅgala (青目). The resultant work is known as the *Zhong lun* (中論), the *Middle Treatise.* Remarkably, Kumārajīva translates the Sanskrit term *svabhāva* in the MMK as "determinate nature" (*dingxing* 定性) as well as as "self-nature" (*zixing* 自性). In addition, he uses the term "determinate form" (*dingxiang* 定相) not infrequently in his translation of the commentary.[5] Such usages must have influenced the direction of

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[5] The use of the term "determinate" to refer to things of self-nature may be Kumārajīva's own idea. Both "determinate nature" and "determinate form" occur in his Chinese translation of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra*, the *Weimojie suoshuo jing* (維摩詰所說經). However, the corresponding passages in the extant Sanskrit text of the *sūtra* contain no

Chinese Mādhyamika thinking. For Sengzhao, the myriad things, when apprehended by the mind or intellect, appear to have various forms, which prompt people to use nominal words to designate them. However, they are codependent, nonsubstantial, and devoid of any determinate form or nature; they are then said to be empty and nonreal. A human face, for instance, is neither beautiful nor ugly in itself. It is through delusional conception that we apprehend in it a determinate form, cognize it as definitely beautiful or otherwise, and come to have an attachment thereto.[6]

In Sengzhao's system, there is no ready-made mind-independent world with a determinate structure that empirical investigation can reveal to us, a world that houses properly sliced *res* waiting to be labeled accurately by the corresponding words. The way the myriad things ordinarily appear to us is already saturated with concepts, which yet cannot accurately represent the way things really are. Following Indian Madhyamaka, Sengzhao emphasizes the notion of notional codependence. We know that many concepts are interdependent and complementary, forming such pairs as "long" and "short", "something" and "nothing", "life" and "death", and so on. Indeed, given any word *X*, we can always coin a word, say, *non-X* to form a pair of codependents. Just as Nāgārjuna takes a father and a son to be interdependent, Sengzhao claims that there is no existence without nonexistence, and no nonexistence without existence.[7] This claim probably derives from the idea that,

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word that expresses the sense of determinacy. See T14:475.545a12, 548b25–27, and *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra*, 2006: 50, 73.

[6] Nowadays, many would think that being beautiful is not a property of objects, but merely the content of a subjective judgment that may vary from person to person. However, I use the example to retain the flavor of the original thought. See *Zhu Weimojie jing* (注維摩詰經), T38:1775.386b18–20, 389b21–22; *Zhao lun*, T45:1858.156b17–18, 159 b20–21. Among the four essays in the *Zhao lun* that are traditionally attributed to Sengzhao, the authenticity of the essay "*Nirvāṇa* Is Nameless" has been questioned by a few contemporary scholars. I concur with many others that the essay was basically penned by Sengzhao himself.

[7] Such a claim does not merely concern notional dependence; see *Zhao lun*, T45:1858.159 a27–b3, and *Zhu Weimojie jing*, T38:1775.332c29–333a2, 348c13–16. Thus, it may appear to conflate existential dependence and notional dependence.

given the ubiquity of concepts in our daily experience, we cannot really bypass notional codependence and focus solely on existential causality in order to attend to things in the world. Thus, we can cognize something *as* existent, involving the concept of existence, only when we are aware of nonexistent items of which the concept of nonexistence can be predicated. Consequently, or so it seems, there is no *existence* without *nonexistence*, and *vice versa*.

It is presumably on such grounds, together with the thought that words cannot match anything real, that Sengzhao argues for the nonreality of all things:[8]

> The *Zhong lun* says, "Things are neither this nor that."[9] Yet, one person takes this to be *this* and that to be *that*, while another takes this to be *that* and that to be *this*. This and that are not determined by one word [say, "this" or "that"], but deluded people think they must be so. Thus, *this* and *that* are originally nonexistent, whereas to the deluded they are existent from the beginning. Once we realize that *this* and *that* do not exist, then, is there anything that can be considered existent? Thus, we know that the myriad things are not real; they have always been provisional appellations!

A thing may be referred to by the demonstrative "this" and taken by the speaker as *this.* Yet, it would be the referent of "that" and taken as *that* in respect of another speaker some distance away. The thing is not fixed by "this" or "that", not definitely *this* or *that.* Sengzhao can then apply this observation to all referential expressions and their intended referents. Things conventionally referred to by the word *X* are not to be determined by the word: they are not things endowed with a determinate X-form.

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[8] *Zhao lun*, T45:1858.152c23–28: 中觀云，物無彼此。而人以此為此，以彼為彼，彼亦以此為彼，以彼為此。此彼莫定乎一名，而惑者懷必然之志。然則，彼此初非有，惑者初非無。既悟彼此之非有，有何物而可有哉？故知萬物非真，假號久矣. Incidentally, it is not my purpose here to examine the soundness of Sengzhao's argumentation.

[9] It is stated in Piṅgala's commentary that "There is in the real nature of things neither this nor that;" see T30:1564.30c8: 諸法實相無有此彼. However, the idea expressed here is rather reminiscent of a passage in the *Zhuangzi* (莊子); see *Zhuangzi yinde* 4/2/27–33.

They are not definitely so and so, and there cannot be any sharp demarcation between them and things referred to by the word *non-X.*

From the ontic indeterminacy of things, Sengzhao appears to conclude, rather hastily, their nonexistence. However, his overall philosophy does not support such a one-sided conclusion. For him, the myriad things are neither existent nor nonexistent, though they can be said provisionally to be existent and nonexistent. They can be said to be nonexistent on the grounds that they are codependent and empty of permanent and determinate nature. They can be said to be existent because they arise endowed with forms and are responsive to causal conditions. They are neither permanent entities nor sheer nothings (*Zhao lun*, T45: 1858.152b18–c20, 156b11–13; *Zhu Weimojie jing*, T38:1775.332c27–29). Therefore, we should read the above-quoted passage as primarily asserting the nonexistence of things *qua* linguistically determined. Since the myriad things, unlike the ineffable supreme truth discussed below, are properly expressible and so tend to be mistaken as determinate, they are here provisionally said to be not real.

Meanwhile, Sengzhao appears to acknowledge the completely quiescent true nature of the myriad things, which is typically termed supreme truth (*zhendi* 真諦). This supreme truth is characterized as formless, nameless, and real, which means that it is conceptually indeterminable. It is said that a sage's sacred mind illuminates formless supreme truth. Thus, we seem to arrive at *something* as how things really are, independent of the concepts we happen to employ. As the way things really are goes beyond the grip of concepts, it is simultaneously structureless, perhaps like an amorphous lump, to be carved up using our conceptual scheme into the things that we take to be constitutive of our world.

Significantly, Sengzhao's stance is to emphasize the nonduality of the way of supreme truth and the myriad things of conventional truth (*sudi* 俗諦). For him, the fact of there being two truths does not dictate that there be two types of thing. Equating the supreme and conventional truth respectively with nonacquisition and acquisition (*youde* 有得),[10]

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[10] In Sengzhao's writings, the word "acquisition" basically means the delusional-conceptual obtention of something that is taken as real and is an object of attachment. The

he contends that the two principles designated by the two terms, "non-acquisition" and "acquisition", are not different.[11] This may explain why Sengzhao famously avers that people have the real (*zhen* 真) right before their eyes without their knowing it, and that the real is precisely where we are in contact with things (*Zhao lun*, T45:1858.151a27–28, 153 a4–5).

As we just saw, Sengzhao seems to equate supreme truth with nonacquisition, and conventional truth with acquisition. He states, elsewhere, that the real arises by dint of nonattachment, whereas the unreal occurs on account of attachment. He repudiates any acquisition of nonacquisition. All this indicates that Sengzhao may deny the existence of any higher reality or objective truth, and affirm and find soteriological value only in the subjective state of freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. However, it is also implied in the *Zhao lun* that supreme truth is the ineffable and formless *principle*, the profoundly quiescent pinnacle of all things, which is to be illuminated by the sacred mind. This is a puzzling issue, similar to the one we mentioned at the beginning of the paper in respect of Jizang's notion of the Way. The difficulty of resolving the issue lies in the fact that Sengzhao does not explain his notion of supreme truth in detail.

The best way to solve the problem, I believe, is by considering Sengzhao's understanding of the notion of *nirvāṇa*, because the latter presumably concerns that which is considered ultimate in his philosophy. Indeed, he cites approvingly a line from a *sūtra* to the effect that supreme truth is the way of *nirvāṇa*.[12] Sengzhao discusses *nirvāṇa* fairly ex-

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word "nonacquisition", by contrast, signifies the absence of such obtention. See *Zhu Weimojie jing*, T38:1775.377c18–26, and *Zhao lun*, T45:1858.161b1–4.

[11] *Zhao lun*, T45:1858.152b12–18. It would seem that the two *truths* are two *principles*. In any case, I here use the word "truth" in a nonstandard sense such that supreme truth can be characterized as formless and nameless.

[12] *Zhao lun*, T45:1858.159a26–27. It is here said that conventional truth consists of existent and nonexistent things.

tensively, so we are in a position to ascertain his conception of supreme truth. In this context, the following passage is the most noteworthy:[13]

> Things [in reality] have no form of existence or nonexistence. Sages have no knowing of existence or nonexistence...There is no figure outside [us], no [objectifying] mind in within. Both [exterior and interior] are quiescently ceased; both things and oneself are harmoniously one. Being tranquil and traceless, this state is termed *nirvāṇa.*

Clearly, Sengzhao takes *nirvāṇa* to be a state of quiescence in which oneself and things, heaven and earth, and even past and present, are undifferentially equal and harmoniously one. Here, presumably, the myriad things lose their identities; there is nothing to be acquired, not even nonacquisition itself.[14]

Arguably, Sengzhao's notion of supreme truth signifies such a nondual and indeterminable state of quiescence. If so, supreme truth is formless, without being an objective, higher reality. It can be characterized as nonacquisition, and yet is not purely mental or subjective. This observation provides us with a significant clue for interpreting Jizang's notion of the Way.

3

Just as Nāgārjuna sought to render explicit some implications of the Buddha's teaching about the causally conditioned state of things by emphasizing their emptiness, Jizang deepened Nāgārjuna's teaching about the emptiness of things by highlighting nonacquisition as the main intention behind all Mahāyāna scriptures.[15] The term "nonacquisition"

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[13] *Zhao lun,* T45:1858.159c8–11: 法無有無之相，聖無有無之知...於外無數，於內無心。彼此寂滅，物我冥一，怕爾無朕，乃曰涅槃. See also T45:1858.161a17–19, 161b7–9.

[14] However, given the nonduality of supreme truth and conventional truth, the identities of the myriad things are not really erased. Thus, Sengzhao speaks of a sage's mind mirroring all things as they are, while he also realizes the quiescent oneness of himself and the things; see *Zhu Weimojie jing*, T38:1775.372c19–24.

[15] While, as hinted in MMK 24.18 and Lindtner, 1987: 65, v. 68, Nāgārjuna construes the Buddha's notion of dependent origination as *emptiness*, Jizang, in his *Erdi yi* (二諦義),

recurs in Kumārajīva's translations of Mahāyāna *sūtra*s. There, it often implies that because all things are in reality empty and illusory, there is no real and substantial thing as such that can be conceptually apprehended, or even attained.[16] In Jizang's thought, to have acquisition with respect to a thing is to take it as having a determinate and substantial nature such that one abides in its presumed determinate reality and depends on that reality in daily life, thereby becoming attached to it and losing one's spiritual freedom.[17] Alternatively, to have acquisition with respect to a view is to affirm it as definitely true of reality and become attached to it. Jizang is emphatic that one must not abide in, or attach oneself to, anything in a spirit of acquisition.

For Jizang, just as for Sengzhao, the myriad things are ontologically indeterminate. One and the same thing can be existent for an ordinary unenlightened person, yet nonexistent for a sage. It may look impure and disgusting to a human, yet pure and attractive to an animal (*Erdi yi*, T45:1854.81b6–8; *Jingming xuan lun* [淨名玄論], T38:1780.897a14–29). Indeed, what one human being takes to be a tree may be just food for tree-eating bugs, a post ablaze for some meditating yogis, or a great mass of particles of indeterminate nature for a stubborn quantum physicist. Thus, much of what things are taken to be is such only relative to the

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takes Nāgārjuna's notion of emptiness to be synonymous with *nonacquisition*. See T45: 1854.106a18.

[16] The Sanskrit words for "nonacquisition", *anupalambha* and *anupalabdhi*, generally mean non-perception or non-apprehension. In a passage of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra*, the word *anupalambha* signifies not having any view (*dṛṣṭi*) of oneself and other things; see *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra,* 2006: 50. Jizang understands the term "nonacquisition" somewhat differently. Commenting on the *Weimojie suoshuo jing*, and basing himself on Sengzhao's interpretation, he takes the term to mean the mind's nonobtention of all *dharma*s, especially delusional conception and external things. See *Weimo jing yishu* (維摩經義疏), T38:1781.959b4–10. Moreover, as noted above, the terms "nonacquisition", "nonabidingness", "nonattachment", and "nondependence" are, for him, interchangeable. Here, Jizang might be influenced by the Indian Mādhyamika text, the *Dazhidu lun* (大智度論), wherein it is said, in T25:1509.501c4, that when the mind has no attachment to dual and nondual *dharma*s, this is called *nonacquisition*. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this issue.

[17] The notion of dependence here is used not in the Nāgārjunian sense, but as indicating the opposite of spiritual freedom.

current situation and the observer's conceptual scheme or perspective; there is no ultimate, perspective-free and context-free determination of things as they truly are. Here, to take a thing to be determinate is to delineate it, setting it in opposition to other things, which results in harmful dualistic views about things. Meanwhile, Jizang's contention that what we take to be things are not really different from the ineffable, indeterminable middle Way also reinforces the indeterminacy thesis that we have ascribed to him.

Now, if the two truths in Nāgārjuna's doctrine are taken as singly determinate and mutually distinct principles of actuality, there is a strong temptation to treat them as objects of acquisition and become attached to them.[18] For those who have not yet begun to follow the path to liberation, attachment to conventional truth is the *de facto* mode of being, whereas those who are already on the path will be tempted to attach themselves to supreme truth; meanwhile, those who *misconstrue* the doctrine may become attached to both of the truths. In order to counter acquisition and attachment, Jizang avers that the two *truths* are just two provisional, expedient teachings meant to make explicit the nondual middle Way, which is neither supreme nor conventional:[19]

> The reason for taking the middle Way to be the *body* (*ti* 體) of the two truths is that the two truths are meant to make explicit the nondual principle. As when one points toward the moon with a finger, his intention is not to highlight the finger, but to let others see the moon, so also with the teaching of the twofold truth. The two truths are meant to make explicit the nondual; the intention is not in the duality,

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[18] *Erdi yi*, T45:1854.108c17–23; Jizang here quotes from a Buddhist *sūtra* a statement that equates a view of acquisition with a dualistic view. In his *Dasheng xuan lun* (大乘玄論), T45:1853.30a16–17, Jizang cites from a *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* to the effect that those who embrace duality follow acquisition, while those who embrace no duality follow nonacquisition.

[19] *Erdi yi*, T45:1854.108b22–25: 所以明中道為二諦體者，二諦為表不二之理。如指指月，意不在指，意令得月，二諦教亦爾。二諦為表不二，意不在二，為令得於不二。是故，以不二為二諦體. Notably, Jizang also takes supreme and conventional truth to be two objective spheres of principle, namely, *emptiness* and *existence* respectively; see *Erdi yi*, T45:1854.97b4–13 and *Zhongguan lun shu*, T42:1824.28c28–29a3. The two principles are interdependent, and so are both provisional.

but to enable others to access the nondual. Thus, we take the nondual
[principle] to be the body of the two truths.

Here, the Way is variously named the correct Way (*zhengdao* 正道), the
nondual principle, the correct principle, the Real (*shixiang* 實相), and so
forth. Significantly, it is also equated with nonabidingness, nonacquisi-
tion or the like.

In line with his emphasis on nonacquisition, Jizang proposes the doc-
trines of "three levels of the two truths" and "four levels of the two
truths". The main concern here is to oppose any definite understanding
that views the referent of a term as determinate in nature and determi-
nable by the term; such a referent is an object for acquisition and attach-
ment. At the first level, Jizang takes *existence* and *emptiness* to be the con-
ventional and supreme truths, respectively. To counter people's prob-
able determination and acquisition of *emptiness*, *duality of existence and
emptiness* is regarded as the conventional truth at the second level, while
nonduality of existence and emptiness is the supreme truth at this level. At
this level, one may make the mistake of delineating *nonduality* from *dual-
ity*, treating it as determinate, and becoming attached to it. Against such
a practice, Jizang takes *both duality and nonduality* to be the conventional
truth at the third level and regards *neither duality nor nonduality* as the su-
preme truth at this level. Even so, one may come to have acquisition in
respect of the supreme truth at this third level. Thus, finally, all the
truths of the three levels are said to be the conventional truth at the
fourth level, which indicates that they are expedient teachings for peda-
gogic and therapeutic purposes, while the supreme truth at this level is
the state or principle of forgetting speech and ceasing thought (*yan wang
lü jue* 言忘慮絕).

Jizang, it seems, is here distinguishing between teaching and prin-
ciple. Whatever truth can be expressed in language belongs to the do-
main of *teaching*, which coincides with the conventional truth of the
fourth level; by contrast, the supreme truth of this level, which lies be-
yond the reach of words, is the ineffable *principle* of nonacquisition. The
distinction between teaching and principle, then, corresponds to that
between what can be said using language and what cannot. A parallel

distinction holds between what Jizang refers to as the provisional (*jia* 假) and the middle (*zhong* 中).

For Jizang, the myriad things are codependent, indeterminate, and interrelated. He highlights the role that notional codependence plays in our understanding of things. Since the words *X* and *non-X* are notionally codependent, X and non-X, which are signified by these words, respectively, are not definitely X and non-X, that is, they are not what is demarcated and determined by the words when considered independently. For example, speech is speech only relative to silence (or nonspeech). It cannot be identified and fixed by the word "speech" independently, without regard to silence as signified by the word "silence". It is not something fittingly determined by "speech" and definitely differentiated from silence. Thus, speech is not definitely speech and not definitely different from silence; and likewise for silence. Similarly, existence and emptiness, being notionally interdependent, are not definitely existence and emptiness. Rather, the one is provisional existence, the other provisional emptiness.[20]

The notion of *the provisional* refers to that which is interdependent, nonreal, indeterminate, and conceptually differentiated. The provisional X is not definitely X, and the provisional non-X not definitely non-X; they are only provisionally said to be X and non-X. According to Jizang, however, they also point to a state that is neither X nor non-X, which is *the middle* as the ineffable, real, and ever-indeterminable Way.[21]

Now, we may approach the middle conceptually or nonconceptually. If we approach it conceptually, then the middle, being notionally dependent on the provisional, is simply provisional in character. Beyond this again, however, the middle and the provisional in turn point to a state that is neither middle nor provisional. So long as we are engaged in discussion like the present discussion, of course, we cannot really approach

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[20] *Dasheng xuan lun*, T45:1853.24a9–14. As noted above, existence and emptiness can be regarded as conventional and supreme truth respectively. Here, the two truths are provisional in character.

[21] *Zhongguan lun shu*, T42:1824.61c25: "Only this one principle [of the Real] is designated as real; all else is illusory" (唯此一理名之為實，自斯以外並皆虛妄). Yang (1989: 130) takes this statement to show that Jizang affirms the existence of an absolute truth.

the middle nonconceptually. However, we can at least assume that we are referring to the middle as such, taken precisely as the aforesaid state of forgetting speech and ceasing thought. Here, based on textual evidence such as MMK 24.18, Jizang proclaims the nonduality of the middle and the provisional, which amounts to the nonduality of the Real and the illusory, and of what cannot be said using language and what can be so said. Indeed, to draw a clear-cut distinction between the middle and the provisional is to delineate them and fall prey to a harmful dualistic thinking. Jizang's philosophical practice aims at transcending all types of dualistic thought. Just like Sengzhao, he dismisses as inadmissible any acquisition of nonacquisition.

4

We began this paper with the question of how to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Or is it rather a useful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete nonacquisition? Apart from equating the Way with nonacquisition, Jizang appears to take the correct principle to be a state of mind in which any form of teaching, whether Buddhist or not, is quiescent. In addition, he refers to the Real as the complete nondependent state of the mind that is free from any judgment (*San lun xuanyi* [三論玄義], T45:1852.6c12–16; *Zhongguan lun shu*, T42:1824.124a4–5). All this suggests that he probably dispenses with any notion of higher reality and attends merely to the subjective state of complete freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. This explains his therapeutic use of words and his claim that once one has freed oneself from acquisition, nonacquisition must be relinquished as well.

   According to Hsueh-li Cheng, the Mādhyamika notion of emptiness is mainly a soteriological device that is meant to empty the mind of cravings and to suggest that enlightenment is the abandonment of conceptual thinking. In his view, for Jizang and other Sanlun thinkers, no reality is really real, no truth is truly true. All truths taught by the Buddha are merely provisional instruments used to eradicate extreme views; they are pragmatic in nature and eventually must be dispensed with (Cheng, 1984: 53, 98–99). Endorsing a similar position, Ming-Wood Liu writes,

In thus making non-attachment the sole criterion of truth, [Jizang] empties the concept of truth of any determinate content. And if he still refers to some statements and beliefs as true, he makes it perfectly plain that his primary consideration is their efficacy in refuting false views and cultivating non-attachment (Liu, 1994: 103).

Liu points out that for Jizang, words such as "Way" and "principle" express only the spirit of nonacquisition, rather than any ineffable absolute Way or principle. Indeed, to think otherwise and to affirm the Way or principle as real would only contravene the spirit of nonacquisition itself.

Both Cheng and Liu rightly highlight the therapeutic and pragmatic dimensions of Jizang's thought. Their stance somehow echoes that of a number of contemporary scholars of Indian Madhyamaka, who hold that Nāgārjuna's insistence on the groundlessness of all things invalidates any positing of a higher metaphysical reality in the system. Nevertheless, Jizang usually refers approvingly to the Way without directly equating it with some subjective state, and for him, though words have a therapeutic use, they also function as an expedient device that can indicate the ineffable principle.[22] He clearly characterizes the Way as real, and when he appears to repudiate the Way or the like, he may be repudiating the linguistic determination imposed thereon or any conceptual acquisition thereof. All this seems to indicate that he acknowledges the existence of some real ineffable principle. Thus, we face a problem similar to that which we encountered in Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao concerning the ontological status of supreme truth.

We saw in Section 2 that Sengzhao takes *nirvāṇa* to be an indeterminable nondual state of complete quiescence, wherein both oneself and things are undifferentially equal and harmoniously one, and this seems to be what he has in mind when speaking of supreme truth. This point provides us a valuable clue for resolving our problem.

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22 I am referring to Jizang's employment of the famous simile of a finger pointing to the moon. A related issue concerns how one can say of something, without contradiction, that it is unsayable. For discussion of these two issues, see Ho, 2008.

To begin with, Jizang occasionally refers, approvingly, to the a-bove-quoted *Zhao lun* passage to explicate the notion of *nirvāṇa*, which he identifies with the Way. In addition, commenting on MMK 18.9, he appears to rephrase the passage to explain the notion of the Real:[23]

> By getting rid of the two kinds of linguistic fabrication, one knows that things [in reality] have no different forms of existence and non-existence, and the mind has no conception of existence and nonexistence. Thus...there is no [objectifying] mind within...no figure without. Both [interior and exterior] are quiescently ceased, and both alike attain to a great equality. This is named the Real.

It seems plausible that Jizang follows Sengzhao closely in taking the Real to be an ineffable nondual quiescence wherein both oneself and things are equal and conceptually undifferentiated.

In fact, Jizang's phrasing is much less Daoistic than Sengzhao's, and he does not stress the harmonious oneness of oneself and things as Seng-zhao does. However, Jizang, like Sengzhao and other Sanlun thinkers before him, approaches the issue from the subject-object perspective. He frequently refers to a state in which both interior and exterior, apprehension and apprehended, have ceased, becoming quiescent. This, for him, is one significant point that distinguishes the Buddhist from the non-Buddhist teaching: "The outsiders [Confucians and Daoists] do not realize the abeyance of both object and cognition, while the insiders [Buddhists] have reached the quiescence of both the apprehended and apprehension."[24] Alternatively, he speaks of the nonduality of object and cognition.

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[23] *Zhongguan lun shu*, T42:1824.128a8–11: 既無二種戲論，則知法無有無之異，心無有無分別...無心於內...無數於外。彼此已寂滅，浩然大均，名為實相. In his *Zhao lun* (T45: 1858.161a15), Sengzhao uses the phrase "both alike attain to a great equality" (浩然大均) to describe *nirvāṇa*.

[24] *San lun xuanyi*, T45:1852.2a13–14: 外未境智兩泯，內則緣觀俱寂. See also *Jingming xuan lun*, T38:1780.870a8–11, 871c12–21.

For Jizang, the notion of the middle requires that one transcend both the (one-sided) subjective and objective dimensions of human experience. Thus, he comments on MMK 1.8:[25]

> The real subtle *dharma* lies beyond object and cognition. As it lies beyond object, there is no object to be apprehended; as it lies beyond cognition, there is nothing that apprehends...being neither the apprehended nor apprehension...[the Real] is provisionally named the middle.

The fact is probably not that no reality is really real, but that the Real is nowhere apprehensible in a conceptual experience. Surely, what is transcended here is the cognitive mind, not the mind of nonacquisition. However, while the Way *can* be indicated as a nondependent mental state of nonacquisition, to reduce the former to the latter would be to fall one-sidedly on the subjective dimension, which does not tally well with Jizang's emphasis on the nonduality of subject and object.

The discussion so far may suggest that the Way is completely quiescent and negative. However, Jizang also holds that if one approaches the Way with an attitude of nonacquisition, it is virtually the same as the myriad things:[26]

> Because the great way of equality is ubiquitously nonabiding, all [its determinations] are to be negated. Because it is ubiquitously nonhindering, all things can be equated with it. If one views affirmation as affirmation, and negation as negation, all affirmations and negations are to be negated. If one knows that there is no affirmation or non-affirmation, no negation or non-negation, that they are only provisionally said to be so and so, then, all affirmations and negations are to be affirmed.

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[25] *Zhongguan lun shu*, T42:1824.50c14–51a2: 真實微妙法者，此法絕於境智。以絕境故，無境可緣；絕於智故，無有能緣...非緣、非觀...強名為中.

[26] *Dasheng xuan lun*, T45:1853.42a28–b3: 平等大道無方無住故，一切並非，無方無礙故，一切並得。若以是為是、以非為非者，一切是非皆是非也。若知無是無非是、無非無不非，假名為是非者，一切是非並皆是也.

As the Way is nonabiding, it is neither exclusively the exterior nor the interior, but both at once. It is quiescent and negative, primarily because all conceptual determinations have ceased or are negated in relation to it. Herein, the myriad things are not erased; rather, they are conceptually undifferentiated. This partially explains the aforesaid nonduality of the middle (the Way) and the provisional (the myriad things). In line with this nonduality, Jizang contends that, for a sage, the quiescence of both the apprehended and apprehension goes hand in hand with the apparent manifestation of object and cognition.[27]

   According to Jizang, the myriad things are ontologically indeterminate in that nothing is endowed with a determinate form or nature. Another aspect of his philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is that the ineffable Way is fully indeterminable, which reinforces our attribution of the indeterminacy thesis to Jizang. As the Way is indeterminable and nonabiding, all its conceptual determinations are to be negated; it cannot be determined as X or non-X, say, as empty or nonempty, as Buddha-nature or non-Buddha-nature. In addition, it cannot be confined to the subjective or objective dimension of human experience. It supposedly contains all things in an undifferentiated nondual state of quiescence. Once this is understood, one can indirectly and provisionally refer to the Way as empty or nonempty, and so forth. Presumably, this allows Jizang to speak of it sometimes objectively and sometimes subjectively, which makes it difficult to ascertain his genuine stance. We see here that Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy is closely related to the issue of the nature of the Way.

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[27] The corresponding Chinese sentence is: 至人緣觀俱寂，而境智宛然; see *Jingming xuan lun*, T38:1780.867b15–16. Jizang then echoes a line from the *Zhao lun* by stating that "as [the sage's] response gets more active, his spirit becomes more tranquil; as his cognition gets more quiescent, the illumination [of his mind] becomes more brilliant" (應愈動, 神愈靜, 智愈寂, 照愈明). This reminds us of the *Dao de jing* (道德經) formula of "doing nothing and yet doing all things" (無為無不為).

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In this paper, I have, in light of Sengzhao's discussion on *nirvāṇa*, interpreted Jizang's puzzling notion of the Way. In my opinion, Jizang's ontological system can roughly be said to consist of two interwoven layers: the layers of the middle and of the provisional. The middle is the conceptually indeterminable nondual quiescence of oneself and things, which is known, above all, as the Way. It is only revealed in fully nonconceptual experience and is indicated to be forgetting speech and ceasing thought. It harbors within itself the myriad things in their undifferentiated state. The middle is intimately interwoven with the provisional, which comprises the myriad things in their conceptually differentiated and interdependent mode. Though empty of determinate form and nature, the things are properly and directly expressible in provisional language.

Jizang does not clearly posit any nonempty metaphysical reality or principle. He does speak of the Way or the like as nonempty (as well as empty). Here, however, one of his purposes is to highlight that the Way cannot be determined as *empty*. Another is to indicate that the Way cannot be reduced to emptiness; after all, it contains within itself all things in their undifferentiated and quiescent state.[28] The Way is not any reality metaphysically higher than the myriad things. Although it is characterized as real, it is nothing more than the ineffable quiescence wherein both oneself and external things are conceptually undifferentiated.

On the other hand, while we should respect the practical spirit in Jizang's writing, his notion of the Way does not merely concern a conscious state of freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. It does not seem correct to hold that all his truth-claims are corrective and pragmatic instead of (indirectly) indicating the Way as well. The fact is that,

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[28] Yang (1989: 153–155) accuses Jizang of deviating from Indian Madhyamaka by endorsing the view of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* that *nirvāṇa* is not empty. See *San lun xuanyi*, T45:1852.4b1–4. Cf. *Zhongguan lun shu*, T42:1824.160a8–11: "The middle way is also named *nirvāṇa*...because therein all encumbrances have ceased and all virtues are fulfilled...As all virtues are fulfilled, it is said to be nonempty; as all encumbrances have ceased, it is designated as empty" (中道亦名涅槃者，以...累無不寂，德無不圓...德無不圓，名為不空，累無不寂，稱之為空). Here, as elsewhere in Jizang's writing, the word "empty" also connotes the sense of nonexistence.

for him, the Way is only realized when one's mind ceases to approach things in a spirit of acquisition;[29] being beyond conceptual determination and attachment, it is accessible only to a mind of nonacquisition. Needless to say, the Way is also the preeminent source of soteriological value, the realization of which, according to Jizang, abolishes linguistic fabrication and the wheel of suffering.

There are merits in Jizang's notion of the Way as elucidated here, although it is hardly attractive to an analytical mind. In line with a philosophical reconstruction of his thought, we may take the notion to point to a pre-subjective, pre-objective experience of nonacquisition. This nondual experience is equally correlated with the mind and the world of things, yet irreducible to either. Being ineffable and conceptually undifferentiated, it is still nothing like our quotidian experience, but then, this follows inevitably from its putative soteriological functions. Meanwhile, Jizang's philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is intriguing and worthy of further investigation. However, exploring these issues would require a separate effort, which must wait for another occasion.

Abbreviations

MMK   *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā.* In La Vallée Poussin (1992).
T   *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新脩大藏經. In Takakusu and Watanabe (1924–1935).

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[29] *Weimo jing yishu*, T38:1781.962b19–23. Jizang has identified the Way with supreme wisdom (*bore* 般若, *prajñā*) and profound meditation (*sanmei* 三昧, *samādhi*), but this rather suggests the comprehensiveness of the notion of the Way.

Dazhidu lun (大智度論) (**Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*). Trans. by Kumāra-jīva. T1509.

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Divided Opinion among Chinese Commentators on Indian Interpretations of the Parable of the Raft in the *Vajracchedikā*[1]

Yoke Meei Choong

1   Introduction

The parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā* stems from an early discourse, MN I 134-135.[2] At the climax of the parable, and as the moral of its story, the Buddha says, "You should abandon even [things that are] *dhamma* (Skt. *dharma*); how much the more so [things that are] *adhamma* (Skt. *a-dharma*)" (*dhammāpi vo pahātabbā, pageva adhammā*). In both MN and the *Vajracchedikā,* the denotations of *dharma* and *adharma* here are ambiguous. This ambiguity has led to a range of differing interpretations.

   In the Pali tradition, the commentator to MN I 134-135, Buddhaghoṣa (Ps II 109), interprets *dharma* (*dhamma*) as concentration and insight, while *adharma* (*adhamma*) is interpreted as desire and attachment. A-mong modern scholars, Gombrich (1996: 24-26) differs from the commentator, and interprets *dharma* as the teaching of the Buddha and *a-dharma* as what is not taught by the Buddha. Jaini (1977: 412) is of the opinion that *dharma* denotes all the objects of the right view (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*), while *adharma* represents all the objects of false views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*).

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[2] This *sūtra* is also extant in Chinese translations. See MA T1:26(200).764b18 ff.; EA T2:125 (43.5).759c29 ff.

Malalasekera (2003: 186) interprets *dharma* as "good things" and *adharma* as "bad things". Coomaraswamy and Horner (2000: 31-32) take them to denote right behavior and wrong behavior respectively. In his translation of the *Vajracchedikā,* Conze (1973: 69) left these terms untranslated.

Variations in the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma* are also seen in the Indian and Chinese commentaries on the *Vajracchedikā.* As we will see below, there are three main Chinese commentaries, by Zhiyi, Jizang, and Kuiji. These three authors base their commentaries on the same Indian commentary, but oddly enough, they nonetheless differ from each other in their interpretations of the root text. This divergence of views is further complicated by the fact that the Indian commentators (understood by the Chinese tradition to be Asaṅga and Vasubandhu) also differ. The purpose of this paper is to unravel the interrelationship of the Indian and Chinese interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma* in the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā,* and thereby to reveal the attitudes and behavior of the Chinese commentators toward Indian *sūtras* and commentaries.

Consideration of this problem is further complicated by the fact that various versions of the *Vajracchedikā* parable of the raft contain variant readings of two passages about *dharma/adharma.* We find these variants not only in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā* itself, but also in citations of the text in the Chinese commentaries.[3] Thus, in order to fully understand the nature and origin of Chinese interpretations of *dharma/adharma*, it will also be necessary to investigate the distribution and provenance of these various readings. On the basis of such an investigation, I attempt to show in the following discussion that the variants might have originated as early as Indic versions of the *Vajracchedikā,* and probably in a Yogācāra context.

In order to determine the extent to which the Chinese commentaries modify the Indian interpretations, then, the argument will proceed as follows: First of all, in Section 2, I will show which of the readings was the original reading in the Indian commentaries. Then, in Section 3, I attempt to show that the two variant readings probably stem from Yogācāra circles in India. In Sections 4 and 5, I will deal with the Chinese com-

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[3] As I will show below, two variants occur in the context of the parable of the raft.

mentaries, and show how the Chinese interpreted *dharma* and *adharma* in two distinct directions, that is, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Then, in Section 6, I will show that the difference between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra interpretations can also be discerned even in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā.* In Section 7, I will look into the interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma* in the Indian commentaries; here I will also find a suitable definition for *dharma*, which is used to mean both "things" and "teachings". Finally, in Section 8, I summarize the meanings of *dharma* and *adharma* in various commentaries, and give an explanation for the variants in the context of the parable of the raft.

Before we turn to the argument proper, it will be useful to provide a list of the commentaries that will be discussed in this paper:

1. The commentary ascribed to Vasubandhu (Bodh/Yi) is extant neither in a Sanskrit original nor in a Tibetan translation. There are two Chinese translations :
    — *Jin'gang banruo boluomi jing lun* (金剛般若波羅蜜經論), trans. by Bodhiruci in 508-534 C.E., T1511 (hereafter abbreviated as Bodh).
    — *Nengduan jin'gang banruo boluomiduo jing lun shi* (能斷金剛般若波羅蜜多經論釋), trans. by Yijing in 635–713 C.E., T1513 (hereafter Yi).

2. The verse summary ascribed to Asaṅga:[4]

    The Sanskrit has been edited in Tucci, 1956 (hereafter Tucci), which also incorporates a Tibetan translation.

    There are two Chinese translations of the verse summary:
    — The translation by Bodhiruci is incorporated into his translation of the Vasubandhu commentary (Bodh above) (hereafter Verse-Bodh).

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[4] This verse text is ascribed to Asaṅga by both the Chinese and the Tibetan traditions. Asaṅga's verses are also found in the prose texts Asg-b, Bodh, Vaj (the so-called commentary of Vajrarṣi [Jin'gangxian 金剛仙], T1512, see n. 6). Those verses in Verse-Yi have the same wordings as that in Yi, since they are both translated by Yijing.

— *Nengduan jin'gang banruo boluomiduo jing lun song* (能斷金剛般 若波羅蜜多經論頌), trans. by Yijing in 635–713 C.E., T1514. This text is also incorporated in his translation of the Vasu- bandhu commentary (Yi above) (hereafter Verse-Yi).

3. The commentary ascribed to Asaṅga (hereafter Asg)
   — *Jin'gang banruo lun* (金剛般若論), trans. by Dharmagupta af- ter 604 C.E.,[5] T1510a and T1510b (hereafter Asg-a and Asg-b). There also exists a Tibetan translation.

4. Other Chinese translations of or lectures on Indian commentaries:
   — *Guṇadāna's (Gongdeshi 功德施) commentary on the *Vajra- cchedikā*, translated by Divākara 地婆訶羅 in the late se- venth cent. C.E., T1515 (hereafter Gu);
   — *Jin'gangxian lun* (金剛仙論), the so-called "commentary of *Vajrarṣi" (Jin'gangxian 金剛仙), actually a "lecture text" composed in China,[6] T1512 (hereafter Vaj).

5. Chinese commentaries on the *Vajracchedikā*
   — *Jin'gang banruo jingshu* (金剛般若經疏), composed by Zhiyi (智顗, 538-597) in 538-597 C.E., T1698 (hereafter Zhi);
   — *Jin'gang banruo jingxu* (金剛般若經序), composed by Jizang (吉藏, 549-623) in 549-623 C.E., T1699 (hereafter Ji);
   — *Jin'gang banruo jing zanshu* (金剛般若經贊述), composed by Kuiji (窺基, 632-682) in 630-682 C.E., T1700 (hereafter Kui).

It will also be relevant to bear in mind the access that the Chinese com- mentators had to the work of their Indian predecessors. Naturally, these Chinese authors were able to refer to the Indian commentaries only via translations. The three Chinese commentators make use of the two main

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[5] See T55:2151.366b20-24: 至煬帝定鼎東都。敬重隆篤。復於上林園內置翻經館。譯… 金剛般若經論(二卷)… "As emperor Yang established his Eastern Capital, Luoyang, he esteemed [Dharmagupta] very highly, and established a translation institute in the Shanglin Park (a royal park). [Dharmagupta] translated…*Jin'gang banruo jinglun*…"

[6] Funayama Toru (2006: 48) considers *Jin'gangxian lun* to be not a pure translation, but ra- ther a kind of lecture given by Bodhiruci regarding *Vajrarṣi's (金剛仙) sub-commenta- ry on Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*. For a discussion of the recon- struction of the Sanskrit name corresponding to Jin'gangxian, see Ibid., n. 40 and 41.

Indian commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga (Bodh and Asg above) as follows. Zhiyi (Zhi) referred to Bodh as he composed his commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*,[7] but he was not able to consult Asg, because it was translated after him. The other two Chinese commentators rely on the Indian exegetes to a larger extent than Zhiyi. Jizang's commentary (Ji) shows close similarities at some points with Bodh, and as we will see, he might also have consulted Asg-b, because he comments only on a variant characteristic of Asg-b.[8] Kuiji (Kui) consulted both Indian commentators, and follows Bodh/Yi more closely than Asg.

2   Variant readings in the Parable of the Raft in the *Vajracchedikā*

In the Taishō Edition there are six Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā*, listed below in chronological order:

— Kumārajīva, ca. 401 C.E. (T235, hereafter Ku)
— Bodhiruci, ca. 508-535 C.E. (T236, hereafter Ruci).[9] There are two versions, T236a (Ruci-a) and T236b (Ruci-b).
— Paramārtha, ca. 557-569 C.E. (T237, Pa)
— Gupta, ca. 581–618 C.E. (T238, Gup)
— Xuanzang, ca. 600-640 C.E. (T220(9), Xuan)
— Yijing, ca. 635–713 C.E. (T239, Jing)

The terms *dharma* and *adharma* occurs several times in the context of the parable of the raft, namely, in the following passages:

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[7] See Zhiyi's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, *Jin'gang banruo jingshu* (金剛般若經疏), T33:1698.76a19-20: 又後魏末菩提流支譯論本八十偈。彌勒作偈天親長行. "Furthermore, under the Later Wei (Eastern Wei, 534-550 C.E.) Bodhiruci translated the commentary of eighty verses, [of which] Maitreya composed the verses and Vasubandhu the commentary."

[8] See Table 1 and the conclusion to Section 5; Jizang comments upon Variant (b) but Passage (c), which is characteristic of Asg-b.

[9] These years of translation are given according to the *Gu jin yijing tu ji* (古今譯經圖紀), T55:2151.363c28-29: 沙門菩提流支...從魏永平元年歲次戊子至天平二年歲次乙卯譯; "The monk Bodhiruci translated...from [Northern] Wei the first year (Wuzi) of Yongping (508 C.E.) until [Eastern] Wei the second year (Yimao) of Tianping (535 C.E.)."

(Passage a:) The Buddha assures Subhūti that even 500 years after his complete *nirvāṇa*, there will still be persons who believe in the teachings of the Buddha. The Buddha sees and knows these persons to have attained immeasurable merits, because they no longer have any conceptions (*saṃjñā*) of a self, a living being, a soul or a person, nor of *dharma* and *adharma* (無法相，亦無非法相). The reason is this: If these persons have conceptions of *dharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons have conceptions of *adharma*, they will [likewise] grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person.

Ku: 何以故？是諸眾生無復我相、人相、眾生相、壽者相。「無法相，亦無非法相…若取法相，即著我、人、眾生、壽者。何以故？若取非法相，即著我、人、眾生、壽者.

Skt: *...nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā nāpi teṣāṃ saṃjñā nāsaṃjñā pravartsyate | tat kasya hetoḥ | sacet subhūte teṣāṃ bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate sa eva teṣām ātmagrāho bhavet | satvagrāho jīvagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāho bhavet | saced adharmasaṃjñā pravarteta sa eva teṣām ātmagrāho bhavet | satvagrāho jīvagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāha iti.*

(Passage b:) Therefore one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharma* (不應取法，不應取非法).

Ku: 是故不應取法，不應取非法.

Skt: *tat kasya hetoḥ | na khalu punaḥ subhūte dharmodgrahītavyo nādharmaḥ.*

(Passage c:) Referring to this [teaching] the Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, [which implies that] the wise one should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharma* (法尚應捨，何況非法).

Ku: 以是義故，如來常說：「汝等比丘，知我說法，如筏喻者，法尚應捨，何況非法」.

Skt: *tasmād idaṃ saṃndhāya tathāgatena bhāṣitaṃ kolopamaṃ dharmaparyāyaṃ ājānadbhiḥ dharmāḥ eva prahātavyāḥ prāg evādharmāḥ.*

(Passage d:) The Buddha asks Subhūti whether the Tathāgata attained the supreme perfect Awakening and gives teachings. Subhūti gives a ne-

gative answer, and explains that what the Buddha teaches is not to be grasped and not to be spoken of; it is neither *dharma* nor *adharma* (非法、非非法).

> Ku: 何以故？如來所說法，皆不可取，不可說，非法，非非法.

> Skt: *...yo 'sau tathāgatena dharmo deśitaḥ | agrāhyaḥ so 'nabhilapyaḥ | na sa dharmo nādharmaḥ.*[10]

As mentioned above, the translation of the *Vajracchedikā* by Bodhiruci (Ruci) exists in two versions, Ruci-a and Ruci-b. Ruci-a differs from all the other versions in two readings:

> Variant (b): In place of Passage (b), viz., "one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharma*" (不應取法，不應取非法), the text has "one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma* (不應取法，非不取法)";

> Variant (c): In Passage (c), in place of "one should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharma*" (法尚應捨，何況非法), the text has "because these *dharmas* should be abandoned, [but] not rejected [altogether] (是法應捨，非捨法故)"

Not only do these variants occur in Ruci-a; they are also found in the citations of the *sūtra* in some of the Indian commentaries. The variants, as they appear in all these various sources, are listed below:[11]

> Variant (b)
> Ruci-a: 何以故？須菩提，不應取法，非不取法 (Why is it so? Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*).

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[10] It is noteworthy that the terms *dharma* and *adharma* are singular in Passages (b) and (d), while they are plural in Passage (c), and their number in Passage (a) is not explicit, because there they occur as the first element of a compound. For Sanskrit see HW 115. 14-117.13. The above citation and all citations that follow are taken from the website http://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=person&bid=2&vid=81&entity=81 &kid=81 (last accessed 18 June 2013). Gregory Schopen's edition of the Gilgit fragments does not contain this portion of the *Vajracchedikā*; see GM: pp. 89-139. For the Chinese, the earliest translation, Ku, is given here; see T8:235.749b4-6, 7-11, 15-16.

[11] For Ruci-a see T8:236a753b14-16; for Bodh see T25:1511.783a25-27; for Asg-b see T25: 1510b.770b24-25; for Ji see T33:1699.107a18-21.

Bodh: 何以故？須菩提，不應取法，非不取法 (Why is it so? Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*).

Asg-b:「須菩提，不應取法，非不取法」者... (Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*).

Ji: 第三「何以故」云「不應取法，非不取法」。此明理教之義。以得理忘教，得月捨指故。故云「不應取法」。而藉教悟理，因指得月，故「非不取法」 (The third [question:] "What is the reason" that [the Buddha] preached: "one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*"? This explains the purpose of the teachings. Because, having attained the truth, one forgets the teachings, [just as] having got the moon, one sets aside the finger [that pointed to the moon]. Therefore [the *sūtra*] says: "One should neither grasp at *dharma*..." On the other hand, one realizes the truth in reliance on the teachings, [just as] one depends upon the finger to apprehend the moon, [and] therefore [the *sūtra*] says: "...nor not accept *dharma*".)

Variant (c)
Ruci-a: 以是義故，如來常說栰喻法門：「是法應捨，非捨法故」 (Referring to this, the Tathāgata always expounds the parable of the raft: "These *dharma*s should be abandoned, [but] not rejected *dharma*s [altogether]")

Bodh: 以是義故，如來常說筏喻法門：「是法應捨，非捨法故」 (Referring to this, the Tathāgata always expounds the parable of the raft: "These *dharma*s should be abandoned, [but] they should not be rejected [altogether]").

Thus, the *sūtra* citations in Bodh support Variants (b) and (c) (see discussion below). Of the two versions of Asg, Asg-b cites Variant (b). Ji also comments on Variant (b), which shows that he is obviously following Asg-b.

There is no mention in the Chinese sources of how the two versions of both Ruci and Asg, i.e. Ruci-a, Ruci-b and Asg-a, Asg-b respectively, came into being. However, it is at least clear that someone must have emended the translations, either from Ruci-a to Ruci-b, or the other way around. The same too is true of Asg-a and Asg-b. Since Jizang, the earliest commentator who consulted Asg, has the same reading as Asg-b, Asg-b must

be the original. However, it is not so straightforward in the case of Ruci. Though Ruci and Bodh were both translated by Bodhiruci, Ruci need not contain the same variants as Bodh, because Ruci, a translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, does not necessarily show the same influence of the Yogācāra commentary, Bodh. As shown in Table 2 below (p. 451-452), no translations of the *Vajracchedikā* other than Ruci-a contain the variants, and it is therefore most probable that Ruci-b, without the variants, could be the original.

Significantly for our purposes, this means that at least within the limits of the Chinese evidence, Variants (b) and (c) are the original readings in Asg (only Variant (b)) and Bodh. The next question we must address is whether all the various readings were also known in the Indic tradition, and if so, which readings were original in that context. To that end, it is necessary for us now to look more closely into both Asg and Bodh/Yi.

3   Chinese translations of Asaṅga's verses of Passages (b) and (c)

The discussion in Section 2 has shown that in the Chinese translations, Variants (b) and (c) were original. However, there are two possible reasons that the variants might occur in the Chinese translations: One is that the variants could have existed already in the Indian sources; the other is that they were inserted at the time that Bodh was translated, and Asg-b was later influenced by this earlier translation. Since we possess neither a Sanskrit version nor a Tibetan translation of Bodh/Yi, it is worth looking into Asaṅga's verses twelve and fourteen, and the corresponding Chinese translations, in order to determine which variants were original in the Indian contexts.

Sanskrit verse 12, corresponding to Passage (b), reads as follows:

Verse Twelve (Passage and Variant b)
Out of strong inclination [and] out of faith, they have correct conception (12ab)/ Because of not grasping [things] as they are in speech, and because of the correct apprehension of what has been correctly taught (12cd).

adhimuktivaśāt teṣāṃ bhūtasaṃjñā prasādataḥ | (Tucci 12ab)

yathārutāgrahāt saṃyagdeśitatvasya codgrahāt ‖ (12cd).

彼人依信心，恭敬生實相。聞聲不正取，正說如是取 (Verse-Bodh).

由彼信解力，信故生實想。不如言取故，取為正說故 (Verse-Yi).[12]

The verse compares the difference between one who has faith (12ab) and one who follows insight (12cd). The former gains correct conception of the truth through faith; the latter, by contrast, obtains it by grasping the teachings, but not according to concepts induced by words. Only the latter (12cd) is crucial for the discussion of Passage (b) and its variant.

In this verse, "apprehension" (*qu* 取) is the translation of *udgraha* "grasping". Interestingly, Asaṅga's verses here mention thus "grasping" what is correctly taught. It is necessary to look into the two Chinese translations of Vasubandhu's commentary on Asaṅga's verses, Bodh and Yi, in order to ascertain what they understand this verse to mean. Bodh and Yi each give a different explanation of Verse 12cd.

> Bodh: The statement "one should neither grasp at *dharma*..." means one should not grasp things according to [the literal meanings of] words. The statement "...nor not accept *dharma*" describes one who is in accordance with the knowledge of absolute truth and "grasps it in the manner of the proper teaching", because the *bodhisattva* gains true understanding by hearing the teachings of the *sūtra*s.[13]

> Yi: Having said this, the Buddha said "One should neither grasp as *dharma*, nor grasp as *adharma*." This means one should neither take the literal meanings of words to be things [in reality], nor should one be entirely wedded to the view that there is non-existence of things.[14]

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[12] Tucci, 1956: 59, v. 12; Ruci T25:1511.783c22-23; Yi T25:1513.876b14-15.

[13] T25:1511.784a3:「不應取法」者，不應如聲取法。「非不取法」者，隨順第一義智，「正說如是取」，彼菩薩聞說如是修多羅章句生實相故.

[14] Since *dharma* and *adharma* here refer to attachment involving words (and thus concepts), through which false imagination of self-nature is superimposed on things, these terms imply ontological existence or non-existence. The interpretation of (*a-*)*dharma* as ontological (non-)existence is further supported by Yi elsewhere (see n. 51), where *dharma* is interpreted as existence and *adharma* as emptiness. Thus it is deemed proper to render these terms as the ontological existence and non-existence of things.

By the [avoidance of these extremes] one is able to comply with the knowledge of absolute truth [and so, the verse] "Because one does grasp by reason of that which is correctly taught", which refers to the sentence in the *sūtra* where [Subhūti] asks "whether one would give rise to true understanding having heard this *sūtra*".[15]

It is interesting to note that the two translations of the same commentary, Bodh and Yi, deviate from each other in their attempts to explain this verse, not only in the version of the *dharma/adharma* formula they cite, but also in their attempts to explain what it means. Bodh gives the explanation of the verse in terms of Variant (b), while Yi interprets in terms of Passage (b). According to Bodh, taking things according to the literal meanings of words is wrong, so that "one should [not] grasp at *dharma*"; but apprehending them in the manner of the proper teaching is in accordance with the knowledge of absolute truth, and so nor should one "not accept *dharma*". Yi, by contrast, renders correct grasping as follows: "one should neither take the literal meanings of words as things [in reality], nor should one be entirely wedded to the view that there is non-existence of things". In other words, Bodh and Yi deviate from one another by rendering the object of correct grasping differently. Nevertheless both renderings advocate "grasping" that is in compliance with the supreme insight, in support of Variant (b).

The same difference is also observed in their renderings of verse 12:

Bodh: With the support of faith and respect, one gives rise to true understanding. Grasping at the spoken word is incorrect, [whereas, by

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15 See T25:1513.876b19-22: 說彼之後，便云：「不應取為法，不應取為非法」。不應如言所說將以為法，亦復不即執為非法。由此是能隨順勝義智，「取為正說故」，即是經云聞說是經生實信 (read 實想) 不. According to the passage (T25:1513.876b17-18) immediately before this passage, the two sentences 由此是能隨順勝義智，「取為正說故」 are two reasons for the true understanding: 由具慧者不如言而取；及由隨順勝義智故，取為正說故，名為實想。 "Because a wise one does not grasp [literally] according to words; and because (及由...) he complies with the knowledge of absolute truth and grasps it in the manner of the proper teaching, it is called a true understanding..." It is clear from the sentence structure that the two parts of the passage are connected by "and" (及).

contrast one should] <u>apprehend</u> in accordance with what is correctly taught.

Yi: Due to the power of their strong inclination, and due to their faith, true understanding arises, because one does not grasp literally, and because <u>one does grasp</u> by reason of that which is correctly taught.[16]

Both translations speak of "grasping" in the correct manner. The discussion above shows that correct grasping is implied in Verse-Bodh, Verse-Yi, Bodh and Yi. In view of the fact that Variant (b) appears in commentaries by different Indian commentators (Verse-Bodh/Yi, Asg and Bodh/Yi) and in translations by different Chinese translators (Bodh and Yi), and in one version of the second early translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, Ruci-a, it is obvious that the variant does not stem from translations; Variant (b) stems from India.

Verse 14, corresponding to Passage (c), reads as follows:

Verse Fourteen (Passage and Variant (c))
Because of not abiding in phenomena and because of conformity with attainment, the intention with regard to the teaching is considered as similar to the abandonment of the raft.

asthānād ānukulyāc ca dharmeṣv adhigamasya hi |
kolasyeva parityāgo dharme saṃdhis tato mataḥ ‖ (Tucci 14).

彼不住隨順，於法中證智，如人捨船栰，法中義亦然 (Verse-Bodh).

證不住於法，為是隨順故，猶如捨其筏，是密意應知 (Verse-Yi).[17]

Asaṅga does not comment on the verse in his self-commentary (Asg). In the first half of the verse, the relation between the four elements – not abiding, conformity, attainment and phenomena – is grammatically ambiguous, and this results in different translations in Verse-Bodh and Verse-Yi. Verse-Bodh translates the verse in the same word-order as the Sanskrit as follows:

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[16] See n. 12.

[17] See Tucci, 1956: 60, v. 14 and the footnote immediately following.

Verse-Bodh: He does not abide in, and conforms to, attainment with respect to *dharma*s. The meaning with respect to the teaching is just as [it is with respect to] the person abandoning the raft.

In Verse-Yi, "not abiding" and "conformity" are not treated as two parallel reasons, unlike in Sanskrit, where they are connected by the connective particle *ca* "and". Verse-Yi renders the verse as follows:

Verse-Yi: "Because attainment without abiding in *dharma*s conforms, the concealed intention is to be understood on the analog to abandoning raft."

When we turn to the explanation that Bodh/Yi gives for this verse, moreover, "conformity" is explained in connection with "attainment".[18] Bodh reads as follows:

Bodh: After one has attained insight, one abandons the *dharma*, just as one abandons the raft after having reached the other shore. [The phrase] "in conformity with" refers to *dharma*s in conformity with the attainment of insight, which is to be grasped (彼法應取), just as one who has not reached the other shore should grasp the raft.[19]

Yi too has a very similar reading:

One should abandon the *dharma*s, just as one abandons the raft after having reached the other shore. Because [the *dharma*s] conform with the highest attainment, one should grasp [them], just as one who has not reached the other shore should grasp the raft. This is called "the concealed intention". It is called "concealed", because there is grasping and abandoning with regard to the same raft.[20]

According to both the Bodh and Yi translations, Vasubandhu takes "not abiding" in the verse as corresponding to the first part of the sentence in the *sūtra,* viz. "these *dharma*s should be abandoned (是法應捨)"; and

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[18] T25:1511.784b4: 隨順者，隨順彼證智法; and T25:1513.876c15: 於增上證是隨順故.

[19] Bodh, T25:1511.784b2-4: 得證智捨法故，如到彼岸捨栰故。隨順者，隨順彼證智法，彼法應取，如人未到彼岸取栰故.

[20] Yi, T25:1513.876c13-15: 應捨彼法，如到彼岸，捨棄其筏。於增上證是隨順故，應須收取，如未達岸必憑其筏。是名密意，一筏之上有其取捨故名為密.

"conformity" as referring to the second part of the sentence "[but] they should not be rejected [altogether] (非捨法故)". Obviously Vasubandhu, in both Bodh and Yi alike, is explaining Variant (c) instead of Passage (c). Since Verse-Bodh, Verse-Yi, Bodh and Yi support Variant (c), Variant (c), like Variant (b), is the original reading in these texts.

Thus, the investigations in this section have shown that both Variants (b) and (c) in Asg and Bodh/Yi can be traced back to India, and probably originated in Yogācāra circles, as evidenced by the fact that they are witnessed by commentaries ascribed to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In this and following sections, we turn to tracing the ways these variant formulations of *dharma/adharma* passages, and interpretations of them, played out in the Chinese commentaries.

4   The Chinese Madhyamaka interpretation

In their treatment of variant readings of the *dharma/adharma* passages, Chinese sources pertaining to the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā,* including both translations and commentaries, display an intriguing set of relationships. In considering the distribution of these variants, it is relevant to bear in mind the fact that Zhiyi and Jizang were affiliated with the Madhyamaka, while Kuiji, like the Indian commentators Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, was associated with the Yogācāra. Before looking at each commentator in detail, it will be useful to have a brief overview of the distribution of variants among the commentators.

Among the Chinese commentators, Zhiyi seems to have no knowledge of any variants in the parable of the raft. Jizang, by contrast, explains Variant (b), doing so with reference to the Madhyamaka interpretation of the division between the two truths. Interestingly enough, however, Kuiji interprets the parable of the raft just like Bodh/Yi, which explains Variants (b) and (c); but the variants are absent from both of the texts upon which Kuiji comments, namely, Kumārajīva's (401-413 C.E.) and Xuanzang's (602-664 C.E.) translations of the *Vajracchedikā.*

The above divergence of views is complicated further by differences between the Indian commentaries. Vasubandhu's commentary (Bodh/Yi) displays stronger Yogācāra thinking than Asaṅga's commentary (Asg). The Chinese commentators assimilated both Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's

interpretations, but not to the detriment of their own schools of belief. As a result, they arrived at various and conflicting interpretations of the Indian commentaries.

With this overview in hand, we will now look in detail at the two Mādhyamika commentators in China, Zhiyi and Jizang. As we proceed, we will also keep an eye on how their interpretations relate to those of the Indian commentators.

As we saw above, the two terms *dharma* and *adharma* are repeated in Passages (a), (b), (c) and (d). The meaning and interpretation of these terms differs not just between the Chinese commentators, but even within the same commentary – particularly in the case of Jizang.

It will be helpful to start from Zhiyi, as a point of comparison. Zhi comments on Passages (a), (b) and (c) together:

> Zhi: Next, the list of the emptiness of phenomena is enumerated, and there are only two items: *dharma* and *adharma*. First, "*dharma*": the statement that the five aggregates are empty is *dharma*, whereas [grasping at the] characteristics of the five aggregates is *adharma*. To take the aggregates as empty is like medicine, and thus, that is called *dharma*; while taking the aggregates as existing is like sickness, and so is called *adharma*; once the sickness of the aggregates is cured, the medicine of emptiness will also be removed. When *adharma* falls away, *dharma* cannot exist either. Furthermore, upholding the precepts is *dharma*, and breaking the precepts is *adharma*. Another view: either upholding or breaking [precepts] is *adharma*, neither holding nor breaking is *dharma*; this is the middle way.[21]

Zhi understands *dharma* and *adharma* in several ways: 1) *dharma* denotes medicine, that is emptiness, and stands in opposition to *adharma*, that is sickness, i.e. grasping at the characteristics of the five aggregates; 2) *dharma* denotes behavior that conforms with the teaching of the Buddha, such as upholding the precepts, vs. *adharma*, which is breaking them; and

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[21] T33:1698.78a21-26: 次列法空，但有兩句：法、非法也。今言法者，說五陰空為法；五陰相為非法。即以陰空為藥，名法；陰有為病，名非法；陰病既除，空藥亦遣。非法既謝，在法亦亡。又持戒為法，破戒為非法。次若持若犯並非法，非持非犯為法，是中道義.

3) *dharma*, the Middle Path, is neither holding to nor breaking the precepts, whereas *adharma* is grasping at extremes, like holding or breaking precepts. Despite the different meanings he thus gives to *dharma* and *adharma,* there is one thing common to all these understandings, that is, Zhi understands *dharma* as positive, and *adharma* as immorality or unrighteousness according to the Buddha's teachings; that is, he understands *adharma* as a *tatpuruṣa.*

On the basis of these interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma* Zhi interprets the parable of the raft as follows:

> Zhi: First, citation of the *sūtra* as evidence: The simile tells of someone who wishes to cross a river and constructs a raft to carry himself across, and then, once he arrives at the other shore, abandons the raft and goes away. This is similar to one who wishes to cross the round of birth and death, and makes use of innumerable practices, but then abandons all wholesome acts once he has attained *nirvāṇa.* If even those things/*dharma*s that are in accordance with the path should thus be abandoned, how much the more is that true of those not in accordance with it? First, one makes use of things that are wholesome in order to abandon the unwholesome; subsequently, both should be abandoned.[22]

Here, Zhi explains the parable of the raft with *dharma* denoting wholesome acts or practices taught by the Buddha, and *adharma* defilements or unwholesome acts that are to be eliminated by *dharma.* Interestingly, Zhi seems to have ignored the variants, though the Bodh translation, which he mentions in his commentary, contains these variants. He might have instead followed Passages (b) and (c) as given in Ku. The reason he gives for the abandonment of both *dharma* and *adharma* is a totally Mādhyamika one. Since wholesome acts and right views are merely antidotes for unwholesome mental and physical factors that do not conform with the Buddha's teachings, they are like medicine, which is no more real than sickness. Thus, once the sickness is cured, the antidotes cannot exist either. With this, Zhi emphasizes the emptiness of wrong grasping (*nādhar-*

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[22] T33:1698.78b1-4: 第一引經為證者，譬欲濟河搆筏自運，既登彼岸棄筏而去。將度生死假乘萬行，既到涅槃萬善俱捨。道法尚捨而況非法，初以善捨惡後則俱捨.

ma) as well as the emptiness of emptiness (*na dharma*), a typical Mādhyamika view. According to Zhiyi's Mādhyamika view, both *dharma* and *adharma* should be abandoned.

When we turn to Jizang, we find a more complex picture. Ji makes selective use of various readings of the root text, and positions himself variously in relation to the interpretations of other commentators (especially Asg), in order to construct his own unique interpretation of the terms at issue.

First, we see that in the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma* in Passage (a), Ji is very close to Zhi:

> Ji: [The sentence in the *sūtra*:] "...they have conceptions of neither *dharma* nor *adharma* (無法相，亦無非法相)" is the second sentence that expounds the emptiness of phenomena. [Someone may think that] although [*bodhisattvas*] do not see [the existence of] the self, they may still see the existence of phenomena, that is, of the five aggregates; therefore, [in order to clear away any such doubts,] it declares, "They have conceptions neither of *dharma*..." [On the other hand,] since phenomena, that is, the five aggregates, do not exist, [the fact that] the five aggregates never existed in the first place[23] is called *adharma*. [However, because *bodhisattvas* do not have] even the sickness of emptiness, therefore it is taught: "...nor [do they have conceptions of] *adharma*".[24]

In this interpretation of the negation of *dharma* as the abandonment of the concept that phenomena exist, and the denial of *adharma* as eliminating the sickness of emptiness, i.e. grasping at non-existence, Ji also stands close to Asaṅga. The corresponding passage in Asg reads as follows:

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[23] *Benwu* (本無) carries the meaning of "being non-existent" elsewhere in the same commentary, where Jizang uses *benwu* to explain the wrong view of arising and perishing: "Some hold [the view that something which] originally did not exist now comes into existence;" T33:1699.89c10; 解是本無而今有.

[24] T33:1699.106b16-20: 無法相、無非法相者。第二句明法空：雖不見我，猶見有五陰之法，故今明「亦無法相」。五陰之法既無，五陰本無，名為非法。空病亦空故，云「無非法相」.

Asg-b: First, the giving rise to the conception of the self, etc.; second, giving rise to the conception of *dharma*s; third, giving rise to the conception of impurity – [all] these still consist in grasping at *dharma*s. "[However,] because grasping at *dharma*s" [also] means grasping at no-*dharma*s [too, therefore, additionally:] fourth, giving rise to the conception of existence; and fifth, giving rise to the conception of non-existence – the *bodhisattva* gives rise to none of these.[25]

And again,

Asg-b: In terms of the conventional truth, there are Awakening and attainments; [that is to say,] for the purposes of helping [sentient beings] by skillful means, both exist. According to the intention of the teachings of the Buddha, [however,] neither exists.[26]

Obviously, Ji uses *dharma* to denote phenomena, that is, the five aggregates, and *adharma* to denote the non-existence of *dharma*s, or emptiness. This is similar to Asg, where the *bodhisattva* grasps at neither *dharma*s nor no-*dharma*s. Like Asg, Ji interprets *adharma* as a *bahuvrīhi*, meaning no-*dharma*s, but adds further something that is not said in Asg: that not only are phenomena empty, but emptiness itself is empty too. In this way, though he accepts Asg's explanation of Passage (a), he reinterprets it in line with the Middle Way. In so doing, he stands close to Zhi's first interpretation, insofar as he ascribes emptiness to both *dharma* and *adharma*, that is, holds that neither are ultimately real. Further, however, and exactly contrary to Zhi, he employs *dharma* to denote phenomena and *adharma* as emptiness, whereas Zhi treats *dharma* as emptiness and *adharma* as existence.

Ji and Zhi again agree with one another in the interpretation of *na dharma* and *nādharma* in Passage (d):

Zhi: All phenomena are empty and inexpressible [not to be spoken of]. [The words] "not *dharma*" (*na dharma*) mean that phenomena do not

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[25] T25:1510b.770b6-10: 第一者我等想轉，第二法相轉，第三者無淨想轉，此猶有法取。有法取者，謂取無法故。第四者有想轉，第五者無想轉，是諸菩薩於彼皆不轉也.

[26] T25:1510b.770c17-19: 世諦故，有菩提及得，是為欲願攝持以方便故，二俱為有。若如世尊意說者二俱無有.

exist, while "not not *dharma*" (*nādharma*) means that it is also not the case that they do not exist [altogether].[27]

Ji: This sentence concludes the above [discussion of] the meaning of imperceptibility and inexpressibility. The true nature of all phenomena is neither to exist nor not to exist. Since they do not exist, "not *dharma*" (*na dharma*) is taught; neither do they not exist, and so "nor not *dharma*" (*nādharma*) is taught.[28]

This negation of both existence and non-existence is a typical Mādhyamika mode of negation. The Mādhyamika mode of negation to which Ji and Zhi resort here is conducive to the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma* as opposite pairs, such as wrong views vs. right views; existence vs. non-existence; or extremes vs. the middle way. For Zhiyi and Jizang both conventional and ultimate truths "do not stand for two objective 'realms'", but "serve in the teaching of the Buddha mainly as tentative devices to negate standpoints".[29]

However, Zhi's interpretation of *dharma* in Passage (d) to mean existence does not correlate with his previous use of *dharma* to denote emptiness and medicine in Passage (a). Neither does *adharma* as non-existence fit well with unwholesome acts and wrong views. By contrast, Ji's interpretation of Passage (d) is consistent with his interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma* in Passage (a), because *dharma* is grasped as existence, and *adharma* as non-existence, which serves as an antidote against such grasping.

However, though Ji may thus be self-consistent in his interpretation of Passage (d), this time, he precisely does not follow Asg, which reads as follows:

Asg-b: ..."not *dharmas*", because [*dharmas*] are of the nature of discrimination; "not *adharmas*", because *dharmas* are without self.[30]

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[27] T33:1698.78b13-14: 諸法空不可說，非法即不有，非非法即不無.

[28] T33:1699.107c9-10: 此句成上不可取不可說意。諸法實相非有非無。非有故非法。非無故非非法.

[29] See Liu, 1993: 660, 662.

[30] T25:1510b.770c24-25: 「非法」者分別性，「非非法」者法無我故.

For the Yogācārins, the nature of No-self itself exists. At this point, Ji (naturally enough) deviates from the Yogācāra interpretation.

When we turn to Passage (b), we find that Ji again picks and chooses to suit his own commentarial purposes. This time, Ji selects actively among different readings of the root text; he follows Bodh/Yi, and comments upon Variant (b), "nor not accept *dharma*" (非不取法).

> Ji: Therefore [the *sūtra*] says, "One should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*." This clarifies the meanings of the truth and the teachings. When one has attained the truth, one forgets the teachings, just as when one sees the moon, one leaves behind the finger [that pointed to it]. Therefore [the *sūtra*] says, "One should neither grasp at *dharma*..." On the other hand, one depends on the teachings in order to realize the truth, just as it is thanks to the finger that one apprehends the moon. Therefore [the *sūtra*] says, "...nor not accept *dharma*". This is just as one should not take the raft [away with him], because the raft is to be abandoned when he arrives at the shore; [but] he should [also] not *not* take the raft, because he wishes to cross the river.[31]

Here, Ji uses *dharma* to denote the teachings of the Buddha, and takes the first and second part of the statement "one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma*" to denote two attitudes toward *dharma,* on the ultimate level and the conventional level respectively. His explanation here is very similar to the exposition of the two truths of the Madhyamaka, as can be seen from the following passage from *Piṅgala's commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*:

> The supreme [truth] is [made known] entirely through speech, and speech is [a kind of] mundane [object]. Hence, [it is said that] without having recourse to the mundane [truth], the supreme [truth] cannot be taught. And without obtaining the supreme [truth], how can *nirvā-*

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[31] T33:1699.107a19-22: 故云不應取法非不取法，此明理教之義。以(read 已)得理忘教，得月捨指故，故云不應取法。而藉教悟理，因指得月，故非不取法。如到岸捨栰故，不應取栰。為欲度河故，非不取栰也.

ṇa be attained? Hence, although *dharma*s are non-originating, there are [two forms of] truth.[32]

This shows that Ji follows Bodh/Yi on Passage (b) because the interpretation of the parable of the raft at this point is in line with some Mādhyamika commentaries on the two truths.

For Passage (c), however, Ji adopts a different strategy again. This time, instead of commenting on the variant (Variant c), he comments on the normal reading (法尚應捨，何況非法):

> Ji: [The statement:] "One should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharma*" clarifies that even existence, which is the support of the senses, should be abandoned; how, then, can one grasp at non-existence, which is not an object of the six senses?[33]

Here, Ji deviates from Bodh and yields to the traditional reading. In so doing, he also gives a different meaning to *dharma* and *adharma* from that we just saw him use in application to Passage (b), interpreting them as "existence" and "non-existence" or "nothing" respectively.

This is also very different from the Indian interpretation of the same passage (Passage b). In Asg-a, the sentence in the *sūtra,* "One should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharma*" (不應取法，不應取非法) is interpreted as referring respectively to the nonduality of the entity (*ti* 體)[34] in the phenomenon and the nature of No-self in the phenomenon.[35] That means Asg takes *dharma* as the phenomenon and *adharma* as the nature of the phenomenon; but the nature of the phenomenon is the

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[32] T30:1564.33a4-7: 第一義皆因言說。言說是世俗。是故若不依世俗。第一義則不可說。若不得第一義。云何得至涅槃。是故諸法雖無生。而有二諦; translation from Liu, 1993: 658.

[33] T33:1699.107a26-28: 「法尚應捨，何況非法。」明有是物情所安，尚應須捨；無非六情所對，豈可執也.

[34] The usual translation of *ti* (體) is "essence" or "substance". This is appropriate in ontological discussions, but the sentence here refers to ordinary people who take phenomena to appear in just the way that they are named or designated. For this reason, I render it "entity".

[35] T25:1510a.761a8-9: 不應取法、非法者，於法體及法無我並不分別故.

highest truth, and this means that *adharma* is not reduced to a tentative device, as it was in Ji's reading of Passage (b).

In short, Ji is selective and strategic in his acceptance of both Asg and Bodh. He follows Asaṅga for Passages (a) and (d), and uses *dharma* and *adharma* to mean the "existence" and "non-existence" of phenomena respectively, where the latter is equivalent to "emptiness". Meanwhile, he follows Bodh/Yi for Variant (b), and interprets *dharma* as the "teachings of the Buddha". (The interpretation of *dharma* in Variant (b) differs from that of other passages, because Variant (b) does not feature the opposition of *dharma* to its opposite, *adharma*.) In all passages other than Passage (b), however, Ji is consistent in the interpretation of *dharma* and *adharma*, that is, he aligns himself more closely with Asg's interpretation of Passage (a), which seemed to be more acceptable to the Chinese Madhyamaka.

We now turn to examine the interpretation of the same material put forward by Kuiji, whom we will take as representative of Chinese Yogā-cāra.

5   The Chinese Yogācāra interpretation

In his commentary on the *Vajracchedikā* (Kui), Kuiji interprets *dharma* and *adharma* in conformity with Yogācāra philosophy. In the context of Passages (a) and (d), he apparently understands *dharma* and *adharma* in the same way as they are understood in Passage (d) by his predecessors, Zhiyi and Jizang. He accepts the interpretations of Ji with regard to *na dharma* and *nādharma*, that is, "not *dharma*" means the non-existence of phenomena and their characteristics, while "not non-*dharma*" means not to grasp at non-existence.

There is a twist, however: Kui ascribes grasping at non-existence to persons who hold that the perfected nature does not exist. As we know, according to the Yogācāra, the perfected nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is the ultimate reality. In this way, Kui seems to follow his predecessors, that is, he also states that grasping at non-existence is to be abandoned; but his actual intention is to advocate the *existence* of the perfected nature:

Kui: The "conception of *dharma*" (*faxiang* 法相)[36] is so-called because fools, out of false imagination (*wang* 妄), grasp the self of phenomena as an existent. As soon as this is understood to be empty, one knows that the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomenon does not really exist, and this is called "without the conception of *dharma*" (*wufaxiang* 無法相). The "conception of non-*dharma*" (*feifaxiang* 非法相, *adharmasaṃjñā*), which means "[the conception] of something empty (*kong* 空) and without entity (*wu youti* 無有體)", is so-called because fools claim that the perfected nature (*yuancheng* 圓成) is non-existent. Since the wise comprehend this perfected nature as existing, [it is called] "without the conception of non-*dharma*" (*wu feifaxiang* 無非法相, *nādharmasaṃjñā*), because there is no conception of emptiness (*kongxiang* 空相) that is grasped by them. The truth of the twofold Selflessness (*erwuwo li* 二無我理) truly exists.[37]

Like his predecessors, Kuiji employs *dharma* and *adharma* to denote two extreme views, viz. grasping at existence and non-existence respectively. In contrast to Zhiyi and Jizang, however, he understands "nor not *dharma*" to imply not simply a negation of non-existence, but rather, an affirmation of the existence of the perfected nature. This twist of interpretation is influenced by Bodh/Yi. The corresponding passage in Bodh/Yi on Passages (a) and (d) reads as follows:

Bodh: (Passage a:) What is the meaning of this? Since all phenomena [which are considered to be] existent, [both those that are] grasped and [those that] grasp [i.e. object and subject], do not exist, it is said: "There is neither conception of *dharma*s..." because nothing [of the

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[36] Here, *faxiang* (法相) is translated as "conception of *dharma*", because it refers to *dharmasaṃjñā* in the root text. Sanskrit *saṃjñā* means "imagining or images superimposed by concepts". For Skt., see HW: 115, 15f.: *nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā nāpi teṣāṃ saṃjñā nāsaṃjñā pravartsyate.* For a detailed discussion of the terms *fa* (法) and *xiang* (相) in the *Vajracchedikā*, cp. Takehashi, 1999.

[37] T33:1700.134c16-21: 無法相者：謂凡情妄執，執法我為有，名為法相。既達為空，知法體而非實故，云無法相，無其所執實有法相故。愚者妄情撥圓成，而是無，名非法相。空無有體故，智者了此圓成是有，故無非法相，無其所執為空相故。二無我理是實有.

sort] exists. Since the [nature of] No-self and emptiness exists in these phenomena, it is said: "...nor is there conception of *adharma*".

Bodh: (Passage d:) [The text] states, "neither *dharma*..." because all phenomena have no substantial nature. On the other hand, it also states, "...nor *adharma*", because the [ultimate] nature, that is, Suchness and No-self, truly does exist.[38]

Thus, the claim in Kui that *adharma* denotes the nature of No-self, which is wrongly thought to be non-existence, derives from Bodh/Yi.

The interpretation of Passage (d) in Kui is in the same vein:

Kui: The reason "it can neither be described as not *dharma* (*fei fa* 非法, *na dharma*) nor as not non-*dharma* (*fei feifa* 非非法, *nādharma*)" is as follows: "*dharma*" is so called, because fools grasp at the existence of the person and phenomena; "*adharma*" is so-called, because they assign non-existence to the perfected nature. Since the wise person comprehends the non-existence of the person and phenomena, the text speaks of "not *dharma*" (*fei fa* 非法, *na dharma*); since he understands the perfected nature as existing, therefore the text speaks of "not non-*dharma*"(*fei feifa* 非非法, *nādharma*). The Dharma-body (*fashen* 法身) is calm and pure, and can be spoken of neither as not *dharma,* nor as not non-*dharma.*[39]

Though Kui is seemingly in line with the first interpretation of Zhi in the explanation of *dharma* and *adharma* in Passages (a) and (d), he follows Bodh/Yi and adds a twist to the interpretation of the ultimate purpose of this parable of the raft. It is clear that Kuiji preferred Bodh/Yi to Asg. Despite the fact that the Chinese ascribe both Indian commentaries to Yogācārins, namely, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu respectively, the way Kuiji gives more weight to "Vasubandhu's" commentary (Bodh/Yi) shows that

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[38] For Passage (a) see T25:1511.783c11-13: 此義云何？有可取、能取一切法無故，言「無法相」，以無物故。彼法無我空實有故，言「亦非無法相」. For Passage (d) see T25:1511.784c2-3：「非法」者，一切法無體相故。「非非法」者，彼真如無我相實有故.

[39] T33:1700.135c10-14: 不可說非法非非法者。謂愚夫執人法為有，名之為法。撥圓成是無，名非法。聖者達人法為無，名為非法。了圓成為有，名非非法。法身寂淨不可說非法。亦不可說非非法也.

he considered it a stronger support for the Yogācāra perspective. In other words, Kuiji subtly admits that Asg contains less Yogācāra thought.

Kui again follows Bodh/Yi closely in his explanation of Passages (b) and (c):

> Kui: "Grasping in accordance with [teachings] means that by relying on sayings [of the *sūtra*s] one attains Awakening...When one wishes to realize the truth, he must depend on the words [of the *sūtra*s]."[40]

Here, Kui is obviously commenting on Variants (b) and (c) (非不取法, 非捨法故, the readings found in Ruci-a and Bodh), instead of the readings that actually appear in Ku (不應取非法, 何況非法, T8:235.749b7-8), the translation Kui is supposedly commenting upon.

In this commentary on the *Vajracchedikā,* it is not clear how Kui justifies Bodh/Yi's explanation of the reliance on the teachings of the *sūtra*s in the context of Passages (b) and (c); however, an answer to this question appears in his sub-commentary on Bodh/Yi, the *Jin'gang banruo lun huishi* (金剛般若論會釋). There, Kuiji comments again on these variants:

> Vasubandhu explains as follows:
>> "The statement 'one should neither grasp at *dharma*...' means that one should not grasp at things as [they seem according to] the literal meanings of words, because attachment is to be abandoned. The statement '...nor should one not accept *dharma*' describes one who is in accordance with the supreme insight, [and means] 'grasping in accordance with what is rightly taught'" (Verse-Yi 12d).
>
> Nor can supreme insight be obtained apart from the teachings, because supreme insight arises [in one who is] in accordance with the teachings. The meaning of this commentary is as follows: The statement "one should neither grasp at *dharma*..." [means] there is no difference between grasping at the existence of phenomena and grasping at the nature of No-self in the phenomena; one should not grasp at any attachment [formed] in accordance with words. The statement "...nor should one grasp at *adharma*" [means this]: Although the com-

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40 T33:1700.135a24-26: 如是取者，謂必因言而悟真故...謂將欲證真必因言說.

mentary does not explicate this phrase, it emphasizes that conversely, [supreme insight] should also not be sought apart from the teachings, because supreme insight arises [in one, who is] in accordance with the teachings, and this is how the truth is attained. This [statement] is [thus] the same as the previous one. Another explanation for the statement "one should neither grasp at *dharma*…" is as follows: One should grasp neither at the entity (*ti* 體) of *dharma*s nor take the *dharma*s exactly as it is designated. [As for] the statement "…nor should one grasp at *adharma*": This teaching preaches that *dharma*s have the nature of No-self, and supreme insight arises [in one, who is] in accordance with this teaching; [thus,] supreme insight should not be sought apart from the teachings. One should not give rise to attachment in reliance on the teaching and conceive of an entity (*ti* 體) in *dharma*s, nor should one seek the nature of No-self in *dharma*s outside the teaching, and give rise to attachments and conceptions. This [statement] is [thus] the same as the previous one. Though the citation of the *sūtra* is abbreviated, and cites only the statement "one should neither grasp at *dharma*…", the statement "…nor should one grasp at *adharma*" is included in [Vasubandhu's] explanation.[41]

Curiously, Kuiji here stubbornly insists that Passage (b) is the statement Bodh/Yi comments on, and fails to see that Bodh/Yi is explaining Variant (b). In the attempt to fit Passage (b) "nor should one grasp at *adharma*" into the interpretation of Bodh/Yi, Kui comes out with *adharma* meaning "the act of seeking the nature of No-self outside the teaching". With this interpretation, Kuiji is obviously aiming at Jizang, the master of the San-lun School (*sanlun zong* 三論宗), who advocates that the ultimate truth is inexpressible and unfathomable (*yan wang lü jue* 言亡慮絕); that all

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41 T40:1816.739a21-b6: 天親解云：「『不應取法』者，不應如聲取法，除所執故。『非不取法』者，隨順第一義智，『正說如是取　』。」又非離言說可求第一義智，第一義智順教生故。此論意言：「不應取法」者。若所執有法及法無我並不分別。如言執著，皆不應取。「不應取非法」者，論雖不解，翻顯離言說外亦不可求，順教便生第一義智證真義故。正與彼同。又解「不應取法」，謂取法體，如言執實，不應取故。『不應取非法』者，謂此教說法無我性，順教便生第一義智，不應離教以求真義證法無我故。不應依教而生執著法體分別，亦不應離教外覓法無我執著分別。亦與彼同。文牒經雖略但牒不應取法，解中便具不應取非法.

the teachings of the Buddha are intended only to deny what is false; that one can reveal the truth only by negation; and that one cannot take any positive position oneself (*wei po bu li* 唯破不立).[42] In short, in Jizang's view, the purpose of all the *sūtra*s is not to affirm the truth, but to negate what is false. Kuiji makes this position of Jizang's an object of ridicule, and compares it with seeking the truth apart from the teachings.

As Kuiji continues his critique against Jizang, he attempts a unique synthesis of Asg's explanations of Passages (c) and (d). As the occasion for this critique, Kui takes the fact that when Asg comments on Passage (c), he introduces the Dharma-body of the Buddha (*dharmakāya*). In his comment, however, Kui uses the wording of Passage (d), and thereby, unlike Asg, implicitly identifies the *dharmakāya* with the *dharma* in the wording of the *Vajracchedikā* itself. Thus, Kui begins by saying (as we already saw at the end of the passage cited above, p. 442):

> Kui: The Dharma-body (*fashen* 法身, *dharmakāya*) is calm and pure, it underline should be spoken of neither as not *dharma,* nor as not non-*dharma* (不可說非法、亦不可說非非法).[43]

However, in using the wording of Passage (d) here, Kui seems again to overlook the fact that in his own talk of the *dharmakāya,* Asg in fact comments on Passage (c) (何況非法). Not only that, but Asg's Passage (c) is different from Variant (c), which features in Bodh/Yi, the text that Kui usually follows. Thus, Asaṅga in fact comments on Passage (c) as follows:

> Asg: It is said, "The wise one should abandon even *dharma,*" because correct conception arises [in him]; [while the next statement says] "...not to mention *adharma*", because that would be unreasonable. In short, it shows that the *bodhisattva*, who wishes to attain the so-called Dharma-body (*fashen* 法身, *dharmakāya*), should not give rise to incorrect conceptions.[44]

Kui understands this passage as follows:

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42 Zhao (1993: 44, 48) and Wang (1995: 126) have discussed Jizang's thought in detail.

43 T33:1700.135c13-14: 法身寂淨不可說非法。亦不可說非非法也.

44 See Asg-a T25:1510a.761a11-12; Asg-b T25:1510b.770b29c2: 法尚應捨，實想生故。何況非法者，理不應故。略說顯示菩薩欲得言說法身，不應作不實想故.

> Kui: [The statement:] "'The wise one should abandon even *dharma*', because correct conception arises" [is explained as follows:] Correct conception arises by following the teachings. Having attained the truth [by means of] correct conception, the teachings are no longer necessary. These teachings are to be abandoned after having attained the truth – "...not to mention *adharma*". It is reasonable not to hold to practices that are *adharma*, because seeking [the truth] outside the teaching would be contrary to the truth; thus it is reasonable that [these practices] are to be abandoned.[45]

Here, Kui interprets the first statement of Passage (c), "The wise one should abandon even *dharma*," to refer to one who has attained the truth, and interprets *dharma* as either the teachings of the Buddha, or specific items taught in the teachings, which lead to the truth; he then interprets *adharma* in the second statement, "...not to mention *adharma*", as the act of seeking the truth outside the teachings, which would not lead to the truth, just as he interpreted *adharma* in Passage (b).

With this interpretation in hand, we can now see that his statement on the Dharma-body, already cited above, means something like this: "Since the Dharma-body is pure and tranquil, one should neither say that the Dharma-body is not existence, nor should one say that the Dharma-body is not non-existence."

But this means that Kuiji has (purposely?) distorted the relevant passage in *Vajracchedikā* Passage (d), so that the phrase "not to be spoken of" (*bukeshuo* 不可說), which is used in the *Vajracchedikā* of the *dharma* itself (and even that is not exactly the same as the Dharma-body), instead is used of existence. What the *Vajracchedikā* itself actually says, let us recall, is this:

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45 T40:1816.739b17-21: 「法尚應捨，實想生故。」由依教法實相得生。實想證真已，更不須教故。此教法證真尚捨，「何況非法」。非法之事，理不應留教外別求。背真理故，理應除棄.

Ku, Passage (d): <u>Whatever *dharma* is preached by the Tathāgata, it is neither to be grasped <u>nor to be spoken of</u>; it is neither *dharma* nor *a-dharma*.[46]

By means of this distortion, the expression "not to be spoken of" (*buke-shuo* 不可說) comes to be used to reject the application of any negation to the Dharma-body, rather than to mean, as it did originally in the *Vaj-racchedikā,* that one cannot speak of the Dharma[-body] itself, at all. Kuiji has turned the passage into an *affirmation* of the Dharma-body as pure and tranquil, and a *rejection* of the refutation of its existence and non-existence.

So how does all this work to continue Kuiji's critique of Jizang? It is obvious that in making this move, Kuiji has Jizang in his sights. Jizang, or the Chinese Madhyamaka in general, had claimed that the ultimate truth is neither existence nor non-existence, and that none of the *sūtra*s ever said anything about the ultimate truth; instead, the *sūtra*s only ever refute what is *not* the truth.[47] According to Kuiji, when Chinese Mādhya-mikas say this, it is equivalent to seeking the truth outside the teachings. Kuiji advocates, rather, that the ultimate truth should indeed be taught:

Kui: On this point, we should say that [it is susceptible to] "neither conception nor non-conception". We say that it is "not [susceptible to] conception", because the truth, that is to say, No-self, cannot be pro-claimed by means of language to be either existent or non-existent. When immature *bodhisattva*s impetuously claim that [the truth of No-self] can be explained, this is called "conception"; when the holy ones (*ārya) understand that it is not to be spoken of, we speak of "non-conception". [The other statement, that] "...nor is it [susceptible to] non-conception" means "describing what is inexpressible by using speech and signs". This is [further explained] as follows: Once the spi-ritually immature hear that [the truth] is not to be spoken of, they re-

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ject all speech as wrong. Since the wise ones have thorough knowledge of the [truth], they teach [it] using words and speech, but they have no attachments [to it]. This is the reason that we say "nor is it [susceptible to] non-conception".[48]

According to Kui, though the ultimate truth, the Dharma-body, is inexpressible ("not to be spoken of"), it should still be taught by words and speech. This emphasis on teachings has close similarity to the reliance on teachings for liberation that features in Variants (b) and (c). This makes it clear that Kui incorporates the explanation of Variants (b) and (c) given in Bodh/Yi into the interpretation of the Dharma-body in Asg's Passage (d). Though Kui cites Asg, then, he in fact bases himself on Bodh/Yi. This shows again that Kuiji indirectly acknowledges that Asg's explanation is insufficiently Yogācāra, so to speak – that it stands closer to Madhyamaka than to Yogācāra.

Interestingly enough, then, Kuiji, like Jizang, makes use of Asg, but comes out with an interpretation that criticizes Jizang's thought. Both follow Asg in claiming that ultimate truth is inexpressible, but Kuiji uses *adharma* to denote the false understanding of the Sanlun School, against Jizang's treatment of *adharma* as a tentative device, which should be abandoned upon arriving at the ultimate truth. This shows that Jizang and Kuiji each uses Asg differently for his own interpretation of the parable of the raft. The Chinese commentators were more faithful to their respective schools than they were to the texts they based their commentaries on.

According to Kui, *dharma* and *adharma* in Passages (a) and (d) mean "existence" and "non-existence" respectively. Of these, *dharma* is the wrong conception that phenomena exist, exactly as it is interpreted in Ji; but *adharma* is assigned a meaning a little different from that in Ji. By "non-existence", Kui means the wrong conception that the perfected nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) does not exist. However, in commenting on Passages (b) and (c), Kui actually comments on Variants (b) and (c) with-

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48 T33:1700.134c21-28: 此中更應云無相、亦非無相。言「無相」者，謂無我理不可以言宣說為有為無，諸小菩薩乍謂可說，名之為「相」。聖者了之為不可說故云「無相」也。「亦非無相」者，以於無言處依言相說也。謂愚者既聞不可說故，即謂有言皆非。智人達之故，依言辭而說，然不執著故，言亦「非無想」也.

out knowing it. Since Variants (b) and (c) do not feature the second part of the formula (i.e. the statement that like *dharma, adharma* is also to be abandoned – indeed, all the more so) where *dharma* actually means "the words of the *sūtras*", Kuiji comes out with an interpretation of *adharma* as the act of seeking the nature of No-self outside the teaching.

At this juncture, it will be convenient to summarise the use of variant readings in all the commentators. As the discussion above has shown, the Indian Yogācāra commentaries comment on Variants (b) and (c). Zhi never mentions the variants, though Zhiyi could have consulted Bodh. Ji comments on Variant (b) but not Variant (c).[49] Kui, oddly enough, uses comments on Variants (b) and (c) from Bodh/Yi, but treats them as if they are explanations of the non-variant Passages (b) and (c). (Only a later commentary, Yan, actually contains Variants b and c.[50])

I summarize whether or not all the commentaries cite one or both variants, or show knowledge of them, in the Table below:

Table 1

	commentaries	Variant (b)	Variant (c)
Indian	Bodh	✓ +	✓ +
	Yi	+	+
	Verse-Bodh	+	+
	Verse-Yi	+	+
	Asg-a	∅	∅
	Asg-b	✓	∅
Chinese	Ji	✓	∅
	Vaj	✓	∅
	Yan	✓	✓

✓   citation of *sūtra*-wordings of the variants

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[49] The same is true of Vaj, which contains also Variant (b). T25:1512.814c24-a1:「不應取法」者，明雖藉詮而說，而亦理非名相，不應取聲教為證法，謂是有相也。「非不取法」者。聞言「不應取法」，便證法一向無名相，不可假教而說。若無名相不可假教說者，則復謂音聲言教令非是法，棄其能詮之義。為遣此疑故，言「非不取法」.

[50] T33:1704.242b30-c2:「何以故？須菩提，「不應取法，非不取法。」以是義故，如來常說筏喻法門，是法應捨，非捨法故」.

+	arguments that imply the variants
∅	absent from the passage concerned
Yan	*Jin'gang banruo boluomi jing lueshu* 金剛般若波羅蜜經略疏, T1704, commentary by Zhiyan (智儼, 602-668)

Thus, though the Chinese commentators had access to Ruci-a and Bodh, which contain both Variants (b) and (c), Ji follows instead Asg-b, which contains only Variant (b), while Zhi and Kui give preference to Kumāra-jīva's translation, which gives the non-variant Passages (b) and (c). This shows how stubborn the Chinese commentators before Zhiyi are; although they either mention or consult Bodh, they are so familiar with the readings in earlier translations that they overlook the variants.

6   *Dharma* and *adharma* in the Chinese translations

The division observed above into Madhyamaka and Yogācāra trends did not first appear in the Chinese commentaries; rather, it is already discernible in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā* itself. This is evinced in the rendering of Passage (a): *nāpi teṣāṃ subhūte bodhisatvānāṃ dharmasaṃjñā pravartsyate nādharmasaṃjñā.* While the phrase *na dharmasaṃjñā* is translated unanimously into Chinese as "no conception of *dharmas*" (*wu faxiang* 無法相), the rendering of *na adharmasaṃjñā* is divided into two groups:

—— "not without the conception of *dharmas*" (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相; hereafter Statement Y[ogācāra]);
—— "without the conception of non-*dharmas*" (*wu fei faxiang* 無非法相; hereafter Statement M[adhyamaka]).

These two versions of this key phrase differ significantly in nuance. The first statement (Y) affirms that imagination itself does exist, while the second (M) denies the existence of the conception of even non-*dharmas*. These statements, further, are distributed among two groups of translators in a significant manner. The first group coincides with the translators who translated the Indian *sūtras* or commentaries containing one or both variants, that is, texts influenced by the Yogācāra. The other group is exactly the opposite, i.e. is free of such influence.

All translations and citations in the commentaries are grouped together in accord with their affinity with the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in the Table below:

Table 2

citation in commentaries	Statement M	Variant (b)	Variant (c)	Statement Y
Bodh		✓	✓	✓
Vaj		✓	✓	✓
Yi				✓
Gu	✓			
translations				
Ruci-a		✓	✓	✓
Pa				✓
Ku	✓			
Ruci-b	✓			
Xuan	✓			
Jing	非非法想			
Gup	∅			∅

Statement M: Madhyamaka-influenced version: "without the conception of non-*dharma*s" (*wu fei faxiang* 無非法相)
Statement Y: Yogācāra-influenced version: "not without the conception of *dharma*s" (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相)
✓   Presence of the variant
∅   Absence of the statement

Since Gup cites neither the passage with *dharmasaṃjñā* nor the one with *adharmasaṃjñā*, nothing can be said about this translation. Setting aside for the moment Pa and Yi, all other versions consistently show one of two patterns: 1. the Mādhyamika rendering of *adharmasaṃjñā,* without the variant readings of Passages (b) and (c); or 2. the Yogācāra rendering, coinciding with the variants.

The two exceptions to this pattern are Pa and Yi. In the case of Pa, we do find the rendering of *adharmasaṃjñā*; but we also find Passages (c) and (d), instead of the variants. This may be explained by the fact that Paramārtha, being a Yogācāra, shows a bias in rendering the term *adharma-*

saṃjñā, despite the fact that he had an original without the variants as the basis for his translation.

With regard to Yi, we find that Yijing in fact gave various translations, which are mutually inconsistent. In Jing (his translation of the *Vajracchedikā*), he renders the statement in question very differently from other translations: "not the conception of non-*dharma*s (*fei fei faxiang* 非非法想)". In Yi, however (Yijing's translation of Vasubandhu's commentary), he gives the Yogācāra rendering: "not without the conception of *dharma*s (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相)". He further interprets this reading as follows:

> Yi: This means that because no *dharma*s, either those that grasp or those that are grasped [i.e. subject or object], exist, the conception of *dharma*s does not arise; this is [called] "no conception of *dharma*s" (*wu faxiang* 無法相). The non-existence of these [*dharma*s is due to the fact that] *dharma*s have no intrinsic nature, [but] since emptiness exists, [thus the text says] "not without the conception of *dharma*s" (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相).[51]

Yi thus expounds the phrase "not without the conception of *dharma*s" (*fei wu faxiang* 非無法相) as referring to the existence of emptiness, that is, from a Yogācāra perspective similar to that of Bodh, which has been discussed above.

Similarly, Vaj clearly interprets from the Yogācāra perspective. One passage of Vaj reads:

> Vaj: The statement "no conception of *dharma*s" explains that the twelve bases (*āyatana*s), that is, the six consciousnesses that grasp, and the six objects that are grasped, are all empty and tranquil, and have not arisen…Furthermore, the statement "not without the conception of *dharma*s" acts as an antidote against "the conception of non-*dharma*s". Having heard that the twelve bases are empty, doubt-

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[51] T25:1513.876b6-8: 此謂能取所取諸法皆無故，法想不生，即「無法想」。彼之非有，法無自性。空性有故，非無法想.

ers claim that Suchness, the Buddha nature, and unconditioned *dharmas* are all intrinsically empty.[52]

It is clear that Vaj here interprets "not without the conception of *dharmas*" (非無法相) as meaning that it is not true that there are absolutely no *dharmas*.

In sum, the above discussion shows clearly that all those who follow the rendering we have called "Statement Y" also propound Yogācāra interpretations of the text. On the other hand, texts that adopt "Statement M", viz., the rendering "without the imagination of non-*dharmas*" (無非法相), do not have such a clear Yogācāra inclination. For instance, Gu explains Passage (a) as follows:

> Gu: In the ultimate sense, *dharmas* have not arisen, [and thus the text states] "no conception of *dharmas*". Since they have not arisen, they have not ceased either. Therefore [the text states] "without the conception of non-*dharmas*".[53]

If "without the conception of non-*dharmas*" is interpreted as referring to the knowledge that there is no cessation of *dharmas*, then "non-*dharmas*" here denotes passing from existence to non-existence, which constitutes an opposite number to the notion of coming into existence. This interpretation shows no influence from the Yogācāra, but instead, is compatible with the Madhyamaka.

The discussion above shows that the Chinese translators rendered "not" (*fei* 非) and "no/without" (*wu* 無) with a keen awareness of the difference between them. In these choices of translation, the school to which the translator was affiliated played a decisive role.

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[52] T25:1512.813c22-27: 言「無法相」，明十二入能取六識可取六塵悉皆空寂本來不生故...亦「非無法相」者，對治「非法相」。疑者聞十二入一切法空，便謂真如佛性無為之法亦皆性空故.

[53] T25:1515.888c17-19: 第一義法本不生故，「無法想」。以不生故，亦無有滅故，「無非法想」.

7   Indian interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma*

In contrast with the Chinese commentators, the Indian commentaries sometimes treat *adharma* as referring to the ultimate nature of phenomena. As we shall see below, although this interpretation is unknown in China, it is true to the original sense of the term *adharma* as it was used in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, of which the *Vajracchedikā* itself forms such an important part.

For instance, Asaṅga occasionally[54] interprets *adharma* as referring to the true nature of phenomena or the ultimate nature, that is, No-self. This can be seen from the following passages in which Asaṅga discusses the four root passages mentioning *adharma*:

> Asg-a on Passage (b): "One should grasp at neither *dharma* nor *adharma*," because one does not discriminate between the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena.[55]

It is clear that Asaṅga here interprets *adharma* as referring to the nature of No-self in phenomena.

> Asg-b on Passage (a): This statement [means that whenever] there is inverted grasping, conception of *dharma* and *adharma* arises; [there is] conception of No-self, etc.,[56] because the conception of the self and the body does not arise.[57] But since the propensity to imagine a self has not yet been given up, there is still grasping at the self.[58]

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[54]   As shown in Table 3 in Section 8, Asg also sometimes renders *adharma* as non-existence.

[55]   T25:1510a.761a8-9: 不應取法、非法者，於法體及法無我並不分別故. Given that there is no occurrence of *adharma* in Variants b and c in Asg-b, those passages cannot be used to ascertain what *adharma* means in the text. Only Asg-a discusses *adharma* in Passage (b).

[56]   Here in Asg-b "Non-self (非我)" occurs instead of "No-self (無我)" in all the editions of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, see *Zhonghua dazangjing* (中華大藏經) 27:90b17-19. But considering the fact that Non-self never occurs in all the other root passages other than Passage (a) and similarly "No-self (*bdag med pa*)" instead of "Non-self" occurs in Tib. (see n. 60), "Non-self" in Asg-b could have occured by error as early as the translation.

[57]   I translate "body" here for *yizhi* (依止). In Tib. there is no equivalent for *yizhi*; see n. 58. My translation here has taken a previous occurrence of the same word into considera-

The statement, "There is conception of No-self, etc., because the conception of the self and the body does not arise" reads differently in the Tibetan translation: "Even though one does not (*sic!*) enter into conceptions of No-self etc., he still has the conception of the self..." Nevertheless, both translations explain "the conception of No-self" after having mentioned the conception of *dharma* and *adharma*. They could well be explaining how inverted grasping gives rise to the conception of *adharma*, that is, of No-self. In other words, Asaṅga uses *adharma* to denote No-self.

As shown above (see n. 44), when Asg comments on Passage (c), *dharma* and *adharma* are used differently from the way they are explained in Passages (a) and (d). There, *dharma* refers to the correct way of seeking the Dharma-body. As for *adharma* in Passage (c), Asg does not explain what is meant by the *adharma* which it is unreasonable not to abandon. So nothing could be said about *adharma* in Passage (c) in Asg. Nevertheless, *adharma* is used again in Asg to denote No-self in a passage immediately after the passages under discussion:

> Asg-b on a passage immediately after the root passages: The statement "not abiding in *adharma*" has the following meaning: *Adharma* denotes No-self. In order to accomplish non-abiding, one should abide in neither *adharma* nor the nature of No-self in phenomena.[59]

Here too, Asaṅga states clearly that *adharma* denotes No-self.

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tion, see T25:1510b.770a27-28: 知者知名身，見者見色身。謂一切行住所作中知其心，見其依止故 ("The one who knows, knows the aggregate of thoughts; the one who sees, sees the physical aggregate. That is because he knows his mind and sees his body in all activities"). Here *yizhi* (依止) corresponds obviously to Sanskrit *ātmabhāva*.

[58] T25:1510b.770b11-13: 此言是中邪取，但法及非法想轉。非我等想，以我想及依止不轉故。然於我想中隨眠不斷故。則為有我取. For the Tibetan translation, see *Zhonghua dazangjing* (中華大藏經) 56:1282.23-1283.4: *de ci'i phyir zhe na zhes gsungs pa'i phyir gang dang gang log par 'dzin pa ni chos dang chos med pa'i 'du shes 'jug par 'gyur ba yin no | bdag med pa la sogs pa'i 'du shes nyid mi 'jug pa gang yin pa de yang bdag la sogs pa'i 'du shes te | de dag gis bag la nyal ma spangs pa'i phyir 'di nyid bdag tu 'dzin pa yin te.*

[59] T25:1510b.774b14-15: 不住非法者，謂非法無我也。於非法及法無我中皆不住故，為成就彼諸不住故.

However, this apparently clear picture is complicated by the fact that when he comments on Passage (d), Asaṅga seems to use *adharma* to denote the negation of *dharma,* or non-existence:

> Asg-b on Passage (d): It is "not *dharma*", [because *dharma*] has the nature of discrimination; it is "not *adharma*", because the phenomena have no Self [as their nature].[60]

Here, *adharma* is denied. It therefore does not stand for No-self, but rather, for non-*dharma* or no-*dharma,* meaning probably "non-existence". This means that Asaṅga is not univocal in his interpretation of *adharma,* even though his dominant tendency is to read it as referring to the nature of No-self in phenomena.

In sum, in Passages (a) and (b) (the latter in Asg-a only), Asaṅga interprets *adharma* as referring to the nature of No-self in phenomena; in Passage (d), he interprets *adharma* as referring to non-existence. However, Asaṅga does not make himself clear about *adharma* in Passage (c).

This interpretation of *adharma* on Asaṅga's part seems consistent with the most likely meaning of the term in the text under comment, that is, in the *Vajracchedikā* itself. The most widespread usage of the term *dharma* in early Buddhism is to denote simple mental and physical states.[61] This usage continues into the early *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, where "*dharma*s" stands for the five aggregates,[62] that is, corporeality (*rūpa*), sensations (*vedanā*), conceptions (*saṃjñā*), volitions (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*). In the *Prajñāpāramitā,* the negation of these five aggregates is used to stand for the true nature of each; for example, for corporeality (*rūpa*), the formula takes the form of either *na rūpa* or *arūpa,* "not corpo-

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[60] T25:1510b.770c24-25: 非法者分別性。非非法者法無我故.

[61] The meanings of the term *dharma* have been widely discussed. See e.g. Gethin, 2004: 514.

[62] In the early versions of the *Prajñāpāramitā in 8,000 Lines* the terms *dharma* and *skandha* (*yin* 陰 or *yun* 蘊, that is, the five aggregates) are used interchangeably; see Choong, 2006: 34, n. 1.

reality" or "no corporeality", and is used to stand for the true nature of *rūpa*.[63]

This being so, Asaṅga derives his interpretation of *adharma* as the true nature of phenomena in the *Vajracchedikā* (except in Passage d) from the early Mahāyāna; and this true nature of phenomena, which is called No-self by the Yogācāra commentators, is something that is not/no phenomena, in the sense that No-self is not identical with phenomena produced by concepts, or it is without such phenomena.

Where this "*Prajñāpāramitā*-style" interpretation sees *adharma* as referring to a *correct* understanding of the true nature of phenomena, however, as shown above, Bodh/Yi uses *adharma* in Passages (a) and (d) to mean non-existence, which is understood to be a *false* conception.[64] Such a usage of *adharma* does not accord with the original meaning of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) in the *Prajñāpāramitā*.[65]

When it is opposed to *adharma*, *dharma* is used consistently by Asg and Bodh/Yi to denote phenomena or existence. In Variants (b) and (c), however, in which *adharma* does not occur, *dharma* is interpreted by Bodh/Yi as "the teachings of the *sūtras*". Against the background of the meaning given to its opposite number, *adharma* – that is, as meaning "not/no

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[63] For example, in the *Prajñāpāramitā in 8,000 Lines* (Vaidya, 1960: 170.21-23) there is a statement: "When there is no corporeality, this is the profundity of corporeality;" *yatra...na rūpam, iyaṃ rūpasya gambhīratā;* where *gambhīratā* (profundity) aims at the inexpressible nature of all phenomena. At the corresponding locus, T226 reads: 有甚深者，非色之甚深，是為色之甚深 (T8:226.528c28-29), which corresponds to something like: **yā gambhīratā, [sā] arūpasya gambhīratā, iyaṃ rūpasya gambhīratā.* This expression, in which *gambhīratā* stands alone (in *yā gambhīratā*), i.e. neither in a compound, nor in connection with *rūpa* as a genitive attribute as in the "profundity of corporeality" (*rūpasya gambhīratā*), is exactly like the way *tathatā* is discussed in the *Prajñāpāramitā in 25,000 lines* (T8:221.89c23; T8:223.344a15; T7:220(3).635b20; T7:220(2).269b15; Kimura, 1990: 165.16): *yatra...tathatāyāṃ na rūpam, nānyatra rūpād tathatā.* This confirms that *gambhīratā,* standing alone exactly like *tathatā,* takes the place of the inexpressible nature of all phenomena. See also Choong, 2006: 44-45. Thus, the statement above identifies the non-existence of corporeality with the true nature of corporeality.

[64] Given that there is no occurrence of *adharma* in Variants b and c in Bodh/Yi, those passages cannot be used to ascertain what *adharma* means in the text.

[65] The five aggregates occur very frequently with the prefix *a/an* in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature; see Choong, 2006: 51.

phenomena" – this interpretation certainly looks odd. Nonetheless, the apparent incongruity can easily be resolved by taking *dharma*s (*xiuduoluo deng fa* 修多羅等法, *jing deng fa* 經等法) to mean "objects like the aggregates, sense faculties, elements, concentrations, insights, paths and fruits that are *taught in* the *sūtras*".

Asg and Bodh/Yi tend to interpret *adharma* as meaning "non-existence", in the sense of either (i) "the true nature of phenomena" (upon which only conceptions of phenomena are denied) or (ii) "extreme negation" (in virtue of which they do not in fact exist). According to Asg and Bodh/Yi, *dharma* in the *Vajracchedikā* bears the meaning of "all phenomena" or "all phenomenal and spiritual objects/items taught in the *sūtras*". In the case of *adharma,* Asaṅga, though he does not make it clear in Passage (c), explains it in Passages (a) and (b) as "the nature of No-self", and in Passage (d) as a misconception of "non-existence". The reason lies in the different sentence structure of Passage (d), which denies both *dharma* and *adharma.* Bodh/Yi, however, comments on *adharma* in only Passages (a) and (d), and assigns it the meaning of "non-existence", which is wrongly attributed to the nature of No-self.

8   *Dharma* and *adharma* in the *Vajracchedikā*

The discussion of the various commentaries above throws light on the interpretation of the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā.* In order to find out which is the most plausible interpretation of the parable of the raft, it is necessary first to sort out the complicated meanings of *dharma* and *adharma* in each of the commentaries discussed above.

The denotations of *dharma* and *adharma* in the four passages discussed above can be summarized as in the Table below. For ease of comparison, I have tried to put similar meanings of *dharma* together; I have also ordered the Table to progress from Indian to Chinese commentaries:

Table 3: Indian and Chinese interpretations of *dharma* and *adharma* in Passages (a), (b), (c) and (d)

Version	Passage	*dharma*	*adharma*	implications
Asg-a	a, b	phenomena	nature of No-self	existence is misconception
Asg-a	d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions
Asg-b	d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions
Yi	b	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions
Zhi	a, b, c	medicine	sickness	neither has reality
Ji	a	grasping	antidotes	neither has reality
Zhi	d	existence	no-existence	neither has reality
Ji	d	existence	no-existence	neither has reality
Ji	c	existence	no-existence	neither has reality
Bodh	a, d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions, denial of *adharma* with assertion of the existence of the true nature
Kui	a, d	existence	non-existence	both are misconceptions, denial of *adharma* with assertion of the existence of the true nature
Asg-b	Var (b)	phenomena and nature of No-self are nondual	∅	
Asg-a, Asg-b	(c)	teachings	meaning unclear	
Bodh	Var (b)	teachings	∅	
Bodh,	Var (c)	teachings	∅	

Yi				
Ji	Var (b)	teachings	∅	
Kui	b, c	teachings	∅	

∅   absent from the passage concerned

The above Table shows clearly that Kui comments on Variant (b) and Variant (c), although Passages (b) and (c) appear in his commentary. It is noteworthy that Ji comments on Variant (b), but features Passage (c), exactly like Asg-b. As shown in Section (4), the explanation Ji gives for Variant (b) follows that of Bodh, and not Asg-b. The above Table shows clearly that the commentators who explain *adharma* on the basis of Passage (b) are Asg-a, Yi and Zhi, while those who comment on *adharma* on the basis of Passage (c) are Zhi and Ji. Though Asg mentions *adharma* in discussing Passage (c), it does not explicate it. There is consistently no comment on *adharma* for Variant (b) and (c), because the Variants do not have them. Only in the Indian commentary Asg-a does *adharma* denote the true nature. Asg-b mentions the nature of No-self just as Asg-a, though Asg-a comments on Passage (b) and Asg-b on Variant (b). But Asg-b does not identify *adharma* with No-self:

> Asg-a: The statement "Subhūti, one should grasp at neither *dharma* nor *adharma*" is clear; it refers to the time when one is absorbed in concentration and when one's mind is distracted [respectively]. "One should grasp at neither *dharma* nor *adharma*," because one does not discriminate between the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena.

> Asg-b: The statement "Subhūti, one should neither grasp at *dharma* nor not grasp at *dharma*" is clear; it refers to the time when one is absorbed in concentration and when one's mind is distracted [respectively]. "One should neither grasp at *dharma*..." because one does not discriminate between the entity (*ti* 體) of the phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena.[66]

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[66] T25:1510a.761a6-9: 「須菩提，不應取法、非法」者是顯了，謂相應三摩鉢帝及攝散心時，「不應取法、非法」者，於法體及法無我並不分別故; T25:1510b.770b24-27:

According to Asg-a, Passage (b) means that one should grasp neither at *dharma*, that is, the phenomena, nor at *adharma*, that is, the nature of No-self in the phenomena, both at the time when one is absorbed in concentration as well as when one is not in concentration. But Variant (b), according to Asg-b, means that one should not discriminate between phenomena and the nature of No-self in the phenomena when one is absorbed in concentration only; instead, one should follow the *dharma* when one is not absorbed in concentration. As shown in Section (2), Variant (b) in Asg is original, so the text in Asg-a must have undergone modification to fit it to Passage (b).

With the above Table in mind, we turn first to the interpretation of the Variants, because they are more straightforward. Variants (b) and (c) in the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā* should read as follows:

> Why is it so? If these persons have a conception of *dharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons have imaginings of *adharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. (Variant b:) Therefore one should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor not accept *dharma* (不應取法，非不取法). (Variant c:) Referring to this, the Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, because these *dharma*s should be abandoned, [but] not rejected [altogether] (是法應捨，非捨法故).[67]

This could be interpreted as follows:

> On the one hand, if these persons falsely imagine that the items taught in the *sūtra*s exist, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. On the other hand, if these persons wrongly imagine that these items do not exist, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. (Variant b:) Therefore one should neither imagine that these items taught by the Buddha exist, nor not accept these i-

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「須菩提，不應取法，非不取法」者是顯了，謂相應三摩鉢帝及散心時。「不應取法」者，於法體及法無我竝不分別.

[67] See Ruci-a, T8:236a.735b11-16：何以故？須菩提！是諸菩薩，若取法相，則為著我、人、眾生、壽者。須菩提！若是菩薩有法相，即著我相、人相、眾生相、壽者相。何以故？須菩提！不應取法，非不取法。以是義故，如來常說栰喻法門，是法應捨，非捨法故.

tems by rejecting them as nothing. (Variant c:) Referring to this, the Tathāgata tells the parable of the raft, because these items taught by the Buddha should be abandoned at the ultimate stage, but not rejected at the stage of preparation.

On the other hand, Passage (b) and (c) in the *Vajracchedikā* read as follows:

> Why is it so? If these persons have a conception of *dharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. If these persons have imaginings of *adharma*, they will grasp at a self, a living being, a soul and a person. (Passage b:) Therefore the *bodhisattva* should neither grasp at *dharma*, nor grasp at *adharma* (不應取法，不應取非法). (Passage c:) Referring to this, the Tathāgata says: "If the meditator understands the parable of the raft, he should abandon even *dharma*, not to mention *adharma* (法尚應捨，何況非法).[68]

As for Passage (b) and (c) in the *Vajracchedikā*, there is no unanimity of interpretation. The interpretation depends on the actual meaning of *adharma* in Passage (c). If *dharma* in Passage (c) bears the same meaning as it does in Variant (c), that is, "objects like the aggregates, sense faculties, elements, concentrations, insights, paths and fruits that are taught in the *sūtras*", then *adharma* should be the opposite of *dharma,* and, according to all the commentaries discussed above, could therefore mean either a) "items not taught by the Buddha", that is, *adharma* taken as a *tatpuruṣa*; or b) the "non-existence of these items", when *adharma* is taken as a *bahuvrīhi*. Furthermore, "non-existence" could stand either for (i) the non-existence of conceptual imaginations, that is, the term could still allow for the existence of the true nature of phenomena; or for (ii) extreme negation, that is, a position upon which all phenomena do not in fact exist. This being so, out of the three possible meanings, we have seen that Kui adopted the first meaning (a); Asg suggests (b i), the true nature of *dharma;* and Zhi and Ji, by contrast, are close to (b ii).

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68 See Ruci-b, T8:236b.758a1-5：何以故？須菩提！是諸菩薩若有法想，即是我執，及眾生、壽者、受者執。須菩提！是故菩薩不應取法，不應取非法。為如是義故如來說：『若觀行人解筏喻經，法尚應捨，何況非法。』

Against this, some might think that the term *adharma* could hardly mean the true nature of phenomena, because it is given in the plural in Passage (c).[69] There are two possible responses to this objection: First, *adharma* in the plural could mean the negation of each and every item taught in the *sūtra*s; second, *adharma* in the plural could mean the nature of No-self in each and every item taught in the *sūtra*s.

The implications of Passage (b) and (c) differ significantly, depending upon the meaning of *adharma.* As for *dharma*s, from all Buddhist perspectives, there can be no question that they in fact have no reality, since phenomena do not exist as they appear. However, as we have seen repeatedly, the denial of *adharma* is not so straightforward, because *adharma*, as summarized above, can mean either 1. items not taught by the Buddha; 2. the true nature of things whereby they are devoid of the conception of *dharma;* or 3. the misconception that something does not exist. In the first case, the denial of *adharma* is a claim that teachings outside Buddhism are not conducive to the realization of the truth; in the second case, even if *adharma* is comprehended correctly as the true nature of a *dharma*, no grasping of it is possible; in the third case, the denial of *adharma* is a refutation of the extreme negation that the *dharma* does not exist at all. Many scholars adopted the first meaning. The *Prajñāpāramitā* in general advocates the second one, which could mean the letting go of all concepts, including the concept of the truth. The third meaning, however, is close to the interpretation of Variants (b) and (c), where *dharma* should not be rejected altogether as non-existence. It is also similar to the interpretation of Passages (a) and (d) by Bodh/Yi and Kui.

Against this background, the differences between the various commentators emerge in their true light. Vasubandhu (Bodh/Yi) and Kui employ the second strategy, in which *adharma* denotes the misconception that the true nature does not exist. Among the three interpretations, the third obtains a slight twist in the Chinese Mādhyamikas, Zhi and Ji. According to them, *adharma* acts only as a provisional antidote against

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[69] It is noteworthy that the terms *dharma* and *adharma* are in the singular in Passages (b) and (d), while they are plural in Passage (c), just as in MN I 135 25-26. In Passage (a), the syntactical number of the word *dharma* is not explicit, because it occurs there as the first element of a compound.

grasping, and as such, remains a concept, which should itself ultimately be denied. This interpretation of *adharma* as an antidote, however, does not occur in the Indian commentaries under discussion.[70] This allows us to see that Zhi and Ji deviated from the (Yogācāra) Indian commentaries known to the Chinese tradition, proffering instead unique interpretations more in line with their own (Madhyamaka) doctrinal affiliations.

9   Conclusion

Close examination of the commentaries preserved in the Chinese Tripiṭaka shows that those affiliated to the Yogācāra tradition favor the Variants over the ordinary Passages (b) and (c). These Variants in the parable of the raft can be traced back to the Indian Yogācāra commentaries, which could have in turn initiated the change in the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā.*

However, the change could not have been initiated by the actual meaning of the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā*, because we arrived at an interpretation that is compatible with both the traditional parable of the raft and its variant in the *Vajracchedikā.* According to the interpretation of the Variants by the Yogācāra, the purpose of the parable of the raft in the *Vajracchedikā* is to admonish against falling into the two extremes of grasping at the items of the Buddha's teachings, and of annulling the items of the teaching altogether, with the consequence of not following the teachings. That is to say, not rejecting *dharma,* in Variants (b) and (c), means that the items taught by the Buddha should not be rejected altogether as nothing.

Along similar lines, the Yogācāra could have commented on Passages (b) and (c), if they had used *adharma* in these passages to denote non-existence the same way as Asg-b on Passage (d), and Bodh/Yi and Kui on Passages (a) and (d). If *adharma* was taken to denote non-existence, the

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[70] The only case in the Indian commentaries where the nature of No-self is also said not to be grasped is the interpretation of Passage (b) in Asg-a, but here, there is no mention of *adharma* as an antidote. *Adharma* is not denied; rather, the text just warns that it should not be grasped conceptually. See the discussion above (n. 66 and the translations in the main text).

denial of *adharma* in Passages (b) and (c) would be a refutation of the extreme negation that holds that the *dharma* does not exist at all, and would thus be in line with the interpretation of the Variants. Thus, the traditional parable of the raft and its variant can be interpreted in just the way the Yogācāra wish to interpret it. This being so, the change of Passages (b) and (c) to their Variants could not have been initiated by the content of the parable itself, but rather, must have been initiated by the interpretation of the parable in some other schools like the Madhyamaka.

The reason for the change reveals itself clearly through observation of the usage of *adharma* in the Indian and Chinese commentaries: First of all, the commentaries interpreted "not *adharma*" in Passages (a) and (d) as the negation of non-existence, but with different implications. Bodh/Yi tries to explain non-existence as the wrong grasping of non-existence in regard to the doctrine of No-self; Asg uses *adharma* to denote the non-separation of the true nature of phenomena, that is, No-self. It is clear that Asg and Bodh/Yi assume the existence of No-self. Ji, however, also uses *adharma* to denote non-existence. But this non-existence, according to Ji, is not the same as the misconception to which *adharma* refers for Asg and Bodh/Yi; rather, it is emptiness, an antidote against the misconception of existence, and it itself also does not exist ultimately. As shown above, Ji's interpretation is close to the Mādhyamika's position. It is exactly this interpretation of emptiness as an antidote that the Yogācāra commentaries try to avoid, because emptiness in the Mahāyāna is usually identified with the true nature of phenomena, which for the Yogācāra truly exists.

Second, the interpretation of *adharma* as the true nature of phenomena begins already in the *Prajñāpāramitā*. This usage of *adharma* to denote the true nature of phenomena continues into the later Mahāyāna. Asg-a, for example, used *adharma* in Passage (b) to denote the nature of No-self. This shows that the *adharma* of the parable of the raft could also easily be interpreted by the Madhyamaka in line with the *Prajñāpāramitā*. According to the Yogācāra, the true nature of phenomena, that is, emptiness or No-self, exists, whereas Passages (b) and (c) advocate the abandonment of *adharma*, which could mean the abandonment of emptiness. This is an-

other reason why the Yogācāra could have changed Passage (b) and (c) to the Variants.

As to the relation between those versions that contain the Variants: Verse-Bodh and Verse-Yi and their commentary Bodh/Yi are earlier versions, which contain Variants (b) and (c). On the other hand, Asg, as evinced by the favor it found among the Chinese Mādhyamikas, evinces weaker Yogācāra influence, and could have incorporated Variant (b) not from Bodh/Yi, since Asg shows no knowledge of Bodh/Yi, but most probably, from a lineage of the *Vajracchedikā* which has not been transmitted to us. Variant (b) in the orginal Asg (i.e. Asg-b) was then changed back to Passage (b), probably out of familiarity with the traditional parable of the raft, to give Asg-a. Last but not least, the Variants (b) and (c) in Ruci-a hint at the possibility of a lineage of the *Vajracchedikā* which contains the Variants instead of Passages (b) and (c).

Thus, it has been shown that the selective attitude in the Chinese translations of the *Vajracchedikā* and its Chinese commentaries has its precursor in the Indian transmission of the *Vajracchedikā* and the Indian commentaries.

Abbreviations

Asg   Dharmagupta's translation of Asaṅga's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, T1510
Asg-a   first version of Asg, T1510a
Asg-b   second version of Asg, T1510b
Bodh   Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā,* trans. Bodhiruci, T1511
Bodh/Yi   Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*
Gu   Guṇadāna's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, trans. Divākara, T1515
Gup   Gupta's translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, T238
GM   Gómez and Silk, 1989
HW   Harrison and Watanabe, 2006
Ji   Jizang's (吉藏) commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, T1699
Jing   Yijing's (義淨) translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, T239
Ku   Kumārajīva's translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, T235

Kui	Kuiji's (窺基) commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, T1700
MA	*Madhyama-āgama* (中阿含經), T26
MMK	*Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*
MN	*Majjhima-nikāya*
Pa	Paramārtha's translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, T237
Ps	*Papañcasūdanī* (*Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā*)
Ruci	Bodhiruci's translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, T236
Ruci-a	first version of Ruci, T236a
Ruci-b	second version of Ruci, T236b
Skt	Sanskrit
T	The Taishō Edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka.
Tucci	Sanskrit edition of Asaṅga's summary verses on the *Vajracchedikā*; Tucci, 1956
Vaj	the so-called commentary of *Vajrarṣi (Jin'gangxian 金剛仙), a "lecture text" composed in China, T1512
Verse-Bodh	Bodhiruci's translation of Asaṅga's summary verses on the *Vajracchedikā*, the verse portion in Bodh
Verse-Yi	Yijing's (義淨) translation of Asaṅga's summary verses on the *Vajracchedikā*, T1514 and the verse portion in T1513
Xuan	Xuanzang's (玄奘) translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, T220(9)
Yan	Zhiyan's (智嚴) commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, T1704
Yi	Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Vajracchedikā,* trans. Yijing, T1513
Zhi	Zhiyi's (智顗) commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, T1698

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Ideas about "Consciousness" in Fifth and Sixth Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on the Survival of Death by the Spirit, and the Chinese Background to *Amalavijñāna*

Michael Radich

Introduction

As is well known, the Chinese Buddhist world in the fifth through early sixth centuries was the scene of debates about whether or not some part of the sentient being does or does not survive death, to transmigrate and reap *karmic* rewards. Buddhist thinkers were concerned to argue, against what seems to have been the default position of their opponents, that something does survive death. This should not surprise us, since it was understood that otherwise the doctrine of *karma* was incoherent.[1]

A significant thread running through Buddhist contributions to these debates is the use of terms meaning "consciousness" for the transmigrating entity. In the present paper, I will explore this aspect of the debates. This study is part of a larger project in which I am examining possible antecedents to the *amalavijñāna* (*amoluoshi* 阿摩羅識, "taintless consciousness") doctrine of Paramārtha (Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) in both In-

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[1] On these debates or parts thereof, see Balazs, 1932; Liebenthal, 1952 (it must be noted that Liebenthal's translations are often misleading; I nonetheless give references to them where relevant below, because they are often still the only English translations in existence); Hurvitz, 1957: 106-112; Balázs, 1964: 266-276; Forke, 1964: 266-274; Robinson, 1978: 196-199; Wagner, 1969: 198-207; Chang, 1973; Hachiya, 1973; Schmidt-Glintzer, 1976; Pachow, 1978; Vande Walle, 1979; Lai, 1981a, 1981b; Nakanishi, 1983; Frisch, 1985: 106-117; Itō, 1986; Liu, 1987; Lo, 1991; Jansen, 2000: 216-217, 235-246; de Rauw, 2008: 97-123. Further sources cited in Wagner 198 n. 1; de Rauw 98 n. 265.

dia and China.[2] Through this research, I hope to address possible rela-
tions between *amalavijñāna* and the so-called "sinification" of Buddhist
concepts. Through this case study, in turn, I hope to address larger me-
thodological problems in the study of so-called "sinification" itself. Con-
sequently, I will make a few preliminary remarks in the present paper
about the significance of my findings as part of the background to *ama-
lavijñāna.*

In the main, however, the present paper will focus on tracing the
place of concepts of consciousness in the debates in question, from the
early fifth through to the early sixth centuries; and, particularly, on
presenting a new interpretation of Liang Wudi's (梁武帝, r. 502-549)
Shenming cheng fo yi (神明成佛義, "On the Attainment of Buddhahood by
the *Shenming*") and its relation to its scriptural sources and intellectual-
historical context. The debates on the survival of death, themselves,
have also sometimes been taken as part of the process of the so-called
"sinification" of Buddhism. On the basis of my examination of the role of
the concept of consciousness in those debates, I will also suggest that
this way of reading the debates is probably misleading.

As the story is usually told, the debates in question can be traced back
as far as the generation of Xi Chao (郗超, 336-377) and Dai Kui (戴逵, ca.
335-396),[3] through the writings of Lushan Huiyuan (廬山慧遠, 334-416)
and a piece by the shadowy Zheng Daozi (鄭道子, d.u.); and then through
Zong Bing (宗炳, 375-443); He Chengtian (何承天, 370-447); a debunking
Confucian riposte from Fan Zhen (范縝, ca. 450-515); and reactions a-
gainst the latter, lasting through to the early Liang, including contribu-
tions by Xiao Chen (蕭琛, 478–529), Cao Siwen (曹思文, d.u.), Fayun (法
雲, 467-529), Lu Chui (陸倕, d. 517), Liang Wudi, Shen Ji (沈績, d.u.) and
Shen Yue (沈約, 441-513).

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[2] The first part of this study has already appeared as Radich, 2008. I presented earlier ver-
sions of other parts of the study as Radich, unpublished, at both the 2010 meeting of the
present project, and the June-July 2011 meeting of the International Association of Bud-
dhist Studies; and as a draft paper at the June 2011 meeting of the present project. I am
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Hamburg University Press for suggesting several
improvements.

[3] See also Itō, 1986: 221-222 for a very interesting early passage, around the time of this
same generation, from Yuan Hong's (袁宏, 326-379) *Hou Han ji* (後漢紀).

Before beginning our discussion, I would like first to set aside as misleading the most common label in English-language scholarship for the issue at stake in these debates: "the *immortality* of the *soul*". The most common phrase used in Chinese is *shen bu mie* (神不滅) (and variants thereon). It is true that this wording implies a limited kind of "immortality", in that it refers to something that "does not perish/is not extinguished" at the moment of a given death, in a chain of multiple lifetimes. However, in English, "immortality" typically has the additional connotation of surviving death *and then "living" for ever more*, and I do not believe that this connotation is necessarily entailed by the Chinese Buddhist claims under discussion. In addition, to translate "soul" for *shen* is perhaps understandable, but I believe that the Chinese has stronger connotations of the mental component in the human being (as in the opposition between *shen* [神] and *xing* [形], roughly "mind" and "body") than "soul" has, at least to the ears of modern English speakers. In an attempt (doubtless fated to be less than perfectly successful) to avoid some of these connotations, I will speak instead of the "survival of death" by the "spirit".[4]

The debates on the survival of death can be regarded as part of the background to *amalavijñāna in two respects: in terms of the general outline of the Chinese Buddhist views at play; and more specifically, in terms of certain key terminology that appears in places in the relevant texts.

In more general terms, I believe that we must be careful not to exaggerate the similarities between the general contours of the ideas at stake in this debate, and of *amalavijñāna doctrine. In particular, we must avoid a simplistic interpretation of the "immortality of the soul" debates (the popularity of this term to label the debates is itself indicative of the problem I have in mind) that sees in them a Chinese failure to understand basic Buddhism, and a lapse into heterodox "*ātmavāda*". For a start,

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[4] The phrase "survive death" might sound oxymoronic. Throughout this paper, however, following the usage in my primary materials, I use the phrase "survive death" to indicate that the pertinent part of the sentient being is understood *not* to be destroyed by death. On one occasion, the Ch. *Dhammapada* even states that "spirit does not die" (*shen bu wang* 神不亡, T4:210.574b4). Typically, in these contexts, texts understand "death" to be primarily a corporeal matter, i.e. something that happens to the body.

as we will see in part here, there was a sound basis in translated Buddhist scriptures (or texts that appeared as such to Chinese readers) for the notion that some constituent of the person does transmigrate (this constituent was often called "consciousness"). More broadly, as I hope to show elsewhere – and indeed as should be well known – it is not apostasy for Buddhists to admit *some* kind of notional hook on which to hang the idea of such continuity across multiple incarnations (e.g. *saṃtāna, saṃtati, karma* – and, of course, concepts closer to the heart of the present study like *gandharva* and *vijñāna* itself). Second, the terms at issue (*shen* etc.) are not personal pronouns, nor words that were used in Chinese to denote the ego, identity or self-understanding of the person; other such terms, which did exist, were avoided (we will touch below on one such term, *shenwo* 神我). Rather, as I have already mentioned, *shen* has overtones of the mental constituent in the human constitution. Third, we must remember that all polemical utterance is "targeted", that is, it is molded to the contours of the position it aims to refute. In this case, the Buddhists' opponents propounded an absolute extinction of the person at death, and the concomitant discontinuity of moral responsibility beyond the frame of a single earthly lifetime. Against this, in order for basic Buddhist concepts to cohere and prevail, it was necessary to argue that there was indeed some thread of continuity between multiple rebirths, and this is what *shen* and related notions achieved (retooled for the purpose from the uses they served in the older Chinese background). Thus, Chinese assertions that a *shen* survived death had a stronger warrant in Indic Buddhist materials, and are less necessarily congruent with doctrines supposedly "heterodox" to Indian Buddhism, than prior scholars have often assumed.

With these caveats, we can still recognize that a few key features of the Chinese Buddhist views formed and displayed through these debates anticipate **amalavijñāna* doctrine. The putative transmigrating entity in question is said to be mental; it is a thread of continuity between successive incarnations; it becomes entangled with the phenomenal world through ignorance; and sometimes, it is depicted as a kind of "subject" of liberation. In all of these respects, the surviving component of the person, by whatever name, has structural similarities to *vijñāna* as it features in **amalavijñāna* doctrine and its contexts.

On occasion, however, a more specific set of terms was used that brings us closer to meaningful antecedents to *amalavijñāna* doctrine. In particular, we can trace a subset of contributors to the debate who use "consciousness" (*shi* 識) in a recognizably Buddhist sense, or *shishen* (識神, "consciousness-cum-spirit")/*shenshi* (神識, "spirit-cum-consciousness") to refer to the transmigrating entity in question.[5]

Lushan Huiyuan

We turn first to Huiyuan, who is often treated as the starting point of the debate (though, in fact, the issue is clearly older than his time; Nattier, 2008: 127 and n. 42; Zacchetti, 2010).[6] Oddly, perhaps, the most interesting thing about Huiyuan's writings, for us, is that terms for consciousness appear *not* to feature in his discussion of the problem of survival of death,[7] even though, by his time, texts existed in which the connection between that problem and consciousness was available for use. This perhaps indicates that even learned Chinese Buddhists embroiled in the

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[5] Many key figures in the broader debates, as usually treated in more general scholarship, do not mention "consciousness" in the sense that interests us here. We therefore set aside texts by such figures as Luo Han (羅含, d. after 373?); Huilin (慧琳, d.u.); He Chengtian; Fan Zhen; Xiao Chen; and Cao Siwen. Park (2012) includes the most extensive published research to date on the term *shenshi/shishen*; however, the book did not appear until after the present study was finalized. Cf. Radich (2013).

[6] I am currently preparing a companion to the present study examining some of this prehistory, in particular reference to terms for consciousness (Radich, in preparation).

[7] A cursory search through Huiyuan's writings seems to indicate, in fact, that Huiyuan only ever uses *shi* as an ordinary verb meaning "know" etc., or an ordinary noun meaning "knowledge, intelligence". In some instances, the term is difficult to understand (see e.g. HMJ T52:31c10, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:286, 290 n. 29; Kimura, 1960-1962: "Texts and Translations" 394-395 n. 29). The overall pattern of Huiyuan's use of the word, however, makes it implausible to me that in this instance only does he mean to refer to the *vijñānaskandha*. In one instance, Huiyuan does say that when the spirit takes up residence in the body, it "*jin chang ming shi*" (津暢明識) ("Letter to Huan Xuan", HMJ T52: 33b13, Makita 2:310, Liebenthal, 1952: 358). However, this phrase is difficult to interpret: Does it mean "permeates [the body] and illuminates it with consciousness"? – or "permeates [the body] and brings consciousness to awareness"? – or (with Makita), "the clear function of consciousness springs from [the body in which the spirit has lodged]"? – or (with Guo, 2007: 309) "provid[es] a smooth conduit for bright awareness"?

thick of the debates took some time to discover those resources and deploy them accordingly.

Zheng Daozi

At the next discernible stage, in Zheng Daozi, we find a curious situation: the term "consciousness" is only used by the opponent, and not by Zheng himself. From the outset of the essay, the opponent frames his questions in terms of consciousness (*shi* 識) (among other terms), referring to the concept three times.[8] It is difficult to know what to make of this fact, partly because of difficulties in dating the text; however, if it is as early as Liebenthal thinks,[9] it may represent the first mention of consciousness in these debates. Again, the fact that consciousness enters almost through the back door, so to speak – in the mouth of an opponent – may indicate that the Buddhists who spoke on behalf of Buddhism in the debates had not yet realized the potential use of the term in defending their claims.

Zong Bing

We finally see the connection between the transmigrating entity and consciousness clearly made in Zong Bing's *Ming fo lun* (明佛論). It is clear

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[8] "Most hold that the body and spirit perish together, and that illumination and consciousness are extinguished in tandem" (多以形神同滅、照識俱盡; HMJ T52:27c29, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:251, Liebenthal, 1952: 346-347); "Not only would there be nothing on the basis of which to establish speech, there would also be nothing on the basis of which to establish consciousness; and if consciousness is not established, upon what will spirit depend?" (非但無所立言、亦無所立其識矣。識不立則神將安寄; 28a25-26, Makita 2:253, Liebenthal 348); "...that grasses and trees have neither spirit nor consciousness" (草木之無神無識; 28b12-13, Makita 2:255, Liebenthal 349). The only instance of *shi* outside utterances of the opponent is in a simple verbal sense meaning "to know": "...does not know benevolence and righteousness" (*bu shi ren yi* 不識仁義; 29a14-15, Makita 2:260, Liebenthal 353).

[9] Forke proposes that "Zheng Daozi" may have been Zheng Daozhao (鄭道昭, d. 516) (Forke, 1964: 265-266). However, Liebenthal suggests the earlier Zheng Xianzhi (鄭鮮之, 364-427) (Liebenthal, 1952: 346-354).

that at least in places, Zong Bing uses *shi* (識) to mean *vijñāna* in a specifically Buddhist sense, as a member of the twelvefold *nidāna* chain and a key link in the process of reincarnation.[10] According to Zong Bing, reincarnation occurs because the continued functioning of mind keeps *vijñāna* active, so that successive *vijñāna*s follow one after another (presumably, through multiple lifetimes) (*Hong ming ji* [hereafter "HMJ"] T52:11 a16-17, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, Liebenthal, 1952: 392-393). "The structure [comprising] *saṃskāra* and *vijñāna* [ensures] the subtle continuity between new and old [lifetimes]" (情識之搆既新故妙續, HMJ T52:11a18-19, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, Liebenthal, 1952: 393; cf. Makita 2:317 n. 6). However, this *vijñāna,* described as "the *vijñāna* that thinks and constructs" (*siying zhi shi* 思營之識), is missing in the enlightened being, who possesses (or is) only *shen* (神); and liberation is described as a process whereby *saṃskāra* and *vijñāna* cease (upon the cessation of mental functioning), and the *shenming* (神明, "spirit-cum-awareness/illumination"; see below) is complete (HMJ T52:11a12-18, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, Liebenthal, 1952: 393).[11]

Zong Bing further explains the relation between *vijñāna* and the approach to awakening by the old analogy of a mirror obscured by dust, where *vijñāna* is the dust: just as a mirror can be obscured by a thin or a thick layer of dust, so spirit (*shen* 神) can be obscured by fine or coarse *vijñāna,* which "sticks" (*fu* 附) to spirit and obscures its original nature (like the "original brightness" [*benming* 本明] of the mirror). However, practicing (contemplation of) emptiness works to reduce the layer of obscuring *vijñāna,* and when it is eliminated entirely, "original spirit" (*benshen* 本神) is consummated (*qiong* 窮). The resulting state is *nirvāṇa* (HMJ T52:11b1-7, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:100, Liebenthal, 1952: 394).[12]

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[10] E.g. "Now, intention[?] and other *saṃskāra*s combine interdependently to constitute *vijñāna,* and *vijñāna* precipitates the formation of *nāmarūpa*" (夫億等之情，皆相緣成識，識感成形), describing the process of taking a new incarnation, where *qing* (情), *shi* (識) and *xing* (形) are *saṃskāra, vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* respectively (HMJ T52:11a9-10, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:97, Liebenthal, 1952: 392).

[11] See n. 61. This remarkable passage does much to anticipate Liang Wudi, and we will return to it below; see p. 499.

[12] Note the overtones here of the "return to the origin" motif.

In one or two places, further, Zong Bing also discusses consciousness, as the subject of transmigration, in a manner that seems to connect it to Buddha-nature, or, more broadly, to the possibility of attaining buddhahood – another respect in which he breaks new ground. (Recall that the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* [hereafter "MPNMS"], which more or less introduced "Buddha-nature" to a Chinese readership, had only been translated a decade or two before Zong Bing wrote.) For instance, Zong Bing says that it is in virtue of the fact that the unperishing spirit (*shen* 神), transmigrating through multiple lifetimes, contains awareness (*shi* 識, "consciousness", here conceivably simply "knowledge") of Yao['s virtue], that it is ultimately possible to become Buddha (今以不滅之神含知堯之識...由此觀之，人可作佛，其亦明矣; HMJ T52:10b25-c1, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:92; Liebenthal, 1952: 387-388). In the most striking passage in this respect, he says:

> If consciousness (*shi* 識) can make lucid (*cheng* 澄) the origin (*ben* 本) that does not become extinct (*bu mie* 不滅, [i.e. survives through various incarnations]), and accept the learning/practice that daily reduces, "reducing ever more day by day, until it necessarily arrives at non-action",[13] then it will no longer have any greedy passionate impulses (*yuyu qing* 欲欲情),[14] so that only the spirit (*shen* 神) shines, and there will then be no more rebirth. Where there is no rebirth, there is no body; and where there is no body but there is still spirit, we term it *dharmakāya* (識能澄不滅之本，稟日損之學，「損之又損，必至無為」，無欲欲情，唯神獨映，則無當於生矣，無生則無身。無身而有神，法身之謂也; HMJ T52:10c7-10, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:93-94; Liebenthal, 1952: 388).

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[13] *Laozi* 48: 損之又損、必至無為 (Chen, 1987: 250, Lau, 1963: 109). Zong Bing refers to this model again elsewhere (HMJ T52:14a23, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:126).

[14] Liebenthal notes that from Huiyuan onward, Chinese Buddhists of this era saw in *qing* (情) the motive power that drove reincarnation (he translates "will to live"), making it something like *saṃskāra* (Liebenthal, 1952: 388 n. 249). Cf. the passage cited above n. 10, where the equivalence to *saṃskāra* seems clear.

This passage is also notable because it features the motif of the return to the origin, and also (though in quite unusual terms) of the luminosity of liberated mind ("so that only the spirit *shines...*").

It is of interest to note that Zong Bing also emphasizes a kind of rough idealism, i.e. the doctrine that all *dharma*s are created by mind, citing the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* and a *Dhammapada* verse already connected with the *Yin chi ru jing* (HMJ T52:11a3-6, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:95-96, Liebenthal, 1952: 391-392);[15] and, in the same passage, emphasizes "purification of mind" (*qing xin* 清心) (though here as a means to rebirth in a "wondrous, glorious realm", not to final liberation) (HMJ T52:11a6).

In sum, Zong Bing represents an important watershed in the developments we are tracing. He specifically makes *vijñāna* the thread of continuity in transmigration; he discusses it, implicitly, in terms of the removal of defilements, through the analogy of the mind as a mirror; he may include inklings of a connection to Buddha-nature, or the potential of attaining buddhahood; and he links his ideas to the claim that all that exists is mind only.

An anonymous Liu Song text

A next important step is found in a brief, anonymous Liu Song text (perhaps by Huiguan 惠觀, d. 443-447?) (X77:1523.354a8-b7).[16] This essay

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[15] Citing *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* verbatim from Zhi Qian's translation (T14:474.523a25), Skt. *sarvadharmāś cittaparikalpenôtpadyante* (Study Group, 2006: 30; cf. Makita 2:97 n. 29); and *Dharmapada* (心為法本, T4:210.562a13, a15, T4:211.583a7, a9, T4:212.760a11, a21, b9, b11, *Dhammapada* 1.1, 1.2, *Udānavarga* 31.23, 24, Pāli *manopubbaṅgamā dhammā*, Skt. *manaḥpūrvaṅgamā dharmā*, Mizuno, 1981: 1:82-83). For the *Yin chi ru jing* use of the *Dhammapada* passage, see T33:1694.10a12-14 (Lai, 1986: 87; and Radich, in preparation).

[16] This short essay has been preserved in Sōshō's (宗性, 1202-1278) *Meisō den shō* (名僧傳抄) X1523, which excerpts Baochang's (寶唱, fl. 502-after 519?) otherwise lost *Mingseng zhuan* (名僧傳). It thus dates before Baochang, at the latest. It appears in a section which lists biographies of a number of figures, but there is no notice of which of the various figures listed wrote the text that concerns us. Liebenthal therefore seems to be conjecturing that the text is by Huiguan, on the basis of the fact that he is among the figures listed (Liebenthal, 1952: 396 n. 305; 宋道場寺釋惠觀七, X77:1523.347c2). However, the figures in question are all from the Liu Song (劉宋, 420-479). We can thus tentatively regard the text as dating before 479. The essay is translated in Liebenthal

makes an unusual contribution to these debates by *denying* the doctrine
of a *shen* that survives death, but doing so in *defense* of correct Buddhism
(usually, Buddhists defend the survival of the spirit against non-Buddhist
critics). However, the terms used here are different from those usually
deployed, and show that the author – and it is possibly significant that
this author was a monastic[17] – is attempting to defend a more "correct"
view, inspired by MPNMS.

The entity the essay denies is called a *shen* (眾生…無常住之神, X77:
1523.354a16), but also, tellingly, a *shenwo* (神我, "spirit-*ātman*") (four
times at X77:1523.354a8-15). This shows clearly that the author is con-
cerned about *ātmavāda* heresy. By the time this text was written, *shenwo*
had emerged in Chinese Buddhist contexts as a technical term for the
ātman. The use of this term may also have recalled to contemporary
readers' minds the discussion in SA 196 (corresponding to the MN *Aggi-
vacchagotta-sutta*) of whether or not a sentient being has a *shenwo* that
exists after death (the use of the term *shenwo* here is unique in the Chi-
nese Āgamas).[18] It also features in this role in such seminal texts as the
Tattvasiddhi (which was the focus of intense scholastic activity in this

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396-397, but the translation is short, and so I will not cite Liebenthal at each instance
below.

[17] Although the author is unknown, we know he was a monastic because his views are
reported in the context of monastic biographies; see n. 16 above.

[18] The question is put by a figure called in Chinese *Vatsaputra (Duzi 犢子, Pāli Vaccha-
gotta), a name which might also have associated these doctrines, and the text, with
the Pudgalavādins (especially the Vātsīputrīyas [*duzibu* 犢子部]; cf. n. 21 below)
(Priestley, 1999: 34-36; on possible connections between *amalavijñāna* doctrine and
pudgalavāda, see Radich, unpublished). *Vatsaputra asks: "Does the *shenwo* of the sen-
tient being, that dies here and is born there [in a next or other world], exist or not, or
does it both exist and not exist, or does it neither exist nor not exist?" (眾生神我、死
此生彼、為有為無、亦有亦無，非有非無，非非有非非無; T2:100.445a18-19, cf. 445b1-3).
In the parallel *Aggivacchagotta-sutta* MN 72, these questions correspond to questions
about the "*tathāgata*" (PTS MN I:484-486, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 591-592; cf. also
SA no. 202, 448c6-7; paralleled in *Kiṃdiṭṭhika* [*Diṭṭhi*], PTS AN V:186, Woodward and
Hare, 1995: 5:128). Woodward (128 n. 2) notes that the Pāli commentary interprets *ta-
thāgata* here as "just a being" (cf. Cone, 2001-2010: 2:286 s.v. *tathāgata,* citing the pre-
sent passage and others using roughly parallel formulae; also Anālayo, 2011: 1:391 and
n. 13). Thus, the SA translation as "sentient being" may not be discrepant.

period, alongside MPNMS);[19] commentaries on MPNMS (collected in the *Da banniepan jing ji jie* 大般涅槃經集解, hereafter "DBJJJ") by Fayao (法瑤, fl. ca. 423-462),[20] Sengzong (僧宗, 438-496)[21] and Baoliang (寶亮, 444-509) (who mentions the concept by far most frequently out of these three authors);[22] and a few other texts.[23] In many of these contexts, it is clear that *shenwo* corresponds to *ātman* (as a concept that heretics propound, and Buddhism denies). In MPNMS commentaries, it is also sometimes opposed (as here) to Buddha-nature (as a "true" self), and discussed in distinction to it.

The predicate denied of *shenwo* in the essay under discussion is not "extinction" (*mie* 滅), as is more usual, but "eternity" or "permanence" (*chang* 常, *nitya), echoing the preferred phraseology of the MPNMS. Against this false construct, the essay opposes Buddha-nature (*foxing* 佛性) and simply *buddha* (*fo* 佛), which is said to be the "true self" (*zhenwo* 真我), in terms again redolent of MPNMS (X77:1523.354a9, 354a11, etc.).[24]

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[19] T32:1646.254b19 – clearly corresponding to *ātman* (Katsura, 1974: 22, 36); also 323b15; 363b10; 372c3-4.

[20] DBJJJ T37:462b16-19, distinguishing between Buddha-nature and the false *ātman.*

[21] Clearly referring to Pudgalavādins (*duzi daoren* 犢子道人, 460a13-14; also 577a13).

[22] Opposed (by Baoliang) to Buddha-nature as the "true" self of MPNMS (DBJJJ T37:447b 19-20); distinguishing between the case of the ordinary sentient being and that of the Buddha (459a13-18, 459b5-8; see also 443b21; 491a10; 524c6; 548c17-23; 577a15, a18).

[23] In the *Bodhisattvabuddhānusmṛtisamādhi* (*Pusa nian fo sanmei jing* 菩薩念佛三昧經), trans. *Guṇabharman? (功德直, fl. ca. 462) (T13:414.801a7-9); Kumārajīva's *Qian fo yin-yuan jing* (千佛因緣經) (seemingly with reference to a "Vedic" *ātman*) (T14:426.71b5-8); and in the *Upāyahṛdaya* (*Fangbian xin lun* 方便心論) ascribed to Jijiaye (吉迦夜, fl. ca. 472) (T32:1632.24b18-23) (Tucci back-translates *ātmabhāva, Tucci, 1929: 9.7). The term also appears in the *Scripture of Brahma's Net* (*Fan wang jing* 梵網經) (composed in China in this same period) (T24:1484.998c17-19, 999c27-1000a3).

[24] Outright discussion of the "true self" is relatively unusual even in MPNMS itself, but see the following passages: "The 'true self' now expounded by the Tathāgata is termed 'Buddha-nature'" (今日如來所說真我，名曰佛性, MPNMS T12:412c25-26, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:200) (where nothing corresponds exactly to this phrase in either Faxian [法顯, 320?-420?] or Tib.); "Those without the heavenly eye (*divyacakṣus) do not recognize the 'true self', and arbitrarily conceptualize it as a self (*ātman)" (無天眼者不知真我橫計我, 415c17, Yamamoto 1:214; Tib. *lha'i mig med pa'i mi rnams kyis ni bdag la bdag yod du zin kyang mi mthong ste*); (see also 590a20, Yamamoto 3:942; unique to *Dharmakṣema, no parallels).

In part, as elsewhere, the issue here hinges on the efficacy of moral action – phrased in terms of *brahmacaryā* (X77:1523.354a14-16). Significantly for our purposes, when the essay denies that a *shen* exists, it proposes instead, as a thread of continuity guaranteeing the efficacy of moral acts, "mind" (*xin* 心). In an echo of a rough "mind-only" doctrine, this mind is said to be the factor that governs (or perhaps even creates?) "heaven and hell", i.e. all rebirth destinies (眾生雖無常住之神，而有善惡之心).[25] The essay winds up by puzzling somewhat inconclusively over the problem of how mind can secure this continuity between rebirths, when it is also momentary (*niannian bu zhu* 念念不住; X77:1523. 354a19-20). In this detail, this small essay may constitute a key step in the development of the ideas we are tracing here (or at least reflect such a key turning point, which might also have been more broadly current in texts lost to us): as we will see immediately below, the problem of the relation between a momentary (surface layer of) mind and an underlying constant substratum is pivotal to the important essay by Liang Wudi, who may have been in part reacting to the ideas seen here.

This short essay is also important because for the first time, it clearly connects these debates to MPNMS and the doctrine of Buddha-nature. In so doing, it also connects the "entity" in question more clearly than previously to the problem of becoming Buddha, as well as that of ordinary transmigration and the efficacy of ordinary karmic action.

Liang Wudi and Shenji's *Shenming cheng fo yi,* and its contexts

These ideas reached a watershed in the time of Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty. Soon after coming to the throne (between 502 and 508), Wudi is supposed to have written a very short treatise entitled *Shenming cheng fo yi* (神明成佛義, "On the Attainment of Buddhahood by the *Shenming*",

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[25] This *xin* is, moreover, the "master" (or source?) (*zhu* 主) of all conditioned things, the "root" (*ben* 本) of rebirth in the five destinies, etc. (善惡之心為萬行之主，天堂地獄以心為本, X77:1523.354a16-18).

HMJ T52:54a8-c20),[26] which is accompanied in HMJ by learned interlinear notes by Shen Ji. Much about this text, as I will demonstrate below, is representative of broader trends in the Buddhist thought of its time, and the essay is thus a useful lens through which to examine an important phase in the history that concerns us here.

In both the text and commentary of *Shenming cheng fo yi*, we see two broad developments. First, for the first time in these debates, we see the influence of the wave of **Tattvasiddhi* and MPNMS scholarship that famously swept the south in the fifth through sixth centuries.[27] We also see consciousness linked much more closely to the problem of attaining buddhahood, and to Buddha-nature more specifically. However, in order to fully appreciate the ideas espoused by Wudi and Shen Ji, it will be necessary for us to look more closely than previous scholars into the scriptural background of their work, especially in MPNMS and the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra* (hereafter "Śrīm"); and its more immediate historical background in the exegetical scholasticism of their time.

Wudi uses the term *shenming* (神明, "spirit-cum-awareness/illumination")[28] for the single, fundamental ground of all the mind's various "functions" (*yong* 用), which is unchanging (夫心為用本，本一而用殊。殊用自有興廢，一本之性不移…一本者，即無明神明也; HMJ T52:54b19-21, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 172). Throughout his essay, he also calls this mental instance simply "mind" (*xin* 心). However, Wudi approaches this "undying" entity with a new question: "Who achieves buddhahood?" (*shui cheng fo hu* 誰成佛乎, HMJ T52:54b14, Makita, 1973-

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[26] On the title and date, see Itō (1986: 229). In addition to Makita (1973-1975), translations are found in Itō (1978: 233-244), and Liebenthal (1952: 376-378), but I will not cite them for every reference below.

[27] In fact, Nakanishi has usefully suggested in passing that we might see a central thrust behind Wudi's essay as issuing from the confrontation of an Abhidharmic (thus, in Wudi's context, **Tattvasiddhi*-derived) doctrine of the momentariness of mind, and the diametrically opposed implication that mind must be permanent or eternal, which arises as soon as we identify MPNMS's Buddha-nature with mind (Nakanishi, 1983: 118).

[28] As we will see below, this term is highly ambiguous, and can scarcely be translated into English in a way that makes sense of all the various connotations with which Wudi employs it.

1975: 3:477-478, Lai, 1981b: 171). In answer, Wudi implicitly identifies this substrate of mind with Buddha-nature – in part via two references to MPNMS (one of which, as we will see, is actually inaccurate, and one of which harbors problems of translation!). One of these passages, more-over, hinges on the notion of the "primary cause" or "cause proper" (*zhengyin* 正因) of the attainment of buddhahood, reference to which, as we will see below, helps us contextualize Wudi's ideas among those of his contemporaries.[29] Thus, Wudi builds upon the connection to Buddha-

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[29] "The *sūtra* says, 'The mind is the cause proper, which ultimately brings to completion the Buddha-fruit'" (經云：「心為正因，終成佛果」; HMJ T52:54b16, Lai, 1981b: 171, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478). This citation is incorrect in the sense that MPNMS does not contain these words (Makita 481 n. 12, Liebenthal n. 170). However, Nakanishi has pointed out that Wudi's claim here may be justified in light of MPNMS, which explains that the effect (e.g. yogurt) is in an important sense present in its cause, and then says, "So, too, with sentient beings: they all have mind, and all things that have mind will certainly attain to *anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi;* it is on the basis of this principle that I al-ways preach that all sentient beings without exception have Buddha-nature" (眾生亦爾，悉皆有心，凡有心者，定當得成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。以是義故，我常宣說一切眾生悉有佛性; MPNMS T12:524c7-10, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 2:658; Nakanishi, 1983: 118).

In raising the problematic of *zhengyin,* Wudi seems to be thinking of some part of a long discussion in MPNMS (T12:530b26-28 ff.), which opposes "primary cause" (*zheng-yin*) to "ancillary cause, supporting condition" (*yuanyin* 緣因); and most probably, more specifically, of the following line: "Noble scion! For this reason, I expound two kinds of cause, [namely] cause proper, and ancillary cause. Cause proper is what is termed 'Buddha-nature'. The ancillary cause is the conception of *bodhicitta*. It is by this pair of causes that one attains *anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi*" (善男子，以是義故，我說二因：正因、緣因。正因者，名為佛性。緣因者，發菩提心。以二因緣得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提; T12:533b3-6, Yamamoto 2:697). Thus, where MPNMS says that the cause proper of awakening is Buddha-nature, Liang Wudi states that it is mind, implying that the two concepts were perhaps somehow interchangeable in his thinking or context.

Wudi further supports his contention with another verbatim quote from MPNMS (this time correct): "That which functions/exists as ignorance transforms itself into il-lumination" (若無明轉，則變為明; HMJ T52:54b18, citing MPNMS T12:411a23, Yamamoto 1:294). Oddly enough, the idea for which he cites the passage seems to be an artifact of an ambiguous (or even incorrect) translation by *Dharmakṣema (Tanwuchen 曇無讖, 385-433), where the original passage may have meant more or less the opposite (i.e. that knowledge becomes ignorance): Faxian has, "Because one commits *karmic* [acts] and misdeeds, knowledge is transformed into ignorance" (行業過故，明非明轉, T12:376.886c7-8); Tib. has, "There is [in fact] no duality in ignorance and knowledge; but nonetheless, through the *karmic* [acts] and evil deeds of sentient

nature drawn by the anonymous Liu Song author discussed above, and more broadly, also builds further on anticipatory moves in that same author, and perhaps even Zong Bing, to connect the thread of continuity through transmigration to the "subject" of liberation.

Wudi also uses the term "consciousness" (*shi* 識). To some extent, both Liang Wudi and Shen Ji treat *shi* as synonymous with "mind" (*xin* 心) (the latter explicitly so, citing the **Tattvasiddhi*) (HMJ T52:54b5-6, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:487, Lai, 1981b: 171; citing **Tattvasiddhi* T32:1646.274 c19).[30] We must therefore be careful not to exaggerate the significance of this choice of vocabulary. However, the way this consciousness is discussed is informed by the new scholastic flavor of Wudi and Shen Ji's writings; central to their discussion is the fact that this consciousness is momentary (HMJ T52:54b14, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:477, Lai, 1981b: 171). In this detail, too, Wudi's essay may betray connections with our anonymous Liu Song author; but he may also be showing the influence of **Tattvasiddhi* scholarship and its Abhidharmic categories.

In his interlinear comments on Wudi's essay and his Preface, Shen Ji speaks of the entity that does not perish at death as both *shenshi* (神識) and *shishen* (識神) (HMJ T52:54a12-13, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:475, Lai, 1981b: 170; HMJ 54b15, Makita 3:478, Lai 171; HMJ 54b16-17 [twice], Maki-

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beings, <u>precisely knowledge itself is transformed to take on the appearance of ignorance</u>," *ma rig pa dang rig pa gnyis su med mod kyi sems can rnams kyi las kyi nyes pas rig pa gang yin pa de nyid ma rig pa lta bur gyur te* (D Tha 111b).

    Note further that, *pace* the *Foguang dacidian* (193 s.v. *eryin* [二因] (1)), it is clear from context that the terms for the two types of cause at issue in the first quote are not the same in meaning as *shengyin* (生因, *kāraṇahetu*) and *liaoyin* (了因, *jñāpakahetu*) (for which see Radich, 2008: 125 n. 345); although there is an attempt – typical of MPNMS in its creative or confused character – to identify them with those categories (531b17-19). The problem of doctrines of causation in MPNMS is extremely tangled, but promises to reward careful study.

30 Katsura points out that this **Tattvasiddhi* passage parallels AKBh 2.34ab, *cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham* (Pradhan, 1967: 61, la Vallée Poussin, 1980: 1:176; also paralleled in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*) (Katsura, 1974: 133). Cf. also *shilü* (識慮) (HMJ T52:54b25, Makita 3:479, Lai 172).

ta 3:475, Lai 171).[31] In glossing Wudi's comment that "consciousness" is impermanent, further, he states that the "essence of *shenshi*" (*shenshi zhi xing* 神識之性) is limpid and unmoving (*zhanran bu yi* 湛然不移, HMJ T52:54b15, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 171). When Wudi states that mind has a single, unchanging, underlying essence, moreover, Shen Ji says that if one removes defilements and impurities, the "fundamental consciousness" (*benshi* 本識) will shine/be clear (陶汰 [var. 沐, Song, Yuan, Ming] 塵穢，本識則明; HMJ T52:54b20, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 172). This is, moreover, Shen Ji's reading of the "transformation" (from ignorance to the liberated state) spoken of in Wudi's second MPNMS quote.[32] Similarly, Shen Ji also states, "Illumination is [our] fundamental nature, and we are therefore susceptible to becoming illuminated; but because consciousness is defiled by objects without, we cannot avoid delusion within" (明為本性，所以應明。識染外塵故，內不免惑; HMJ T52:54b26, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:479, Lai, 1981b: 172). Thus, it is clear that for Wudi and especially Shen Ji, consciousness is the transmigrating entity, and also the "subject" of liberation.

Shen Ji's comments are also the first time we have so clearly seen the language of an underlying "clear essence" of mind/consciousness in the context of these debates. We will see below that debts to Śrīm in both these essays and their wider context make it likely that this trope can be connected quite directly with *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine. Moreover, whereas Wudi identifies a generic "mind" as the "cause proper" (*zhengyin*) of buddhahood, for Shen Ji, the cause proper is specifically *shenshi* (略語佛因其義有二：一曰緣因，二曰正因。緣者，萬善是也。正者，神識是也。萬善有助發之功，故曰緣因。神識是其正本，故曰正因; HMJ T52:54b16-17, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 171). Thus, the link between consciousness (specifically, rather than a more general notion of "mind") and liberation is drawn closer than ever before.

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[31] Note that Shen Ji also uses *shi* as an ordinary verb meaning "to know", e.g. "being 'insentient' is not knowing" (匪情莫識, HMJ T52:54b23, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 172).

[32] See n. 29 above. Shen Ji: 明闇相易，謂之「變」也。若前去後來，非之謂也 (var. 非「變」之謂, Song, Yuan, Ming, "Palace") (HMJ T52:54b20-21, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 172).

Shen Ji also cites a key work of Zhi Qian (支謙, fl. 223-253) as an authority for the claim that "spirit does not perish" (HMJ T52:54b8-9, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:477, Lai, 1981b: 171).[33] This shows that his comments have deeper roots than modern scholars have usually recognized in the history we are tracing here. In what follows, I will trace in some detail other, hitherto largely unrecognized connections between Wudi and Shen Ji's work and three important reference points: Śrīm; MPNMS; and the exegetical practice and theories of some of their most important contemporaries. In light of these connections, we can see the full significance of Wudi and Shen Ji's use of the concept of consciousness as a possible antecedent to *amalavijñāna* doctrine.

First, it is significant that a pivotal concept underlying Wudi's essay – namely, *avidyāvāsabhūmi* (Ch. *wumingzhudi* 無明住地) – ultimately derives from Śrīm (in Guṇabhadra's [Qiunabatuoluo 求那跋陀羅, 394-468] translation).[34] It is natural enough that Wudi would have taken up a key

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[33] Makita and Lai were unable to trace this passage; however, it is a verbatim quote from Zhi Qian's *Taizi rui ying benqi jing* (太子瑞應本起經) (T3:185.475a1-3; noted in Itō, 1986: 235 n. 6). This passage has partial parallels in the *Xiuxing benqi jing* (修行本起經) (T3: 184.467a21, cf. Karetzky, 1992: 57); and in Dharmarakṣa's *Pu yao jing* (普曜經) (T3:186. 503b1-2) (which is not an independent witness, being drawn from T185; Nattier, 2008: 127 n. 42). The passage seems to have no parallels in the *Lalitavistara, Mahāvastu* or *Buddhacarita*. Note that the *Taizi rui ying benqi jing* also contains other passages that could support a similar view (including its very opening, 472c6-9, where the transmigrating entity is *jingshen* 精神; 478b3-6, *hunshen* 魂神; 479c17-23, where, pivotally for our purposes, "mind is the *jingshen*" 意為精神 and rebirth is explained by the arising of consciousness [and *saṃjñā*?] 識想; Itō, 1986: 219-200).

[34] Cf. Makita (1973-1975: 3:481 n. 16) (which mentions Jizang's commentary on Śrīm, T1744) and Lai (1981b: 377 n. 172) (tracing this rubric only as far as the *Pusa yingluo benye jing* [菩薩瓔珞本業經], where it appears at T24:1485.1022a6-8). Itō (1986: 240 n. 1) notes the connection to Śrīm, but does not explore it any further (see also Nakanishi, 1983: 123-125). Aside from Śrīm, the following texts prior to Wudi also mention *avidyā-vāsabhūmi*: Guṇabhadra's *Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra* (T16:670.510b7-8, 512b17-18, 513a25-27, 513 b10); *Pusa yingluo benye jing* (T24:1485.1022a6-8); and *Mandra[sena]'s (曼陀羅仙, fl. 503) *Ratnamegha* (T16:659.277b21-25). This means that it may not be possible to identify Wudi's source for the concept with absolute certainty. However, two factors argue in favor of Śrīm: 1) it contains the most extensive discussion of the concept, where the other texts largely only mention it in passing; 2) Wudi also mentions the momentariness of ordinary mind, which also features in Śrīm (see below). The Skt. *avidyāvāsa-*

concept from Śrīm, given the interest in the text in the period, as indicated by the series of (now lost) commentaries mentioned or cited in Jizang's (吉藏, 549-623) commentary, the *Shengman bao ku* (勝鬘寶窟, T1744) (Tsurumi, 1977).[35]

It is difficult to find a simple, clear translation of *avidyāvāsabhūmi* into English. *Āvāsa* means "dwelling-place, residence", and *bhūmi* has a broad range of meanings centered on the notion of "place";[36] basically, then, the term suggests a type of ignorance (*avidyā*) so profound and fundamental that it is as if the sentient being has set up residence (*āvāsa*) in it, so that it operates as a "home base" or place of identification, which is the point of departure and reference for all of the sentient being's more specific knowledge and acts. We might perhaps translate *āvāsabhūmi*, more loosely, "[ignorance in/of/as] the very condition of existence".[37]

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bhūmi is known from citation of Śrīm in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (Johnston, 1950: 33-34, Takasaki, 1966: 217).

[35] The term **avidyāvāsabhūmi* appears nowhere else in HMJ (nor *Guang hong ming ji* [廣弘 明集] T2103). However, evidence of interest in the concept is seen in such luminaries of Wudi's time as Fayun (who some have suggested might have ghost-written Wudi's essay) (T33:1715.573b3-9; 588a2-3, 603c9-11, 606b28-c5, 654b18-19); Baoliang (DBJJJ T37: 392a10, 404c22-25, 526b3-12, 551a4-5, 600b13-14, 611a4); and Sengzong (413b4, 485 a15-16, 551a17); and it appears in the Liang *Cibei daochang chanfa* (慈悲道場懺法) (T45: 1909.927c4-7, 946b24-25, 947c24-26).

[36] I take *bhūmi* here to refer primarily not to anything analogous to the more familiar *bhūmi* of the *bodhisattva* path, but to the "earth"; the text speaks in several passages of this fundamental defilement as a kind of soil from which the other particular defilements grow.

[37] Wayman and Wayman (1974) translate by the somewhat impenetrable phrase "nescience entrenchment". Exploiting a useful etymological ambiguity in English, we might also translate *āvāsa* as "habit*at*", i.e. somewhere that the sentient being "in*habit*s" (*ā/ vas*), and say that "dwelling" in this habitat also "*habit*uates" us to commit particular defiled (morally harmful) acts (compare the Yogācāra term *vāsanā,* perhaps from the same root). In both these senses, the notion of "habitat" could even be fruitfully understood on the basis of a selectively retooled use of the term *habitus* (after Mauss, Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu). Thus, **āvāsakleśa* might be something like a latent global tendency to karmically negative action, including, perhaps most saliently, the very basic act of taking rebirth itself; whereas "active *kleśa*s" are explicitly realized acts instantiating that underlying tendency. There are apparent structural analogies between this deeper layer of defilement in Śrīm and the notion of *ālayavijñāna* in early Yogācāra texts.

We realize that Wudi has this concept in mind when he says:

The coming into being and passing out of being [of things] takes place over and above the essence of "ignorance" [non-illumination, *wuming* 無明 = **avidyā*]. This coming into being and passing out of being consists in the various functions [of fundamental "ignorance"], but the character (*yi* 義) of mind *qua* "ignorance" (*wuming*) remains unchanged. However, there is a danger that, seeing the variety in its functions, [people] will say that mind passes out of existence along with its object (*jing* 境, **viṣaya*). For this reason, the term "dwelling-place" (*zhudi* 住地, **āvāsabhūmi*) is added immediately after the word "ignorance" (*wuming*). This shows that "ignorance" is identical with *shenming* (神明), and the nature (*xing* 性) of *shenming* is unchanging.[38]

In his interlinear comments, Shen Ji reiterates the same point: "By attaching [the term] 'dwelling-place' to 'ignorance', the intention is to chastise those whose minds are muddled; but fools who are full of doubts have never understood this [point]."[39] In other words, both writers seem to have had in mind some text (other than their own) in which *wuming* appeared together with the term *zhudi* (住地) = *āvāsabhūmi*.

Śrīm discusses this *avidyāvāsabhūmi* at some length (T12:353.220a1-c7, Ogawa, 2001: 189-191, Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 84-89). It is presented as one of five *āvāsabhūmi,* the remaining four of which, briefly, are similar, existentially foundational defilements through attachment respectively to 1) incorrect views; and 2-4) existence in each of the three realms (*kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, ārūpyadhātu*). These five foundational defilements are the basis upon which "active defilements" (*qi fannao* 起煩惱) arise in turn.

Significantly for our purposes, these "active defilements" are defined in Śrīm thus: "'Active [defilements]' refers to the momentary (**kṣaṇika*) mind and its momentary concomitant factors (**caitta*)" (此四種住地，生

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[38] 無明體上，有生有滅。生滅是其異用，無明心義不改。將恐見其用異，便謂心隨境滅。故繼「無明」名下，加以「住地」之目。此顯無明即是神明，神明性不遷也; for reference, see n. 39 following.

[39] 「無明」係以「住地」，蓋是斥其迷識，而抱惑之徒未曾喻也 (HMJ T52:54b26-c7, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:479, Lai, 1981b: 172).

一切起煩惱。起者，剎那心，剎那相應; T12:353.220a4-5).[40] This gives us a clue as to where Wudi gets his concern with the momentariness of mind, already touched on above. At the opening of the essay, he says (ventriloquizing an imaginary interlocutor):

> The wondrous result [of the path of practice, i.e. buddhahood], the ultimate acme of essence, is eternal; but subtle spirit cannot but be impermanent. "Impermanent" means that a prior [entity] goes out of existence and a latter one comes into existence, without enduring even for a *kṣaṇa* (moment) (妙果體極常住，精神不免無常。無常者，前滅後生，剎那不住者也; HMJ T52:54b10-12, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:477, Lai, 1981b: 171).[41]

This leads to the conclusion that each moment of mind (*shi,* "consciousness") should differ from its predecessor, and go out of existence together with its object; and this in turn sets up the central question of Wudi's tract: "Who becomes *buddha*?" (若心用心於攀緣 前識必異後者，斯則與境俱往，誰成佛乎; HMJ T52:54b13-14, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:477-478, Lai, 1981b: 171). In the argument that he gives in answer to this question, Wudi distinguishes between a momentary, changeable, phenomenal layer of mental content, and an underlying substrate of the essence or nature of mind – very much as Śrīm distinguishes, in the passage where *avidyāvāsabhūmi* features, between incidental phenomenal instances of defilement, and underlying, enduring structural conditions for it.

Indeed, the underlying nature of the basic question Wudi uses this doctrine to answer ("Who becomes Buddha?" or how buddhahood is attained) bears further resemblances to the question at issue in Śrīm's *avidyāvāsabhūmi* passage. Śrīm is at pains to stress that the *avidyāvāsa-*

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[40] A few lines later, Śrīm clearly says that *avidyāvāsabhūmi,* by contrast, is dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*) (心不相應無始無明住地, T12:353.220a6)*.*

[41] We should note that the use of technical Buddhist terms, especially transcription terms from Skt. like *kṣaṇa,* is very unusual in the debates we are following here (which tend to be dominated rather by reference to non-Buddhist Chinese terms and texts); and indeed, Shen Ji feels a need to gloss *kṣaṇa.* This makes it all the more likely that the word *kṣaṇa* derives from some other textual source that Wudi is taking as the occasion of his argument.

bhūmi is by far the most "powerful" of all the *āvāsabhūmi*s (如是無明住地力，於有愛數四住地，無明住地其力最大 etc. [at some length]; T12: 353.220a9-10 ff.; Ogawa, 2001: 189 ff., Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 84 ff.). This difference in power lies in the fact that Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas and lower-level Bodhisattvas are capable of destroying the other *āvāsabhūmi*s, and are therefore exempt from ordinary embodiment; but they are, nonetheless, prone to embodiment in a "body made of mind" (*manomayakāya*), and this is because they have not broken the type of attachment to existence constituted by the *avidyāvāsabhūmi* (T12:353.220a16-18 ff.; Ogawa, 2001: 189 ff., Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 85 ff.; *evam eva bhagavann avidyāvāsabhūmipratyayā anāsravakarmahetukā arhatāṃ pratyekabuddhānāṃ vaśitāprāptānāṃ ca bodhisattvānāṃ manomayā trayaḥ kāyāḥ sambhavanti* etc., Johnston, 1950: 33-34, Takasaki, 1966: 217). In fact, the only power that can destroy the *avidyāvāsabhūmi* is the awakening and wisdom of the Tathāgata (阿羅漢辟支佛智所不能斷。唯如來菩提智之所能斷; T12:353.220a13-15, Ogawa, 2001: 189, Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 85). But this means, of course, that the elimination of the *avidyāvāsabhūmi* is the key to the process of attaining buddhahood – precisely the problem that preoccupies Wudi.

Thus, Śrīm – one of the most seminal *tathāgatagarbha* scriptures – is a pivotal reference point for Wudi and Shen Ji's ideas. We will see further below, moreover, that it was also a key reference point for their prominent contemporaries when they discussed closely allied ideas. This alone is sufficient to show a close, direct textual link between Wudi's ideas and *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine. However, comparison with his source in Śrīm shows that Wudi's use of the idea of *avidyāvāsabhūmi,* and indeed, his use of the term *wuming/avidyā/*"ignorance" itself, seems unusual and problematic at first blush. The problem lies in the fact that Wudi poses a radical and startling underlying identity between this "ignorance" and *shenming*, whereas these two terms would more normally look like opposites (一本者，即無明神明也; HMJ T52:54b21, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 172; 無明即是神明; 54c5-6, Makita 3:479, Lai 172). This leads us in the direction of a second key element among Wudi's sources, namely MPN-MS and its Buddha-nature doctrine.

It is tempting, perhaps, at first, to think that Wudi's strategy of identification here is based upon the fortuitous fact that *shenming* ("spirit-

cum-*illumination*") and *wu<u>ming</u>* ("ignorance", more literally, "lack of *illu-mination*") contain the same constituent syllable, *ming* (明, "illumination", "awakening", "awareness"), and that this furnishes Wudi with a hinge by which to join the two. However, Wudi is able to cite scriptural authority, again from MPNMS, in support of this identity, so that it is not at all idio-syncratic (善男子，明與無明，亦復如是。若與煩惱諸結俱者，名為無明，若與一切善法俱者，名之為明; MPNMS T12:411b17-19, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:195). It is significant that this quote forms a pair with one of his earlier quotes from MPNMS.[42] If we back up a little, moreover, the MPNMS passage in question as a whole begins by saying (in the Chinese Wudi would have been referring to[43]):

> If we say that conditioned things have ignorance as their cause and conditions, then ordinary people, hearing this, will falsely imagine the concept of a duality between "illumination" (*ming*) and "non-illu-mination" (*wuming*) [i.e. ignorance]. The wise, however, understand that in essence, they are not dual, and that this non-dual essence is the true nature [of things] (若言無明因緣諸行，凡夫之人聞已分別生二法想，明與無明，智者了達其性無二，無二之性即是實性; MPNMS T12:410c20-22, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:192-193).[44]

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[42] The present quote caps a long passage (MPNMS T12:411a7-b23, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:194-195), which is immediately preceded by Wudi's second quote (see n. 29). The two quotes in combination can be understood to refer to the passage as a whole. Remark-ably, the entire paragraph intervening between the two quotes seems to be an inter-polation into *Dharmakṣema's version only of MPNMS; it is absent from Faxian, Tib. and Skt. fragments (even though it occurs in the portion of *Dharmakṣema's MPNMS that is generally paralleled by other versions).

[43] It is an important methodological principle, in treating the scriptural bases of Chinese developments like those under study here, to distinguish between the way the Chinese would naturally have been read by Chinese readers, in Chinese, and what we can de-termine the original Indic text might have meant before passing through the transla-tion process. This principle is particularly important in dealing with texts like *Dhar-makṣema's MPNMS, where the Chinese is often significantly at variance with other known versions of the text.

[44] This is reasonably close to Tib: "The benighted, due to [their] ignorance, maintain that there is duality in so-called conditioned things; but the wise know that there is [in fact] no duality in the difference [between] ignorance and knowledge;" *byis pa rnams ni ma*

The entire passage that follows (ending with Wudi's second quote) explains a series of such non-dualisms, which are taken by the ignorant as dual, in light of the paradoxical identity-in-difference of causes and effects, using the metaphor of various dairy products. (The concern with the mysteries of causation, and the elaborate dairy metaphors, are both prominent features of MPNMS as a whole.) The connection between this problem and Wudi's concern with the problem of the "cause proper" (*zhengyin*) of buddhahood is obvious. Thus, it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that Wudi's entire essay is a comment on the larger MPNMS passage we have identified here, by way of the Śrīm concept of *avidyāvāsabhūmi* as the ultimate impediment to the attainment of buddhahood.

These echoes of Śrīm and MPNMS help us make better sense of other aspects of Wudi and Shen Ji's ideas. Wudi unpacks the MPNMS non-dualism between ignorance and illumination by saying that there is a surface level at which mind merely functions (*yong* 用) to engage with phenomenal objects, whereas beneath this level, there is an underlying substratum of substance (*ti* 體) which remains untouched.[45] In glossing the Emperor's comments, Shen Ji specifies further that mind/consciousness falls prey to delusion because it is defiled by external objects;[46] elsewhere, he specifies that the reverse process is also possible, and consciousness can be purified of defilements to return to its pristine illumination.[47] The broad lineaments of these ideas should be familiar. They bear a close resemblance to the idea of a fundamental purity covered by "adventitious defilements" (*āgantukakleśāḥ*) elaborated in various Indic texts (even though the usual, more exact translation terms associated with that doctrine are not used here). It is significant, in this light, that Wudi's key MPNMS quotes come from a context where the text is ex-

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rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnams zhes bya ba la gnyis su 'dzin to | shes rab can rnams kyis ni ma rig pa dang rig pa tha dad pa gnyis su med par shes so (D 110b).

[45] See n. 39 above. It is common for scholars to see Wudi's essay as the first use of the *ti-yong* paradigm in specific Buddhist applications; Itō, 1986: 241-242; but cf. Nakanishi, 1983: 114, 128 n. 21.

[46] Passage discussed p. 488 above.

[47] Passage discussed p. 488 above.

plaining Buddha-nature (*foxing yi er* 佛性亦爾, MPNMS T12:411b21-22, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:195);[48] in fact, immediately following the second of his quotes, the text goes on to state that the reason sentient beings cannot see their Buddha-nature is that it is covered by adventitious defilement (煩惱覆故眾生不見...但為煩惱客塵所覆; Tib. *nyon mongs pa rnams ni glo bur du byung ba yin te* etc.; MPNMS T12:411b23-c1, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:195-196). Thus, although Wudi's tract mentions Buddha-nature nowhere, Shen Ji seems to be right when he alludes to it in his Preface as the issue at stake (至於佛性大義，頓迷心路; HMJ T52:54a22-23, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:476, Lai, 1981b: 170).[49]

Another key context, without reference to which we cannot hope to fully understand Wudi and Shen Ji's ideas, is the ideas of their learned contemporaries.[50] We have already mentioned the fact that Wudi and Shen Ji's interest in Śrīm (as shown by appeal to the notion of *avidyāvāsabhūmi*) was fairly typical of this period. This is also true of their concern with the problem of the "primary cause". We saw above that Wudi identifies "mind" (*xin* 心) as the "cause proper" of buddhahood, and that Shen Ji further specifies that this "cause proper" is *shenshi*.[51] This state-

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[48] Comparison shows that the last words of the passage are unique to *Dharmakṣema.

[49] As Itō has pointed out, MPNMS contains one remarkable passage that seems to make exactly the equation Wudi and Shen Ji are hinting at here: "Again, there is an interpretation that holds that *vijñāna* is Buddha-nature (*shi wei foxing* 識為佛性), and that because of *vijñāna* as a cause, it is possible to attain the undifferentiated mind of the Tathāgatas. Although the mind and *vijñāna* of sentient beings is impermanent, the succession of *vijñāna*s [comprises] an unbroken continuum, and this is why it is possible to attain the true, eternal mind of the Tathāgata. It is like [the relation between] heat and fire: although the fire is impermanent, heat is not impermanent. So it is, too, with sentient beings and Buddha-nature, and this is why it is held that *vijñāna* is Buddhanature" (MPNMS T12:556b17-21, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 3:800, Itō, 1986: 235 n. 3). The context is a passage that argues by turn that all the *skandha*s are identical to Buddhanature, and so the claim for *vijñāna,* in particular, is not especially significant; nonetheless, it could have been a useful proof-text for Wudi's claims. In fact, however, the passage seems to have disappeared without a trace in the later Chinese tradition, except that it is quoted once in Guanding's (灌頂, 561-632) commentary (X36:659.747c 7-9).

[50] Attention is given to aspects of this problem by Itō (1986), for which see immediately below; and Nakanishi (1983: 109-117).

[51] See above n. 29 and p. 488.

ment can be further illuminated by reference to the works of eminent exegetes roughly contemporary with Wudi and Shen Ji, who also evinced considerable interest in the problem of the "cause proper" of buddhahood.

As Itō Takatoshi has shown, evidence preserved in the *Silun xuan yi* (四論玄義)[52] reports that Sengrou (僧柔, 431-494) and Zhizang (智藏, 458-522) declared that the "cause proper" of buddhahood was "mind-consciousness" (*xinshi* 心識), which "ultimately becomes the great sage" (*zhong cheng dasheng* 終成大聖, X46:784.601c15-23, Itō, 1986: 226);[53] Fa'an (法安, 454-498) held that the cause proper was mind (*xin* 心), which he contrasted with a deluded *manas (yi* 意) and *vijñāna/shenshi* which are functions and susceptible to change (601c1-3; Itō 227); and Baoliang is supposed to have held that "true spirit" (*zhenshen* 真神) is the cause proper (601b20-c1; Itō 227);[54] or that the "principle of Thusness" (*zhenruxing li* 真如性理) is the cause proper, where ordinary mind is produced on the basis of a substratum of Thusness (601b15-20; Itō 227)[55] (this view is also supposed to have been shared by Fa'an, Fayun and Huiyan [慧琰, d.u.]; 601c4-9; Itō 228). In commenting on MPNMS, further, Baoliang connects *zhengyin* to mind, and in support, cites Śrīm on *prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta* (DBJJJ T37:447c11-20; Itō 238.).[56] Sengzong calls *shenming* (神明) itself the *zhengyin* (DBJJJ T37:586c20-23; Itō 239; Nakanishi, 1983: 112-113; cf. also DBJJJ 454b26).

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[52] By Huijun/Hyegyun (慧均, d.u., fl. 574-580s?) (Radich, 2008: 121-122 n. 330).

[53] Huijun's account of this position includes the notion of "return to the origin" (*fan ben zhi li* 反本之理).

[54] Huijun also ascribes this view to Wudi himself. A related view is ascribed to Baoliang by Jizang (T38:1768.237c4-9).

[55] As Itō notes, this position is particularly important in light of the doctrines ascribed to the Dilun school. Itō suggests, in fact, that the very term *zhenru* is very early here, as it is usually taken to date from Bodhiruci; of course, there is also a possibility that its use indicates that Huijun's doxographical information has been contaminated by ideas intervening between Baoliang and himself.

[56] The exact terms in which Baoliang connects *zhengyin* (and *yuanyin* 緣因) to mind are obscure to me: "Both *zhengyin* and *yuanyin* are paths of spirit and(?) thought" (緣正兩因並是神慮之道).

As this last comment of Sengzong's suggests, Wudi's essay is also representative of the views of the scholarly elite of its time in the very use of its titular concept of *shenming* (神明). Surprisingly, to my knowledge, scholars who have worked on Wudi's essay have not generally explored the background of this term in any depth (but cf. Nakanishi, 1983: 110-117). One possible remote source of the term is in An Shigao – where, remarkably for our purposes, it is already used for the transmigrating entity, in a manner that may sometimes correspond to *vijñāna* – but this single passage is unique in the Āgamas and separated from the period under discussion by many years, and so we should probably not make too much of it.[57] *Shenming* is also used at least once, in the GSZ biography of *Dharmamitra (曇摩密多), as an ordinary word for the spirit or intelligence of a person (T50:2059.342c8-9; translated as *seishin* 精神, Yoshikawa and Funayama, 2009: 310). In the "apocryphal" "Consecration *sūtra*", *shenming* is the name for the transmigrating entity.[58]

On the whole, however, *shenming*, in any sense close to Wudi's, is a relatively rare term in Buddhist texts outside the present debates. By contrast, within those debates, it begins to appear in senses more closely related to Wudi's as early as Zheng Daozi (*shenming zhi ben* 神明之本, HMJ T52:28a1-3, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:251, Liebenthal, 1952: 347; *shenming lingji* 神明靈極, HMJ 28b7-9, Makita 2:254, Liebenthal 349). It is especially frequent in Zong Bing. In his "Letter to He Chongtian", for instance, it appears as a general term for spirits; and also in a formulation describing liberation as "making luminous the *shenming* and directing it towards the birthless state" (HMJ T52:18a9-12, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:163; HMJ 18c3-5,

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[57] *Shenming* is found five times in a discussion of various reincarnation destinies in Buddhist cosmology in An Shigao's *Daśottara-sūtra*, where it corresponds to Pāli *satta* (Skt. *sattva*); this, in turn, corresponds to a list of "states of consciousness" (*viññāṇaṭṭhiti*) in another *sutta* (T1:13.239a9-16; PTS DN III:263, Walshe, 1987: 506; PTS DN II:68-69, Walshe 228-229).

[58] In a list of things that the faithless do not believe: "They do not believe that when the person dies, the *shenming* is born again" (不信人死神明更生, T21:1331.534b23-24). According to Sengyou, this *sūtra* was composed by Huijian (惠簡, fl. ca. 457) under the Liu Song (Makita, 1976: 14).

Makita 2:169).[59] One key passage in Zong Bing is particularly telling for our purposes; describing accession to the liberated state, the text says:

> The spirit (*shen* 神) of the sage illuminates [things] in a sublime manner, while remaining free of the [ordinary] consciousness that thinks and constructs (無思營之識); this is because when the mind (*xin* 心) withdraws from [association with external] things, only spirit [remains], and nothing more. For this reason, the source of empty illumination (*ming* 明) endures at all times (lit: "from start to finish"), and cannot perish. If, on the one hand, one engages with [external] things, and does not maintain unity with the spirit, then even though one might have the subtlety of a Yan Hui, one must nonetheless strive diligently, "loving benevolence and delighting in mountains" (好仁樂山),[60] [and yet still] falling short and suffering penury. All this is [because] the function of the mind (*xinyong* 心用) is consciousness/cognizing (識, *vivjñā*); one function necessarily follows another imperceptibly, so that consciousness after consciousness join in an imperceptible continuum, just as in a fire, flame after flame join in succession to constitute a blaze. If, on the other hand, one awakens to emptiness and extinguishes mind, then mental functions are extinguished and volition and consciousness cease, and then *shenming* is complete.[61]

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[59] In addition to other Zong Bing passages discussed immediately below, see also, in *Ming fo lun,* HMJ T52:10a1-3 (Makita, 1973-1975: 2:87, Liebenthal, 1952: 383); HMJ 11b22-25 (Makita 2:102); HMJ 12b13-16 (Makita 2:108); HMJ 14a27-b1 (Makita 2:126); HMJ 15 a12-15 (Makita 2:134); HMJ 16a17-19 (Makita 2:142).

[60] *Analects* 6.2: 知者樂水，仁者樂山; "Those with wisdom delight in water, those with 'benevolence' delight in mountains."

[61] 夫聖神玄照而無思營之識者，由心與物絕，唯神而已，故虛明之本，終始常住，不可�矣。今心與物交，不一於神，雖以顏子之微微，而必乾乾鑽仰，好仁樂山，庶乎屢空。皆心用乃識，必用用妙接，識識妙續，如火之炎炎相即而成爛耳。今以悟空息心，心用止而情識歇，則神明全矣 (HMJ T52:11a12-19, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, Liebenthal, 1952: 392-393, Guo, 2007: 240-242). My translation here benefited considerably from consulting Guo, and from suggestions from the anonymous reviewer. Similarly, elsewhere, the phrase "consummated the ultimate limit of the *shenming*" (*qiong shenming ji* 窮神明極) is used to describe the liberation of the Tathāgata (13c23-26, Makita 2:121).

Thus, already before it is taken up by Wudi, *shenming* refers to a key component of the mind of sentient beings, which others had already asserted survives death, and was in some sense the subject of liberation.

In comparison to the relatively scant and non-technical ways it was used previously, however, the term *shenming* saw an explosion of technical usage in the hands of the eminent exegetes of Wudi's day,[62] and it is in their writings that we find the most illuminating background to Wudi's own use.

For example, not only does Sengzong claim that *shenming* is the cause proper, as we just saw above; he also uses it in his explanation of the sense in which MPNMS can say that there is a "great self" (*dawo* 大我, **mahātman*). If we hold that there is absolutely no self, we fall into the extreme of nihilism; if we hold that there is an eternal, unperishing (*bu mie* 不滅) self within *saṃsāra,* we fall into the opposite extreme of eternalism. Between these two extremes, Sengzong suggests, we should recognize that even though there is no self, "The essential principle is not destroyed, and upon the basis of it, the *shenming* [continues] without being cut off."[63] Elsewhere, Sengzong uses the notion of *shenming* as cause proper to explain how sentient beings in *saṃsāra* can be spoken of as having "[the Buddha] nature", even though *saṃsāra* is impermanent (DBJJJ T37:545a13-16).

Baoliang speaks of *shenming* as the "ineffable essence" (*shenming miaoti* 神明妙體), and the one, true, unconditioned *dharma* (DBJJJ T37:488c 13-15).[64] He also speaks of *shenming* as the new knowledge that is taught, for the first time, by MPNMS itself (strongly suggesting that he identifies it with Buddha-nature); he alludes in this connection to the Śrīm doc-

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[62] Wang Jing's (王靖, d.u.) comment seems to reflect this situation: "Opinions are many and various about the purport of [the notion of] *shenming*" (神明之旨，其義多端, HMJ T52:66a27; cited in Nakanishi, 1983: 120).

[63] 性理不亡，神明由之而不斷也 etc. (DBJJJ T37:459b11-15, commenting on MPNMS T12: 410b18-24, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:191; this passage discussed in Nakanishi, 1983: 111).

[64] Baoliang also speaks of the *shenming miaoti* elsewhere (e.g. DBJJJ T37:547a15, and passages cited below in n. 65 and p. 501); as does Sengzong (519b15-16).

trine that *saṃsāra* is based upon *tathāgatagarbha.*[65] In another telling passage, Baoliang glosses the idea that buddhahood does not arise *ex nihilo* (非本無今有) with reference to the Śrīm doctrine that *saṃsāra* is based upon *tathāgatagarbha,* and says that the *shenming* is the "nature/essence" (*xing* 性) of the cogitating intellect (*lüzhi* 慮知); *saṃsāra* only arises because the *shenming* becomes entangled in causes and conditions, whereas if it can disentangle itself, "the false dies out, and the true remains" (DBJJJ T37:521c19-22). Elsewhere, he describes the highest kind of faith as faith in the ineffable essence of *shenming* and the highest [truth?] of Thusness (信神明妙體真如之第一; DBJJJ T37:538b3).

Such relations between Wudi's essay and its milieu are thrown into particularly sharp relief if we examine Baoliang's comments on exactly the main MPNMS passage that I have argued lies behind Wudi's essay. In explaining the opening of this passage, Baoliang says that its non-dualist understanding of the relation between ignorance and "illumination" is a middle path, which presents things in their true aspect. He then goes on immediately to say, "It recognizes the Thusness of the ineffable essence of *shenming* as true reality" (識神明妙體真如為實; DBJJJ T37:460c3-5).[66] Baoliang returns to the topic of *shenming* in commenting on the passage immediately following Wudi's second quote, in which MPNMS explains that Buddha-nature is not seen because it is covered over by adventitious defilements. The terms of his comment closely echo those of Wudi's essay:

> [When MPNMS says,] "Buddha-nature is not a conditioned *dharma,"* [it] means that Buddha-nature, as the <u>cause proper (*zhengyin*)</u>, is not affected by good or bad [actions]; how [then] could it be created? Thus, we know that the essence of <u>the *shenming,*</u> at its fundament, has this **dharmatā* as its source...If <u>the *shenming*</u> in all cases arose from that which is constructed out of causes and conditions, and it did not have this as its essence, how then would it be possible for [the *sūtra*] now to

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[65] 自四時經教，無有此言。今大乘了義，其旨始判，得知神明以真俗為質也 etc. (DBJJJ T37:489c22-23); 從昔教來，學者未體乎大理，見法未分明。不知身為佛因。今於此教，識因果性，知神明妙體，生死依如來藏 etc. (528c15-17; cf. also 537a25-26).

[66] I read *shi* (識) here as an ordinary verb.

say that there is a wondrous king of all medicines within the poiso-
nous body? ...Thus, we know that [the *sūtra*] is speaking in reference
to the <u>cause proper (*zhengyin*)</u>. If it was of the nature of a causal pro-
duct, then that would automatically mean that the principle (*li* 理)
would not exist within the poisonous body. On the other hand, we
also should not make the result dependent upon the cause. If it were
indeed the case that result is dependent upon cause, then the *Śrīmālā-
devī* should say "On the basis of *saṃsāra,* there is *tathāgatagarbha;"*
whereas it actually says, "On the basis of *tathāgatagarbha,* there is *saṃ-
sāra*" (DBJJJ T37:462a25-b7).[67]

Aspects of this comment are admittedly obscure. For our purposes, how-
ever, it suffices to note the following points, which are clear: like Wudi,
Baoliang understands the key issue to be the "cause proper" of buddha-
hood; like Wudi, he closely identifies *shenming* with the cause proper; in
the background, via MPNMS, is the doctrine of Buddha-nature; like Wudi,
Baoliang links the MPNMS passage to ideas from Śrīm; and as with Wudi,
his explanation has echoes of the doctrine of the aboriginal purity of
mind.

    In fact, we even find echoes of Wudi and Shen Ji's treatment of con-
sciousness/*shenshi* in Baoliang and Sengzong. For instance, in another
passage also discussing the "cause proper" (*zhengyin),* Baoliang speaks of
a type of "middle path with reference to principle" (*li zhong zhongdao* 理

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[67] 「佛性非是作法者」,謂<u>正因</u>佛性非善惡所感,云何可造?故知<u>神明</u>之體,根本有
此法性為源...若<u>神明</u>一向從業因緣之所構 [for 稱, reading with the v.l. in the 甲
m.s.] 起,不以此為體者,今云何言,毒身之中有妙藥王...故知據<u>正因</u>而為語也。
若是果性,則毒身之中,理自無也。復不應以果來依因。若以果來依因者,『勝鬘
經』應言,「依生死故有如來藏;」而云,「依如來藏有生死」. The Śrīm reference is
to the following passage (from the opening of the *prakṛtiprabhāsvara* chapter!): "Birth-
and-death [*saṃsāra*] is grounded upon *tathāgatagarbha,* and it is with reference to *ta-
thāgatagarbha* that it is taught that the 'original limit' [? *bhūtakoṭi*?] is unknowable. O
Bhagavan! It is because *tathāgatagarbha* exists that we speak of *saṃsāra*" (生死者依如
來藏 ,以如來藏故 說本際不可知 。世尊 ,有如來藏故說生死; T12:353.222b5-7, Ogawa,
2001: 199-200, 238, Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 104); *sati bhagavaṁs tathāgatagarbhe
saṃsāra iti parikalpam asya vacanāyêti* (Johnston, 1950: 73, Takasaki, 1966: 292); however,
this Skt. may be uncertain, and according to Takasaki, we should read, with Ch. and
Tib., something more like, "O Bhagavan! It is [only] because there is *tathāgatagarbha*
that *saṃsāra* is a meaningful concept" (Takasaki 292-293 n. 185).

中中道) which he sees instantiated in the fact that all [beings] possessed of *shenshi* know in every moment (**kṣaṇa*) to avoid suffering and seek happiness (*pi ku qiu le* 避苦求樂),[68] and this understanding in them is Buddha-nature, as the "cause proper" (DBJJJ T37:545a24-27).[69] Again discussing the "cause proper", Baoliang reiterates that all [beings] with *shenshi* have an innate understanding of the principle of seeking happiness and avoiding pain (DBJJJ T37:554c28-555a8).[70] In another passage, the Bodhisattva Lion's Roar asks (in MPNMS): "If the five *skandha*s comprising the sentient being are empty and do not exist, then who is it that receives teachings and practices the path?" (眾生五陰空無所有。誰有受教修習道者; MPNMS T12:537a28-29, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 2:714). Commenting on this passage, Sengzong paraphrases the problem thus:

> If the essence [= Buddha-nature?] [already] exists within the cause, and is enwrapped by ignorance, then [since the progression] from cause to result, to eliminate ignorance, is called "practice", [and] the capacity to eliminate ignorance is already [inherent] within [the essence], it is established that it is meaningful to practice the path; but if no essence exists within the cause, then there is only arising and extinction, which is momentary and impermanent, and even in its

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[68] As Nakanishi notes, this phrase (which may well be Baoliang's own coinage; it is unattested before him) is relatively central to Baoliang's understanding of Buddha-nature, *shenming, zhengyin* etc. (cf. also DBJJJ T37:447c17, 500b13, 547b10-11, 550a15-19, 555a2-4; see n. 69 below). Nakanishi further plausibly suggests that we may hear here an echo of Śrīm (also from the chapter on **prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta*): "If there were no such thing as *tathāgatagarbha,* it would not be possible to conceive of disgust for suffering and hanker after *nirvāṇa,* or seek it" (若無如來藏者，不得厭苦樂求涅槃, *tathāgatagarbhaś ced bhagavan na syān na syād duḥkhe 'pi nirvinna nirvāṇa icchā vā prārthanā vā praṇidhir veti,* T12:353.222b14-15; Ogawa, 2001: 200, 239; Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 105; Johnston, 1950: 36, 73; Takasaki, 1966: 221, 293) (Nakanishi, 1983: 115).

[69] 理中中道，即是一切眾生避苦求樂，解正因佛性。夫中道之義，本是稱理之心，然有神識者，無一剎那心中無有此解 (commenting on MPNMS T12:523b23-24, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 2:653). In this same comment, Baoliang also cites Śrīm on **prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta*: "This is why Śrīm takes up the topic of *tathāgatagarbha* and **prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta*" (是以『勝鬘經』說出如來藏與自性清淨心, 545b6-7); and says that both cause proper and conditions have Thusness as their essence (二因乃同用真如為體, 545b12-13). This passage is discussed by Nakanishi (1983: 115).

[70] Commenting on MPNMS T12:530b17-19 (Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 2:685).

substance, [the sentient being] becomes extinct, [in which case,] who is there to practice the path, and attain *nirvāṇa*? (若因中有性，為惑所纏，從因至果除惑說修，既有除惑之功，則修道義立。若因中無性，則唯是生滅，念念無常，當體自滅，誰有修道至涅槃耶? DBJJJ T37: 560b2-5).

The echoes with Wudi's problematic are obvious: the meaning and nature of practice; and the problem of "Who becomes Buddha?" in face of the momentariness of the constituents of the ordinary sentient being. Even further echoes of Wudi and Shen Ji are heard when Baoliang says, in discussing this same passage, "One intent of this passage is to show that it is possible for the sentient being to practice the path, even though its *shenshi* is extinguished from moment to moment" (第一明眾生，神識雖念念滅，得有修道之義, DBJJJ T37:560b12-13).

These examples could be further multiplied, but full treatment of the background of Wudi's essay in the Buddhist exegetical studies of his time would require broaching unstudied problems in Chinese Buddhist doctrinal history, which lie far beyond the scope of this study. Even this cursory examination, however, should suffice to show that Wudi's essay is merely the tip of an iceberg of ideas current in his time, and quite representative of contemporary developments. Indeed, as Itō points out, facts like those discussed above, and the way Wudi made use of the expertise of such leading clerics in other textual projects and on other doctrinal issues, makes us suspect that the *Shenming cheng fo yi* might have been written with the input of some of these figures, and even represent a kind of collective, official position on the issues it addresses (Itō, 1986: 239). Hopefully, the above examination will also serve to demonstrate that Wudi's essay has deep roots in scripture, and the scholastic engagement with those sources that animated his Buddhist world; indeed, that his essay cannot properly be understood without reference to this broader intertextual framework.

In sum, then, Wudi's essay, in conjunction with Shen Ji's more expansive comments, marks a significant new stage in the development of the ideas we are examining. These ideas had formed in the hands of the learned Southern exegete monks that Wudi gathered around him early in his reign, out of the encounter between the topics of earlier contro-

versies about survival of death, as sharpened by the provocative polemic of Fan Zhen, with the new scholastic engagement with the Abhidharmic categories of the *Tattvasiddhi,* the Buddha-nature and causality doctrines of MPNMS, and the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine of Śrīm. In this new synthesis, the focus is now upon consciousness less as the thread of continuity between ordinary incarnations, but rather, as the thread of continuity between the deluded and the liberated state. The distinction between an underlying, substantial or essential ground and a surface, epiphenomenal level of functioning in mind allows for an attempted resolution of the relation between ordinary momentary *vijñāna* (in a sense apparently indebted to Abhidharma) and an original, pure mind/consciousness which enables liberation and perhaps, by implication, endures into the liberated state. The texts clearly claim that this underlying essential substratum of mind-cum-consciousness is aboriginally pure and luminous. Obviously, in this latter dimension of the doctrines, the old theme of liberation as a return to the origin endures, even if it remains largely implicit.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the notion of "consciousness" (*vijñāna*), under a variety of labels, but most importantly called *shenshi/shishen,* became increasingly important in medieval Chinese debates about the survival of death. Related developments were seen in the use of the broader term "mind" (*xin*), and in the use of the term *shenming.* This study has traced those developments, most importantly, through Zong Bing; an anonymous Liu Song monastic author; Liang Wudi and Shen Ji; and previously under-explored context for the latter in the exegetical scholarship of the late fifth and early sixth century, especially Baoliang and Sengzong. These authors all ground their arguments more in Buddhist scripture than other contributors to the debates (including Huiyuan), who, by contrast, had a tendency to appeal to Chinese classics (with an emphasis on the neo-Daoist canon). These developments therefore seem to be linked to an ongoing process of increasing engagement with new scriptural sources translated around the turn of the fifth century, especially MPNMS, Śrīm and the

Tattvasiddhi; and especially with developments in scholastic comment and system-building on the basis of those sources.

Already from Zong Bing, these authors link *vijñāna* to the twelvefold chain of dependent origination, where, of course, the concept already played a pivotal role in theories of the precise mechanism of rebirth (see below). *Vijñāna* was understood by these authors to be a continuum or succession of momentary states of mind, a dimension of its significance which puzzled our anonymous Liu Song monastic author; the resolution of the dilemma posed by survival of death by a momentary entity is a central agenda for Wudi. Again beginning with Zong Bing, we see indications of the trope of a fundamentally pure mind which needs cleansing from adventitious defilements, and this aspect of the doctrine merely increases in strength over time as well. Behind this doctrine, we can discern the shadowy presence of liberation as a "return to the origin". As this dimension of these ideas suggests, from Zong Bing onwards, the concepts of *vijñāna* and mind in question were not only applied to resolve the dilemma of rebirth for ordinary sentient beings, and the continuity through successive lifetimes of ordinary *karma*; they were also connected to the problem of liberation, and there was a growing sense in which the entities so named figured as a kind of "subject" of liberation. Throughout these developments, further, the link to Buddha-nature doctrine grows increasingly clear, until in Wudi, Shenji, Baoliang and Sengzong, it is made explicit by clear and pivotal reference to MPNMS and Śrīm.

Previous scholars have often taken these entire debates about the survival of death by the spirit as evidence for, and an important part of, the "sinification" of Buddhist concepts. According to such a reading, Chinese Buddhists did not appreciate *anātman* doctrine, and could not understand the ins and outs of a theory of reincarnation without an essence of the person to act as the vehicle of rebirth. They thus wound up ironically propounding an "*ātmavāda*" in the name of Buddhist apologetics; that is, they attempted to convince their skeptical non-Buddhist contemporaries that a transmigrating person *did* exist, when the essence of Buddhist orthodoxy in India was precisely to hold, controversially, that it did not.

I hope that this study will help to show that such a reading is excessively simplistic (cf. Nakanishi, 1983: 120-121). First, such arguments

typically overlook the fact that key terms in the more sophisticated versions of the Buddhist position that developed over time were linked to *vijñāna,* not to a "self", a "person" or any concept directly commensurable with the polemical targets of *anātman* doctrine. Second, it can be shown that important aspects of ideas about *vijñāna* and related concepts in India were directly comparable to important parts of the doctrines of consciousness traced in this paper.[71] Third, the uses of *vijñāna* traced here through fifth and sixth century debates also have a longer history in China than is usually recognized.[72] As Itō Takatoshi has suggested, these notions may have had their origin in the translation of *jātaka/avadāna* literature, which required, in the Chinese context, that readers be given an explanation of how a person could be "the same" across multiple lifetimes, merely in order that the plotlines of the literature in question could be understood (Itō, 1986: 219-200). Examination of these deeper roots in Chinese Buddhist texts strengthen the claim that Chinese Buddhist doctrines about the "survival of death" could legitimately trace their provenance and pedigree back to India; as indeed, as we have seen, this is also the case when we more accurately trace the actual scriptural sources of the ideas of Wudi and his contemporaries. In this light, it is far from certain that we require a hypothesis of "sinification" to account for the ideas under study.

As I mentioned in opening, this paper is intended as part of a larger study into the possible background of **amalavijñāna* doctrine in both India and China, also taken as a case study in the problem of supposed "sinification" of Buddhist ideas. The ideas traced in this paper have many resonances with the shape eventually assumed by **amalavijñāna* doctrine: they concern a type of *vijñāna,* specifically linked to the problem of rebirth in *saṃsāra* through the *karmic* efficacy of defilements; but this *vijñāna,* in a Janus-faced manner, also has an aspect that is directed

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[71] The details required to demonstrate this lie beyond my scope here (see Radich, 2008: 95-97, and studies cited there; to which should be added Vetter, 2000: 66-73, and the studies he cites at 68-69).

[72] Demonstration of this claim is once again beyond the scope of the present paper. I address this problem in the companion piece to the present article (Radich, in preparation).

towards liberation, which is understood as a purification of an original or underlying substrate of the mind, and so has possible connections to *tathāgatagarbha,* Buddha-nature, Thusness, and so forth. I certainly think it is true, then, that the ideas traced here could be regarded as forerunners to, and possible influences upon, the eventual formation of *amalavijñāna* doctrine, as is also true of a number of other ideas current in China in roughly the same period, such as the antecedents to "survival of death" debates already mentioned; the trope of liberation as a "return to the origin"; aspects of the doctrines of the early *Buddhāvataṃsaka* commentator Lingbian (靈辯, 477–522) and of the Dilun master Fashang (法 上, 495–580); and so on. By the same token, however, I also hold that we can identify similarly ample possible antecedents to *amalavijñāna* in Indian materials.[73] It is therefore not possible to claim simply that *amalavijñāna* is necessarily either entirely Indian or entirely Chinese (though this has been the typical strategy of most scholars who have analyzed the concept and its history to date). This leads to methodological reflections on the ways the problem of the possible "sinification" of Buddhist ideas might be addressed, but such considerations will have to await future research.

Abbreviations

AKBh	*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*
AN	*Aṅguttara-nikāya*
Ch.	Chinese
D	Derge
DBJJJ	*Da banniepan jing ji jie* (大般涅槃經集解) T1763
DN	*Dīgha-nikāya*
GSZ	*Gao seng zhuan* (高僧傳) T2059
HMJ	*Hong ming ji* (弘明集) T2102
MN	*Majjhima-nikāya*
MPNMS	*Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* (T374 etc.)
PTS	Pali Text Society

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[73] Radich (unpublished).

SA   *Saṃyuktāgama* T99, T100
Skt.   Sanskrit
Śrīm   *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra*
T   *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* (大正新脩大藏經)*.* Chinese Buddhist
            Electronic Text Association, 2008. References to the Taishō
            follow the order: volume number: text number. page/regis-
            ter/line number. Thus, e.g. T8:225.483b17 is volume 8, text
            number 225, page 483, second register, line 17. I omit text
            numbers when using abbreviated titles, e.g. MPNMS, DBJJJ,
            HMJ.
Tib.   Tibetan
X   *Shinsan dai Nippon zokuzōkyō* (卍新纂大日本續藏經)*. Refer-*
            ences formatted as for T.

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The Process of Awakening in Early Texts on Buddha-Nature in India

Michael Zimmermann

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to throw some light on the question of how the authors of early texts on buddha-nature (*tathāgatagarbha*, *buddhadhātu* etc.) in India, in the first centuries of the Common Era, perceived the process of awakening, i.e., how they imagined the actual realization of this buddha-nature, and how they described this process in terms of their own underlying vision. As far as I can see, the discussions of the last twenty years or so about the question of whether buddha-nature thought might actually be Buddhist at all[1] have lost their immediate punch and relevance, and might already have become an historical topic to be studied in its own right. New approaches have entered the world of academic Buddhist Studies. They have shown Buddhism to be a multi-layered phenomenon to be studied on many diverse levels, and honored it as such, taking into consideration not only doctrinal aspects of the religion, but also the contexts in which these doctrines came into exis-

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[1] An excellent summary of the positions put forward by the proponents of the idea that buddha-nature is not Buddhist, on the one hand, and criticism of this position, on the other, is found in Hubbard and Swanson, 1997. It is my understanding that the representatives of the so-called Critical Buddhism movement (*hihan bukkyō* 批判仏教) started out with the aim of reforming certain deplorable states of affairs in Japanese Buddhism, but quickly turned against much of what characterizes the history of Buddhist ideas in India and beyond. Though their immediate aim was thus laudable, the normativity of their approach makes it difficult for a critical scholar of the intellectual history of Buddhism to accept their criticisms.

tence, as much as their assumed social ramifications. I have never doubted that the idea that all sentient beings have buddha-nature, alongside other notions, has always been of central interest for the Mahāyāna movement. It is an idea which can be found expressed in many of the *sūtra*s of the Mahāyāna – not only those explicitly dedicated to the elucidation of this issue, but also in texts which in certain passages subscribe to the theory in passing, so to say.[2]

Descriptions of buddha-nature in early Indian texts

For the topic at issue here, I would like first of all to recall the essence of what buddha-nature theory in India looked like. Regarding this point, it is probably safe to say that in terms of the fundamental structure, we are confronted with at least two quite distinct branches – and both of them seem already to have been present in what can be considered one of the oldest texts, if not *the* oldest text, dealing explicitly with the idea of buddha-nature in India: the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* (TGS).

The TGS probably came into existence in third-century India, and thus is not part of the oldest layer of Mahāyāna literature. However, it counts as one of the basic texts which form the earliest stage of the Indian development of buddha-nature thought.[3] A detailed analysis of the basic concepts contained in the TGS brings some interesting conclusions to light. First, the *sūtra* is structured as a series of similes, and does not allow for a consistent analysis along strict philosophical lines. This, however, is in any case not to be expected, given that the *sūtra* style is that of a narrative, aiming to draw the attention of its listeners directly to its main message. As in the TGS, the best way to do this is by means of similes, in which situations from daily life, with which the audience is well acquainted, illustrate metaphorically the spiritual concepts the text tries to promulgate. It is in these illustrations in the TGS, then, that two basic concepts of how buddha-nature should be imagined come to light.

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[2] The most comprehensive discussion of the scriptures on buddha-nature in India is still Takasaki, 1974.

[3] For a detailed study and translation of the TGS see Zimmermann, 2002.

Buddha-nature as already present, and only requiring disclosure

The first of these basic conceptions could be termed a *theory of disclosure*. Here, the underlying notion is that living beings already carry perfect buddhahood within themselves, just as is indicated by the term *tathāgatagarbha,* which, in the context of this *sūtra,* bears the sense of "containing a Buddha".[4] The main point of comparison (*tertium comparationis*) is that a precious and pure element is hidden within all living beings. However, this core is unknown to the living beings themselves; they are in need of some agent with supernatural faculties who can inform them about their precious essence, and only then will they take up the work of setting it free. This precious element, which all sentient beings have carried within themselves since beginningless time, is already perfect. In itself, it needs no transformation, no refinement, no change at all. Its nature is forever unchanging, just as gold will forever remain gold without ever losing the nature of gold, so that even if, as the *sūtra* has it, the piece of gold were to fall into a pit of excrement and lie hidden there for more than a thousand years, it would still be the very same gold.[5]

Parallel to this, in the spiritual realm, this element is identified with the buddha-nature of all living beings. This buddha-element is present in each sentient being, and in its essence, does not need any treatment in order to come to fruition. Living beings and buddhas are, in their essence, of the same eternally unchanging nature, i.e., they all carry the state of full awakening within themselves. However, even though this buddha-element is within them, nonetheless, its efficacy is blocked – because sentient beings are not aware of its existence, and, as a consequence of this unawareness, sentient beings have not turned to cleansing the buddha-element from external impurities, namely, the excrement of the simile, corresponding to the *kleśa*s, i.e., the emotional and cognitive defilements which completely cover these living beings' precious buddha-like nature. Once these defilements have been cleared away, the buddha-

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[4] For a detailed analysis of the compound *tathāgatagarbha* and its use in the TGS, see Zimmermann, 2002: 39–46.

[5] See TGS in Zimmermann, 2002: 117–119 ("The simile of a gold nugget in excrement").

nature can unfold its full potency, and a being that has realized this stage would be called a buddha in the full and unrestricted sense of the word.

This theory of disclosure bears striking similarities to other doctrines with which we are acquainted from elsewhere in the Indian religious world, such as, for instance, the Pāśupata doctrine of *abhivyakti*, which characterizes liberation as the manifestation of one's innate Śiva-like perfection through the removal of impurities (*mala*). It is therefore not so surprising to find similar ideas in the Buddhist doctrinal world as well. We will later come back to the question of how the process of disclosure of one's buddha-nature is imagined in detail.

Buddha-nature as something which has to be developed

Let us now turn to the second of the two basic concepts of how buddha-nature is imagined in the early *sūtra*s on *tathāgatagarbha,* which could be termed a *theory of development.* As I have shown at some length (Zimmermann, 2002: 50-67), in the very same TGS, we also find the idea that buddha-nature is an element, which is, however, not yet fully developed, but rather, is a germ or an embryo which still needs further ripening and appropriate nurturing in circumstances which would allow this element to come to full perfection. Here we are clearly talking about a different idea, i.e., the idea that living beings carry nothing more than a potential within themselves – a potential which is illustrated in the language of the *sūtra* by the image of a sprout inside the kernel of a plant, which will become a huge tree; or an embryo in the belly of a despised and ugly woman, where the embryo is destined in future to become a universal ruler (*cakravartin*). No doubt, the compound *tathāgatagarbha* conveniently allows for such an interpretation, given that the term *garbha* at the end of the compound also has the meaning of "embryo", which would bring the meaning of the whole term to "embryo of a tathāgata".

I am fairly sure that the authors of this early text did not spend too much time pondering the evolving implications of such different conceptions of buddha-nature. Rather, I suspect that at this early stage, the authors were probably aiming merely to convey to an audience, in terms as easily apprehensible as possible, the idea – which at that time was not so common – that all sentient beings can somehow attain full awakening.

Similes brought together from different fields of the experience of the audience served well to accomplish this task. However, it was only natural that not all of the similes chosen in this process would prove to imply the same underlying conception of how exactly this buddha-nature or buddha-germ should be imagined.

Of course, the implications resulting from this alternative model were to become rather significant. The actual process of awakening would not be seen any more as a disclosure of an essence assumed to have hitherto been latently present in living beings, as I described it above; rather, we could call the underlying idea a *theory of development*, in the sense that the buddha-constituting characteristics would now have to be brought to ripening by the sentient being, and awakening would only become effective once this had been done.

In sum, the first formulations of buddha-nature thought in India deal with two rather diverse concepts: that of *disclosure* on the one hand, and that of *development* on the other. This is the first conclusion that we can draw from an analysis of the earliest texts on buddha-nature in India.

Awakening from the perspective of sentient beings

Let us look at some other issues which come to light in the TGS, in the context of our discussion of the process of awakening. Here, I would like to focus on the perspective from which the awakening is described, and contrast it to that found in what can be counted as one of the *sūtra*'s most direct forerunners: the **Tathāgatotpattisaṃbhava-nirdeśa* (TUSN), first translated into Chinese by the Indo-Scythian monk Dharmarakṣa under the title *Fo shuo rulai xingxian jing* 佛說如來興顯經,[6] with later translations as a part of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*. Dharmarakṣa's translation was made at the end of the 3rd century CE, which is about the same time that the first translation into Chinese of the TGS is reported to have been

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6 T10:291.592c–617b; later translations are the *Da fangguang Fo huayan jing Baowang Rulai xingqi pin* 大方廣佛華嚴經寶王如來性起品, translated by Buddhabhadra (359–429 CE), T9:278.611b–633b, and the *Da fangguang Fo huayan jing Rulai chuxian pin* 大方廣佛華嚴經如來出現品, translated by Śikṣānanda (652–710 CE), T10:279.262a–278c.

produced.[7] In a famous simile in the TUSN, which is structurally identic-
al with the nine similes of the TGS, tathāgata-knowledge (*tathāgatajñāna*),
which is said to permeate all sentient beings without exception, is com-
pared to a piece of cloth with the whole universe painted on it in its ori-
ginal size.[8] We are to imagine what would happen if the cloth were then
to be compressed to the size of a tiny particle. In this form, it would be
completely useless; only a person with god-like vision would be able to
perceive how rich the content of this particle was, whereupon they
might break it open with a diamond, and so make it useful for the whole
world. In the same way, the Tathāgata is then said to teach living beings
and induce them to practice the Noble Path, so that in the end, they will
recognize the pervasive nature of the Buddha's knowledge and attain
"equality" (*samatā*) with the tathāgatas.[9]

Setting aside the obvious structural parallelism to the similes of the
TGS, what makes the passage in the TUSN distinctly different from our
sūtra is the viewpoint from which the whole scenario is described. The
TGS is based on the viewpoint of individual sentient beings each equip-
ped with buddha-nature, which in several passages is also called *tathāga-*
tajñāna; that is to say, each single sentient being is seen as the "owner" of
his or her own internal buddha-knowledge, with this knowledge neatly
packaged in confined personal units. The main point of reference here is
the sentient being and the fact of his or her inherent buddhahood. All
this is in clear contrast to the TUSN, whose mission is to illustrate and
glorify the unfathomable qualities of the Tathāgata: his unlimited and
undifferentiated outreach to all living beings; his supreme compassion
and active engagement in liberating sentient beings; the omnipresence
of his body, voice, and knowledge; and his never changing, eternal na-
ture. Living beings merely happen to fall within the sphere of his efficacy,
without ever stepping into the foreground. They are the *objects* of the
Tathāgata's all-pervasiveness, like everything else, profiting from his be-
neficial work irrespective of any differentiation. It is the quasi-totalistic

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[7] For a discussion of the dates see Zimmermann, 2002: 69–75.

[8] The illustration is cited in Sanskrit in the *Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā* (RGVV), 22.10–24.8.
All references to the RGVV are from the text as edited in Johnston, 1950.

[9] A part of the Sanskrit text is provided below.

eternal realm of the Tathāgata, the *dharmadhātu*, which is portrayed in these passages of the TUSN.

The author(s) of the TGS, however, were not interested in this dimension of the Tathāgata. They took up the task of thinking through what this all-pervasiveness of buddha-knowledge would mean when seen from the individual perspective of sentient beings, and how this idea would work out in a concrete form: that is, how this buddha-knowledge in each being is to be imagined; why it does not manifest itself immediately; what the Tathāgata's role in the whole process would be; and not least, how, on this model, it would be possible to become awakened at all. In other words, this new perspective shifted to a view from "below", so that the more abstract doctrine of an all-pervading Tathāgata, of which the TUSN is just one representative, was turned upside down. What seems important here is that in contrast to the TUSN, the early beginnings of buddha-nature thought in India were based on a view which focused on the individual as the major anchoring point and described the issue of awakening from this perspective – a remarkable step towards setting aside the Buddha's beneficial influence as the major or even the *only* source for the attainment of awakening by sentient beings.

The role of the Buddha on the path to realization

This leads to a third point worth mentioning: in the TGS, the exact role of the Buddha on the path to realization is not completely clear. In my view, the *sūtra* seems to follow in the footsteps of the *Lotus Sūtra,* in which the standard portrayal of the Buddha is that of an almighty father figure, who takes care of and protects living beings just as he would his own children.[10] In many passages, however, the TGS is not very explicit, and it is left to the reader to figure out the exact impact of the salvific activities of the Tathāgata, and where the individual striving of the sentient being itself has to be involved. It seems that the emphasis fluctuates: some particular passages seem to go so far as to present the role of the Tathāgata as that of the decisive person in charge of liberating senti-

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[10] On the relation between the TGS and the *Lotus Sūtra* see Zimmermann, 1999. For a completely different view cp. Kariya, 1979.

ent beings – he envisions the benefit of sentient beings and, so it seems, does the job of liberating them all by himself; whereas in other passages, the role of the Buddha is more restricted, and he functions merely as somebody who stimulates or encourages sentient beings to strive for awakening.

This brings us to a fourth interesting observation regarding the question how the path leading to liberation is conceived of in the early *sūtra*s on buddha-nature. Strikingly, no concrete descriptions of this path are found in the texts, and no particular recommendations for moral or spiritual practices are provided. This problem does not even seem to be on the radar for the authors, that is, it seems not to attract their interest whatsoever. As I said earlier, the main point seems merely to be to promulgate the new idea that all sentient being have buddha-nature. In place of such concrete models, all we find in the TGS (towards the end) are some fairly stereotypical Mahāyāna-like encouragements to memorize the *sūtra*, copy it and propagate it to other people, which is supposed to result in beneficial results and finally lead to awakening (TGS 10A–10D).

One very interesting question, in this respect, is that of the terms in which the realization of awakening is portrayed in the texts. The TUSN passage I already mentioned earlier, which has come down to us in Sanskrit through citation in the *Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā* (RGVV),[11] employs the verbal root *pratyabhi-jñā* with respect to the realization of *tathāgatajñāna*. This term is remarkable in this context, as it suggests a kind of recollection of the vision of a buddha, in precisely the sense of rediscovering something which one has always been connected with inside of oneself, albeit not knowingly. Let us look at the TUSN passage in question in some more detail:

> Suppose now that by teaching [them] the Noble [Eightfold] Path, I remove from these sentient beings all the fetters that are caused by [their wrong] conceptions, so that through attaining power [by following] the Noble Path, they remove this great knot of [wrong] conceptions by themselves, recognize *tathāgatajñāna* [which penetrates

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11 See n. 8 above.

them through and through], and attain equality with the tathāgatas. Then, thanks to the Tathāgata's teaching [them] the Path, they will get rid of all the fetters caused by [wrong] conceptions (RGVV 24.4–7).

yan nv aham eṣāṃ sattvānām āryamārgopadeśena[A] *sarvasaṃjñākṛtaban-dhanāpanayanaṃ kuryāṃ yathā svayam evāryamārgabalādhānena maha-tīṃ saṃjñāgranthiṃ vinivartya tathāgatajñānaṃ pratyabhijānīran | tathā-gatasamatāṃ cānuprāpnuyuḥ | te tathāgatamārgopadeśena sarvasaṃjñākṛ-tabandhanāni vyapanayanti |*

[A] *āryeṇa mārgo°* emended to *āryamargo°* according to Takasaki, 1966: 397]

This passage is very clear in attributing the actual process of purification to sentient beings alone (*svayam eva*). The Tathāgata's role is limited to teaching them the Eightfold Path, thereby setting their purifying activi-ties in motion. The text stresses that it is sentient beings themselves who remove their misconceptions and finally realize *tathāgatajñāna.* The verb used to describe this realization is *pratyabhijānīte.* It is here used in the sense of "to become aware of" or "recognize" something which living be-ings have always been carrying around within them, namely *tathāgata-jñāna.* This recognition is the result of living beings' practice along the Noble Path, and coincides with the full manifestation of their *tathāgata-jñāna*, the realization of their buddhahood.

The verb *pratyabhijānīte* implies, then, more than just the pure act of recognizing. According to this TUSN passage, recognition can only take place when living beings follow the Noble Path. It is thus clear that the meaning of *pratyabhijānīte* in this passage goes far beyond the process of abstractly remembering the fact that one possesses buddha-nature. Here, the term implies a fundamental change brought about by the adoption of certain rules and corresponding behaviors that lead to the full manifes-tation of buddhahood. In the lines preceding the passage translated above, the Buddha had stated that as long as living beings are defiled by wrong conceptions, they would not "be aware of" or "realize" their *ta-thāgatajñāna.* Four verbs are used in these lines, and we can see that they cover the meaning contained in the verb *pratyabhijānīte*. These verbs are *jānanti*, *prajānanti*, *anubhavanti* and *sākṣātkurvanti* (RGVV 24.1). It is quite possible that any such Sanskrit term could be understood in both ways, i.e., "to become aware of" and "to accomplish". The former alternative

would entail that knowledge of the presence of a buddha within was considered extremely important on the path leading to awakening.

The importance of religious confidence and motivation (*śraddhā*) for the process of awakening

This fourth point leads to another question, that is, the role of *śraddhā* in the awakening process.[12] In one of its verses, the RGV(V), the most important systematic treatise on buddha-nature in India, argues that just as a blind person cannot see the blazing sun, in the same way, the highest truth can only be grasped (*anugantavya*) by means of religious confidence and motivation (RGV I.153). The immediately following commentary adds that *dharmatā*, i.e., absolute reality, cannot be the object of deliberative thinking (*na cintayitavyā*) nor of conceptual construction (*na vikalpayitavyā*), but can only be approached by means of conviction and delight (*adhimoktavyā*). This idea is further discussed in the commentary to verse I.36, which has it that the cultivation of conviction and delight in the teachings of the Mahāyāna (*mahāyānadharmādhimuktibhāvanā*) is one of the causes of the purification of the *tathāgatadhātu*, the buddha-element, from the adventitious defilements which obscure it in the state of non-awakening. Conviction and delight is here deemed necessary as an antidote to break the doubts of those who do not find pleasure in the teachings of the Mahāyāna, and in particular, to break the hostile resistance of the so-called *icchantika*s.

In other passages, it is made clear that religious confidence and motivation (*śraddhā*) is understood as a necessary means for approaching absolute reality not only for worldly persons, but also for *śrāvaka*s and *pratyekabuddha*s, who can comprehend only in this way the inconceivable

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[12] I understand the complex Sanskrit term *śraddhā* in this context as "religious confidence and motivation". It partly overlaps with the term *adhimukti* ("conviction and delight") as can be seen from the passage immediately below. A comprehensive analysis of both of these terms and their exact connotations in the context of Mahāyāna Buddhism is, to my knowledge, still a desideratum. In my attempt to render *śraddhā* I aimed at avoiding the standard translation "faith", which has deep roots and implications in the Christian theological traditions. My understanding and translation of *śraddhā* owes a great deal to Hacker, 1963.

fact that mind is both naturally pure (*prakṛtipariśuddhacitta*), that is, that it is buddha-nature; and that it is defiled (*upakliṣṭatā*) at the same time. This, by the way, is also said to hold true for the *bodhisattva* who has freshly set out on the Mahāyāna path (*navayānasaṃprasthita*).[13]

On the other hand, the texts are largely silent about the question of whether this same *śraddhā* can also function as the decisive (and maybe even exclusive) means for attaining awakening. In one passage, the RGVV emphasizes that only *bodhisattva*s endowed with great qualities (*mahādharmasamanvāgata*) are able to understand the highest truth, whereas others need to base themselves on confidence in the buddhas (*tathāgataśraddhā*).[14] My impression is that in the earliest texts on buddha-nature, we do not find a homogenous position on the question of how *śraddhā*, on the one hand, and discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*) or non-conceptual gnosis (*jñāna*), on the other, are linked, in the process of attaining awakening. That different interpretations of their relation exist is demonstrated, for instance, by much later Tibetan commentators and schools, from a period when buddha-nature doctrine became a topic of vivid debate in Tibet, spawning a wide range of diverse positions.

Now, we do not know the exact historical developments through which Indian texts on buddha-nature came into existence, and even texts like the RGV and its commentary seem to be end products of complex developments in both their compilation and their diverse interpretative strategies, as Takasaki Jikidō and Lambert Schmithausen have convincingly shown.[15] Given this, I tend to conceive of the oldest layer of buddha-nature texts as belonging to a branch of Mahāyāna Buddhism which is more oriented towards factors of religious emotionality as crucial in the process of attaining liberation – a branch whose main emphasis lies on the non-rational recognition of the overwhelmingly positive and absolute character of buddhahood and buddha-nature. Especially in

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[13] See, e.g., RGV(V) commentary to I.1 and I.25; verse I.153.

[14] See RGVV 22.1-4 (quoting from the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*).

[15] Based on Takasaki Jikidō's ground-breaking study of the RGVV, in which he outlines his idea of the oldest parts of the RGVV (Takasaki, 1966), there is at least one more contribution of fundamental importance that takes up and elaborates upon Takasaki's argument, namely Schmithausen, 1971.

two other early texts on buddha-nature, the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvā-ṇa-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālā-sūtra,* we find buddhahood exposed in very positive terms, such as claims that it is permanent (*nitya*), blissful (*sukha*), pure (*śubha*) and even self (*ātman*).[16] These characterizations are cited in the RGV(V), and lead me to assume that the beginnings of buddha-nature thought in India lie more in the direction of an orientation towards particular religious emotions, such as confidence, and a resulting positive motivation, or, in Schmithausen's terms, a "positive-mystical" direction, rather than in a direction which has been labeled a "negative-intellectual" conception of liberation and awakening.[17]

The RGV understands itself as an attempt to correct the failure to positively appreciate the factors that constitute buddhahood, which are, according to the RGV, truly existent; while at the same time correcting the foolish assumption that other *dharma*s are real, whereas in fact, they have no existence in themselves.[18] Indeed, the topics of confidence in buddhahood, the supporting power of one's buddha-nature, and the need to engage with full motivation emerge as a principal theme in one of the similes found in the TGS, i.e., the simile of the pregnant woman who, ugly and despised though she feels, unknowingly carries a future world-emperor in her womb.[19]

This same issue of the importance of confidence and motivation undergoes a more lengthy treatment in another *sūtra*, which, according to Takasaki, is also part of the oldest layer of texts on buddha-nature: the *Śrīmālā-sūtra.* However, the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* also does not seem to expound a unified structure in terms of which the awakening process should be imagined, and which stipulates a definitive position for these factors in this process.

One of the underlying problems which seem to pervade the history of buddha-nature thought can already be felt here: How can the buddha-

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[16] See the commentary and the citation of the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* in RGVV 30.9–31.6.

[17] This is, of course, a topic far too extensive to touch upon in more detail. Suffice it to point out some of the works dealing with this topic from one perspective or another: la Vallée Poussin, 1937; Schmithausen, 1981; Vetter, 1988.

[18] See RGV verses I.36, 37 with the prose commentary.

[19] See TGS 8A-C and corresponding verses, in Zimmermann, 2002.

element, which is ultimately transcendent in character and is of the same nature with the buddhas, be realized cognitively in this world?[20] Soteriologically, the buddha-nature of all sentient beings implies, no doubt, the immanence of the absolute. On the other hand, the source texts claim that this pure absolute reality, which at the same time is also defiled, is beyond rational thinking (*acintya*) and accessible only to an omniscient being (*sarvajñaviṣaya*).[21] How then should this absolute, which is immanent only from a soteriological standpoint, be cognitively grasped? I am afraid that the texts are not explicit enough to allow for an answer to this question. My impression is, once again, that the proponents of the theory did not focus on expounding an exact Abhidharma-style framework for the process of awakening, but rather, aimed at producing a new and inspiring spiritual concept, which would be understood by practitioners and encourage them on their path to spiritual emancipation.

The efficacy of buddhahood

In closing this paper, I would like to deal with the question of how the awakened state, and the characteristics of an individual who has undergone this transformative process, will become manifest. Here, I think, we are on more solid ground, given that the texts abound with descriptions of how the state of buddhahood is to be imagined, and how the activities of a buddha are to be described. RGV(V) alone dedicates the last two of its five chapters to the qualities of a buddha (*buddhaguṇa*) and the acts of a buddha (*jinakriyā*). The author(s) of the TGS, similarly, do not tire of emphasizing that the realization of one's buddha-nature leads to the performance of the tasks of a buddha by the awakened individual.[22] The

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[20] Exactly this question, both from a more general perspective and with respect to the buddha-nature scriptures, is dealt with in Ruegg, 1989, to which I owe much inspiration.

[21] See RGVV 21.17–18 and 74.10.

[22] In the latter part of most of the nine illustrations, we find typical statements such as the following: "...then [they] will be designated 'tathāgata, honorable one and perfectly awakened one', and [they] will also perform all the tasks of a tathāgata" (1B);

texts obviously consider this fact as an automatic consequence of the manifestation of one's buddha-nature, and in several passages it is stated that this activity is a characteristic of buddhahood.

This in itself demonstrates that efficaciousness was a key category in the early stage of *tathāgatagarbha* thought. The reason for describing a buddha primarily in terms of dynamic activity may well lie in an attitude in which worldly engagement predominates over more theoretical concerns. At the same time, we encounter another characteristic of the buddha-nature teaching, namely, that the attributes of a buddha are thought of as inseparably linked to absolute reality, which, of course, also constitutes the buddha-nature of sentient beings. This makes the buddha qualities *per se* unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) elements.[23] Consequently, once living beings realize their true nature, their buddha qualities, being inseparably linked with it, automatically become active too. This is by no means a general matter of course, given that in other soteriological systems, the buddha qualities count as additional elements which, after one has realized ultimate reality, can be produced in a kind of supplementary process in order for one to count as a full buddha. The Yogācāra teaching of the five *gotras*, where different levels of awakening are taken into consideration and not all of them lead to complete buddhahood, is just a sophisticated reflection of this old Buddhist idea, completely alien to our buddha-nature texts. At the same time, the *tathāgatagarbha* texts thus seem to promote the idea of a perfect uniformity of buddhahood in terms of the full arrangement of all buddha qualities, without leaving any room for individual traits. In terms of the buddha-nature theory, all these uncreated buddha-qualities will always unfold their efficacy, inde-

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"[When their] tathāgata's mental vision (*tathāgatajñānadarśana*) has become purified, [they] will perform the tasks of a tathāgata in the world" (2B); "[I do this] in order to induce those [sentient beings], after becoming tathāgatas, to continually perform the tasks [of a tathāgata] throughout the world, and with readiness in speech to teach the Dharma..." (2.4); "At some point [you will] attain the essence of awakening (*bodhimaṇḍa*). Then [you] will proceed to liberate myriads of living beings" (8.6). All passages from the TGS are quoted from Zimmermann, 2002.

23 See the citation from the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* in RGVV (73.1–5) and the discussion of this issue as found in the RGV(V) in Schmithausen, 1973: 135–138.

pendent of the particular exercises the individual predominantly culti-
vated before his awakening.

This, however, is just as should be expected, given that the idea that
all beings have buddha-nature implies that there cannot be an alterna-
tive level of liberation, be it above or below that of a buddha. Just like the
sun, so will each buddha, once awakened, shine indifferently on all other
sentient beings, without needing to activate a particular function in or-
der to do so.[24] I consider this last point – that buddha qualities are un-
created and latently present in all living beings – particularly worth
mentioning, given that it is exactly this somewhat this-worldly dimen-
sion of the *tathāgatagarbha* strand of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and its view of
the liberated individual, that positions it in contrast to some of its doc-
trinal predecessors and competitors.

Abbreviations

RGV(V)   *Ratnagotravibhāga*(*vyākhyā*)
TGS   *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*
TUSN   **Tathāgatotpattisaṃbhava-nirdeśa*

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[24] See, e.g., RGV IV.63–65.

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