

item of the necessary informations about the activities in different months), "Within the first decade of the 7th month, the monastic manager is to announce to the monks of all apartments the list of Scriptures to be read in the coming Ullambāna Ceremony, and at the same time to have contributions collected before-hand for preparation of the bushels of food to be offered as sacrifice. On the 13th, the Lêng-yen Assembly is to conclude, and on the 15th the summer retreat expires. In that evening, the Ullambāna offering is performed including recitation of Scriptures and giving of food (to ghosts)." Regulations for the same occasion are also found in the *Pure Rules of the Huan-chu Monastery* composed by Ming-pê of the Yüan dynasty, in which he writes, "On the 15th day of the 7th month, the summer retreat expires. In the evening the holy Ullambana Service is held to deliver the departed souls from the infernal regions in requital of the parental favours they have done us. The list of scriptures to be read in the ceremony should be announced before-hand so that monks may make preparatory perusals according to their convenience. The ceremony includes an altar-performance of nectar-giving which should be duly observed." All these records will attest to the fact that the principal items of the Ullambāna Service practised at that time consisted in the recitation of Scriptures and the giving of food to spirits.

This performance continued to prevail till the Ming dynasty. Chu-hung in his *Writings on the Rectification of Erroneous Practices* tried to set the thing straight. "People of to-day" writes he, "generally regard the Ullambana Ceremony held on the 15th day of the 7th month as a rite of giving food to ghosts and spirits. This is a mistake. The Ullambana traces its origin to Maudgalyāyana. It was so prescribed because the 15th day of the 7th month is the day when the monks conclude, their summer retreat and begin to make confessions. Through the past three months of cultivation, there must be many who have achieved enlightenment. Consequently offerings made on this day will reap hundred fold of bliss. It is not meant at all to give food to ghosts and spirits. The rite of food-giving has its own origin, that is, from Ānanda. Moreover, the time of its performance has never been fixed on the 15th of the 7th month, and the utensil to be used is the Magadha bushel, not the Ullambana vessel. The purport of the one is to serve the wise and the saintly, whereas that of the other is to deliver the *pretas*. The one is motivated by the sense of respect

while the other by the sense of compassion. How should acts of so widely different causes be mixed up as the same thing" I-jun of the Ch'ing dynasty attempted to bring about a reconciliation by advocating a dual practice of offering the Ullambana vessel at day as a Pious service to the Triple-gem and giving the bushelful of food at night as a universal salvation to the ghosts and spirits. In the 8th fascicle of his *Record of the Ascertained Meanings of the Pure Rules of Pali-chang*, I-jun has an abstract of the important items of the Ullambana Ceremony given in details, saying that the full, text is to be found in the *Collective Manual of the Ullambana Ceremony*. The programme he formulated includes such items as the purification of the altar by chanting Scriptures in procession going around it, the presenting of offerings with the Ullambana vessel, the distribution of food among monks, and other rituals, with 21 regulations for the performance appended at the end. This prescription, however, has not been observed at large among monasteries. In the minds of common people in general, the offering of sacrifices to the departed and the salvation of the ghosts still remain the principal functions of the Ullambana performance. This is the condition that this age-long ceremony has eventually come to.

Chou Shu-chia

UPĀDĀNA stands for "taking up", "grasping", "clinging" and "holding on to", as well as for that which is clung to, in the sense of its "basis", "sub-strata", "supply" or "fuel". As the tendency of the mind to cling or grasp, *upādāna* constitutes the ninth factor in the twelve-link series of dependent arising, *paṭicca samuppāda*, being the outcome of craving and leading on to becoming or existence, *bhava*.

As the conditioning force for *bhava*, *upādāna* stands for clinging to sensual pleasures, to views, to vows and observances, and to a doctrine of self, *kāmapādāna*, *diṭṭhupādāna*, *sīlabbatupādāna* and *attavādūpādāna* (M. I, 51). According to the register of terms given in the detailed treatment of the four types of *upādāna* in the *Dhammasaṅgani*, the first of these four, clinging to sensual pleasures, is similar in nature to sensual desire, sensual lust and sensual craving, *kāmacchanda*, *kāmarāga*, *kāmataphā* (Dhs. 212). That is, whether manifesting as clinging, desire, lust or

craving, the pivotal role in regard to the dilemma of the first type of *upādāna* is infatuation with *kāma*, sen-sual pleasures.

Clinging to sensual pleasures

The lure of *kāma* causes the arising of sensual desire, *kāmacchanda*, which constitutes one of the lower fetters, (*D. III*, 234). The same lure is also responsible for sensual lust, one of the underlying tendencies, *kāmarāgānusaya*. This tendency is already present in a new-born baby (*D. III*, 254). The dire results of craving for sensuality, *kāmataphā*, are similar to the case of a leper who cauterises his wounds over a fire and scratches them, experiencing momentary relief through an act that aggravates his condition (*M. I*, 507; See also TAṆHĀ). Hence *kāmupādāna*, clinging to sensual pleasures, has a broad compass and its removal is a central task for being able to progress on the path to liberation.

A series of stark imageries in the *Potaliya Sutta* compares sensual pleasures to meatless bones that are not able to satisfy a dog's hunger; to a bird that is attacked by other birds because it has gotten hold of a piece of meat; to holding a blazing torch against the wind and therefore getting scorched; to being thrown into a glowing charcoal pit; to illusory images seen only in a dream; to borrowed goods that have to be returned to their owner; and to climbing a tree in search of fruit, only to find that someone else is cutting down the tree and one risks severe injury unless one descends quickly (*M. I*, 364). The predicament that results from sensual pleasures is also taken up in the *Mahādukkhakkhandha Sutta*, which depicts in detail the toil and suffering, as well as the quarrel and warfare, that result from the pursuit of their satisfaction (*M. I*, 85).

Clinging to views

The resultant evils of the second of the four types of *upādāna*, clinging to views, *ditṭhupādāna*, are a prominent theme in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* of the *Sutta Nipāta*. The *Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka Sutta* highlights how attachment to one's own views makes it difficult to relinquish them (*Sn. 781* and *785*). According to the *Paramatṭhaka Sutta*, the cause for unending quarrelling is high esteem for one's own view and the consequent looking down on any other view (*Sn. 796-797*). Thus

some will delight in verbal debate and treat others as fools, the *Pasūra Sutta* points out, hoping to gain victory and fearing defeat (*Sn. 824-828*). Yet, if one were a fool simply by dint of holding another view, the *Cūlavīyūha Sutta* remarks, then all debating recluses should be reckoned fools (*Sn. 880* and *890*). As the same discourse points out, such dogmatic upholding of one's own view is but a manifestation of conceit and lust for one's own view (*Sn. 889* and *891*).

The problem behind clinging to views is that "what incites a person to cling passionately to his own view is more often his consciousness and esteem of the self, rather than the consciousness of truth. The dogmatist wishes to safeguard his view at whatever cost, because the refutation of his views means to him defeat and self degradation".¹ Thus it is precisely the degree of clinging to and identification with a particular view that leads to dogmatic adherence and various measures to protect it, to unwillingness to let go of it even when faced with compelling evidence. As a discourse in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* explains, it is due to being bound by views and being obsessed by them that recluses continue to quarrel with each other (*A. I*, 66). Since to hold any view dogmatically will inevitably lead to conflict with those that have different views, the only solution is to let go of clinging to views (*M. I*, 499). The need to let go of clinging might even be of relevance in relation to right view, in the sense of letting go of any dogmatic adherence and identification with it.²

Clinging to vows and observances

The implications of *silabbata*, the object of the third type of *upādāna*, can best be ascertained by turning to the *Kukkuravatika Sutta*. This discourse describes contemporary ascetics that were engaged in behaving like a dog or a cow, the *kukkura-vata*, *kukkura-sīla* or else the *go-vata*, *go-sīla* (*M. I*, 387). Such and other types of vows and observances were apparently undertaken in ancient India in the belief that they would lead to purification or to rebirth in heaven.³ However, in a verse in the *Dhammapada* the Buddha enjoined his own monks to go beyond vows and observances, which indicates that this type of clinging could also become a problem for Buddhist monastics (*Dhp. 271*).⁴ In fact a discourse in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* points out that vows and observances in themselves can be either wholesome

or unwholesome (*A. I, 225*), hence here too the problem is to be found in the act of clinging to them.

Clinging to a doctrine of self

The fourth type of *upādāna*, clinging to a doctrine of self, *attavādūpādāna*, is according to the *Cūḷasihanāda Sutta* a mode of clinging and grasping that is beyond the ken of other recluses and Brahmins. Though these may recognize the predicament inherent in the other three types of clinging, the problem posed by clinging to a self is characteristic of the Buddha's teaching alone (*M. I, 67*). The exposition given in the *Dhammasaṅgani* explains clinging to a doctrine of self with the help of altogether twenty modes of construing a sense of identity, twenty modes also regularly listed in the discourses (*Dhs. 212*). These proceed by taking any of the five aggregates to be a self; the self to be possessed of the aggregate; the aggregate to be part of the self; or the self to be part of the aggregate (See SAKKĀYADIṬṬHI).

Within the context of the twelve-link scheme of dependent arising, *paṭicca samuppāda*, the above listed four types of *upādāna* should account for any clinging that leads to any type of *bhava*. Yet, on closer inspection it seems as if the four types of clinging might not completely cover all types of clinging. Clinging to sensuality, *kāmuṇupādāna*, would be left behind with the attainment of non-returner, when the fetter of sensual desire, *kāmacchanda*, will be eradicated. Clinging to views, *diṭṭhupādāna*, should according to the *Dhammasaṅgani* be understood to stand for clinging to wrong views, *sabbāpi micchadiṭṭhi diṭṭhupādānaṃ* (*Dhs. 212*). Such clinging would thus be overcome already with streamentry. The same would be the case for clinging to vows and observances and for clinging to a doctrine of self, *silabbatupādānaṃ attavādūpādānaṃ*, which with the removal of the two fetters of personality view and of dogmatic adherence to vows and observances would similarly be left behind at streamentry. From this perspective, then, it would seem as if a non-returner has already successfully overcome all four types of *upādāna*.

Hence "this traditional fourfold division of clinging is not quite satisfactory. Besides *kāmuṇupādāna* we should expect either *rūpupādāna* and *arūpupādāna*, or simply *bhavupādāna*. Though the Anāgāmi is entirely

free from the ... four kinds of *upādāna*, he is not freed from rebirth, as he still possesses *bhavupādāna*."⁵⁵ In fact, the remainder of *upādāna* of a non-returner comes up explicitly in several passages that depict how a certain mode of practice has the potential of leading either to non-returning or else to *arahant*-ship. Such passages indicate that in the case of a non-returner final knowledge here and now is not won since there is a remainder of clinging left, *sati vā upādīsese* (e.g. *M. I, 63*).

A solution to this problem could be found by turning to the Chinese *Āgamas*. The Chinese parallels to the analysis of *upādāna* given in the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* and in the *Cūḷasihanāda Sutta* differ in so far from the Pāli versions as, instead of referring to clinging to 'a doctrine of self', they simply speak of clinging to 'a self' (*T. I, 463a7; T. I, 591a22; T. II, 644a16*). Clinging to a self would indeed be a form of clinging that is only overcome with the attainment of *arahant*-ship. Thus on adopting the reading found in the Chinese *Āgamas*, which speak only of clinging to a self, the four types of clinging would cover all the forms of *upādāna* responsible for any type of *bhava*.

The persistence of a subtle type of clinging to a sense of 'I' even in a non-returner is the theme of the *Khemaka Sutta*, which clarifies that even though a noble disciple may have overcome the five lower fetters and thereby become a non-returner, still a trace of the sense of 'I' in regard to the five aggregates of clinging remains (*S. III, 130*). By way of illustration, this discourse describes how a dirty and soiled cloth can be cleaned with the help of cleaning salt, lye and cow dung. Though after rinsing the cloth in water it would be clean, yet, a remainder of the smell of the cleaning salt, lye and cow dung still pervades the cloth, and it is only after the cloth has been kept in a perfumed casket that this remainder will also disappear.

In addition to the simile of the cleaned cloth, the *Khemaka Sutta* also presents another simile to illustrate how a subtle clinging to a sense of 'I' can remain even when the selfless nature of each of the five aggregates is well understood and realized. This simile involves the scent of a lotus. Just as the sense of 'I' remains even though it cannot be identified as belonging to any of the five aggregates, so too the scent of a lotus cannot be identified as belonging to the petals or the stalk or the pistils, as it belongs to the flower as a whole (*S. III, 130*).

That even the most subtle sense of an 'I' should be reckoned as a form of clinging comes to the fore in another simile that forms part of a penetrative instruction that led to the stream-entry of Ānanda (S. III, 105). According to this instruction, the sense of 'I' arises only when there is clinging or grasping, *upādāya 'asmī'ti hoti, no anupādāya*, just as it is only by grasping a mirror that one is able to see one's own face. This simile conveys how "it is when one looks into a mirror that one suddenly becomes self-conscious ... one gets the notion 'this is me' ... the moment one looks into a mirror one is suddenly reminded of it, as if to exclaim: 'Ah, here I am!'"⁶

What is grasped or clung to, according to this discourse, are none other than the five aggregates of bodily form, feeling, perception, volitional formations and consciousness. This, then, discloses another important perspective on *upādāna*, namely its role in relation to the "five aggregates of clinging", or perhaps better the "five aggregates affected by clinging", *pañc c'upādānakkhandhā*.

Clinging and the five aggregates

The role of *upādāna* in the context of the *pañc c'upādānakkhandhā* is of considerable importance, since according to the standard definition of the first noble truth, these *pañc'upādānakkhandhā* are the succinct manifestation of the truth of *dukkha*. This is the case to such an extent that one discourse even dispenses with the other explanations usually given, according to which birth, old age, death etc. are *dukkha*, and simply states that the five aggregates affected by clinging are the first noble truth, *katamañca dukkham ariyasaccaṃ? Pañc'upādānakkhandhā 'ti'ssa vacanīyaṃ* (S. V, 425).

The eminent role of *upādāna* in this respect is reflected in some shortened versions of the dependent arising of *dukkha* that set in directly with clinging, without mentioning the preceding eight links and then follow up the chain of dependent arising through the remaining links of the series. A case in point is the *Māgandīya Sutta*, which takes off from grasping at the five aggregates and proceeds via becoming and birth to old age and death (M. I, 511). A discourse in the *Samyutta Nikāya* begins by describing the arising of delight in relation to the five aggregates, followed by equating delight with clinging, *yā nandī tad upādānaṃ*, and then filling in the rest of the series (S. III, 14).

According to the *Cūlavedalla Sutta*, *upādāna* is not the same as the five *upādānakkhandhas*, nor is it something apart from them. Rather, *upādāna* stands for desire and lust in regard to them, *pañcas' upā-dā-nak-khandhesu chan-darāgo taṃ tattha upādānaṃ* (M. I, 300). Another discourse introduces the five aggregates as "things that can be clung to", *upādāniya dhamma*, again explaining that desire and lust are what is meant by the term 'clinging' in this con-text (S. III, 167). This would make it clear that the expression *pañc'upā-dā-nak-khan-dhā* refers to five aggregates as the objects of clinging. In fact, aggregates such as the body would in themselves not be able to cling. As the *Vibhaṅga* points out, only the aggregate of volitional formations is capable of clinging, *upādāna*, while the other aggregates can only be clung to, *upādāniya* (*Vibh.* 67).⁷

Without such clinging, the *pañc'upādānakkhandhā* then become the bare five aggregates, *pañcakkhandhā*. The distinction between these two is made in the *Khandhā Sutta* in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, which explains that the content of the *pañcakkhandhā* and the *pañc c'upādānakkhandhā* is the same, in as much as they cover any possible instance of bodily form, feeling, perception, volitional formations and consciousness (S. III, 47). What makes the difference between them is that in the case of the *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*, the five aggregates are clung to, *upādāniya*, and hence related to the influxes, *sāsava*.

According to the *Dhammasaṅganī*, the five aggregates are free from clinging and being clung to only at the time when someone experiences the supramundane paths and fruits, *apariyāpannā maggā ca maggaphalāni ca asaṅkhatā ca dhātu, ime dhammā upādānavippayuttā anupādāniyā* (*Dhs.* 214). From the perspective of this presentation, even the five aggregates of an *arahant* are related to clinging (since they can be clung to), as long as the *arahant* is not experiencing path and fruit. Conversely, already the five aggregates of a stream-enterer can be considered as free from clinging and being clung to when the latter is experiencing path and fruit. The *Atthasālinī* follows up this presentation in the *Dhammasaṅganī* by explaining that though an *arahant* will no longer cling to anything, others may cling to him or her (*DhsA.* 347). In contrast, the supra-mundane fruits and path, as well as *Nibbāna*, cannot become the object of clinging, just as a fly is not capable of settling down on a red-hot burning iron ball.

This mode of presentation seems to some extent to bypass the import of specifying the five aggregates as *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*, whose purpose is to reveal the predicament of one's own clinging to different aspects of oneself, not the problem of the clinging that others may have. Moreover, it is not entirely clear why the five aggregates cannot be clung to during the time of the experience of the supramundane fruits and paths. As long as an *arahant* can become the object of clinging during his or her everyday life, as envisaged by the *Atthasālinī*, why should it be no longer possible to cling to this *arahant* when he or she is experiencing the supramundane paths and fruits? The person who clings to the *arahant*, described in the *Atthasālinī* as entertaining such notions as "our senior Elder", *amhākaṃ mātulatthero*, stands little chance of knowing when this elder is experiencing the supramundane path and fruit and thus should no longer be clung to.

In regard to *Nibbāna*, one might also wonder why it should be impossible to develop clinging in regard to it. That outsiders had mistaken notions of *Nibbāna* and would cling to them can be deduced from the survey of views given in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, which counts altogether five modes of proclaiming the attainment of *Nibbāna* here and now, *diṭṭhadhammanibbāna-vāda* (*D. I*, 36). An instance of one of these mistaken notions is recorded in the *Māgandiya Sutta*, according to which a wanderer thought that *Nibbāna* stands for bodily health and wellbeing (*M. I*, 509). Not only such mistaken notions, but apparently even the Buddhist idea of *Nibbāna* might become an object of clinging. This much seems to be implicit in the exposition given in the *Mūlapariyāya Sutta*, according to which a disciple in higher training, a *sekha*, should take care to avoid conceiving *Nibbāna* in various ways typical for a worldling, and beware of appropriating it as 'mine' (*M. I*, 4). Though the commentary holds that the *Nibbāna* spoken about in this context refers to wrong notions held by outsiders (*MA. I*, 38), the fact that this instruction is given to a disciple in higher training, and thus to someone who has already had personal and direct experience of *Nibbāna*, makes it clear that this is not the case. A disciple in higher training would not need to be instructed on avoiding conceiving wrong notions of *Nibbāna*, which would not arise in the first place.

Hence it seems as if the gloss offered in the *Atthasālinī* is not entirely convincing. From the

perspective of the early discourses, it appears more straightforward to assume that once an *arahant* has destroyed clinging, his or her five aggregates can be considered as bare aggregates, as just *pañcakkhandhā*, precisely because he or she no longer clings in any way at them. A disciple in higher training, in contrast, would fall under the heading of *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*, independent of whether this disciple is experiencing the supramundane paths and fruits or anything else.

A problem with this interpretation could seem to be found in a discourse in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, according to which a worldling or any of the four types of noble ones should engage in the same mode of contemplation that reviews the five aggregates of clinging from a variety of perspectives, such as impermanence etc. (*S. III*, 167). The instruction given in each instance, even in relation to an *arahant*, speaks of contemplating the *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*. This appears to imply that even the aggregates of an *arahant* are *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*, not just the five bare aggregates, *pañcakkhandhā*.⁸ Yet, the instruction speaks throughout of "these five aggregates of clinging", *ime pañc'upādānakkhandhā*, without providing a direct grammatical relation to the different type of nobles ones mentioned as part of the instruction. Hence it would also be possible to interpret this passage to be intending the *pañc'upādānakkhandhā* of the monk to whom the discourse was given, who apparently had come for instructions on how to progress on the path.

Clinging and *Nibbāna*

Another passage of relevance to the theme of *upādāna* and the status of an *arahant* can be found in the *Itivuttaka*, which distinguishes between the *sa-upādisesā nibbānadhātu* and the *anupādisesā nibbānadhātu* (*It. 38*). The former, the "element of *Nibbāna* with a residue remaining", stands for the *arahant* while he or she is still alive. The latter, the "element of *Nibbāna* without residue remaining", refers to the passing away of an *arahant*. This much can be seen from the verses that accompany this discourse, which qualify the *anupādisesā nibbānadhātu* as being related to the future, *samparāyika*, when all forms of existence cease, *yamhi nirujjhanti bhavāni sabbaso*.

To appreciate the implications of the distinction drawn in this *Itivuttaka* discourse, it needs to be born

in mind that *upādāna* can also have the sense of a “basis”, “substrata”, “supply” or “fuel”.⁹ This sense comes to the fore in the context of a fire simile in a discourse in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, which indicates that fire burns only as long as it has some fuel or basis for burning, *saupādāna*, not without such fuel, *anupādāna* (S. IV, 399). The imagery is telling, since it is by ‘grasping’ its *upādāna*, its ‘fuel’, that fire continues to burn. This sense of “substrata” or “residue” also underlies the very expression *saupādisesa* in the context of a simile of a doctor who treats a wound caused by a poisoned arrow, given in the *Sunakkhatta Sutta* (M. II, 257). Here *saupādisesa* refers to a “residue” of poison left in the wound.

Applied to the case of the above *Itivuttaka* passage, *saupādisesa* thus indicates that the ‘substrata’ of the five aggregates are still in existence. Though this ‘substrata’ is the product of former clinging, it continues in existence even when clinging itself has already been removed. In the case of distinguishing between a nonreturner and an *arahant*, however, the qualification *saupādisesa* does imply a remainder of ‘clinging’ (e.g. M. I, 63: *sati vā upādisese anāgāmitā*).

Freedom from clinging

A prominent method for developing freedom from clinging takes the five aggregates of clinging as its object. This mode of contemplation focuses on their impermanent nature in particular, on their arising and passing away, a mode of practice that results in establishing a clear appreciation of the objectionable nature of any clinging, *pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu udayabbayānupassino viharato upādāne pāṭikkūlyatā saṅghāti* (A. III, 32).

To contemplate the rise and fall of the five aggregates is a mode of practice given considerable prominence in the discourses as a form of meditation that issues in awakening.¹⁰ This may well be the reason why instructions on this form of meditation practice are reckoned to be the Buddha’s lion’s roar (S. III, 85). The same form of contemplation features among the mindfulness practices described in the *Satipatthāna Sutta* as the direct path, *ekāyana magga*, to the final goal (M. I, 61). According to the *Ag-givacchagotta Sutta*, the Buddha’s aloofness from views, *ditthi*, was the direct outcome of his having seen, *dittham*, the rise and fall of the five aggregates of clinging (M. I, 486).

Even the former Buddha Vipassī reached awakening by contemplating the rise and fall of the five aggregates of clinging (D. II, 35).

The point behind this practice is that it directly undermines all clinging to a sense of ‘I’, *pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu udayabyayānupassino viharato yo pañcas’ upādānakkhandhesu asmimāno so pahīyati* (M. III, 115). Once the sense of ‘I’ that lurks behind the *pañc’ upādānakkhandhā* has been fully understood and abandoned, they stand, as it were, with their root cut, *pañcakkhandhā pariññātā tiṭṭhanti chinnamūlakā* (Thig. 106), the root being desire for them, *chandamūlaka* (S. III, 100). Such desire for the five aggregates of clinging can take various forms, as it could be directed to future instances of each of the five (M. III, 16), imagining the way one would like them to be. Through perceiving gratification in things that can be clung to, *upādāniyesu dhammesu assādānupassino*, craving will grow, just as a fire will burn ever more when additional fuel is added to it, or as a tree will grow as long as it is well nourished through its roots (S. II, 85 and S. II, 87; see also TAṆHĀ). In short, one who clings is bound by Māra, *upādiyamāno bhaddho Mārassa* (S. III, 73).

Due to clinging to a world that is but the product of the six senses, one’s experience of the world becomes subject to affliction, *channam eva upādāya, chassa loko vihaññati* (Sn. 169). Such clinging is the condition for becoming and thus for the perpetuation of *dukkha*, *upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhūto dukkham nigacchati* (Sn. 742). But those who see clinging as fearful, *upādāne bhayaṃ disvā*, will reach liberation through not clinging, *anupādā vimuccanti* (A. I, 142), attaining the internal freedom, *ajjhata vimokkha*, of having destroyed all clinging, *sabbupādānakkhaya* (S. II, 54). To reach the destruction of all clinging requires to let go even of the most sublime type of experiences, such as the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, which can be reckoned supreme among objects of clinging, *upādānaseṭṭha* (M. II, 265).

Hence practising mindfully one should dwell free from any dependencies and from clinging to anything in the world, *anissito viharati, na ca kiñci loke upādiyati* (M. I, 56). In particular at the time of death it is of considerable importance to avoid clinging to any aspect of experience, be this any of the sensedoors or their

objects, any element or meditative experience, this world or another (*M. III*, 259). Freedom from clinging is freedom from agitation, *anupādiyaṃ na paritassati*, and will issue in liberation, *aparitassaṃ paccatta yeva parinibbāyati* (*M. I*, 67). One who has reached final liberation, has thereby fully understood the nature of clinging, *'pariññātaṃ me upādānaṃ 'ti pajānāti* (*S. IV*, 33). In fact, the total absence of clinging is the final goal itself.

“Having nothing, clinging to nothing ... This I call *Nibbāna*.” *Akiñcanaṃ anādānaṃ ... nibbānaṃ iti naṃ brūmi* (*Sn*. 1094).

Anālayo

References

1. Premasiri: *The Philosophy of the Aṭṭhakavagga*, Kandy 1972: 21.
2. Nāṇavīra: *Clearing the Path*, Colombo 1987: 481, however, comments that since according to *M. I*, 66 *diṭṭhupādāna* is a type of clinging that was understood by contemporary recluses and Brahmins, “if *diṭṭhupādāna* includes *sammādiṭṭhi*, then it is beyond the scope of outside *samaṇabrāhmaṇā* to teach *pariññā* of *diṭṭhupādāna*, since *sammādiṭṭhi* is found only within the Buddha’s Teaching. From this one might conclude that *sammādiṭṭhi* is not to be reckoned as *diṭṭhupādāna* “. Yet, the passage at *M. I*, 66 may only intend the problem of clinging to one’s own views. Thus the outside recluses and Brahmins would be able to understand the problem of *diṭṭhupādāna* within the scope of their own experience, without needing to be able to understand the problem of Buddhists clinging to their own (right) view.
3. Cf. e.g. *M. I*, 102: *iminā 'haṃ sīlena vā vatena vā ... devo vā bhavissāmi devaṇṇataro vā*.
4. Akiñcano: “Wo das Herz hängen bleibt - Upādāna und die Folgen”, in *Der Buddha und seine Lehre*, Konstanz 2002: 106, suggests that this type of *upādāna* could even be understood to cover clinging to a particular meditation technique or tradition, or else to opinions on the relative importance of *sīla* or of the ability to attain *jhāna* for progress on the path.
5. Nāṇatiloka: *Buddhist Dictionary*, Kandy 1988: 216.
6. Ñānanda: *Nibbāna - The Mind Stilled*, vol. 2, Sri Lanka 2004: 217.
7. Gethin: “The Five Khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikāyas and Early Abhidhamma”, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 14, 1986: 38.
8. Bodhi: “Aggregates and Clinging Aggregates”, *Pali Buddhist Review*, vol. 1 no. 1, 1976: 94.
9. Rhys Davids: *Pali-English Dictionary*, Delhi 1993: 149, s.v. *upādāna* speaks of “substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going”.
10. Gethin: *The Buddhist Path to Awakening*, Leiden 1992: 56, comments that “the practice of watching rise and fall with regard to the five aggregates of grasping seems to be particularly associated with the gaining of insight that leads ... directly to awakening”.

UPAGUPTA. A great *arahant sthavira* with high psychic potency, famed as a great meditator, preacher of the *dharma* and instructor, said to have lived in a forest hermitage in Mathurā, one hundred years after the demise of the Buddha. Probably due to his capabilities he was able to excite the imagination of Buddhists, so that the name of Upagupta became the centre of a wide variety of legends around which grew up a vast literature, especially in the circles of the northern Buddhist tradition. But what is significant is that the name of Upagupta has been able to cut across the traditional divisions in Buddhism to penetrate into the Theravāda tradition in South East Asia with the Pali form of his name as Upagutta or its local derivative, Shin Upāgo, in Myanmar or Phra Uppakut in Thailand and Laos, and remain there up to date as an unorthodox cultic belief and practice in popular Buddhism.

Predictions of the Buddha

Once the Buddha, while on tour in the Śūrasena Janapada, arrived in Mathurā with Ananda there. There pointing at the distant bluish forest line he told Ananda that, one hundred years after his demise, two brothers of Mathurā, Naṭa and Bhaṭa by name, will establish a monastery there on the Mount Urumuṇḍa, which will be named Naṭabhaṭṭika after them. It will be foremost among such institutions with facilities conducive for both tranquility (*Samatha*) and insight (*Vipassanā*) meditations. Making a second prediction the Buddha told Ananda that, at the same period, will live one

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