

Mihintale inscription. By the time this portion of Mahavamsa was written it was no more a kingdom as in the past.

- 12 Ven. Ellawala Medhananda has already identified the ruins at Lanakvihara on the eastern coast near Potuvil at the mouth of the River Hedaoya where Viharadevi might have been landed. Mahavamsa (Chapter XXII verse 22) appear supporting this view, saying that she landed at a place called Lanka. Ven. Ellawala further says the place known as "Abhisekamandapa" at the other end could be the place where King Kakavannatissa consecrated Viharadevi who landed there.
- 13 Instead Ven. Ellawala Medhananda thinks that she might have been sent by sea to Kakavannatissa for her protection due to the political turmoil at Kelaniya Kingdom. Ellawala Medhananda *ibid.* p. 92.

VIHESĀ, "injury", "vexation", or "frustration", is a term used in the discourse with somewhat similar connotations to *vi-hiṃsā* (see VI-HIṂSĀ), but with a broader range of reference. The similarity in meaning between the two terms can be seen in instances where *vi-hesā* replaces *vi-hiṃsā*. Examples for this are when the standard set *kāma, vyāpāda, vihiṃsā*, "sensuality, ill-will and harming" instead reads *kāma, vyāpāda, vihesā*. Such replacing of *vihiṃsā* by *vihesā* can be found in a listing of six [mental] elements, *dhātu* (*M.* III, 62); in a listing of elements of release, *nis-saraṇā dhātu* (*A.* III, 245); and in a listing of different inclinations of the mind, *cittuppāda* (*M.* III, 50). In each of these cases, *vihesā* stands in place of *vi-hiṃsā*. The close relationship between the two terms is also reflected in the circumstance that the antidote to *vihesā* is the development of compassion, *karuṇā* (*D.* III, 248), which would also be the way to overcome *vi-hiṃsā*.

In addition to being at times a near synonym to *vihiṃsā* - in the sense of standing for actual violence, cruelty or harming - *vihesā* can also connote various degrees of vexation and frustration, or even just disturbance, nuisance, or fatigue. This sense of the term can be seen, for example, in the complaint that the minor rules for monks are a nuisance, as they only lead to worry and *vihesā* (*Vin.* IV, 143). Or else a monk who remains silent when questioned about an offence

in the midst of the *Saṅgha* would in this way cause *vihesā* to other monks through his behaviour (*Vin.* IV, 36).

According to a verse in the *Sutta Nipāta*, monks who delight in quarrel can cause *vihesā* to others who have already progressed on the path of self development (*Sn.* 276-277). This indicates that *vihesā* can even arise in those who are at a more developed stage of development. In fact, *vihesā* can even qualify the experience of an *arahant*. A case in point is reported in the *Aṅguta-tara Nikāya*, according to which on one occasion Sāriputta was publicly contradicted by another monk up to three times. When the Buddha finally intervened, he censured the other monks that had been present on this occasion for their lack of compassion, as they had not intervened when an elder was being "vexed", *theraṃ bhikkhuṃ vihesiyamānaṃ* (*A.* III, 194). Since Ānanda was present on this occasion, who became the Buddha's attendant only twenty years after the Buddha had started to teach (*Thag.* 1041-1043; see also ĀNANDA), the present incidence would have to be placed at a time when Sāriputta had already become an *arahant*. Thus, according to this discourse, even an *arahant* can be "vexed" or perhaps better be "bothered".

In fact, the same can even be the case for a Buddha. According to the *Ariya-pariyesana Sutta*, the recently awakened Buddha was disinclined to teach his discovery to others, as he anticipated that this would lead to fatigue and *vi-hesā*, *so mam' assa kilamatho, sā mam' assa vihesā* (*M.* I, 168). A verse that takes up the same theme even speaks of "perception of harm", *vihiṃsa-sāñ-ñī*, when referring to the reason why the Buddha wanted to remain silent (*M.* I, 169). This disinclination and apprehension of *vihesā* should apparently be considered typical for Buddhas, as the previous Buddha Vipassī was similarly hesitant to teach, anticipating that this would lead to *vihesā* (*D.* II, 36).

The theme of the Buddha's *vihesā* recurs also in other contexts, such as when the Buddha indicates that it causes him *vihesā* if Ānanda keeps on asking after the fate of people who have passed away (*D.* II, 93). Again, just when the Buddha was about to pass away the same *vihesā* makes its appearance, when Ānanda tells the wanderer Subhadda to not insist on wanting to see the Buddha, *ma Tathāgataṃ vihetthesi* (*D.* II, 149).

At first sight, these passages might seem difficult to reconcile with the total removal of any unwholesome

states or tendencies in the mind of one who has reached final liberation. Moreover, in the case of a Buddha an additional problem could seem to be the contrast between his anticipation or even experience of *vihesā* and the dictum that it is impossible for *vihesā* to overwhelm and remain in the mind of someone who has developed the liberation of the mind through compassion, *aṭṭhānaṃ etam anavakāso, yaṃ karuṇāya cetovimuttiyā bhāvītāya bahulikatāya ... atha ca pan'assa vihesā cittam pariyādāya ṭhassati* (D. III, 248). There can be little doubt that the Buddha had indeed developed liberation of the mind through compassion (A. I, 183). In fact, according to the *Upāli Sutta* the very basis for the Buddha's endowment with compassion was his total removal of any lust, anger or delusion on account of which he might experience vexation, *vihesāvāssa* (M. I, 370).

This suggests that there must be a form of *vihesā* that is unrelated to un-wholesome states of mind. In fact, the above dictum about *vihesā* and the liberation of the mind through compassion does not state that *vihesā* does not arise at all, but only that it is impossible for *vihesā* to overwhelm and remain in the mind, *cittam pariyādāya ṭhassati*.

This, then, reveals an important perspective on the mind of an *arahant* or a Buddha. With full awakening all unwholesome states and tendencies have been fully removed. Yet, what remains is not just a blank. Wholesome emotions are still there, such as compassion etc., and some of their counterparts are also not totally left behind, such as the "bother" or "fatigue" that is represented by *vihesā*.

A parallel case could be seen in regard to food. An *arahant* or a Buddha would certainly be beyond greed for any particular food. Yet, this does not mean that they no longer experience the taste of food. As the *Brah-māyū Sutta* clarifies, when eating the Buddha would clearly experience the taste of the food, without, however, experiencing any greed for the taste, *rasa-paṭisaṃvedī kho pana so bhavaṃ Gotamo āhāraṃ āhāreti, no ca rasarāga-paṭi-saṃ-vedī* (M. II, 138). In a similar vein, the above passages on *vihesā* indicate that an *arahant* or a Buddha can also experience some form of tiredness or fatigue caused by irrelevant inquiries or by being faced with those who are simply incapable of understanding.

Notably, according to the account given in the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* the Buddha decided to teach after he had been invited to do so by Brahmā and had

surveyed the world "out of compassion", *kāruṇṇatam paṭicca*, (M. I, 169). Viewed from this perspective, then, the *Ari-yapariyesana Sutta* can be seen to accord with the above dictum about the impossibility of *vihesā* to overwhelm and remain in one who has developed the liberation of the mind through compassion, as it was precisely compassion that outweighed the Buddha's anticipation of *vihesā*.

The Buddha's *vihesā* comes up again in a discourse in the *Udāna*, which reports how the Buddha, who was in town begging alms, was approached by the non-Buddhist ascetic Bāhiya and asked to give a teaching right there on the spot. Bāhiya insisted up to three times to be taught right there and then, in spite of the clear indication given by the Buddha that it was not the proper time for teachings. After the Buddha had agreed to dispense instructions, Bāhiya immediately put what he heard into practice and became an *arahant*. The narration of the same discourse concludes with the Buddha remarking that Bāhiya had not caused him any *vihesā* on account of the *Dhamma, na ca maṃ dham-mādhikaraṇaṃ vihe-seti* (Ud. 9). That is, the inappropriate circumstances of Bāhiya's request and his insistence in spite of two refusals did not cause the Buddha *vihesā* apparently because the request came from a sincere aspiration and the instructions given were immediately put into practice.

The same appears to be the case with the wanderer Subhadda just before the Buddha's passing away, where the Buddha told Ānanda to let Subhadda ask his question as it was motivated by desire for knowledge and not in order to cause *vihesā, aṇṇāpekkho 'va pucchis-sati no vihesāpekkho* (D. II, 150). Here, again, the point is the sincerity of the inquiry, not the inappropriate circumstances of asking questions of someone who is about to pass away.

In regard to the Buddha's hesitancy to teach the same perspective emerges, since the anticipation of *vihesā* was not related to any encumbrance related to teaching activities, but rather to the doubt whether beings so deeply entrenched in attachment will have the ability to understand what he had to convey, *pare ca me na ājāneyyūṃ, so maṃ'assa kilamatho s ā maṃ'assa vi-hesā* (M. I, 168). Hence *vihesā* in such context seems to stand only for a form of fatigue that can even arise in one who has reached full liberation.

See also VIHIMŚĀ.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM

Founder Editor-in Chief

G. P. MALALASEKERA, M. A., Ph. D., D. Litt., Professor Emeritus

Editor-in Chief

W. G. WEERARATNE, M. A., Ph. D.

VOLUME VIII

FASCICLE 3 : Vācā – Z hong a-han



2009