

āṇadassana could be said to be "oneself". Whether the mode adopted for developing *yathābhūtañāṇadassana* is based on the five aggregates of clinging, or on the six sense-spheres etc., the real point of developing such knowledge is to know and see the true nature of oneself as it "has come to be" and "according to reality". To truly know and see oneself requires maintaining the perspective of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and not-self throughout all aspects and moments of subjective experience, thereby withstanding the pressure of the affective investment inherent in one's self-image and in the way one's perceptions tend to construct an image of the 'world'. In the ordinary case, witnessing one's own shortcomings easily leads to unconscious attempts at reducing the resulting feeling of discomfort by avoiding or even altering the perceived information so as to make it more congruent to one's view of oneself. *Yathābhūtañāṇadassana*, however, requires seeing and knowing "according to reality", remaining aloof from the influence of projections and expectations.

The relevance of knowledge that accords with reality to self-inspection is reflected in the *Anāṅgana Sutta*, which points out that one who does not know according to reality that a blemish is present within him or her will not strive to overcome it; and one who does not know according to reality that he or she is free from blemishes will not take the appropriate measures in order to protect this level of purity (*M. I, 25*). These two cases can be compared to a dirty bronze dish that is not being cleaned and to a clean bronze dish that, by not being cleaned or used, becomes dirty. Thus, from the perspective of the *Anāṅgana Sutta*, the presence of knowledge according to reality is the crucial factor that gives self-inspection the power to recognize the presence or absence of mental blemishes "as they have come to be", forming the indispensable basis for adopting the appropriate type of conduct in regard to both situations.

In fact, overwhelmed by ignorance one does not know according to reality if a particular way of undertaking things will result in future suffering (*M. I, 311*). Again, those who do not know according to reality the nature of perception, failing to distinguish between the types of perception that lead downwards and those that uplift, will be unable to reach liberation (*A. II, 167*). Hence the development of at least some degree of knowledge and vision that is in accordance

with reality is of considerable importance for being able to avoid unwholesome conduct and for progress on the path to awakening.

To clearly see according to reality and with proper wisdom is also the means to go beyond views (*M. I, 40*), in fact speculative views about the future existence of a liberated being can only arise for those who do not know or see the five aggregates of clinging according to reality (*S. IV, 386*). By seeing according to reality and with proper wisdom dependent arising, *paṭicca samup-pāda*, one will leave behind all speculation about the existence of a self in past and future times (*S. II, 26*). Hence the wise, who see dependent arising, see karma as it has come to be and are knowledgeable in matters relating to its fruition (*Sn. 653*). The world by and large is entangled in affirming or denying existence, but those who have seen according to reality and with proper wisdom the arising and passing away of the world, have gone beyond these two extremes (*S. II, 17*). Being endowed with proper view, they stand on the threshold to the deathless (*S. II, 80*).

Those who have been quenched in the world,
Had insight in accordance with reality.

*ye cāpi nibbutā loke
yathābhūtaṃ vipassisuṃ* (*D. III, 196*).

Anālayo

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1. Kalupahana: *A History of Buddhist Philosophy*, Delhi 1994: 51-52.
2. Jayatilleke: *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, Delhi 1963: 352.
3. *S.A. III, 211* (glossing the occurrence in *S. V, 161*) explains that in the present context *yathā--bhūta* intends *yathāsabhāvena bhāve-tvā*.

YAVANAS See INDO-GREEKS

YEBHUYASIKĀ See ADHIKARAṆASAMATHA

YIN-SHUN (pS⁷), 1906-2005. Born in Mainland China, the eminent scholar monk Yin-shun ordained in 1930 and came to Taiwan in 1952. Based on his extensive readings in the Chinese Tripitaka and his detailed study of the history of Buddhism, Yin-shun

published over 40 monographs and a large number of essays. In 1973, he received a doctorate from the Taishan University in recognition of his research on Chan Buddhism. As a successor of the famous reformer Tai-xu, Yin-shun spearheaded an intellectual renaissance of Taiwanese Buddhism, confronting the influence of superstitions, empty rituals and blind devotion. Thanks to the historical perspective introduced by him, the *Āgamas* have become the object of a revival of interest and study in Chinese Buddhist circles.

Bibliography: Bingenheimer 2004: *Der Mönchsgelehrte Yinshun (*1906) und seine Bedeutung für den chinesisch-taiwanischen Buddhismus im 20. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg. Chu: "Yinshun", in *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Buswell (ed.), New York: Macmillan, vol. 2, 2004: 913.

Anālayo

YODHĀJĪVA SUTTA is the title of a discourse found in the *Gaṇaṇi Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (S. IV, 308), which has two Chinese parallels in the two extant *Saṃyukta Āgama* translations (T. II, 227b and T. II, 420b). The *Yodhājīva Sutta* records the Buddha's reply to an inquiry by a professional soldier, *yodhājīva*, if on being killed in battle while performing his duty as a warrior he will be reborn in heaven. The Buddha denies, informing his visitor that on that account he will rather end up in hell. The simple reason is that at the time of fighting the mind is full of desire to harm, kill and destroy, which will inevitably conduce to a hellish rebirth. Holding the wrong view that soldiers who die in battle will be reborn in heaven is another condition for a lower rebirth, conducive to a life in hell or in an animal realm. The same inquiry is posed again by a warrior specialized on riding an elephant and by one specialized on riding a horse in the two discourses that follow the *Yodhājīva Sutta* in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, only to receive the same reply by the Buddha (S. IV, 310).

The unequivocally clear stance taken in these three discourses against warfare is remarkable, as it leaves little scope for endorsing warfare or developing the concept of a holy war. The position taken in these discourses stands "in sharp opposition to the dominant view of the time, according to which it was the particular duty of a kṣatriya, a member of the warrior

caste, to fight and, if at all possible, to die on the battlefield".¹

The *Yodhājīva Sutta* thus expresses with particular clarity the implications of the first precept incumbent on any Buddhist – abstaining from killing – adherence to which would make participation in a war impossible.² In fact, according to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* even in case of conscription a soldier is nevertheless guilty of killing, as is anyone who kills in self-defence or for the sake of defending others.³

The detailed treatment of the first precept in the *Sāleyyaka Sutta* indicates that adherence to this precept involves abstaining from killing, laying aside stick and sword, being conscientious, showing kindness, and dwelling full of compassion towards any living being, *pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hoti, nihitadāṇḍo nihitasattho lajjī dayāpanno sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī viharati* (M. I, 287). The principle that inspires such conduct is the maxim, "just as I am, so are these; just as these are, so am I; comparing oneself [with others in this way], one would not kill or cause to kill", *yathā ahaṃ tathā ete, yathā ete tathā ahaṃ, attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā, na haneyya na ghātaye* (Sn. 705).

For a monk or a nun, killing a human being will cause loss of their monastic status. This applies even in case of merely encouraging the act of killing, without directly participating in it (*Vin.* III, 71). Hence a Buddhist monastic who advocates war risks losing the right to be reckoned a *bhikkhu* or a *bhikkunī*. The degree to which warfare was seen as censurable in early Buddhism can also be seen in other *Vinaya* regulations, which make it an offence to watch an army in combat or even just to witness an army review (*Vin.* IV, 105 and 107). The same disdain for warfare is also reflected in the circumstance that armies and battles are topics on which one should not even converse (*M.* III, 113).

To encourage others to kill involves a loss of ethical purity for a lay follower of Buddhism as well. This is so since to fully undertake the precept of abstaining from killing requires not only refraining oneself from such deeds, but also to discourage others from killing and to praise abstention from killing (S. V, 354). Only if undertaken in this way will the precept be kept entirely pure in all these three respects, *tikoṭṭiparisuddha*.

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